[CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Colleagues, During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such :
*ACTION:* Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week. As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward.
This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread. I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work. Mathieu ------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2:
Problem statement from our Charter :
The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was considered to be crucial for the transition process. Work stream scopes from our Charter : In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams:
* *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; * *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.
The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams.
Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to:
* What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause? * What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? * What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after. o If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 :
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided*there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.* Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 :
As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it*WS0*for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community.
Alan Greenberg's concern :
Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition.
Comment from Becky Burr : Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability.
Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call):
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
If we cannot have the Board commit to a mechanism by which the community can control the Board in the event it chooses not to follow community advice how can we give the Board the ultimate authority that the transition will be giving it? Contrary to your point, many Board allow outside auditors/controllers - at least they do in corporations that I'm familiar with. Many other Boards also acknowledge subservience to shareholders (the equivalent here of the community). Indeed, the much rarer circumstance is one where a Board asserts unreviewable authority ... Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Roelof Meijer [mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl] Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 10:18 AM To: Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> > Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> > Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> " <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus.
Cheers,
Roelof Meijer
SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>
From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Works for me.
*From:*Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] *Sent:* Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM *To:* Bruce Tonkin *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
How about:
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board.
Greg Shatan
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote:
Hello All,
>> WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
+1 this is exactly right Mathieu. The Board can, if it wishes, adopt these commitments. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 12:14 PM To: Roelof Meijer; Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> > Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> > Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> " <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Agreed. And importantly, even if the ICANN Board is reluctant to adopt them, NTIA could require them to do so in response to a consensus community recommendation. Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2015 1:09 PM To: Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr; 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Bruce Tonkin'; 'Greg Shatan' Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals +1 ... this is exactly right Mathieu. The Board can, if it wishes, adopt these commitments. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> From: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 12:14 PM To: Roelof Meijer; Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
+1 Mathieu. I would envisage the Board having to be compliance with all Corporate Governance Codes specific to Companies Law in the country of incorporation, subject to a community consensus override. But what is its corporate status not for profit or for profit as different codes would apply ? Regards, Phil From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: 06 January 2015 18:19 To: Paul Rosenzweig; Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr; 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Bruce Tonkin'; 'Greg Shatan' Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Agreed. And importantly, even if the ICANN Board is reluctant to adopt them, NTIA could require them to do so in response to a consensus community recommendation. Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2015 1:09 PM To: Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr; 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Bruce Tonkin'; 'Greg Shatan' Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals +1 this is exactly right Mathieu. The Board can, if it wishes, adopt these commitments. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 12:14 PM To: Roelof Meijer; Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Exactly. And especially as a preconditions for the transition of the IANA oversight (that oversight can than (partly or wholly) be transitioned to that structure. Sorry for the confusion I caused, see my email sent just before this one Best regards, Roelof A. Meijer CEO SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 19:18 To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>>, Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl>>, 'Bruce Tonkin' <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>>, 'Greg Shatan' <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Agreed. And importantly, even if the ICANN Board is reluctant to adopt them, NTIA could require them to do so in response to a consensus community recommendation. Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Rosenzweig Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2015 1:09 PM To: Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr<mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>; 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Bruce Tonkin'; 'Greg Shatan' Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals +1 … this is exactly right Mathieu. The Board can, if it wishes, adopt these commitments. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> From: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Sent: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 12:14 PM To: Roelof Meijer; Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Dear All, I have serious difficulties with the following amendments proposed by Bruce Quote *"in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance*." Please kindly make sure that every body agree to the text . We thank Bruce but we could not subordinate CCWG to Board 's wishes . Regards Kavouss 2015-01-10 17:53 GMT+01:00 Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>:
Exactly. And especially as a preconditions for the transition of the IANA oversight (that oversight can than (partly or wholly) be transitioned to that structure.
Sorry for the confusion I caused, see my email sent just before this one
Best regards,
Roelof A. Meijer
CEO
SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | www.sidn.nl
From: <Drazek>, Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 19:18 To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>, Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer@sidn.nl>, 'Bruce Tonkin' <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>, 'Greg Shatan' < gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Agreed.
And importantly, even if the ICANN Board is reluctant to adopt them, NTIA could require them to do so in response to a consensus community recommendation.
