Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. Iâm not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
Iâm talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
---------- Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/>heritage.org
From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" <<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; <mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett <<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I donât think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>wp1-bounces@icann.org [mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; <mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/>heritage.org
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/>heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <<mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com>holly.gregory@sidley.com> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118>+64-4-495-2118 (office) | <tel:%2B64-21-442-649>+64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz>www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118>+64-4-495-2118 (office) | <tel:%2B64-21-442-649>+64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz>www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
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Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. Iâm not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
Iâm talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I donât think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
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I have not fully considered this new proposal but if it were to be fully considered it would have to apply to ACs as well. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 11:51:36 PM GMT-03:00, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> wrote: >Folks: > >I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making >Process. > >In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a >specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO >in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community >is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of >the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports >using a community action in order to move forward. > >In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific >amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that >community process. > >In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before >the community makes a decision binding. > >We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the >other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the >community decision process is invoked. > >To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the >group most impacted by a decision. > >Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at >issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we >already have been discussing. > >We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is >predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure >that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. > >Thanks. > >Jon > > >> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg ><alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: >> >> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of >some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. >> >> Alan >> >> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: >> >>> Alan, >>> >>> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. Iâm not talking about >a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That >is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is >not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of >exercising the community powers in other words iit does not count for >the thresholds either in support or against. >>> >>> Iâm talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to >participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise >decide not to participate. >>> >>> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. >This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating >entities in the community mechanism. >>> >>> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot >reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only >have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, >using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In >the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at >all. >>> >>> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to >participate acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of >the CCWG proposal from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately >project for the model. >>> >>> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels >of participation for that reason. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory >Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National >Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> >>> >>> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca ><mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] >>> Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM >>> To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett >>> Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community >>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole >Designator >>> >>> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said >it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a >position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS >participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without >sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. >>> >>> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on >its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. >>> >>> Alan >>> -- >>> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. >>> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji ><seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote: >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock >since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any >point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have >agreed to go by consensus. >>> >>> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order >to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of >participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved >then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a >minimum number of 4 may be in order. >>> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating >SO/AC or less. >>> >>> Regards >>> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 >>> Kindly excuse brevity and typos. >>> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org ><mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: >>> Jordan, >>> >>> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly >realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. >>> >>> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the >thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) >shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at >least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) >allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz ><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] >>> Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM >>> To: Schaefer, Brett >>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org ><mailto:wp1@icann.org> >>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> >>> hi Brett, >>> >>> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to >attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk >this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs >participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current >model. >>> >>> Jordan >>> >>> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < >Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> >wrote: >>> Jordan, >>> >>> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. >>> >>> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that >it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. >The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will >participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get >confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not >be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. >>> >>> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a >possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate >and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to >participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed >participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus >position. >>> >>> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to >participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and >7. I donât think that unanimous support was supposed to be required >for exercise of the community powers. >>> >>> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC >which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be >participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. >For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on >varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ >mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf >Of Jordan Carter >>> Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM >>> To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org ><mailto:wp1@icann.org> >>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> >>> ... and in PDF >>> J >>> >>> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz ><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: >>> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. >>> >>> Jordan >>> >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory >Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National >Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory >Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National >Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com ><mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > >>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 >>> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, >>> >>> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on >how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo >that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature >of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as >well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. >>> >>> Please let us know if you have any questions. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> Holly and Rosemary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Jordan Carter >>> >>> Chief Executive >>> InternetNZ >>> >>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 ><tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) >>> Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >>> Skype: jordancarter >>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> >>> >>> A better world through a better Internet >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Jordan Carter >>> >>> Chief Executive >>> InternetNZ >>> >>> +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 ><tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) >>> Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >>> Skype: jordancarter >>> Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> >>> >>> A better world through a better Internet >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ><https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> >>> >>> >>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>> >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ><https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org<mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com<mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I don't agree with Jon, and I don't think we are in a position to fundamentally re-evaluate the decision-making process for the use of the community powers. best Jordan On 12 November 2015 at 14:24, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <wp1-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
------------------------------
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_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
I'm with Jordan here. Procedurally we're pretty far down the road to now add, in the next draft, additional prerequisites before community powers can be used. Of course, a minority comment on the matter that generated substantial support in the public comment period would be appropriate and might be the way for proponents to go. Substantively I'm not a big fan of anything that would add complexity to the voting mechanism or make it even more difficult to use the community powers than the exceptionally high thresholds already make it. The 'who', as in who decides which units of the community decide have effective veto power, is also a concern. Thanks, Ed Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 12, 2015, at 2:49 AM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
I don't agree with Jon, and I don't think we are in a position to fundamentally re-evaluate the decision-making process for the use of the community powers.
best Jordan
On 12 November 2015 at 14:24, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote: Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
Thanks Ed. At least the Registries Stakeholder Group has raised this issue in its public comments at least two times already. The time has come to deal with it -- not to kick the proverbial can down the road again and deal with it after the next round of public comments. Best, Jon
On Nov 12, 2015, at 6:16 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
I'm with Jordan here. Procedurally we're pretty far down the road to now add, in the next draft, additional prerequisites before community powers can be used. Of course, a minority comment on the matter that generated substantial support in the public comment period would be appropriate and might be the way for proponents to go. Substantively I'm not a big fan of anything that would add complexity to the voting mechanism or make it even more difficult to use the community powers than the exceptionally high thresholds already make it. The 'who', as in who decides which units of the community decide have effective veto power, is also a concern.
