what can be designated the original or core «sense of accountability is that associated with the process of being called to “account” to some authority for one’s action Such accountability has a number of features:
It is external, it involves social interactions, and exchange and it implies rights of asserting in those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority in those calling for an “account «over those who are accountable including the rights of demand answers and to raw consequences ,possibly, including the imposition of sanctions
Accountability is described as involving justification of an action’s performance vis a vis others, the assessment of judgment if that performance against certain standards and possible imposition of consequences if the actor fails to live up to applicable standards.
Accountability implies that how legislator can scrutinizing the actions of public servants and make them accountable for wrong doing or mistake
I wish to comment on your statement that ICANN may reject a Recommendation if it is against public interest.
What are the criteria based on which ICANN could decide that a given Recommendation is against public interest?
Which entity decided on these criteria ?
What are the legal basis that few designated individual could claim that they are guardian of the public interest?
Which mechanism is in place to ensure that such judgement is not wrong doing
Dear Bruce, dear all,
There are many unanswered questions.
Moreover, terms, conditions and sphere of accountabilty are binding clauses and not recommendations which has optional character
Hear from you tomorrow at 11,00-13.00 UTC .
KAVOUSS
Dear Bruce,Thank you for this helpful note.Could you please point us to or share with us some thoughts regarding what the ICANN Board sees as "the public interest"?Many thanksJordan--On 15 December 2014 at 12:23, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:Hello Kavouss,
>> In addition to what I informed you before is that , Under WS 1 they already agreed to the terms and conditions as stipulated in the Board Resolution adopted in LA I.E. ALLOWING THE BOARD TO VETO the content of the accountability whereas in case of ICG we have clearly mentioned that the Board should not modify the ICG work and send it as it was received to NTIA .However, should the Board has any comment, they may send it separately to NTIA
In case of CWG and WS1 of CCWG, it is not the case.
>From my understanding there are two separate but related activities.
The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) is developing a proposal to send to NTIA for the IANA transition. This proposal could incorporate the output of this Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability. The ICANN Board's liaison on the ICG - Kuo Wei Wu - has conveyed to that group that the Board will send the report onto the NTIA without making any changes. The Board will send an accompanying letter which will either endorse the report, or it will express concerns that will already have been shared with the ICG through the various opportunities for public comment and dialogue.
This Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability is developing recommendations for improvements of ICANN's accountability. These improvements can be made irrespective of whether the NTIA chooses to change its role with respect to the IANA function. The Board of ICANN is committed to making continuous improvements in its accountability mechanisms. The ICANN bylaws are clear on how the Board will approve policy recommendations from the supporting organisations (GNSO, ASO and ccNSO), but there is no explicit material in the bylaws for how the Board will process recommendations directly from a cross-community working group. The Board resolution passed in Los Angeles (https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-10-16-en#2.d) was intended to set clear expectations for how the recommendations would be treated. The assumption is that the Board will approve the recommendations from this group, and implement those recommendations. If the Board feels that it would not be in the public interest to implement a particular recommendation it has set out a process for working with the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability to resolve the matter. The Board will not make any changes to a recommendation or report from this group. It is up to the CCWG to make or change any of its recommendations.
Separately, I expect that the NTIA could make the ICANN Board's approval and implementation of improved accountability mechanisms proposed by this group as a pre-condition to any transition.
I hope that helps.
Regards,
Bruce Tonkin
ICANN Board Liaison to the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability
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