Hi Greg,
While I support WS2, I see it as a blunt instrument.
The definition of WS 2 is "All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided the mechanisms in WS1 are adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board."
I believe we have reached a point where WS1 does not provide mechanisms that are adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.
While I understand that the community may want to spill the board if it rejects WS2 recommendations in toto. But I do not see the community spilling the board if
(i) the board only partially implements WS2 recommendations; or
(iii) the board implements a modified version of WS2 recommendations
Would we topple the entire board if the board accepted all recommendations in WS2 except for just DIDP reforms? Would we topple the entire board if the board implements a modified version of DIDP by selectively adding just one additional restriction criteria? Would we topple the entire board because the board agrees to give advance notice of board meetings by 2 days instead of 5 days as demanded by the community?
As Avri pointed out, we will create a system of confrontation by adopting the designator model wherein everyone would need to be prepared to spill the board at the drop of a hat for any kind of enforcement. Instead, the membership model would have avoided confrontation by distributing responsibility to the community thereby promoting cooperation and the multistakeholder model.