In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released: I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a decision making role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part. II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case. III. p.34 on reconsideration process. Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant: * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests in relation to ICANN’s Legal Department. Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text): * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests instead of ICANN’s Legal Department. Thanks, Robin
I agree with all of Robin’s points below. In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robin Gross Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released: I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a decision making role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part. II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case. III. p.34 on reconsideration process. Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant: * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests in relation to ICANN’s Legal Department. Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text): * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests instead of ICANN’s Legal Department. Thanks, Robin
Agree strongly with Robin and Brett as regards the GAC role description. Permitting the GAC to decide issue-by-issue whether it wants to vote on the exercise of community power, and whether it will vote yes or object, gives it a never before possessed ability to reach “understandings” with the Board or with other parts of the community that could provide leverage on unrelated policy matters. It could, for example, indicate to the Board that it will object to an effort to remove one or more Board members – if the Board in turn will acquiesce to its “consensus” advice on a particular policy matter. And it could in the interim have altered its manner of reaching “consensus”, notwithstanding the current version of ST 18. Let’s not be naïve and think this could never happen. And let’s have an accurate description of this significant proposed change in the GAC’s role, from merely advisory to potentially operational. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Schaefer, Brett Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:27 PM To: Robin Gross; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary I agree with all of Robin’s points below. In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robin Gross Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released: I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a decision making role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part. II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case. III. p.34 on reconsideration process. Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant: * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests in relation to ICANN’s Legal Department. Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text): * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests instead of ICANN’s Legal Department. Thanks, Robin ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2015.0.6140 / Virus Database: 4450/10889 - Release Date: 10/25/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Hi, I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact. avri On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
I agree with all of Robin’s points below.
In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------------------------------------------------ BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robin Gross *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released:
*I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." *
This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part.
*II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. *
We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case.
*III. p.34 on reconsideration process.*
Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant:
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN’s Legal Department.
Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text):
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN’s Legal Department.
Thanks,
Robin
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+1~ Cheers! On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 4:20 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact.
avri
On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
I agree with all of Robin’s points below.
In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------------------------------------------------ BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robin Gross *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released:
*I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." *
This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part.
*II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. *
We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case.
*III. p.34 on reconsideration process.*
Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant:
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN’s Legal Department.
Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text):
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN’s Legal Department.
Thanks,
Robin
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
The bit of Avri's mail I want to draw attention to is this: "we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board." Avri goes on to speak for, or to, the GAC. She urges an increase in the "powers of On 11/11/15 12:12 AM, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
+1~
Cheers!
On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 4:20 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:
Hi,
I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact.
avri
On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote: > > I agree with all of Robin’s points below. > > > > In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. > Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant > changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are > not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains > unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant > additional powers and influence through participation in the community > mechanism. This needs to be made clear. > > > > Best, > > > > Brett > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > BrettSchaefer > Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs > Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National > Security and Foreign Policy > The Heritage Foundation > 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE > Washington, DC 20002 > 202-608-6097 > heritage.org <http://heritage.org> <http://heritage.org/> > > *From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf > Of *Robin Gross > *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM > *To:* Accountability Cross Community > *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary > > > > In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, > with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following > comments on the draft summary just released: > > > > *I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any > changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." * > > This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change > - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the > community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim > otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the > beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are > recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are > providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be > honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale > for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we > aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact > proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is > shamefully misleading on our part. > > > > > > *II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an > individual director. * > > We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the > right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community > forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a > single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because > that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the > community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a > legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to > "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to > eliminate the power in a legitimate case. > > > > > > *III. p.34 on reconsideration process.* > > Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant: > > * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial > assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN’s > Legal Department. > > Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text): > > * Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial > assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN’s Legal > Department. > > > > Thanks, > > Robin > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
/Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 //alt email:<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>/
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
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I tend to agree. The concept that ALL of the powers we are discussing are over and above what we (the SO/ACs) do in our "normal life" in ICANN is often forgotten. SOs recommending policy and ACs giving advice is a fact, but this entire accountability process is adding a new dimension to their existence. Alan At 10/11/2015 10:20 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact.
avri
On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
I agree with all of Robin's points below.
In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------------------------------------------------ BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robin Gross *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released:
*I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." *
This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part.
*II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. *
We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case.
*III. p.34 on reconsideration process.*
Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant:
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN's Legal Department.
Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text):
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN's Legal Department.
