Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org
And that is news to you? I am on record when starting on this Wg as that we'll spend an enormous amount of energy and resources, and in the end staff will do whatever they want. Been there, done that, moved on, bought the T-Shirt. Never mind that I abhor finding myself in agreement with the good Professor of Ethics. greetings, el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Apr 30, 2015, at 15:14, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG:
It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Sorry to hear you abhor yourself Dr! Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8837 7176 (New Number) Enviado desde mi iPhone
El abr 30, 2015, a las 8:42, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> escribió:
And that is news to you?
I am on record when starting on this Wg as that we'll spend an enormous amount of energy and resources, and in the end staff will do whatever they want. Been there, done that, moved on, bought the T-Shirt.
Never mind that I abhor finding myself in agreement with the good Professor of Ethics.
greetings, el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Apr 30, 2015, at 15:14, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG:
It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Wow…. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>
Very troubling, especially given that the Board said in Singapore it was accepting the numbers proposal. I believe it was Bismarck who said that when I agree with you in principle it means I have no intention of doing so in practice. Or, as the saying goes in DC, watch what they do -- not what they say. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Wow…. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/> ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2015.0.5863 / Virus Database: 4331/9535 - Release Date: 04/14/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
I am unable to read everything, but it strikes me that there could be a difference between “accepting the numbers proposal” (although in the end the NTIA should accept or not accept that proposal) and "ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN”. Also, there might be something wrong with the chronological order Cheers, Roelof From: Phil Corwin <psc@vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> Date: donderdag 30 april 2015 18:22 To: Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Very troubling, especially given that the Board said in Singapore it was accepting the numbers proposal. I believe it was Bismarck who said that when I agree with you in principle it means I have no intention of doing so in practice. Or, as the saying goes in DC, watch what they do -- not what they say. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Wow…. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability. Best, Keith From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/> ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2015.0.5863 / Virus Database: 4331/9535 - Release Date: 04/14/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Exactly From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Wow…. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>
Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this? Thanks for forwarding it, Ed. Best, Robin On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
Exactly
From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Wow….
A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability.
Best, Keith
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
At a guess, with only limited information, I do not think the NTIA will accept this proposal if it is told clearly by the community that ICANN is thwarting the community's will . Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Robin Gross [mailto:robin@ipjustice.org] Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 1:03 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this? Thanks for forwarding it, Ed. Best, Robin On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote: Exactly From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Wow.. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN's Accountability. Best, Keith From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu> > Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu <mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It's now official: ICANN doesn't even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions- monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/> 's interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN's legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities - names, numbers and protocols - will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860> ). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org <http://internetgovernance.org/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Bill Woodcock just posted a reply to Milton’s post, clarifying his role in the meetings with ICANN. (link<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...>). Bill concludes with a confirmation of the troubling trend that Milton reported: Those particulars aside, the rest of your description of the situation seems accurate to me. The IAB minutes that you cite are particularly worthy of note: that ICANN is _refusing to renew_ the MOU under which they provide Protocol Registry services to the IETF, because it contains a termination clause, I find very disturbing. I have to admit that if I were in the IETF’s shoes, I might very well just take ICANN at their word and go on my merry way, if they say they don’t want to renew the agreement. Let’s assume we will encounter the same resistance when it comes time to ‘negotiate’ implementation of CCWG proposals. From: Paul Rosenzweig Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 1:30 PM To: 'Robin Gross', 'Accountability Cross Community' Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition At a guess, with only limited information, I do not think the NTIA will accept this proposal if it is told clearly by the community that ICANN is thwarting the community’s will … From: Robin Gross [mailto:robin@ipjustice.org] Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 1:03 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this? Thanks for forwarding it, Ed. Best, Robin On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote: Exactly