Agree

 

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2015 8:05 AM
To: Arun Sukumar
Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem

 

Dear All

Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities.

We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers.

Regards

Kavouss


Sent from my iPhone


On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:

Dear Bruce,

 

To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?

 

Arun

 

On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:

Hello Keith,

That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.

When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.

Regards,
Bruce Tonkin


-----Original Message-----
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith
Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM
To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem

Thanks Nigel.

In no particular  order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:

-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.

-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.

-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.

-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.

-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.

-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.

-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.

-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.

I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns.  I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.

That was a reply to your question (a).  I can't respond to question (b).

Regards,
Keith

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