Keith
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Paul Rosenzweig *Sent:* Tuesday, January 06, 2015 1:09 PM *To:* Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr; 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Bruce Tonkin'; 'Greg Shatan' *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
+1 … this is exactly right Mathieu. The Board can, if it wishes, adopt these commitments.
Paul
***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 ****
509 C St. NE
Washington, DC 20002
Paul Rosenzweig
paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com>
O: +1 (202) 547-0660
M: +1 (202) 329-9650
Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066
Link to my PGP Key <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...>
*From:* Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>] *Sent:* Tuesday, January 6, 2015 12:14 PM *To:* Roelof Meijer; Bruce Tonkin; Greg Shatan *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Hi Roelof, All,
I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group.
First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments).
Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers".
But once again, I may have misunderstood your point.
Best Mathieu
Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus.
Cheers,
Roelof Meijer
SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | www.sidn.nl
*From: *Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> *Date: *dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 *To: *Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> *Cc: *"accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Works for me.
*From:* Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>] *Sent:* Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM *To:* Bruce Tonkin *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
How about:
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board.
Greg Shatan
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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*****************************
Mathieu WEILL
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*****************************
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Dear Mathieu, Paul, It seems I did not fully understand Paul, because I agree with both his reaction and yours, Mathieu. I understood Paul to suggest (in short) that the Board should beforehand, and without knowing what they would have to implement, to agree to implement any advice from the working group. I think you will both agree that that would not be a very realistic expectation. I am quite aware of the fact that boards commonly operate under some structure of higher authority (General assembly, shareholders, supervisory board (as SIDN has). And I consider that very good practice. In fact, it is what I suggested in my mail of 19 december to this list: …. The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable. I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number): * On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; * If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; * If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; * If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization …… That solved, I agree that it might prove a challenge for the board to agree to introduce such a structure and relinquish power to it. Especially not in this phase of developments. I think this is yet another prove of how important it is for the CCWG and our working group to fully synchronize their work. Because if such a proposal it done in the light of „just” our work, enhancing ICANN’s accountability in general, the decision to agree to it or not is the board’s an can easily be postponed (even indefinitely). However, if the proposal for the introduction of such a structure (or any other mechanism by which the board relinquishes power) is part of the plan for the transition of the NTIA’s oversight of IANA (and in my opinion it should), agreement of the board might be much more likely or even unavoidable. Especially if the NTIA accepts the proposal and such a structure would become a precondition for the transfer. Cheers, Roelof From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Reply-To: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 18:13 To: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl>>, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Hi Roelof, All, I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group. First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments). Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers". But once again, I may have misunderstood your point. Best Mathieu Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Works for me. From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals How about: All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board. Greg Shatan On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
On 06/01/2015 15:17, Roelof Meijer wrote:
mechanisms in WS1 adequate *to* force implementation of WS2 items *in the event of* resistance from ICANN management and Board
How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this.
I work for an organisation, LINX, that is structured as a membership association. We have a Board, like any company. Our members, however, are ultimately in charge, and indeed in our organisation they are asked to approve any major strategic projects, as well as to ratify the Board's proposed annual budget for the company. Our Board has no problem with the concept that ultimately the members are in charge. They don't expect to be overruled by the members, because they expect to have consulted (and for the staff, like me, to have done so) sufficiently that there is usually a consensus by the time we reach a formal decision point. On rare occasions when this doesn't work out like that, well, we work for the members; they're the boss. Now I recognise that ICANN is not a membership organisation in the way LINX is, and we've only a little over 500 members, rather than the thousands of active participants in the ICANN community. So the analogy isn't perfect. But the essential ethos that the Board is there to serve the community, not rule it, ought to apply just the same. If the organisation truly lives that ethos, conflict with the community will be very rare. In the event that the community insisted on something that a Board member simply couldn't in good conscience accept, the appropriate and honourable course is to resign your position on the Board, not to assert your preeminence. Back in about 2000, this happened at LINX: the Board had convinced itself that the very survival of the organisation depended on de-mutualising and selling out to Venture Capital. The members disagreed, and the Board (and CEO) resigned en masse. We're still here, still one of the world's most successful IXPs. If it came to it, I'd rather see the ICANN Board quit than the community quit ICANN. Kind Regards, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
The current wording seems to assume
there is some sort of default resistance