From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Wow…. A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability. Best, Keith From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition Hi, I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability. Best, Ed Morris ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Speaking from the numbers community - Steve has helpfully referenced a response from Bill Woodcock, and I would like to reiterate that it is not the CRISP Team which is involved in the negotiations with ICANN. However in essence, it is true that the numbers community has concerns about closed negotiations and to hear about requests to change our proposal, which lacks in transparency. We believe transparency in the process is the key to this. To address this concern, below is what the CRISP Team has stated on the numbers community mailing list, as a part of sharing the next steps in preparing implementation. Transparency in providing feedback on the implementation - The proposal consolidated by the CRISP Team was developed based on the requirements announced by the NTIA in March 2014, with consensus from the numbers community. Therefore, in case there are any concerns for implementation to be consistent with the numbers community proposal, including the ability to choose an operator for the IANA numbering services, it should be communicated to the community's attention in a transparent manner. https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/2015-April/000433.html Additionally, in the panel on 25th April with the ICANN Board on the IANA Stewardship Transition, I listed with the CRISP Team Chair hat "Transparency in both the ICG process and preparing implementation" and "Ensuring implementation to be consistent with the proposal" as two of the three elements important for the future steps. The audio and transcript was shared on this mailing list earlier by Bruce Tonkin. Talking points from the CRISP Chair on the ICANN Board Panel on the IANA stewardship transition (Compiled as slides after the panel) https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ICANN-Board-community-panel.pdf I very appreciate the ICANN Board to have given us this opportunity, to invite the operational communities to share our views, and having recordings of this panel publicly available. I think this itself demonstrates the Board's interests to hear the views from the communities and to make discussions transparent. It is also reassuring to see the response from Bruce that the Board's position hasn't changed on the process. It would be further helpful to encourage ICANN to act in helping instill trust in this process through communicating any concerns in transparent manner, during such critical time in our process. While what I've shared here is basically in the context of the numbers proposal, I hope it may be of a helpful reference to this group as well. Regards, Izumi On 2015/05/01 3:13, Steve DelBianco wrote:
Bill Woodcock just posted a reply to Milton���s post, clarifying his role in the meetings with ICANN. (link<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...>). Bill concludes with a confirmation of the troubling trend that Milton reported:
Those particulars aside, the rest of your description of the situation seems accurate to me. The IAB minutes that you cite are particularly worthy of note: that ICANN is _refusing to renew_ the MOU under which they provide Protocol Registry services to the IETF, because it contains a termination clause, I find very disturbing. I have to admit that if I were in the IETF���s shoes, I might very well just take ICANN at their word and go on my merry way, if they say they don���t want to renew the agreement.
Let���s assume we will encounter the same resistance when it comes time to ���negotiate��� implementation of CCWG proposals.
From: Paul Rosenzweig Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 1:30 PM To: 'Robin Gross', 'Accountability Cross Community' Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
At a guess, with only limited information, I do not think the NTIA will accept this proposal if it is told clearly by the community that ICANN is thwarting the community���s will ���
From: Robin Gross [mailto:robin@ipjustice.org] Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 1:03 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this?
Thanks for forwarding it, Ed.
Best, Robin
On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
Exactly
From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Wow���.
A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN���s Accountability.
Best, Keith
From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Edward Morris Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu>
Dear NCSG: It���s now official: ICANN doesn���t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN���s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN���s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities ��� names, numbers and protocols ��� will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi Robin, My first response to your question is to ask that you kindly specify the "this" you are referring to in your statement. As for the numbers community, I understand there were some unofficial (side-talk) discussion with ICANN legal and the CRISP has rightly indicated that such informal discussions cannot be tolerated going forward; insisting on transparency in following due process as it concerns the procedure to resolving issues. Especially issues that would significantly go against the wish of the community as reflected in their proposal. ICANN made an open declaration about numbers proposal(including IETF's?) at Singapore, and if there is now a significant change in their view, I guess it will be helpful for them to formerly present this as well. As to Protocol parameters, I think it may be important to read the statement of the IAB chair before having a viewpoint. Overall fact is that the level of information available may not be sufficient to effectively come to a conclusion on this issue and I don't think this should influence the work of the ccwg. Regards sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Apr 2015 18:03, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this?
Thanks for forwarding it, Ed.
Best, Robin
On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
Exactly
From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Wow….
A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability.