Thanks,
Ed
Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 12, 2015, at 2:49 AM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
I don't agree with Jon, and I don't think we are in a position to fundamentally re-evaluate the decision-making process for the use of the community powers.
best Jordan
On 12 November 2015 at 14:24, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> wrote: Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
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-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
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With timelines being incredible tight we can’t fundamentally reevaluate the mechanics of these community veto powers, but I agree with Jon, we can’t just kick the proverbial can down the road again. It is only going to store up more problems when these community powers need to be implemented and made workable. I guess the Registry & Registrar Stakeholder Groups will need to raise a third public comment, particularly regarding the fixed fee structure within ICANN revenue streams. Regards, Phil From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jon Nevett Sent: 12 November 2015 13:57 To: Edward Morris Cc: wp1@icann.org; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Thanks Ed. At least the Registries Stakeholder Group has raised this issue in its public comments at least two times already. The time has come to deal with it -- not to kick the proverbial can down the road again and deal with it after the next round of public comments. Best, Jon On Nov 12, 2015, at 6:16 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote: I'm with Jordan here. Procedurally we're pretty far down the road to now add, in the next draft, additional prerequisites before community powers can be used. Of course, a minority comment on the matter that generated substantial support in the public comment period would be appropriate and might be the way for proponents to go. Substantively I'm not a big fan of anything that would add complexity to the voting mechanism or make it even more difficult to use the community powers than the exceptionally high thresholds already make it. The 'who', as in who decides which units of the community decide have effective veto power, is also a concern. Thanks, Ed Sent from my iPhone On Nov 12, 2015, at 2:49 AM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: I don't agree with Jon, and I don't think we are in a position to fundamentally re-evaluate the decision-making process for the use of the community powers. best Jordan On 12 November 2015 at 14:24, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote: Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett _____ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> ] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> > wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> ] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> > wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> ] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _____ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
If the community powers will do what Chris and Jon has indicated; by rubbishing/trampling on outcome of PDP instead of upholding it then there is absolute need to fix whatever part of the proposal that implies such pre-transition. Will be good to know what part of the proposal implies that the community can overturn outcome of a PDP, as i think that will be an unacceptable coup. Cheers! Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 12 Nov 2015 16:44, "Phil Buckingham" <phil@dotadvice.co.uk> wrote:
With timelines being incredible tight we can’t fundamentally reevaluate the mechanics of these community veto powers, but I agree with Jon, we can’t just kick the proverbial can down the road again. It is only going to store up more problems when these community powers need to be implemented and made workable.
I guess the Registry & Registrar Stakeholder Groups will need to raise a third public comment, particularly regarding the fixed fee structure within ICANN revenue streams.
Regards,
Phil
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jon Nevett *Sent:* 12 November 2015 13:57 *To:* Edward Morris *Cc:* wp1@icann.org; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Ed. At least the Registries Stakeholder Group has raised this issue in its public comments at least two times already. The time has come to deal with it -- not to kick the proverbial can down the road again and deal with it after the next round of public comments.
Best,
Jon
On Nov 12, 2015, at 6:16 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
I'm with Jordan here. Procedurally we're pretty far down the road to now add, in the next draft, additional prerequisites before community powers can be used. Of course, a minority comment on the matter that generated substantial support in the public comment period would be appropriate and might be the way for proponents to go. Substantively I'm not a big fan of anything that would add complexity to the voting mechanism or make it even more difficult to use the community powers than the exceptionally high thresholds already make it. The 'who', as in who decides which units of the community decide have effective veto power, is also a concern.
Thanks,
Ed
Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 12, 2015, at 2:49 AM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
I don't agree with Jon, and I don't think we are in a position to fundamentally re-evaluate the decision-making process for the use of the community powers.
