[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Dear Steve Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions! Cheers Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org and http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options Kavouss 2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hi all - Merry Christmas I feel like some don't care to much other then those that have got them self in a nice positions on ICANN. I wait and see before I do get more active, even I started on commodore C64 back in the 1984 and today are educated IT System Admin, internet back then was like a 300 baud modem lol Again have a nice Christmas all, and hope we shape the future of the internet together. Danish Viking living in Sweden today 2014-12-17 21:21 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear All,
The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of
First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC
Second the composition of the group is not mentioned
Third the footing is not mentioned
Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and
More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition.
We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic.
All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that
Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model
There are variety of possibilities
I know most of you are for statuesque
But I and many others wants to see and examine other options
Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco < sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Just as an aside, that's not really culturally sensitive :-)-O el Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Dec 17, 2014, at 22:35, Balder Sørensen <dataekspert@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi all - Merry Christmas
I feel like some don't care to much other then those that have got them self in a nice positions on ICANN.
I wait and see before I do get more active, even I started on commodore C64 back in the 1984 and today are educated IT System Admin, internet back then was like a 300 baud modem lol
Again have a nice Christmas all, and hope we shape the future of the internet together.
Danish Viking living in Sweden today
2014-12-17 21:21 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Kavouss — thank you for the quick reaction. Rest assured, however, that GAC would be an equal 'Member', along with the other Advisory Committees and Stakeholder Organizations. And in the BC’s proposal, even constituencies would get a Member slot. — Steve DelBianco On 12/17/14, 8:21 PM, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options Kavouss 2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org<mailto:crg@isoc-cr.org>>: Dear Steve Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions! Cheers Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487<tel:%2B506%208335%202487> Enviado desde mi iPhone El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> escribió: This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482<tel:%2B1.202.420.7482> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Kavouss, I like the idea of examining other options. Which options should we be looking at? Best regards, León
El 17/12/2014, a las 14:21, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> escribió:
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org <mailto:crg@isoc-cr.org>>: Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 <tel:%2B506%208335%202487> Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 <tel:%2B1.202.420.7482>
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Why are you worried about planning for California laws when the stated plans are if and when Congress lets IANA go the plan is, not to keep ICANN/IANA in America but to move IANA to Switzerland where it will be under legal oversight for DRS of WIPO? Sincerely Carrie Devorah On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 10:41 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> wrote:
Dear Kavouss,
I like the idea of examining other options. Which options should we be looking at?
Best regards,
León
El 17/12/2014, a las 14:21, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> escribió:
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options
Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco < sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Sincerely CARRIE Devorah 562 688 2883 DISCLAIMER : With the continuing crossing and interfacing of platforms both on & off line both with & without our knowledge nor approval to note nothing sent over the Internet anymore is ever private nor should be presumed to be so. If it is that much of a secret, say nothing. If you must? Take a lesson from our military- hand write the note, chew then swallow
Where did you ever get such an idea? "Stated" by whom? *Gregory S. Shatan **|* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab* *666 Third Avenue **|** New York, NY 10017-5621* *Direct* 212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022 *Fax* 212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428 *gsshatan@lawabel.com <gsshatan@lawabel.com>* *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> * *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>* On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 11:07 PM, Carrie Devorah <carriedev@gmail.com> wrote:
Why are you worried about planning for California laws when the stated plans are if and when Congress lets IANA go the plan is, not to keep ICANN/IANA in America but to move IANA to Switzerland where it will be under legal oversight for DRS of WIPO? Sincerely Carrie Devorah
On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 10:41 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> wrote:
Dear Kavouss,
I like the idea of examining other options. Which options should we be looking at?
Best regards,
León
El 17/12/2014, a las 14:21, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> escribió:
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options
Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco < sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Sincerely CARRIE Devorah 562 688 2883
DISCLAIMER : With the continuing crossing and interfacing of platforms both on & off line both with & without our knowledge nor approval to note nothing sent over the Internet anymore is ever private nor should be presumed to be so. If it is that much of a secret, say nothing. If you must? Take a lesson from our military- hand write the note, chew then swallow
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
This will be much more interesting to know if the source can be referenced. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 18 Dec 2014 05:07, "Carrie Devorah" <carriedev@gmail.com> wrote:
Why are you worried about planning for California laws when the stated plans are if and when Congress lets IANA go the plan is, not to keep ICANN/IANA in America but to move IANA to Switzerland where it will be under legal oversight for DRS of WIPO? Sincerely Carrie Devorah
On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 10:41 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> wrote:
Dear Kavouss,
I like the idea of examining other options. Which options should we be looking at?
