As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it WS0 for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community.To comply with our Charter as well as anticipate reactions from some stakeholders, I think we would need to elaborate on how this related to the NTIA transition. The two key questions in our Charter are :
I do recommend every colleague to consider this with attention.· What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause?
· What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition?
- Per requests from the chairs and from Alain Bidron, I expanded the rationale for work stream designations. These appear in the headers of the table and are shown below:Proposed rationale for designating Work Streams: Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.
1. Mechanisms giving the ICANN community ultimate authority over the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS1, since community Members need the leverage of IANA transition to obtain these Bylaws changes.
2. Mechanisms to restrict actions of the board and management of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above).
3. Mechanisms to prescribe actions of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). For example, a bottom-up consensus process to change ICANN bylaws might be rejected by ICANN board, but the Members could then reverse that decision and force the change. [I folded the Transparency items into this category]
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************