best
Jordan
On 12 November 2015 at 14:24, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> *Date: *Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 *To: *Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Cc: *"<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <wp1-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
*Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
*Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org<mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com<mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, "wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org<mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com<mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
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I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
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*Important Notice* *- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco@netchoice.org');>> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin@ipjustice.org');>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>
Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel@godaddy.com');>>, "wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett < jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>
Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>" < wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory@sidley.com');> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco@netchoice.org');>> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin@ipjustice.org');>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel@godaddy.com');>>, "wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory@sidley.com');> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
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A better world through a better Internet
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Hi, My understanding was that bylaw changes that are made as a result of policy developed under PDP guideline ( the ccNSO, GNSO and ASO) are immune to community veto, unless in a situation where the bylaw implementation did not reflect the accurate interpretation of the policy. In such scenario, I expect that its only when the reconsideration processes set in the respective PDP guideline is exhausted that the community enforcement can be triggered by the affected community member(e.g GNSO). The ASO(NRO) for instance has a clear process stipulated for such reconsideration/enforcement as defined in gPDP hence may not require use of the ICANN community enforcement mechanisms. Don't know if the ccTLDs has such processes defined as well otherwise the ICANN community enforcement mechanism will be handy for their use. Regards Regards On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 2:50 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
Chris is absolutely correct. What the community powers should protect against is the ccNSO going through a two-year Policy Development Process, reaching consensus, and approving a ccTLD policy recommendation, but the Board in approving the policy change alters the Bylaws in a way that changes the intent of the policy and refuses to change it. In that case, the ccNSO should be able to utilize the community powers and rally the rest of the community around it to block the Bylaw change as written. What the community powers should not be used for is to undermine the PDP process. In the same scenario as above, the ccNSO spends 2 years on ccTLD policy reaching consensus and the Board approves it and implements the requisite Bylaw change. Even though such Bylaw change only alters Article IX of the Bylaws (CCNSO), the GNSO and others in the community do not like the change and try to block it. This scenario seems highly inappropriate. If Nigel is correct and we already protect against this, that is great. The extra protection by baking into the voting structure, however, wouldn't hurt. Another example is that the ICANN budget process sets a fee on all gTLD registrations. It has been US$.18 cents per transaction for a while, but it has been as high as US$.25. Some gTLD registrars pass the fee on directly to registrants with a line item fee, while others bake the fee into their cost structure. If the ICANN Board decided unilaterally to increase the fee back to US$.25 one year to pay for some initiatives that the community felt were extravagant and unnecessary, then it appropriately could use the community powers to block said budget. The fee increase would impact the entire GNSO community and they rightly would be able to take action. On the other hand, let's look at an example where the ICANN Board approved the budget with the longstanding US$.18 cent fee on gTLD registrations. The community in that case -- other than the GNSO community that pays the fees -- however, got together to block the budget to get the Board to increase the fees that they don't pay to raise money for their pet projects. I agree with the various objectors that such a scenario would be an inappropriate use of the community powers. The bottom line is that we should save the pitchforks and torches for only those instances when we have the support of the actual community members whose houses are at risk of being burned. Best, Jon
On Nov 12, 2015, at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');> | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/>
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Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco@netchoice.org');>> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin@ipjustice.org');>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel@godaddy.com');>>, "wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory@sidley.com');> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
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Chris, I'm not saying that the community *should* in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community *will* have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful. Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
*Important Notice* *- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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------------------------------
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_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Interesting you are turning this around on me Greg, (you said current proposal has provision that impact on PDP [1]) I said I have not seen the part of the proposal that implies that and asked for reference. I have always had the impression that one of the principle of the CCWG is not to infringe on PDP, so when I read the community powers it's with that mindset. Will be grateful if you point to where such power is mentioned to be possible under current proposal so it can be fixed before it's too late. Regards 1. Greg: "I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." " Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. Chris, I'm not saying that the community *should* in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community *will* have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful. Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
*Important Notice* *- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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Seun, I was responding to your statement below. I would be grateful if you could provide the basis for it, other than your mindset. My understanding was that bylaw changes that are made as a result of policy developed under PDP guideline ( the ccNSO, GNSO and ASO) are immune to community veto, unless in a situation where the bylaw implementation did not reflect the accurate interpretation of the policy. In such scenario, I expect that its only when the reconsideration processes set in the respective PDP guideline is exhausted that the community enforcement can be triggered by the affected community member(e.g GNSO). Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Interesting you are turning this around on me Greg, (you said current proposal has provision that impact on PDP [1]) I said I have not seen the part of the proposal that implies that and asked for reference. I have always had the impression that one of the principle of the CCWG is not to infringe on PDP, so when I read the community powers it's with that mindset.
Will be grateful if you point to where such power is mentioned to be possible under current proposal so it can be fixed before it's too late.
Regards 1. Greg: "I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." "
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. Chris,
I'm not saying that the community *should* in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community *will* have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful.
Greg
On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
*Important Notice* *- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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And I was responding to yours (on Chris interpretation) indicating what I believe(expected) that it should be and indicated that it be fixed if it's not the case. In most sections where PDP was mentioned in draft 2, it's either talking about enforcing it's outcome(as in the case of IRP) or protecting its outcomes from unilateral edit(as referenced in paragraph 394 ). It is therefore logical that what is being protected should not be destroyed. Again you have not indicated the part of the proposal that actually says such infringement on PDP is possible. Perhaps I missed that part hence the reason why it's good to point it out early enough. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. Seun, I was responding to your statement below. I would be grateful if you could provide the basis for it, other than your mindset. My understanding was that bylaw changes that are made as a result of policy developed under PDP guideline ( the ccNSO, GNSO and ASO) are immune to community veto, unless in a situation where the bylaw implementation did not reflect the accurate interpretation of the policy. In such scenario, I expect that its only when the reconsideration processes set in the respective PDP guideline is exhausted that the community enforcement can be triggered by the affected community member(e.g GNSO). Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Interesting you are turning this around on me Greg, (you said current proposal has provision that impact on PDP [1]) I said I have not seen the part of the proposal that implies that and asked for reference. I have always had the impression that one of the principle of the CCWG is not to infringe on PDP, so when I read the community powers it's with that mindset.
Will be grateful if you point to where such power is mentioned to be possible under current proposal so it can be fixed before it's too late.
