This is the detailed step out, from Annex L:

CCWG Accountability Dependencies

Enumeration of the relevant accountability mechanisms that could or must be exhausted before a separation process could be triggered:

 




On 19 October 2015 at 18:00, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:

This is the separation process from the CWG proposal:  https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53779816#_ftn57

 "The selection of a new  operator to perform the IANA Naming Functions or other separation process will be subject to approval by the ICANN Board, and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process. [62]  A determination by the ICANN Board to not approve a recommendation by the SCWG that had been supported by a supermajority of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils will need to follow the same supermajority thresholds and consultation procedures as ICANN Board rejection (by a supermajority vote) of a PDP recommendation that is supported by a supermajority of the GNSO."

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