Best regards,
León
El 17/12/2014, a las 14:21, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> escribió:
Dear All, The entity may be one option. However, it is not what we were thinking of First of all, no mentioned was made of GAC Second the composition of the group is not mentioned Third the footing is not mentioned Fourth the legal Framework is not mentioned and More importantly, it seems to me that every possible effort is made to maintain the current structure as we are talking of SO and AC .However, this is not the realistic composition. We need to look at other option in which the process is more democratic. All these SO and AC are not fully democratic as the stakeholder does not have direct role on that Please kindly do not limit us to merely existing practice and model There are variety of possibilities I know most of you are for statuesque But I and many others wants to see and examine other options
Kavouss
2014-12-17 17:45 GMT+01:00 "Carlos Raúl G." <crg@isoc-cr.org>:
Dear Steve
Are you suggesting we include changes in the bylaws within the scope of the working groups? I would have a few suggestions!
Cheers
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8335 2487 Enviado desde mi iPhone
El dic 17, 2014, a las 10:20 AM, Steve DelBianco < sdelbianco@netchoice.org> escribió:
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Sincerely CARRIE Devorah 562 688 2883
DISCLAIMER : With the continuing crossing and interfacing of platforms both on & off line both with & without our knowledge nor approval to note nothing sent over the Internet anymore is ever private nor should be presumed to be so. If it is that much of a secret, say nothing. If you must? Take a lesson from our military- hand write the note, chew then swallow
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Deal all, Steve wrote: "Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „ The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable. I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number): 1. On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”) The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure.. Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability. And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise. Best regards, Roelof A. Meijer CEO SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> Date: woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Dear All, May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes, procedures. Are you aware that ICANN’s ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a “surplus” of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionres... with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds. Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit. Best regards, Phil Buckingham From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: 19 December 2014 15:26 To: Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority Deal all, Steve wrote: "Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „ The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable. I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number): 1. On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”) The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure.. Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability. And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise. Best regards, Roelof A. Meijer CEO SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> Date: woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Dear Phil, Roelof, All, It is great to see such a vigorous and creative thread on our list. It is still too early in our work to assess solutions of course, but I think we could really use your contributions (as well as the Op-Ed from ITIF) to inform our current questions regarding the purpose of accountability, and its characteristics. So it would be greatly valuable if you could look back at your proposals and expand on the following questions (currently being considered in WA1 about existing mechanisms) and mentioned in Thomas note after our latest call a) is the mechanism providing check and balance, review or redress (see Netmundial definition of accountability in our Charter) ? b) to whom does this mechanisms seek to make Icann accountable ? c) for what purpose does this mechanism make Icann accountable ? As mentioned in the note mentioned above, this would then be a great starting point to assess which issues are most needed to be tackled. Best regards, Mathieu Le 19/12/2014 17:52, Phil Buckingham a écrit :
Dear All,
May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes, procedures.
Are you aware that ICANN's ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a "surplus" of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionres... with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds.
Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit.
Best regards,
Phil Buckingham
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Roelof Meijer *Sent:* 19 December 2014 15:26 *To:* Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
Deal all,
Steve wrote:
"Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). "
The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law.
If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO's and AC's and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and --dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN's accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable.
I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number):
1. On the basis of "too much noise from the community", tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN's role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain's "nuclear option")
The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it's actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure..
Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, "[is limited] to merely existing practice and model". As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN's accountability.
And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN's accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN's present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise.
Best regards,
Roelof A. Meijer
CEO
SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>
*From: *Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> *Date: *woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 *To: *Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> *Subject: *[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community 'Membership' group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN's bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/>
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Dear Mathieu, all, In response to Mathieu’s questions: is the mechanism providing check and balance, review or redress (see Netmundial definition of accountability in our Charter) ? Yes, given the „4 powers” that the structure of statutory members have to whom does this mechanisms seek to make Icann accountable ? Primarily, to the group of statutory members. As these are elected representatives of AC’s, SO’s and other structures representing the community, ultimately to the community for what purpose does this mechanism make Icann accountable ? In principle, on a high level, for everything it does. Excluding daily operations. But for strategy, operational performance, finance, risks and risks mitigation etc. The group of statutory members is similar to a supervisory board Cheers, Roelof From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Reply-To: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>> Date: vrijdag 19 december 2014 18:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority Dear Phil, Roelof, All, It is great to see such a vigorous and creative thread on our list. It is still too early in our work to assess solutions of course, but I think we could really use your contributions (as well as the Op-Ed from ITIF) to inform our current questions regarding the purpose of accountability, and its characteristics. So it would be greatly valuable if you could look back at your proposals and expand on the following questions (currently being considered in WA1 about existing mechanisms) and mentioned in Thomas note after our latest call a) is the mechanism providing check and balance, review or redress (see Netmundial definition of accountability in our Charter) ? b) to whom does this mechanisms seek to make Icann accountable ? c) for what purpose does this mechanism make Icann accountable ? As mentioned in the note mentioned above, this would then be a great starting point to assess which issues are most needed to be tackled. Best regards, Mathieu Le 19/12/2014 17:52, Phil Buckingham a écrit : Dear All, May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes, procedures. Are you aware that ICANN’s ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a “surplus” of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionres... with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds. Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit. Best regards, Phil Buckingham From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: 19 December 2014 15:26 To: Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority Deal all, Steve wrote: "Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „ The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable. I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number): 1. On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”) The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure.. Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability. And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise. Best regards, Roelof A. Meijer CEO SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> Date: woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
It is NOT outside the remit. In the Area 2 working group discussion, I just wrote the following: * Supermajority to change fee structure. This is currently WS2. I am surprised that the community thinks so. To my mind the greatest risk in the ICANN transition is not the risk to free expression. Rather it is the creation of an unregulated monopoly controlling a scarce resource (the domain names). I would have thought that the community would be deeply concerned about the creation of excess profits that ICANN could devote to other purposes (e.g. the proposal to fund broadband expansion) that would allow it to, in effect, buy support and create independence. For me, this is a WS0 requirement or at a minimum a WS1 part of the bylaw revision. “WS0” is my way of identifying absolutely vital issues that are at the highest level of importance – and I think that “taming” the ability of ICANN to achieve monopoly profits is one of the 3 or 4 most important objectives of the CCWG. I proposed a super majority requirement to raise fees – but I am equally intrigued by your idea of a separate commercial entity (presumably subject to contractual oblilgations and law suits). Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key From: Phil Buckingham [mailto:phil@dotadvice.co.uk] Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 11:53 AM To: 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Steve DelBianco'; 'Accountability Cross Community' Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority Dear All, May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes, procedures. Are you aware that ICANN’s ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a “surplus” of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionres... with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds. Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit. Best regards, Phil Buckingham From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: 19 December 2014 15:26 To: Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority Deal all, Steve wrote: "Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „ The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable. I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number): 1. On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”) The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure.. Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability. And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise. Best regards, Roelof A. Meijer CEO SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org> > Date: woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Mathiew I am happy that my earlier comments on accountabilty are now more or less appeared in your three questions. Yes we need to answer these questions Who is accountable to whom and on what ICANN SHALL NOT BE ACCOUNTABLE TO ITSELF on the accountability that submitted to ICANN in a series of ATRT Recommendations We need to embark on these questions as soon as possioble Regards Kavouss 2014-12-19 20:05 GMT+01:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
It is NOT outside the remit. In the Area 2 working group discussion, I just wrote the following:
· Supermajority to change fee structure. This is currently WS2. I am surprised that the community thinks so. To my mind the greatest risk in the ICANN transition is not the risk to free expression. Rather it is the creation of an unregulated monopoly controlling a scarce resource (the domain names). I would have thought that the community would be deeply concerned about the creation of excess profits that ICANN could devote to other purposes (e.g. the proposal to fund broadband expansion) that would allow it to, in effect, buy support and create independence. For me, this is a *WS0* requirement or at a minimum a WS1 part of the bylaw revision.
“WS0” is my way of identifying absolutely vital issues that are at the highest level of importance – and I think that “taming” the ability of ICANN to achieve monopoly profits is one of the 3 or 4 most important objectives of the CCWG. I proposed a super majority requirement to raise fees – but I am equally intrigued by your idea of a separate commercial entity (presumably subject to contractual oblilgations and law suits).
Paul
***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 ****
509 C St. NE
Washington, DC 20002
Paul Rosenzweig
paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com>
O: +1 (202) 547-0660
M: +1 (202) 329-9650
Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066
Link to my PGP Key <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...>
*From:* Phil Buckingham [mailto:phil@dotadvice.co.uk] *Sent:* Friday, December 19, 2014 11:53 AM *To:* 'Roelof Meijer'; 'Steve DelBianco'; 'Accountability Cross Community'
*Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
Dear All,
May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting of the whole gTLD programme, processes, procedures.
Are you aware that ICANN’s ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a “surplus” of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants. It has also in addition, subsequently received https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionres... with another 100+ contention sets ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds.
Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit.
Best regards,
Phil Buckingham
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Roelof Meijer *Sent:* 19 December 2014 15:26 *To:* Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
Deal all,
Steve wrote:
"Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „
The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law.
If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable.
I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number):
1. On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process; 2. If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process; 3. If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away; 4. If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”)
The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure..
Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability.
And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise.
Best regards,
Roelof A. Meijer
CEO
SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | www.sidn.nl
*From: *Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> *Date: *woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20 *To: *Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject: *[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (13)
-
"Carlos Raúl G." -
Balder Sørensen -
Carrie Devorah -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Greg Shatan -
Kavouss Arasteh -
León Felipe Sánchez Ambía -
Mathieu Weill -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Phil Buckingham -
Roelof Meijer -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve DelBianco