Regards 1. Greg: "I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." "
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. Chris,
I'm not saying that the community *should* in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community *will* have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful.
Greg
On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
*Important Notice* *- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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Greg, Since you have acknowledged the elephant in the room with regards to the ccTLDs and the work of the CCWG, I'll address my remarks to you, but bear in mind they apply to the entire WG and the collective work product to date. Recall that ccTLDs walked away from ICANN at the conclusion of the Shanghai meeting (ICANN 14) in October 2002, and only returned in a formal capacity when the ccNSO was formed at the Montreal meeting (ICANN 17) in June 2003. The decision to withdraw from formal participation in ICANN was made by a group that consisted of 65 ccTLD Managers, so in no way can it be construed as being a decision of some dissident "fringe" group. Between the withdrawal from ICANN and the decision to formally re-engage with ICANN, a tremendous amount of informal engagement occurred between the ccTLD Community and ICANN over a number of contentious issues, not the least of which was the ICANN Staff imposed demand that ccTLDs grant access to their zone files to ICANN in return for critically needed root zone changes. This action on the part of ICANN was nothing short of extortion. It both endangered the stability of the DNS and caused a tremendous amount of distrust of ICANN within the ccTLD Community. To an extent, that distrust persists to this day, as you have seen from some of the postings to this list. At the end of the day what the ccTLD community gained was an SO that imposed light-weight membership requirements on the Community. Formal membership is not required for a ccTLD to participate in the deliberations of the ccNSO. Membership is a two-way street --there is no restriction on a ccNSO member leaving the Organization, if it should, for whatever reason, decide that it is in its best interest to do so. Most importantly, the ccNSO was structured so that it could with assurance propose ccTLD related policy development (with input from other SOs/ACs during the process), with a reasonable expectation that the policy put forth to the Board would in fact be adopted by the Board, along with any necessary Bylaw changes required to implement the policy. Under the current structure, there is no way another SO/AC (either acting alone or together) can block a Bylaw change based on an adopted PDP. This provision was and remains the major foundation of the relationship between ccTLDs and ICANN as embodied within the structure of the ccNSO. The formation of the ccNSO, coming as it did on the heels of the Zone File fiasco described above, could not have occurred without the fundamental principle of the agreement being that the ccTLDs, and only the ccTLDs, would be responsible for ccTLD affairs. What has been admitted to now, at the 11th hour of the CCWG's work, is that in fact this foundation underpinning the relationship between the ccTLD Community and ICANN is being cast aside as the CCWG races to complete its work in order to meet an arbitrary deadline set by who knows who. This is not acceptable to me as a ccTLD Manager, nor, I believe, will it be acceptable to a great many of my Colleagues. The ccTLD Community has walked away from ICANN before; it could well do so again. At the end of the day, for the CCWG proposal to go forward, it is going to need the endorsement of the ccNSO Council. Historically, the ccNSO Council has not acted in haste, nor does it have a track record of going on record without having first engaged in a serious consultative process with the ccTLD Community regarding the issue at hand. It is unlikely that the Council will act unless it is comfortable that (a) the ccTLD Community has had ample opportunity to review the (as yet non-existent) 3rd (final?) draft proposal, and (b), the broader ccTLD Community (not just the Council, or, for that matter, the ccNSO membership) has come to a reasonable level of consensus around endorsement of the proposal. The arbitrary “completion” deadline for the CCWG’s work is now less than 48 hours away. As a result, I fear this issue raised by Chris, like so many others, is either going to be ignored, or swept under the rug by relegating its resolution to WS2. I do not see why, under the guise of “increasing ICANN Board/Staff Accountability”, the ccTLD community should forfeit control of its destiny, which is what is being asked of it as this proposal currently stands. This issue cannot be relegated to WS2; it has to be dealt with here and now. Regards, Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Councilor) From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 2:32 PM To: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Chris, I'm not saying that the community should in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community will have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful. Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> > wrote: Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan < <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote: I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain < <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204111> +61 3 8341 4111 | F: <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204112> +61 3 8341 4112 E: <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au | W: <http://www.auda.org.au/> www.auda.org.au auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco < <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org> sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote: "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: < <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org> robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" < <mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com> jbladel@godaddy.com>, " <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org" < <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett < <mailto:jon@donuts.email> jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: < <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett < <mailto:jon@donuts.email> jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "< <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org>" < <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg < <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett _____ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 <tel:202-608-6097> 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/> heritage.org From: Alan Greenberg [ <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: < <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%20> seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> wp1-bounces@icann.org [ <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; <mailto:wp1@icann.org> wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter < <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%20> jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 <tel:202-608-6097> 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/> heritage.org Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 <tel:202-608-6097> 202-608-6097 <http://heritage.org/> heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly < <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com%20> holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz/> www.internetnz.nz A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: <http://www.internetnz.nz/> www.internetnz.nz A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _____ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list <mailto:WP1@icann.org> WP1@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