So many opportunitIes for a humorous dig here Bruce, but it's probably worth reflecting on the situation while we all consider accountability mechanisms designed for the next 10 years of ICANN. It is remarkable that despite all the reviews and the numerous extensive accountability discussions and processes that a main topic on the community's mind is how to get the Board and staff to actually make changes. And, yes, I agree the wording does suggest a default resistance. It is also noteworthy that your instinctive reaction is to simply want to change the wording rather than open up a discussion about why there is such a problematic gap between what the community feels and the Board believes it does. To many things are done in ICANN by bending the words rather than making the change. I think coming up with mechanisms that would pull ICANN in a different direction, one where the Board is seen as a reflector or advocate for community opinion rather than a blocking force, would be good and healthy for everyone across the board. Kieren - [sent through phone] On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board. If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
+ 1 Giovanni Giovanni Seppia External Relations Manager EURid Woluwelaan 150 1831 Diegem - Belgium TEL: +32 (0) 2 401 2750 MOB:+39 335 8141733 giovanni.seppia@eurid.eu<mailto:giovanni.seppia@eurid.eu> http://www.eurid.eu<http://www.eurid.eu/> <http://christmas2014.eurid.eu> Please consider the environment before printing this email. <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry><https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry><https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry><https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> <https://www.facebook.com/EUregistry> On 06 Jan 2015, at 14:08, Kieren McCarthy <kierenmccarthy@gmail.com<mailto:kierenmccarthy@gmail.com>> wrote:
The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance
So many opportunitIes for a humorous dig here Bruce, but it's probably worth reflecting on the situation while we all consider accountability mechanisms designed for the next 10 years of ICANN. It is remarkable that despite all the reviews and the numerous extensive accountability discussions and processes that a main topic on the community's mind is how to get the Board and staff to actually make changes. And, yes, I agree the wording does suggest a default resistance. It is also noteworthy that your instinctive reaction is to simply want to change the wording rather than open up a discussion about why there is such a problematic gap between what the community feels and the Board believes it does. To many things are done in ICANN by bending the words rather than making the change. I think coming up with mechanisms that would pull ICANN in a different direction, one where the Board is seen as a reflector or advocate for community opinion rather than a blocking force, would be good and healthy for everyone across the board. Kieren - [sent through phone] On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 4:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello All,
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.
If possible I would like to see the last phrase read: "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board". The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community Disclaimer: This email and any attachment hereto is intended solely for the person to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient or if you have received this email in error, please delete it and immediately contact the sender by telephone or email, and destroy any copies of this information. You should not use or copy it, nor disclose its content to any other person or rely upon this information. Please note that any views presented in the email and any attachment hereto are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of EURid. While all care has been taken to avoid any known viruses, the recipient is advised to check this email and any attachment for presence of viruses. http://www.eurid.eu/en/legal-disclaimer
Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues, Thank you for all the work that have gone into advancing this key issue. Acknowledging that the discussion regarding the definitions of WS1/WS2 is moving fast, we would, however, like to raise a question regarding the proposal submitted for comment by the Co-chairs and the wording “consensus support” (marked in yellow). What would “consensus support from the community” entail in this situation? For example, would it mean that a proposal would be taken off the table if only one person/stakeholder group/AC-SO etc. from the community (also a term that is currently discussed) would be against it? WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity. This is just another example of the importance of carefully considering the Problem definition of our work. Looking forward to continuing our work on this important issue. Best, Finn Kind regards Finn Petersen Director of International ICT Relations DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY Dahlerups Pakhus Langelinie Allé 17 DK-2100 København Ø Telephone: +45 3529 1000 Direct: +45 3529 1013 Mobile: +45 2072 7131 E-mail: FinPet@erst.dk www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk MINISTRY FOR BUSINESS AND GROWTH P Please consider the environment before printing this email. Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Mathieu Weill Sendt: 5. januar 2015 16:56 Til: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Emne: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Dear Colleagues, During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such : ACTION: Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week. As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward. This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread. I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work. Mathieu ------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2: Problem statement from our Charter : The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was considered to be crucial for the transition process. Work stream scopes from our Charter : In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams: · Work Stream 1 : focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; · Work Stream 2 : focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams. Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to: · What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause? · What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? · What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after. o If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 : WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board. Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 : As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it WS0 for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community. Alan Greenberg's concern : Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition. Comment from Becky Burr : Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability. ----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call): WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity. -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Dear Finn, This is a good point you're raising. Looking at our own Charter, I did find this definition of consensus in the decision making methodologies section :
In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:
a)Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection
b)Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree
I do not know whether Icann has a documented definition of consensus other than that ? Maybe there is within the gNSO for PDP purposes ? Best Mathieu Le 12/01/2015 12:08, Finn Petersen a écrit :
Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues,
Thank you for all the work that have gone into advancing this key issue.
