CMSM 

Areas of Concern/Divergence

• Lack of consensus on whether the community should take decisions through formal voting or through establishing consensus.

• Lack of consensus on the voting allocations between SOs and ACs.  Comments expressed concern for “dilution and authority and influence of SO community”. Most commenters on this issue expressed support for voting allocations along the lines of ICANN’s existing board structure.

• Lack of consensus on the composition of the community within the Model (e.g. role of Advisory Committees). Comments indicated concern over the possible “duality” of the governmental role in the Model. Several comments expressed concern that providing votes to GAC will fail to meet NTIA requirements.

• Comments expressed concern over the extent of changes required in ICANN’s structure with the model.

• Proposal that enforceability for narrowed community powers could be provided for by binding arbitration to enforce fundamental bylaws, instead of the CMSM Model.

Options for CCWG Consideration

1.    Continue to evolve SMM to address specific points of concern raised in public comment, while maintaining “membership” model.

2.    Explore how maximum legal enforcement can be achieved for desired community powers under an empowered designator model for comparison.

Sub-Issues within the Models:

1. Single Member and Single Designator Models

a.    Voting or consensus basis;

                                 i.         Move away from “voting” and towards “consensus” for decision-making purposes within the community mechanism.

                                ii.         Consider community powers only may be exercised by the community as a whole, based on consensus or near consensus of the whole of it.

                              iii.         Consider option of consensus definition depending on absence of recommendations or advice against when using community powers.

                               iv.         Consider option of consensus definition depending on absence of recommendations or advice against.

b.    Reconsider role of the ACs in the Model’s community forum.  Should some ACs be non-voting / decisional and rather, advisory only?

c.     Reconsider voting allocations between SOs-ACs to be more in-line with balance of appointments to ICANN board.

d.    Consideration of advice from those SOs and ACs opting out of the decision-making mechanism;•

e.    Maintaining balance of power to prevent capture of/by those opting-in to the decision-making mechanism;•

f.      Factoring in conflicts of interest and fiduciary or other responsibilities (such as public interest) into the decision-making design;•

g.    Ensuring accountability of the new structure to the broader community and the global public interest.