Hi Mathieu,


1) that the policy proposal requires a Bylaw change

Acknowledged. Or, the adoption of the policy might require some by-law changes in order for implementation to be carried out. This has the same effect I think. 


2) (in the scenario described earlier) that 2/3 of the community reject the Bylaw change. In the scenario you described (4x5 votes), that means 14 votes against out of 20, while 5 votes come from the gNSO. 

Yes. Your 2/3 example makes it easier to block the by-law change not harder. In other words all 5 GNSO votes could vote against blocking the by-law change and 1 vote from the ccNSO could also vote against blocking the by-law change but the by-law change would still be blocked. 

Once again, it's useful (but subjective) to ask whether that's a useful safeguard or an undue interference with the policy making role of the gNSO. 

Well, here I am prepared to express an opinion. The ccNSO policy by-law is clearly written and sets out the basis upon which ccNSO policy can be dealt with by the Board. There is a requirement for the ccNSO to involve the other relevant ICANN bodies in its policy making. The idea that the extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs that may be undertaken by the ccNSO in accordance with the carefully crafted and politically balanced methodologies that have been created could, in essence, be blocked by other SOs and ACs is totally unacceptable to auDA and I suspect would be unacceptable to a number of my ccTLD colleagues.



Cheers,


Chris


On 29 Jul 2015, at 19:38 , Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:

Hi Chris, All,

Another very good example of scenario, so I Cc Hillary.

Le 29/07/2015 07:24, Chris Disspain a écrit :
However, we should also be very clear that the community powers we are considering putting in place will also provide the power to block policy arising from one of the SOs especially where the policy concerned requires there to be a by-law change. The GNSO could complete a PDP and recommend POLICY X and the Board decide to proceed to change the by-laws BUT all of that would be trumped if the by-law change were blocked by 'the community'. And whether the GNSO could ‘block' the block depends entirely on the voting thresholds we put in place. So, for example, with 20 votes and 75% required to vote to block, the gNSO cannot, alone, block the block. 
As you rightly point out Chris, two cumulative conditions are needed for a gNSO policy proposal to get blocked with the new powers :
1) that the policy proposal requires a Bylaw change
2) (in the scenario described earlier) that 2/3 of the community reject the Bylaw change. In the scenario you described (4x5 votes), that means 14 votes against out of 20, while 5 votes come from the gNSO.

Once again, it's useful (but subjective) to ask whether that's a useful safeguard or an undue interference with the policy making role of the gNSO. 
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Mathieu WEILL
AFNIC - directeur général
Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
mathieu.weill@afnic.fr
Twitter : @mathieuweill
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