I understand that the main argument John and Andrew are giving is that there is no coercive power of enforcement behind ICANN's decisions and it is for this reason that is cannot be called as 'governing'. First of all, this is simply a solid assertion of the quite discredited position of "Internet exceptionalism' which is much written about and I would not expound upon it. Let me just speak about the coercive power behind ICANN's decisions.

First of all even in the case of a state it is mostly open for people, if they want to avoid being subject to its laws, to leave it... In earlier times that would mean going to the jungle or something, but since there are so few of them left now, it mostly means going to another state. Snowden is a famous example of someone who did it.

To say that it is up to anyone not to use the ICANN's DNS services today has more or less a similar meaning (except that there are even fewer ways to go to a place of its non-application). In the same way the possibility of leaving a state is not practical for most, leaving the 'network' isnt either. And so one is, nilly willy, subject to all the policies that apply to the 'network', and ICANN policies is a part of it. I dont have to go into detailed descriptions of how ICANNs policies dictate online behaviour of all of us, and how many have, at their cost, found out the coercive power of these policies on their online presence/ behaviour. This has been much discussed, including on this list. But if you are not convinced, we can have that particular discussion.

The fact is that ICANN policies have considerable force or enforceability behind it, and it it not appropriate for us to act as if they dont. And to the extent that it applies to all people of the world, and concerns a matter of considerable social importance, makes is a matter that is legitimately an issue of public governance. How that public governance is ordered is another matter.

And of course, ICANN authority is enmeshed with other authorities... Right now the decision that ICANN would be taking, of whether ICANN would continue to be subject to the US jurisdiction or not, will directly and strongly mean extension of US government's coercive force over rest of the world, or not, on many very important matters.

As activists, for whom social power is the central issue, people like me have learnt that such power that denies itself is one of the most dangerous.... In the constant denial of the social and political power of ICANN, one sees this continuing danger.

parminder

Hi,

On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 09:26:48AM -0500, Pranesh Prakash wrote:

Those are standards-setting bodies.  Those of us who study patents (and
especially patent pools) believe that they too wield power, and are
important governance actors.  They aren't mere "coordination" bodies.

Could you say more about what you think the differences are among
"coordination", "wielding power", and "governance"; and also whether
you think there is a difference between the way that those terms apply
to standards development organizations that work as effective patent
pools and those that do not?  It seems to me that some of these
distinctions could make a difference.

here.  If one goes by the definition of "Internet governance" that emerged
from the WGIG ("Internet governance is the development and application of
shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.") then ICANN clearly
engages in Internet governance.

[and later]

more it engages in a "governance" function.  (A nation-state, even a
minimalist one, after all, is a "coordination body - one that sets polices
and charges various fees related to national affairs", but also a governance
body.)

But the difference here is surely one of sovereignty.  A
nation-state's government can undertake "governance" in the sense that
it can not only develop and apply "shared principles, norms, rules,
decision-making procedures, and programs", but also that it can decide
which of those are ones the violations of which people can be fined or
go to jail or whatever.  That is not something that other bodies can do.

Part of the reason some people (I, at least; I won't speak for John)
get concerned about the word "governance" is because there is a
tendency to slide pretty fast from "here are the rules" to "here are
the controls by which we shall enforce your conformance to these
rules."  That latter move has a faint scent of the illegitimate about
it, because in a network of networks there isn't anybody -- and
shouldn't be anybody -- who has the legimtate authority to make the
former move.  For instance, …

only one canonical set of domain names.  Even if you believe that ICANN only
does "coordinating" (it emphatically doesn't), it's "coordination"
definitely leads to my being governed by my ISP's choice to use
ICANN-recognized root servers.

… it most definitely does not lead to that.  Indeed, an awful lot of
networks connected to the Internet _aren't_ using only the
ICANN-recognized root servers, because just about everyone uses split
DNS some of the time.  Split DNS is just another way of accepting that
the global name space is in fact not the only one.  It's the only
_global_ one, but there are lots of local ones.  (This is a problem
for global co-ordination, I agree.)

Moreover, you could just use another DNS root, if you wanted, even if
your ISP didn't want to.  The reason we don't see a lot of root
splintering is not because of governance or rules.  It's because
fracturing the global namespace is much worse for everyone than having
these choices.  There is nothing in any rule or technology preventing
an alternative root.  What there is, however, is the vast utiity that
accrues to everyone if we have just one namespace.  So we have a
tussle to work out what that namespace will look like.

So, I think that the emphasis on "governance" is at least problematic
in two ways: it emphasises the role of sovereignty in a system that is
designed almost exactly to resist such sovereignty, and it fails to
acknowledge that the outcomes we appear to have are driven primarily
by utility functions rather than governance.

Best regards,

A