Thanks,
Robin
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I think Avri and Alan are incorrect about "increasing the powers of the ACs and SOs." We are not, we are merely making the board (slightly) more accountable to them, so that the SOs and AC's existing powers can actually be enforced. We have known for some time that the board can just disregard and SO's proposed policy or make unilateral post-hoc modifications of it based on political pressure from the GAC or other parties behind the scenes. The community enforcement mechanism does not change the role of the SOs or ALAC, it simply gives them the ability to make the board pay attention to what they do. The GAC's role would be unchanged by this; it would still have the special bylaw-enhanced power to hold up the process and make everyone pay attention to its advice and negotiate over it. Because the GAC is _supposed_ to be purely advisory, it should not be able to enforce its advice as if its preferences were the equivalent of a bottom up consensus coming from an SO.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 12:30 PM To: avri@acm.org; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
I tend to agree. The concept that ALL of the powers we are discussing are over and above what we (the SO/ACs) do in our "normal life" in ICANN is often forgotten. SOs recommending policy and ACs giving advice is a fact, but this entire accountability process is adding a new dimension to their existence.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 10:20 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact.
avri
On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
I agree with all of Robin's points below.
In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear.
Best,
Brett
-------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robin Gross *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released:
*I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." *
This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part.
*II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. *
We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case.
*III. p.34 on reconsideration process.*
Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant:
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN's Legal Department.
Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text):
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN's Legal Department.
Thanks,
Robin
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I could not agree more, Becky Best, Roelof On 11-11-15 00:20, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I think one point that is missing in this discussion is that we are increasing the powers of all segments of the ICANN community, with the exception of the ICANN Board. In that respect, if we are to point out that the GAC influence is increasing it must be done in the context of increasing the powers of all other the SO and the ALAC and with consideration that in relative terms the GAC is not being increased any more than any other SOAC. It should be noted that not to give GAC an equivalent increase in its ability to participate in decisions with regard to ICANN the organization, not is policies, would be to decrease the influence of the GAC. If the intention of the proposal is to decrease the relative influence of the GAC, we should be clear in stating that fact.
avri
On 10-Nov-15 14:26, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
I agree with all of Robin¹s points below.
In particular, the point about the GAC needs clarity and correction. Pedro, Steve, Jorge and others were actually discussing significant changes to the GAC advisory role yesterday. Even if those changes are not included in the proposal and the GAC advisory role remains unchanged, we are proposing allowing GAC to exercise significant additional powers and influence through participation in the community mechanism. This needs to be made clear.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------------------------------------------------ BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robin Gross *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:06 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] comments on draft summary
In addition to the comments on the text provided by Brett and Tatiana, with which I separately voiced my agreement, I'd offer the following comments on the draft summary just released:
*I. p.4-5 "The CCWG-Accountability is not recommending that any changes or alterations be made to ... the advisory role of the GAC..." *
This statement is simply false. We ARE in fact proposing a big change - in that we are offering a */decision making /*role to GAC on the community powers. I understand the desire to make the claim otherwise, but we are simply misleading the public to say that at the beginning of the report no changes to GAC's advisory role are recommended, but in the details to come out later, we learn we are providing GAC a decision making role on key issues. We should be honest and admit that is what we are doing and provide the rationale for it (if we believe it is worth doing). But simply to claim we aren't proposing a change in GAC's advisory role, when we are in fact proposing a major change of GAC's role to decision making is shamefully misleading on our part.
*II. p. 18 and 20 - The process can only be used once for removing an individual director. *
We need to specify at what stage does that "once" count. I think the right place for that "once" to count is at the stage of community forum deliberations. I don't think we are saying there can only be a single petition (stage 1) to remove an individual board member because that could be filed with little merit and go no where, and then the community would lose its opportunity to use that power when a legitimate need to exercise it comes along. It could even be used to "game" the process, by intentionally filing bogus petitions to eliminate the power in a legitimate case.
*III. p.34 on reconsideration process.*
Current wording of draft, which is unclear what is meant:
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_in relation to_* ICANN¹s Legal Department.
Proposed change to clarify what is meant (red text):
* Focusing on having the ICANN Ombudsman performing the initial assessments of Reconsideration Requests *_instead of_*ICANN¹s Legal Department.
Thanks,
Robin
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participants (9)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Avri Doria -
Eric Brunner-Williams -
Mueller, Milton L -
Phil Corwin -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Schaefer, Brett -
Seun Ojedeji