Acknowledging that the discussion regarding the definitions of WS1/WS2 is moving fast, we would, however, like to raise a question regarding the proposal submitted for comment by the Co-chairs and the wording “consensus support” (marked in yellow). What would “consensus support from the community” entail in this situation? For example, would it mean that a proposal would be taken off the table if only one person/stakeholder group/AC-SO etc. from the community (also a term that is currently discussed) would be against it?
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
This is just another example of the importance of carefully considering the Problem definition of our work.
Looking forward to continuing our work on this important issue.
Best,
Finn
Kind regards
*Finn Petersen*
Director of International ICT Relations
*DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY*
Dahlerups Pakhus Langelinie Allé 17 DK-2100 København Ø Telephone: +45 3529 1000 Direct: +45 3529 1013
Mobile: +45 2072 7131 E-mail: FinPet@erst.dk www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk
MINISTRY FOR BUSINESS AND GROWTH
PPlease consider the environment before printing this email.
*Fra:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *På vegne af *Mathieu Weill *Sendt:* 5. januar 2015 16:56 *Til:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Emne:* [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Colleagues,
During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such :
*ACTION:* Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week.
As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward.
This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread.
I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work.
Mathieu
------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2:
Problem statement from our Charter :
The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was considered to be crucial for the transition process.
Work stream scopes from our Charter :
In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams:
·*Work Stream 1* : focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition;
·*Work Stream 2* : focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.
The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams.
Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to:
·What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause?
·What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition?
oHow will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
·What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after.
oIf the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented?
oHow will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 :
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs.
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided *there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.*
Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 :
As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it *WS0* for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community.
Alan Greenberg's concern :
Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition.
Comment from Becky Burr :
Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability.
----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call):
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
The definitions from the GNSO Working Group guidelines closely align with those in the charter: Full consensus - when no one in the group speaks against the recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to as Unanimous Consensus. Consensus - a position where only a small minority disagrees, but most agree (From the GNSO Working Group Guidelines section 3.6 (http://gnso.icann.org/council/annex-1-gnso-wg-guidelines-13nov14-en.pdf) Best regards, Marika From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Reply-To: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr<mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr<mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>> Date: Monday 12 January 2015 12:11 To: Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk<mailto:FinPet@erst.dk>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Dear Finn, This is a good point you're raising. Looking at our own Charter, I did find this definition of consensus in the decision making methodologies section : In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations: a) Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection b) Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree I do not know whether Icann has a documented definition of consensus other than that ? Maybe there is within the gNSO for PDP purposes ? Best Mathieu Le 12/01/2015 12:08, Finn Petersen a écrit : Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues, Thank you for all the work that have gone into advancing this key issue. Acknowledging that the discussion regarding the definitions of WS1/WS2 is moving fast, we would, however, like to raise a question regarding the proposal submitted for comment by the Co-chairs and the wording “consensus support” (marked in yellow). What would “consensus support from the community” entail in this situation? For example, would it mean that a proposal would be taken off the table if only one person/stakeholder group/AC-SO etc. from the community (also a term that is currently discussed) would be against it? WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity. This is just another example of the importance of carefully considering the Problem definition of our work. Looking forward to continuing our work on this important issue. Best, Finn Kind regards Finn Petersen Director of International ICT Relations DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY Dahlerups Pakhus Langelinie Allé 17 DK-2100 København Ø Telephone: +45 3529 1000 Direct: +45 3529 1013 Mobile: +45 2072 7131 E-mail: FinPet@erst.dk<mailto:FinPet@erst.dk> www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk<http://www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk> MINISTRY FOR BUSINESS AND GROWTH PPlease consider the environment before printing this email. Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Mathieu Weill Sendt: 5. januar 2015 16:56 Til: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Emne: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals Dear Colleagues, During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such : ACTION: Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week. As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward. This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread. I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work. Mathieu ------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2: Problem statement from our Charter : The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was considered to be crucial for the transition process. Work stream scopes from our Charter : In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams: · Work Stream 1 : focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; · Work Stream 2 : focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams. Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to: · What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause? · What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? · What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after. o If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented? o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 : WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board. Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 : As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it WS0 for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community. Alan Greenberg's concern : Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition. Comment from Becky Burr : Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability. ----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call): WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity. -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill ***************************** -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Dear All, We in ICG have spent over two months with more than several hundreds of message exchanged on consensus building and in particular points raised in this message. May I recommend you to kindly look at that document in ICG drop box or ask Patrik or Mohamd or Alissa ,if still available to provide that to you. It would be a useful element to consider Kavouss . 2015-01-12 18:26 GMT+01:00 Marika Konings <marika.konings@icann.org>:
The definitions from the GNSO Working Group guidelines closely align with those in the charter:
*Full consensus *- when no one in the group speaks against the recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to as *Unanimous Consensus. *
*Consensus *- a position where only a small minority disagrees, but most agree
(From the GNSO Working Group Guidelines section 3.6 ( http://gnso.icann.org/council/annex-1-gnso-wg-guidelines-13nov14-en.pdf)
Best regards,
Marika
From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Reply-To: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr> Date: Monday 12 January 2015 12:11 To: Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Finn,
This is a good point you're raising.
Looking at our own Charter, I did find this definition of consensus in the decision making methodologies section :
In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:
a) Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection
b) Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree
I do not know whether Icann has a documented definition of consensus other than that ? Maybe there is within the gNSO for PDP purposes ?
Best Mathieu
Le 12/01/2015 12:08, Finn Petersen a écrit :
Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues,
Thank you for all the work that have gone into advancing this key issue.
Acknowledging that the discussion regarding the definitions of WS1/WS2 is moving fast, we would, however, like to raise a question regarding the proposal submitted for comment by the Co-chairs and the wording “consensus support” (marked in yellow). What would “consensus support from the community” entail in this situation? For example, would it mean that a proposal would be taken off the table if only one person/stakeholder group/AC-SO etc. from the community (also a term that is currently discussed) would be against it?
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
This is just another example of the importance of carefully considering the Problem definition of our work.
Looking forward to continuing our work on this important issue.
Best,
Finn
Kind regards
*Finn Petersen*
Director of International ICT Relations
*DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY*
Dahlerups Pakhus Langelinie Allé 17 DK-2100 København Ø Telephone: +45 3529 1000 Direct: +45 3529 1013
Mobile: +45 2072 7131 E-mail: FinPet@erst.dk www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk
MINISTRY FOR BUSINESS AND GROWTH
PPlease consider the environment before printing this email.
*Fra:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *På vegne af *Mathieu Weill *Sendt:* 5. januar 2015 16:56 *Til:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Emne:* [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Colleagues,
During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such :
*ACTION:* Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week.
As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward.
This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread.
I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work.
Mathieu
------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2:
Problem statement from our Charter :
The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing
ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements
made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed
and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for
instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting
community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with
regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition
proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was
considered to be crucial for the transition process.
Work stream scopes from our Charter :
In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams:
· *Work Stream 1* : focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition;
· *Work Stream 2* : focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.
The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams.
Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to:
· What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause?
· What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition?
o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
· What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after.
o If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented?
o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 :
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs.
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided *there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.*
Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 :
As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it *WS0* for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community.
Alan Greenberg's concern :
Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition.
Comment from Becky Burr :
Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability.
----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call):
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
--
*****************************
Mathieu WEILL
AFNIC - directeur général
Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
mathieu.weill@afnic.fr
Twitter : @mathieuweill
*****************************
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Kavouss, Thank you for pointing us in that direction. Could you please confirm whether you refer to section 4 of the ICG Guidelines for decision making ? https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icg-guidelines-decision-making-1... Mathieu Le 12/01/2015 21:43, Kavouss Arasteh a écrit :
Dear All, We in ICG have spent over two months with more than several hundreds of message exchanged on consensus building and in particular points raised in this message. May I recommend you to kindly look at that document in ICG drop box or ask Patrik or Mohamd or Alissa ,if still available to provide that to you. It would be a useful element to consider Kavouss .
