I have a couple of queries / concerns with this:

- if you s/elect "alternative" directors at the same time as the genuine article, is there an incentive on those people to undermine the ordinary directors?

Not at all. In several organization, people elect the acting member and an alternate one to be used only in case of vacancy.

- is it legally achievable - i.e. will the springing resignation letters provide enough cover for a different group than appointed, to enact the removal?

As I said several times, I’m not a lawyer. But lawyers can advise for the right way to make it binding for the removed directors to step down when the community decides so

- could the community council be the decision body for doing this on the community's part?

I think it could, but I wouldn’t refuse any other channel that ensure there is at least 4 SOs and/or ACs willing to recall the director(s) including at least 1 SO and 1 AC.

De : accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] De la part de Jordan Carter
Envoyé : mardi 14 juillet 2015 07:13
Cc : Accountability Cross Community
Objet : [CCWG-ACCT] Proposal for dealing with removal of directors (was Re: An mplication of accountability models being discussed)

Hi all,

Tijani made the proposal below and I wanted to draw it into a separate thread in case people missed it.

On 14 July 2015 at 10:25, Tijani BEN JEMAA <tijani.benjemaa@planet.tn> wrote:

Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?

This is a proposals for exercising the power of recalling Board directors by a process that is well distributed in the community consisting in recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by the community and not a single SO or AC:

· The decision is taken by at least 4 SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC.

· All the directors have the same treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom)

· The SOs and ACs and the NomCom select the board directors and their interim simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.).

· All acting directors sign before taking their position as Board Director a commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken

· Those interim directors will fully replace the removed directors if the number of recalled directors is less than 8. In case the number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board (non recalled directors plus the interim of the recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones.

· This is to replace the 2 powers: stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors.

This has the merit to;

· Fulfill the requirement of having the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members

· make the change smaller and simpler by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2

· not having to find a way for the nomcom to remove their appointed directors

· avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place

· avoid the risk of having an SO or AC recalling their selected director because of the SO or AC interest and not the global public interest

I have a couple of queries / concerns with this:

- if you s/elect "alternative" directors at the same time as the genuine article, is there an incentive on those people to undermine the ordinary directors?

- is it legally achievable - i.e. will the springing resignation letters provide enough cover for a different group than appointed, to enact the removal?

- could the community council be the decision body for doing this on the community's part?

cheers

Jordan