Best, Keith
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Edward Morris *Sent:* Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Milton L Mueller* <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG:
It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Mlton, Thank you for information. 1.You said that Quote "*These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process" * Unqoute Please kindly before making it more cotraversial, kindly advise the official and formal announcemnertt of the above, . 2. You also stating that Quote *" these proposals were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria"* Unquote I do not recall that ICG has ever formally approved any proposals.They were submitted discussed, several questions raised which have been recently replied but the replies were not examined by ICG. .Consequently I do not agree with that statement. 3. You also stated that Quote "*Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process*, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal* Unquote This is your impression which are not shared by the ICG. 4. You understood that Quote *"The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries."* Unquote This is agin your interpretation. Nothing has yet been discussed not decided whether each OC would have its own IANA Function operator separately or commonly We should not jump intop any conclusions . 5.You did indicate Quote "* Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition"* Unquote , OPlease point me toward the expilic decision or conclusion of CWG on that issue. Moreover, even if there is an implicit refernce to the possibilityof separate IANA fUNCTION Operator for each OC , that issue is now Under publix comment and needs to be carefully looked at in the light of the potential comments . Once again we should not jump into any conclusion and prejudge the public comment . 6. You indicated Quote "* Separabilityand was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (**RFC 2860* <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>*). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one"* Unquote. Pls provide formal statement by ICANN that they do not wish to maintain the current arrangement with or without reasons Then we will reveiew their standing position and then comment 7. You also mentioned Quote " Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already", IN PARTICULAR, you stated that " it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable" Unquote How you reached that comnclusion . Even if it is your firm conclusions ,ICG need to carefully examine the matter from all angles and all aspects By the way, we still waiting to recieve formal proposal from Name OC, certainly after public comments are included in second draft We need to be calm, patient, priudent and NOT EMMOTIONAL.. If any individual or community wishes to comment ,the public comment is already open but NO ICG STAMP ON ANY THING UNLESS FULLY DISCUSSED EXAMINED ANALYSED AND AGREED UOPN Finally I hope Alissa this tame would not take a uniléateral position in drafting any note on behalf of ICG and put us before something that French called 2 fait a comli" Best Regards Kavouss . . 2015-04-30 20:25 GMT+02:00 Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>:
Hi Robin,
My first response to your question is to ask that you kindly specify the "this" you are referring to in your statement. As for the numbers community, I understand there were some unofficial (side-talk) discussion with ICANN legal and the CRISP has rightly indicated that such informal discussions cannot be tolerated going forward; insisting on transparency in following due process as it concerns the procedure to resolving issues. Especially issues that would significantly go against the wish of the community as reflected in their proposal.
ICANN made an open declaration about numbers proposal(including IETF's?) at Singapore, and if there is now a significant change in their view, I guess it will be helpful for them to formerly present this as well. As to Protocol parameters, I think it may be important to read the statement of the IAB chair before having a viewpoint.
Overall fact is that the level of information available may not be sufficient to effectively come to a conclusion on this issue and I don't think this should influence the work of the ccwg.
Regards
sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Apr 2015 18:03, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this?
Thanks for forwarding it, Ed.
Best, Robin
On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
Exactly
From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Wow….
A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN’s Accountability.
Best, Keith
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Edward Morris *Sent:* Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Milton L Mueller* <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG:
It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I have heard enough from the numbers community to be pretty confident that what Milton describes is at least close to accurate, and that upsets me quite a lot. My own approach to this is to ignore anything that any ICANN board or staff members assert about what the NTIA says or wants. I will listen to NTIA officials on that subject, but nobody else. ICANN as an institution has too much at stake and too much of a history of trying to asset its interests in these debates for anyone to take its alleged analysis of what NTIA would or would not put up with seriously. I can only urge you all to at least consider a similar approach. We must continue to work to the public NTIA criteria. If NTIA wants to change or supplement them, they must do so on the record and in public. cheers Jordan On 1 May 2015 at 05:02, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
Very troubling. On a practical level, will this put ICANN and the NTIA in a "stand-off" or will NTIA allow ICANN to get away with this?
Thanks for forwarding it, Ed.
Best, Robin
On Apr 30, 2015, at 9:22 AM, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
Exactly
From: Keith Drazek Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 11:41 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Wow....
A timely reminder of the importance of our work to improve ICANN's Accountability.
Best, Keith
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Edward Morris *Sent:* Thursday, April 30, 2015 10:15 AM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition
Hi,
I think this post on the NCSG list by Dr. Mueller might be of interest to those of us working on Accountability.