I think this is an important and difficult issue. On the one hand, I feel pretty strongly, that the gNSO should develop policy for the g’s and the ccNSO should develop policy for the c’s, that line should be guarded, and that generally properly adopted policies within ICANN’s mission should be adopted by the Board. But you can imagine extreme cases. For example, what about a ccNSO PDP that declared that all geo names are ccTLDs? I think this would require a change to the ccNSO provisions of the Bylaws. I would think that the gNSO would legitimately have something to say about that. I guess we could rely on the Board to reject such a policy, but it seems like we ought to at least acknowledge that our worlds are connected and interdependent at some level. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "SDeerhake@nic.as<mailto:SDeerhake@nic.as>" <SDeerhake@nic.as<mailto:SDeerhake@nic.as>> Organization: AS Domain Registry Reply-To: "SDeerhake@nic.as<mailto:SDeerhake@nic.as>" <SDeerhake@nic.as<mailto:SDeerhake@nic.as>> Date: Friday, November 13, 2015 at 9:22 AM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Greg, Since you have acknowledged the elephant in the room with regards to the ccTLDs and the work of the CCWG, I'll address my remarks to you, but bear in mind they apply to the entire WG and the collective work product to date. Recall that ccTLDs walked away from ICANN at the conclusion of the Shanghai meeting (ICANN 14) in October 2002, and only returned in a formal capacity when the ccNSO was formed at the Montreal meeting (ICANN 17) in June 2003. The decision to withdraw from formal participation in ICANN was made by a group that consisted of 65 ccTLD Managers, so in no way can it be construed as being a decision of some dissident "fringe" group. Between the withdrawal from ICANN and the decision to formally re-engage with ICANN, a tremendous amount of informal engagement occurred between the ccTLD Community and ICANN over a number of contentious issues, not the least of which was the ICANN Staff imposed demand that ccTLDs grant access to their zone files to ICANN in return for critically needed root zone changes. This action on the part of ICANN was nothing short of extortion. It both endangered the stability of the DNS and caused a tremendous amount of distrust of ICANN within the ccTLD Community. To an extent, that distrust persists to this day, as you have seen from some of the postings to this list. At the end of the day what the ccTLD community gained was an SO that imposed light-weight membership requirements on the Community. Formal membership is not required for a ccTLD to participate in the deliberations of the ccNSO. Membership is a two-way street --there is no restriction on a ccNSO member leaving the Organization, if it should, for whatever reason, decide that it is in its best interest to do so. Most importantly, the ccNSO was structured so that it could with assurance propose ccTLD related policy development (with input from other SOs/ACs during the process), with a reasonable expectation that the policy put forth to the Board would in fact be adopted by the Board, along with any necessary Bylaw changes required to implement the policy. Under the current structure, there is no way another SO/AC (either acting alone or together) can block a Bylaw change based on an adopted PDP. This provision was and remains the major foundation of the relationship between ccTLDs and ICANN as embodied within the structure of the ccNSO. The formation of the ccNSO, coming as it did on the heels of the Zone File fiasco described above, could not have occurred without the fundamental principle of the agreement being that the ccTLDs, and only the ccTLDs, would be responsible for ccTLD affairs. What has been admitted to now, at the 11th hour of the CCWG's work, is that in fact this foundation underpinning the relationship between the ccTLD Community and ICANN is being cast aside as the CCWG races to complete its work in order to meet an arbitrary deadline set by who knows who. This is not acceptable to me as a ccTLD Manager, nor, I believe, will it be acceptable to a great many of my Colleagues. The ccTLD Community has walked away from ICANN before; it could well do so again. At the end of the day, for the CCWG proposal to go forward, it is going to need the endorsement of the ccNSO Council. Historically, the ccNSO Council has not acted in haste, nor does it have a track record of going on record without having first engaged in a serious consultative process with the ccTLD Community regarding the issue at hand. It is unlikely that the Council will act unless it is comfortable that (a) the ccTLD Community has had ample opportunity to review the (as yet non-existent) 3rd (final?) draft proposal, and (b), the broader ccTLD Community (not just the Council, or, for that matter, the ccNSO membership) has come to a reasonable level of consensus around endorsement of the proposal. The arbitrary “completion” deadline for the CCWG’s work is now less than 48 hours away. As a result, I fear this issue raised by Chris, like so many others, is either going to be ignored, or swept under the rug by relegating its resolution to WS2. I do not see why, under the guise of “increasing ICANN Board/Staff Accountability”, the ccTLD community should forfeit control of its destiny, which is what is being asked of it as this proposal currently stands. This issue cannot be relegated to WS2; it has to be dealt with here and now. Regards, Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Councilor) From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 2:32 PM To: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Chris, I'm not saying that the community should in my opinion have that power. I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community will have that power. Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this from happening. If someone could point to where that limitation is stated in our proposal I would be most grateful. Greg On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote: I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111<tel:%2B61%203%208341%204111> | F: +61 3 8341 4112<tel:%2B61%203%208341%204112> E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.auda.org.au_&d=CwMFa...> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org<mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com<mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, "wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__heritage.org_&d=CwMFaQ&c...> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%20> > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org<mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%20> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__heritage.org_&d=CwMFaQ&c...> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__heritage.org_&d=CwMFaQ&c...> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com%20> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetnz.nz_&d=CwM...> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetnz.nz_&d=CwM...> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=CwMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=oqTaLud6jx_1RdP9JHlla3I7oHo8p53rm9FjAWzfllw&s=uvE8F9lc7R1_vS8PDjcnEe6WPtzby9yVtbSXr4lTmXY&e=> ________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=CwMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=oqTaLud6jx_1RdP9JHlla3I7oHo8p53rm9FjAWzfllw&s=uvE8F9lc7R1_vS8PDjcnEe6WPtzby9yVtbSXr4lTmXY&e=> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=CwMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=oqTaLud6jx_1RdP9JHlla3I7oHo8p53rm9FjAWzfllw&s=uvE8F9lc7R1_vS8PDjcnEe6WPtzby9yVtbSXr4lTmXY&e=> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_accountability-2Dcross-2Dcommunity&d=CwMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=oqTaLud6jx_1RdP9JHlla3I7oHo8p53rm9FjAWzfllw&s=uvE8F9lc7R1_vS8PDjcnEe6WPtzby9yVtbSXr4lTmXY&e=> _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_wp1&d=CwMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=oqTaLud6jx_1RdP9JHlla3I7oHo8p53rm9FjAWzfllw&s=GgSTW-Dct6PJCTimCCRW6wAIVPFMhImOtD9Z2EAWqdE&e=>
