Hi,

While not arguing for the member model, as I have my own concerns with the model ...

On 21-Apr-15 19:07, Chris Disspain wrote:

The current recommended model does not provide any viable solution for dealing with the GAC. It seems obvious to me that the governments involved in the GAC are not going to agree to form an unincorporated association under Californian law. If I'm right then presumably the GAC would remain as an advisory committee and would not be able to have a vote in any of the escalation mechanisms. That may be fine as the GAC may not want to have a vote anyway.

The GAC currently does not have a voting Board Director. I have understood that the reason is that they don't want one. Becoming a member is largely about (s)electing a Director. While there are other member oversight powers, the GAC has a special Bylaw status that gives it a degree of ICANN oversight and takes it out of the standard AC model; no other SOAC has the degree of control over the Board that the GAC does. I see no reason why difficulties they might have deciding to become members would be a gating consideration on picking this model. I think that one of the points about their special advice status is that they don't need to become ICANN members to influence the Board.

I have a viewpoint on the ccNSO and its ability to adequately represent the interests of all ccTLDs, but figure the better part of valor requires me to remain silent on that.

On the other hand,

As mentioned above, I have concerns with a member model as a WS1 solution, especially its implementation in the required time frame. I also see the new accountability issues and capture scenarios of the membership model as something that would need to explored and documented; all of the SOAC legal entitieis would be new structures and we would need to provide the details - WS1 is part of the IANA submission. These days, the Board and its SIC (Structural Improvements Committee) are the effective oversight for the SOAC (except the GAC). Would that still be the case when they were independent legal entities? If not, how would they prove accountability and non-capture to their respective communities or to the other members? I believe it could be done, but it is not a quick job. Or does the Board and its SIC remain responsible as today - if so, how would that work?

Another question I have is on the member model as related to the ATRT. The ATRT can make recommendations regarding any part of ICANN, including the SOAC structure, both internal and in their relationship to each other. As part of ATRT2, we made recommendations related to GNSO policy development process, ATRT1 made recommendations about the relationship between the Board and the GAC. Would that still be in scope when to the SOAC became independent legal entities? Would we need to modify the AOC derivative bylaws to deal with that?

The more I think about the member model, the more questions I come up with.
Do we absolutely need this to achieve what we need for WS1?
Or is it the 'Tesla' we wish we had.

avri

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