Best,
Ed Morris
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Milton L Mueller* <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG:
It's now official: ICANN doesn't even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN's interactions with the numbers community <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN's legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities - names, numbers and protocols - will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *
No, I won’t even consider that or a similar approach. Because ignoring will never prove you wrong and you will just continue working on the assumption that you are right. You will not get new insights that might change your view. And that is one of the reasons why there is so much frustration about ICANN (staff) in the community: we assume that nothing has changed and will change. And continue to share past bad experiences. I will (continue to) compare what ICANN (staff) says that the NTIA says and thinks, with what the NTIA says and says it thinks. Cheers, Roelof From: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Date: donderdag 30 april 2015 22:16 Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Ominous update on the IANA transition My own approach to this is to ignore anything that any ICANN board or staff members assert about what the NTIA says or wants. I will listen to NTIA officials on that subject, but nobody else. ICANN as an institution has too much at stake and too much of a history of trying to asset its interests in these debates for anyone to take its alleged analysis of what NTIA would or would not put up with seriously. I can only urge you all to at least consider a similar approach.
This really is starting to look, as Milton said, ominous - coupled with the pressure being placed upon ICANN to regulate message content, see http://www.internetcommerce.org/senate-judiciary-to-ip-czar/ my take on this is here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/04/internet-... If the final proposal does not have real safeguards against ICANN's content-regulation powers, we're all in trouble. And I am starting to wonder whether the USG is interested in making sure those safeguards are in place, or, as suggested in the above, making sure that they're NOT in place. . . . David
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: <mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu>NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG: Itâs now official: ICANN doesnât even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/>blog post on ICANNâs interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html>sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANNâs legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities names, nummbers and protocols will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>RFC 2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies <http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/>http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project <http://internetgovernance.org/>http://internetgovernance.org
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
******************************* David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation blog (Volokh Conspiracy) http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post book (Jefferson's Moose) http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n music http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc. http://www.davidpost.com *******************************
Dear Bruce, as you will have seen on the list, a discussion has started on the article referred to in the e-mail below about the Board’s and ICANN legal’s position with respect to community proposals and relating negotiations. We would like to ask you as Board liaison to clarify the Board’s position and plans with respect to proposals provided by the community. Further, we would like to get clarity on the role ICANN legal plays in this and whether negotiations that were referred to are based on instructions by the Board. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Kind regards, Thomas Rickert
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu <mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu>
Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ <http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/> Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org <http://internetgovernance.org/>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
Bruce — Bill Woodcock just posted a reply to Milton’s post, clarifying his role in the meetings with ICANN. (link<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...>). Bill concludes with a confirmation of the troubling trend that Milton reported: Those particulars aside, the rest of your description of the situation seems accurate to me. The IAB minutes that you cite are particularly worthy of note: that ICANN is _refusing to renew_ the MOU under which they provide Protocol Registry services to the IETF, because it contains a termination clause, I find very disturbing. I have to admit that if I were in the IETF’s shoes, I might very well just take ICANN at their word and go on my merry way, if they say they don’t want to renew the agreement. Please also assure us we won’t encounter the same resistance when it comes time to ‘negotiate’ implementation of CCWG proposals. From: Thomas Rickert Date: Thursday, April 30, 2015 at 4:46 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for clarification - Ominous update on the IANA transition Dear Bruce, as you will have seen on the list, a discussion has started on the article referred to in the e-mail below about the Board’s and ICANN legal’s position with respect to community proposals and relating negotiations. We would like to ask you as Board liaison to clarify the Board’s position and plans with respect to proposals provided by the community. Further, we would like to get clarity on the role ICANN legal plays in this and whether negotiations that were referred to are based on instructions by the Board. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Kind regards, Thomas Rickert ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu<mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu> Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-m...> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Co-Chairs, where is this addressed in the Charter? el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Apr 30, 2015, at 21:46, Thomas Rickert <rickert@anwaelte.de> wrote:
Dear Bruce, as you will have seen on the list, a discussion has started on the article referred to in the e-mail below about the Board’s and ICANN legal’s position with respect to community proposals and relating negotiations.
We would like to ask you as Board liaison to clarify the Board’s position and plans with respect to proposals provided by the community. Further, we would like to get clarity on the role ICANN legal plays in this and whether negotiations that were referred to are based on instructions by the Board.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Kind regards, Thomas Rickert
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:27 PM Subject: Ominous update on the IANA transition To: NCSG-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
Dear NCSG: It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already.
Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello Thomas,
as you will have seen on the list, a discussion has started on the article referred to in the e-mail below about the Board’s and ICANN legal’s position with respect to community proposals and relating negotiations.
We would like to ask you as Board liaison to clarify the Board’s position and plans with respect to proposals provided by the community. Further, we would like to get clarity on the role ICANN legal plays in this and whether negotiations that were referred to are based on instructions by the Board.