Chris, all, I am with Jordan on this. In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency. In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it. So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model. Best, Roelof Meijer From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<mailto:jon@donuts.email>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote: I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');> | W:www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice- This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco@netchoice.org');>> wrote: "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin@ipjustice.org');>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel@godaddy.com');>>, "wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>" <wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>" <wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');> > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory@sidley.com');> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','WP1@icann.org');> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
A very quick response: 1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored). 2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving"). 3. This does expose issues, as you say: - Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? - Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? - How far would this immunity go? - If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? - How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? - Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) - If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? - And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? - Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? - Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email>, Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
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auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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A middle-ground position may be that the voting is significantly weighted towards the community at issue vs. required consent . . .
On Nov 13, 2015, at 1:48 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
A very quick response:
1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored).
2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
3. This does expose issues, as you say: Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? How far would this immunity go? If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>> wrote: Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204111> | F: +61 3 8341 4112 <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204112> E: ceo@auda.org.au <> | W:www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/>
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <>> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <>>, "wp1@icann.org <>" <wp1@icann.org <>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <>>" <wp1@icann.org <>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <>] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <>>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <>] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
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A better world through a better Internet
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Thanks Greg. I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h. Jordan On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
A very quick response:
1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored).
2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
3. This does expose issues, as you say:
- Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? - Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? - How far would this immunity go? - If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? - How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? - Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) - If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? - And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? - Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? - Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all?
Greg
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl');>> wrote:
Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');>> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
* Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
Jordan to the rescue! ;-) Sent from my iPhone On Nov 13, 2015, at 10:03 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Thanks Greg. I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h. Jordan On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote: A very quick response: 1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored). 2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving"). 3. This does expose issues, as you say: * Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? * Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? * How far would this immunity go? * If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? * How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? * Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) * If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? * And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? * Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? * Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl');>> wrote: Chris, all, I am with Jordan on this. In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency. In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it. So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model. Best, Roelof Meijer From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');>> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');>> wrote: I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> wrote: All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111<tel:%2B61%203%208341%204111> | F: +61 3 8341 4112<tel:%2B61%203%208341%204112> E: ceo@auda.org.au | W:http://www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice- This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote: "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> http://heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> http://heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097<tel:202-608-6097> http://heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: http://www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi Jordan, Happy to help. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
On 14 Nov 2015, at 11:03, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h.
Jordan
On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote: A very quick response:
1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored).
