Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Removal and accountability to community (was Re: CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #84 - Tuesday, 16 February @ 06:00 UTC)
Dear Beckie Thank you again. Allow me to inform you that I am not convinced by your argument nor that of Andrew and his supporters. Removal of the Board is a crucial and delicate issue. In case of GAC Carve-Out( which was initially proposed by you ) the removal ? spill of the Entire Board should be Either 3 SO/AC in favour and only one SO/ AC against together with the suggestion of the ICANN as submitted by Bruce , Or 4 SO/AC in favour and no objection among those who have the rights to exercise the power. Otherwise the process would once again is unfavourably treated the GAC due to its exclusion from exercising its community power as results of the Carve-out Concept Better to agree with the Board"s initial proposal as submitted by Bruce. Regards Kavouss 2016-02-18 7:53 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear Andrew Off List Thanks for explanation The aim if comments was to trigger the arguments you have provided The objectives were thus achieved. Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 17 Feb 2016, at 21:47, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
Hi,
On Wed, Feb 17, 2016 at 09:29:47PM +0100, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: of Incorporation isnot violated , the Board is Under the mercy of the SO/AC . That is a very shaky and uncertain situation since just those SO and AC may for any unjustified reasons get together and Spill over the Board That is what the community wants ?
I keep being surprised by others' surprise about the ability of the SOs and ACs to get together and remove the board, given that for some time we've been working on a system by which the SOs and ACs can get together and spill the board.
Some earlier proposals appeared (to some) to be too fragile, because they made that removal easy. But now there is the long engagement and escalation process that requires a lot of work and, it is to be hoped, impresses upon everyone precisely how serious a step they are taking.
Ultimately, though, accountability to the community means that the community can remove you at any time. It also means that the community needs to behave responsibly. We should have confidence that the ICANN community -- of which, after all, we are all a part -- will indeed behave that way.
In case it's useful, by way of comparison: my colleagues on the IAB can remove me as chair at any time and for any reason (no explanation, fulsome or otherwise, required); and with sufficient nomcom-eligible IETF participants I can also be recalled at any time from the IAB. The IETF has never exercised this procedure all the way through to the end, because by the time things are that serious everyone realises that it's time for discussion and compromise. I think the same thing will happen here.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
cc:s trimmed; I think everyone's on the list. On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 08:17:00AM +0100, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Removal of the Board is a crucial and delicate issue.
This is true, but the board has already argued convincingly that this is a corner case. If it's really a corner case, then making a perfect process for it seems like investing more effort than warranted. And as I argued yesterday (though I know you said you don't accept the argument), we are going to have to accept that, if things ever get so bad that people are willing to remove the board despite being unwilling to claim they violated the bylaws, we'll be well into a very bad political landscape. More rules are unlikely to help.
Otherwise the process would once again is unfavourably treated the GAC due to its exclusion from exercising its community power as results of the Carve-out Concept
We've been over that ground: the GAC gets to choose whether it's in the community power or whether it's going to use its special GAC-only power. Nobody else has the power to force the GAC's choice. Yes, the GAC is treated differently under one of those branches, but that is a consequence of GAC's own decisions -- a choice that the GAC makes knowing what its later options are. I really do not care very much how this gets sorted out, but I think it is time to stop debating it. We should unite around the report as it stands and ship it. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
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Kavouss Arasteh