The Board's position hasn't changed on the process. With respect to the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) we made a commitment that we would pass on their final proposals to the NTIA without change. If we have any concerns with those proposal we would communicate those to the NTIA publicly - but only after we have first raised any issues publicly with the community. With respect to the work of the Cross Community Working Group (CWG) on Naming Related Functions Draft Transition Proposal, we understand that the 2nd draft is out for public comment: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-04-22-en The Board will be considering this report, and will submit its comments in the public comment forum as we did after the 1st draft. With respect to the work of the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability . We passed a resolution in Los Angeles setting out how we would be responding: https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-10-16-en#2.d. The Board plans to review the report from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability, and will make any of its concerns public through the public comment process. Under the current arrangements between the IETF and IANA with respect to maintaining the protocol registries this is an annual process of reviewing the SLAs via a Supplemental Agreement. Andrew Sullivan, chair of the IAB, recently posted on this topic on one of the public IETF lists. My understanding is that there are some changes requested by the IETF following he IANA transition discussions that the legal team feel would need approval from NTIA, or were inconsistent with the current agreement with the NTIA. The feeling from staff was that it was best to wait for this to be handled as part of the IANA transition process as a whole, rather than under the existing arrangements. This does not affect any proposed operational improvements that are handled in the annual process. Operational improvements agreed in discussions between the IETF and the IANA function would not normally go through a Board approval process unless there was a material impact to the budget. There have been no instructions from the Board regarding this process. When the Board gives directives to management it is through Board resolutions that are made public. I am also aware that there have been various discussions between various members of the CANN management and various community leaders on concerns about some of the proposals from the IETF, RIRs, and naming community regarding separability. These concerns have been raised in the context of the fear that the proposals may make it harder to get approval from the US Government. Ideally the NTIA would give some clarity on this matter, but that doesn't seem likely until after all the ICG makes its final report to the NTIA. I think that is partly because NTIA will need to run its own process to get guidance from various parts of Government, and no doubt they will also be hauled before a US Senate hearing of some sort before they can make a decision. The Board will be considering the various proposals and if it has concerns or suggestions for improvement - that will be made through the relevant public comment process. Ultimately though once the community settles on its final proposals, I personally see the Board's role as helping support the proposals in the likely long US Government process to get support. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
This is concerning:
"...there have been various discussions between various members of the CANN management and various community leaders on concerns about some of the proposals from the IETF, RIRs, and naming community regarding separability. These concerns have been raised in the context of the fear that the proposals may make it harder to get approval from the US Government."
Non-separability is not among the five criteria established by NTIA in their March 2014 announcement. Where does this so-called "fear" originate? Separability is a core feature of the IETF's existing MOU...why would a continuation of that principle be a threat to the transition? It does not compute. Regards, Keith
On Apr 30, 2015, at 6:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
there have been various discussions between various members of the CANN management and various community leaders on concerns about some of the proposals from the IETF, RIRs, and naming community regarding separability. These concerns have been raised in the context of the fear that the proposals may make it harder to get approval from the US Government.
With respect, given what NTIA has said publicly, this "fear" can only be based on the management's self-fulfilling wish. To the contrary, I think the =most= likely way for the NTIA to reject a proposal is for the management to frustrate the communities will .... Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Drazek, Keith [mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com] Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2015 11:31 PM To: Bruce Tonkin Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for clarification - Ominous update on the IANA transition This is concerning:
"...there have been various discussions between various members of the CANN management and various community leaders on concerns about some of the proposals from the IETF, RIRs, and naming community regarding separability. These concerns have been raised in the context of the fear that the proposals may make it harder to get approval from the US Government."
Non-separability is not among the five criteria established by NTIA in their March 2014 announcement. Where does this so-called "fear" originate? Separability is a core feature of the IETF's existing MOU...why would a continuation of that principle be a threat to the transition? It does not compute. Regards, Keith
On Apr 30, 2015, at 6:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
there have been various discussions between various members of the CANN management and various community leaders on concerns about some of the proposals from the IETF, RIRs, and naming community regarding separability. These concerns have been raised in the context of the fear that the proposals may make it harder to get approval from the US Government.
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (17)
-
"Carlos Raúl G." -
Bruce Tonkin -
David Post -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Drazek, Keith -
Edward Morris -
Izumi Okutani -
Jonathan Zuck -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Phil Corwin -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve DelBianco -
Thomas Rickert