2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
3. This does expose issues, as you say: Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? How far would this immunity go? If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote: Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
> On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: > > Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. > > Thanks— > > J. > > > From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> > Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 > To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator > > Folks: > > I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. > > In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. > > In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. > > In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. > > We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. > > To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. > > Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. > > We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. > > Thanks. > > Jon > > >> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: >> >> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. >> >> Alan >> >> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: >> >>> Alan, >>> >>> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. >>> >>> I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. >>> >>> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. >>> >>> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. >>> >>> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. >>> >>> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org >>> >>> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] >>> Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM >>> To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett >>> Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community >>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> >>> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. >>> >>> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. >>> >>> Alan >>> -- >>> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. >>> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote: >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. >>> >>> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. >>> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. >>> >>> Regards >>> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 >>> Kindly excuse brevity and typos. >>> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: >>> Jordan, >>> >>> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. >>> >>> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] >>> Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM >>> To: Schaefer, Brett >>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org >>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> >>> hi Brett, >>> >>> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. >>> >>> Jordan >>> >>> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: >>> Jordan, >>> >>> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. >>> >>> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. >>> >>> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. >>> >>> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. >>> >>> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Brett >>> >>> From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter >>> Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM >>> To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org >>> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> >>> ... and in PDF >>> J >>> >>> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: >>> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. >>> >>> Jordan >>> >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org >>> >>> Brett Schaefer >>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs >>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy >>> The Heritage Foundation >>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >>> Washington, DC 20002 >>> 202-608-6097 >>> heritage.org >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > >>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 >>> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator >>> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, >>> >>> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. >>> >>> Please let us know if you have any questions. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> Holly and Rosemary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Jordan Carter >>> >>> Chief Executive >>> InternetNZ >>> >>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >>> Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz >>> Skype: jordancarter >>> Web: www.internetnz.nz >>> >>> A better world through a better Internet >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Jordan Carter >>> >>> Chief Executive >>> InternetNZ >>> >>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >>> Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz >>> Skype: jordancarter >>> Web: www.internetnz.nz >>> >>> A better world through a better Internet >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >>> >>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
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Hi Jordan. Happy to help as well. Stephen Deerhake From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Chris Disspain Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 2:29 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Hi Jordan, Happy to help. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au> auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator On 14 Nov 2015, at 11:03, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Thanks Greg. I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h. Jordan On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> > wrote: A very quick response: 1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored). 2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving"). 3. This does expose issues, as you say: * Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? * Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? * How far would this immunity go? * If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? * How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? * Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) * If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? * And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? * Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? * Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl');> > wrote: Chris, all, I am with Jordan on this. In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency. In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it. So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model. Best, Roelof Meijer From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> > on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');> > Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');> > Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');> >, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Thanks Greg. For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure? Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position? Cheers, Chris On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gregshatanipc@gmail.com');> > wrote: I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community. I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time. On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so! Greg On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');> > wrote: All, Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others). Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions: 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block? 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block? This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO. It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204111> | F: +61 3 8341 4112 <tel:%2B61%203%208341%204112> E: ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W:www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice- This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org> > wrote: "consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means. A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support. Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too. From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> > on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org> > Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com> >, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> " <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> >, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email> > Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues. Robin On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> > on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <mailto:jon@donuts.email> > Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> >" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Folks: I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process. In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward. In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process. In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding. We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked. To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision. Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing. We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support. Thanks. Jon On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > wrote: No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue. Alan At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote: Alan, I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against. I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate. But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism. But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all. That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model. I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason. Best, Brett _____ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> >; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies. In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1. Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%20> > wrote: Hi, I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus. Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> > wrote: Jordan, If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem. In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds. Best, Brett From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator hi Brett, Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model. Jordan On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> > wrote: Jordan, I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo. However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal. Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position. In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers. Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted? Thanks, Brett From: wp1-bounces@icann.org <mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator ... and in PDF J On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz%20> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record. Jordan Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 <tel:202-608-6097> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com <mailto:holly.gregory@sidley.com%20> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff, Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo. Please let us know if you have any questions. Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _____ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org <mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Happy to help as well! Greg On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Stephen Deerhake <sdeerhake@nic.as> wrote:
Hi Jordan.
Happy to help as well.
Stephen Deerhake
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Chris Disspain *Sent:* Saturday, November 14, 2015 2:29 AM *To:* Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Hi Jordan,
Happy to help.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
On 14 Nov 2015, at 11:03, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h.
Jordan
On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
A very quick response:
1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored).
2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
3. This does expose issues, as you say:
- Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? - Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? - How far would this immunity go?
- If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited?
- How far does this "One Big Community" idea go?
- Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) - If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? - And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)?
- Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? - Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all?
Greg
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with.
Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect.
Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> *Date: *donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 *To: *Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> *Cc: *Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email>, Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W:www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
*Important Notice- *This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
*From: * <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross < robin@ipjustice.org> *Date: *Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM *To: *Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Cc: *"James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" < wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> *Subject: *Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> *Date: *Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 *To: *Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Cc: *"<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%20>> wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <wp1-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <jordan@internetnz.net.nz%20>> wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*
*Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
*Brett* *Schaefer*
*Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory AffairsMargaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy* The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com <holly.gregory@sidley.com%20>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
*InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
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Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ
+64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz
Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
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I'm in. Thanks. Robin On Nov 14, 2015, at 6:09 AM, Stephen Deerhake wrote:
Hi Jordan.
Happy to help as well.
Stephen Deerhake
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Chris Disspain Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 2:29 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Hi Jordan,
Happy to help.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
On 14 Nov 2015, at 11:03, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Thanks Greg.
I've decided as WP1 rapporteur to start a piece of work to see if we can solve this. More details in around 48h.
Jordan
On Saturday, 14 November 2015, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote: A very quick response:
1. I only used the ccNSO in the example because Chris Disspain did. Clearly, that exposed this issue right over a major fault line. I don't know if that was Chris's intent, or if he was just speaking from his cc point of view, but no matter -- the elephant is where it is. As Becky indicates, GNSO would have similar concerns (though without quite the same ability to walk away from ICANN). One could imagine similar concerns from at least some of the other SO/ACs as well (though without the same history, which can't be ignored).
2. The completion deadline isn't *really* 48 hours from now. That's only when the Formal Update (downgraded from an Executive Summary, and perhaps to be further downgraded to a Strong Breeze, or a Foul Wind) is being published. The *real* proposal won't be published until November 30 (known to those in the US as "the Monday after Thanksgiving").
