I’m not sure the current stance of the Board, i.e. “This transition won’t happen unless you drop the Sole Member and the Sole Designator approach” can be characterized
as “participation” with the community. I think the Board has said, “We reject the CCWG Proposal as it relates to the mechanism of enforceability of the Accountability measures.”
Leon has also pointed out, once again, that enforceability under the MEM proposal involves either individuals taking action to enforce (not fair) or deciding
“after the fact” that the MEM Issues Group will form an unincorporated association for the purpose of enforcement after an objectionable action by the Board or a director. In the latter case, according to CCWG counsel, the unincorporated association may
not have standing since the unincorporated association would not have existed at the time the objectionable Board or director action occurred.
This is why Sidley/Adler keep explaining to us that the powers specified by the CWG-Stewardship Final Report are simply not assured of being enforceable under
the MEM model. This is not rocket science.
Attention from this reality of practical unenforceability in the MEM model has been deflected by the Board’s focus on asking Jones Day to opine on the subject
of binding arbitration orders being enforceable in court. Again, you have to commence and complete binding arbitration before you can enforce the order in court. If you make individuals initiate the action, it’s way too much political pressure and individual
risk. If you require them to form an unincorporated association to enforce after the fact, then they likely don’t have standing to arbitrate because the unincorporated association did not exist at the time the objectionable action occurred . So in fact,
you have a huge deterrent and “chilling effect” against ever being able to commence an arbitration proceeding, especially since under the MEM model, that requires FULL consensus, i.e.
unanimous vote for all types of community enforcement.
Sidley/ Adler have made it clear that the Board’s concerns about Community Enforcement Action “running wild” can be addressed through the establishment of
thresholds and that these can vary in relation to the action sought to be taken, e.g. whether it’s budget, operating plan, strategic plan, and or removal of directors. I assume these can also vary according to how many SOs and ACs are participating in the
sole member for the purpose of achieving some level of consensus as to any particular community power.
In the single member model, the Community gets to take action and then the Board can object to that action and have that examined. The threshold for taking
action can be different in each area. For example, you could require unanimity to dump the whole Board. It seems to me the VERY SIGNIFICANT difference is timing and that this is a very significant aspect of enforceability. By way of example, if you establish
a unanimous threshold for dumping the whole Board, then in the single member model, if the single member votes unanimously to dump the whole Board, it happens and new Board members get appointed and then the Board follows the objection procedures. In the
MEM model, if the Community wants to dump the whole Board, individual SO/AC leaders are forced to individually file an arbitration proceeding, then the opposing parties argue over who the best arbitrators will be, then everyone disagrees and also finds that
the arbitrators they want are not available for months. The dispute drags on forever. The Board remains as it was (unremoved) and the Community suffers through the arbitration the same way we suffered through the .africa IRP.
The Board apparently takes the view that the MEM constitutes adequate enforcement in light of the CWG-Stewardship requirements. I do not really see it. As
to why the Board cannot see its way clear to participating with the Community to establish reasonable restrictions on the powers of a Single Member, that strikes me as stubbornness. The notion that the multistakeholder community is not sufficiently accountable
is simply not credible given that the Board has been endorsing policy made by this very community for years, not only Consensus Policy a to Contracted Parties, but the entire range of policies adopted in the new gTLD program. No one on the Board said, “It
would be dangerous and destabilizing if we were to authorize the launch of a thousand new gTLDs because the Community is not sufficiently represented in the policy-making process and the SOs and ACs aren’t accountable.”
Anne
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Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel |
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Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP |
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One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 |
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(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 |
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org]
On Behalf Of Greg Shatan
Sent: Friday, October 09, 2015 2:46 PM
To: Paul Rosenzweig
Cc: Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog post on the Accountability work headed to Dublin
I think Fadi would say that the statement is accurate and that current events fit under the following part of his statement:
if we have views on that proposal, we should participate with the community.
Greg
(speaking only for myself)
On Fri, Oct 9, 2015 at 2:59 PM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Jordan
This is a magnificent effort for which you are to be commended. I have two modest amendments to
your timeline to make –
First, you note the testimony before the Senate in February 2015. I think it is worth noting the
express commitment from the CEO of ICANN: Senator Thune asked whether the ICANN Board would “send a proposal to NTIA that lessens the Board’s power or authority?” Fadi Cheade responded, “We will if the community and the stakeholders present us with a proposal.
We will give it to NTIA, and we committed already that we will not change the proposal, that if we have views on that proposal, we should participate with the community. Once that proposal comes from our stakeholders, we will pass it on to NTIA as is.” Exchange
available at
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005263.html.
Second, you note the July 2015 House testimony of A/S Strickling and CEO Cheade and say that “no
objections” were made to the idea of membership. That is true, as far as it goes, but I find another exchange at that hearing far more significant to your story:
According to Assistant Secretary Strickling’s testmony, “ICANN has indicated that it expects to receive
both the ICG transition and CCWG accountability proposals at roughly the same time and that it will forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA.”