2015-01-12 18:26 GMT+01:00 Marika Konings <marika.konings@icann.org <mailto:marika.konings@icann.org>>:
The definitions from the GNSO Working Group guidelines closely align with those in the charter:
*Full consensus *- when no one in the group speaks against the recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to as *Unanimous Consensus. *
*Consensus *- a position where only a small minority disagrees, but most agree
(From the GNSO Working Group Guidelines section 3.6 (http://gnso.icann.org/council/annex-1-gnso-wg-guidelines-13nov14-en.pdf)
Best regards,
Marika
From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Reply-To: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr <mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr <mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>> Date: Monday 12 January 2015 12:11 To: Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk <mailto:FinPet@erst.dk>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Finn,
This is a good point you're raising.
Looking at our own Charter, I did find this definition of consensus in the decision making methodologies section :
In developing its Proposal(s), work plan and any other reports, the CCWG-Accountability shall seek to act by consensus. Consensus calls should always make best efforts to involve all members (the CCWG-Accountability or sub-working group). The Chair(s) shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:
a)Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection
b)Consensus – a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree
I do not know whether Icann has a documented definition of consensus other than that ? Maybe there is within the gNSO for PDP purposes ?
Best Mathieu
Le 12/01/2015 12:08, Finn Petersen a écrit :
Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues,
Thank you for all the work that have gone into advancing this key issue.
Acknowledging that the discussion regarding the definitions of WS1/WS2 is moving fast, we would, however, like to raise a question regarding the proposal submitted for comment by the Co-chairs and the wording “consensus support” (marked in yellow). What would “consensus support from the community” entail in this situation? For example, would it mean that a proposal would be taken off the table if only one person/stakeholder group/AC-SO etc. from the community (also a term that is currently discussed) would be against it?
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
This is just another example of the importance of carefully considering the Problem definition of our work.
Looking forward to continuing our work on this important issue.
Best,
Finn
Kind regards
*Finn Petersen*
Director of International ICT Relations
*DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY*
Dahlerups Pakhus Langelinie Allé 17 DK-2100 København Ø Telephone: +45 3529 1000 <tel:%2B45%203529%201000> Direct: +45 3529 1013 <tel:%2B45%203529%201013>
Mobile: +45 2072 7131 <tel:%2B45%202072%207131> E-mail: FinPet@erst.dk <mailto:FinPet@erst.dk> www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk <http://www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk>
MINISTRY FOR BUSINESS AND GROWTH
PPlease consider the environment before printing this email.
*Fra:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *På vegne af *Mathieu Weill *Sendt:* 5. januar 2015 16:56 *Til:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Emne:* [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
Dear Colleagues,
During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such :
*ACTION:* Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week.
As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward.
This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread.
I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work.
Mathieu
------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2:
Problem statement from our Charter :
The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was considered to be crucial for the transition process.
Work stream scopes from our Charter :
In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams:
·*Work Stream 1* : focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition;
·*Work Stream 2* : focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.
The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams.
Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to:
·What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause?
·What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition?
oHow will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
·What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after.
oIf the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented?
oHow will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested?
Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 :
WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs.
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided *there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.*
Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 :
As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it *WS0* for want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for the community.
Alan Greenberg's concern :
Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition.
Comment from Becky Burr :
Understands the community to say there were certain basic accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create real and meaningful accountability.
----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call):
WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against the interest of Icann as a corporate entity.
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél:+33 1 39 30 83 06 <tel:%2B33%201%2039%2030%2083%2006> mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél:+33 1 39 30 83 06 <tel:%2B33%201%2039%2030%2083%2006> mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
participants (13)
-
Bruce Tonkin -
Drazek, Keith -
Finn Petersen -
Giovanni Seppia -
Greg Shatan -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Kieren McCarthy -
Malcolm Hutty -
Marika Konings -
Mathieu Weill -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Phil Buckingham -
Roelof Meijer