3. This does expose issues, as you say: Should all Bylaw changes coming from any SO/AC be immune from challenge by the Community? Or should this immunity be granted only to the ccNSO, given the Great Schism of 2002 and the subsequent Great Re-Engagement of 2003, which was predicated on specific understandings? How far would this immunity go? If such Bylaws were immune from veto, would a "spill the board" or "IRP" action by the remaining Community members also be prohibited? How far does this "One Big Community" idea go? Does it go so far to say that each part of the Community must be subservient to the Community as a whole? (Which sounds like another word that begins with "Commun-" (not that there's anything wrong with that)) If not, how do you balance autonomy and Community? And to what extent should these be general rules vs. specific rules (or exceptions to the general rules)? Can there be a narrowly tailored solution to this particular issue, so that we are dealing with an animal smaller than an elephant, and a problem smaller than the essential underpinnings of "Community Powers"? Do the various escalation steps (especially the conference call and the Community Forum) provide enough of an opportunity for an embattled SO/AC to try to stop this from happening, rather than changing the rules at all? Greg
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote: Chris, all,
I am with Jordan on this.
In the present situation, the board can reject the outcome of such a GNSO or ccNSO process with a 2/3 majority vote, right? Again in the present situation (and if all is well), the board would do so on the basis of comments from the community on the GNSO or ccNSO proposal. So, the community would kind of have the final say. Which is what we want, although it might sometimes be disappointing to a particular constituency.
In the post-transition situation, with the new community powers in place, we want the community to be able to correct the board on important decisions that the large majority of the community does not agree with. Many of these important decisions will either be the outcome of a policy process of an SO or advice from an AC (think about the GAC and stress test 18 in this context). Some of those will require a bylaw change, quite a few not, I suspect. Furthermore, those “important decisions” will in most cases (bylaw change or not) have an impact on a wider group than the SO or AC members that propose it.
So I think it’s completely justified that the community can eventually block an SO policy or AC advice (again, requiring a bylaw change or not) WITHOUT the consent of the “issuing” SO or AC. In fact, I think this this is one of the important pillars of the multi-stakeholder model.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> Date: donderdag 12 november 2015 10:50 To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Thanks Greg.
For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
Cheers,
Chris
On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au | W:www.auda.org.au
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice- This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
From: Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM To: Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
From: Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz] Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett < Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
From: wp1-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf OfJordan Carter Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM To: Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org Subject: Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gregory, Holly <holly.gregory@sidley.com > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz
Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
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Wait a minute, I actually don't understand the below formulation. Is the CCWG really likely to undo the compromises of 2003-2005 that saw the ccTLDs return to ICANN after leaving. Or have I COMPLETELY misunderstood. Nigel (ccNSO Council Member, for the record) On 11/12/2015 01:17 PM, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite opposition from the rest of the community.
I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions "yes." These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite some time.
On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
Greg
On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote:
All,
Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by me and a number of others).
Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO supporting such a block?
This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including, importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on the NRO.
It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain|Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
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auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
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On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sdelbianco@netchoice.org');>> wrote:
"consent of the governed"? I do not think it means what you think it means.
A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by majority of all citizens. A government that campaigned on raising taxes on the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted rich give their support.
Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the contract parties. That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
From: <wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','robin@ipjustice.org');>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jbladel@godaddy.com');>>, "wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>, Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
Robin
On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of community decision making.
Thanks—
J.
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> on behalf of Jon Nevett <jon@donuts.email <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jon@donuts.email');>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');>> Cc: "<wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>" <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
Folks:
I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making Process.
In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a community action in order to move forward.
In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community process.
In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the community makes a decision binding.
We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community decision process is invoked.
To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the group most impacted by a decision.
Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already have been discussing.
We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is predominant. Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
Thanks.
Jon
On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>> wrote:
No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
Alan,
I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. I’m not talking about a participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds either in support or against.
I’m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide not to participate.
But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the community mechanism.
But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate – acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal – from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of participation for that reason.
Best,
Brett
------------------------------------------------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*From:* Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca');>] *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* <wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');>>; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE support, the action dies.
In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
Alan -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');> > wrote:
Hi,
I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time. Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by consensus.
Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4 may be in order. That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC or less.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75 percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');>] *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
hi Brett,
Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current model.
Jordan
On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org');>> wrote: Jordan,
I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement of the CCWG proposal.
Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I don’t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for exercise of the community powers.
Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying levels of participation. Is this being drafted?
Thanks,
Brett
*From:* wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:wp1-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1-bounces@icann.org');>] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','wp1@icann.org');> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
... and in PDF J
On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> > wrote: Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
Jordan
*Brett* *Schaefer*/ Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy/ The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
*Brett* *Schaefer*/ Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy/ The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org <http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory@sidley.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','holly.gregory@sidley.com');> > Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48 Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was sent to you last week. The changes are largely in the nature of clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well. We request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Kind regards, Holly and Rosemary
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
/A better world through a better Internet /
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ * +64-4-495-2118 <tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649 <tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','jordan@internetnz.net.nz');> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/>
/A better world through a better Internet /
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participants (16)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Burr, Becky -
Chris Disspain -
Drazek, Keith -
Edward Morris -
Greg Shatan -
James M. Bladel -
Jon Nevett -
Jordan Carter -
Nigel Roberts -
Phil Buckingham -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Seun Ojedeji -
Stephen Deerhake -
Steve DelBianco