I read these two items as reflecting a commitment by ICANN to Congress and to the NTIA that they
will forward the CCWG-A proposals “without modification” or “as is” to the NTIA when delivered by the CCWG. A fair reading of subsequent statements by the Chair of the Board (your redline FNs 40 and 45) is that ICANN’s testimony to Congress and its promise
the NTIA (reflected in Strickling’s testimony) are no longer operative.
From this I draw the same conclusions you have drawn – which is why I think this particular episode
is worth noting. It also makes me wonder whether/if the CEO intends to revise his testimony.
Again, a strong +1 for putting in one place a useful history that bears directly on the issues at
hand.
Cheers
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig
paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com
VOIP:
+1 (202) 738-1739
Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066
From: Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz]
Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2015 8:20 PM
To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog post on the Accountability work headed to Dublin
Hi all,
Apologies for the interruption to your inbox. I've been doing a bit of work trying to make sense of all
the events in the ICANN accountability debate. I wrote up a chronology of that, which is available attached to this post. A blog post with my reflections is below.
Whatever part of the community you are from, and whatever your view on the substance of the debates we
are having in the CCWG, I hope you can stand up in support of the multistakeholder model at this challenging moment. There is a lot at stake if this accountability effort fails, and the risk of that is not high but it is increasing.
See many of you in Dublin next week!
cheers
Jordan
9 October - at https://internetnz.nz/blog/icann-accountability-chronology-and-dublin-thoughts
You’ve probably had an experience in your life of being part of a difficult or complicated project – sometimes things go into a
blur, or after months or years you find it hard to remember the order of significant events.
Well, the debate regarding ICANN’s accountability is nothing if not complicated (not to say difficult!). I’ve been a participant
in it as a member of the Working Group representing country-code domains since December 2014, and even over not quite a year, things get a bit blurry.
To help me, and possibly you, I decided to pull together a short chronology of some of the key milestones. Dates of proposals,
significant moments in the project, and so on.
You can review (and critique) the chronology here:
I didn’t expect that seeing this story in one short place would trigger some new insights, or remind me of some old ones, but it
did. Here are some of them:
Everyone involved with or watching this process will have different insights, or may agree happily or disagree sharply with mine.
I offer them up in public as part of my own commitment to accountability: it is reasonable for people involved in the conversation to share their thinking. In any case, my own thought processes work best with dialogue – not with solitude.
ICANN is on the verge of historic, meaningful and positive reform. The Numbers and Protocols communities, watching this process
through gritted teeth and very keen for the transition to go ahead, can hopefully celebrate what is happening. With ICANN having a curious dual role for the Names community (policy forum and IANA functions operator), there has been no alternative to making
accountability improvements now.
(To my technical community friends - if there’s any doubt in your mind about why we need change – review the chronology, remember
the pushback, remember what you guys faced early this year.)
We’re all close to the end of the debate. You can sense it – proposals are crystallising, timeframes are compressing, volunteers
are at the end of reasonable commitments of time and energy.
The imperatives now are to see things through: to stick with the multistakeholder process that listens to all perspectives but
gives nobody a right of veto; the accountability framework the community requires to accept the transition going ahead; and the changes to ICANN’s culture that will flow from a new accountability settlement.
Dublin is a week away. The elephant in the room (the CCWG’s proposal and the ICANN Board’s counterproposal for the way to crystallise
accountability powers) will need to be resolved, or eaten, or thrown in the ocean.
My preference is of course for the product of the multistakeholder process, the model the CCWG has developed in public and with
the involvement of all stakeholders. But unlike some others, I am not proclaiming bottom lines on any of the “how” – it is the “what,” the requirements and ability to meet them, that matter.
The “what” is ensuring the Internet community, able to organise through ICANN’s open groupings, can hold a corporation with hundreds
of staff, hundreds of millions of dollars, tight links with the American government, a monopoly ability to extract rents from the domain name industry, and a natural institutional desire to be as free of restraint as it can – can hold all that to account,
given the huge imbalance of power, knowledge, resources that tilt the playing field of accountability entirely in ICANN’s favour.
Beyond the "elephant," there are lots of other details that need to be sorted out. It all matters – NTIA have been clear the proposal
has to be bullet proof.
In the end though, if there isn’t an accountability settlement that achieves consensus, then there isn’t going to be a proposal
bullet proof or not.
No accountability proposal – no IANA Stewardship Transition proposal. No transition proposal – no transition.
No transition? All those risks the transition is designed to head off come back to life. And the multistakeholder approach discredited
to boot.
Those are the stakes on the table as we head to Dublin.
Two final thoughts: where there’s a will there’s a way. And as an old high-school teacher used to say to me, “not
easy, not optional.”
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) |
+64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
Web:
www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
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