Fwd: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Grapsas, Rebecca <rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com> Date: Thu, Feb 11, 2016 at 7:28 PM Subject: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 To: Bernard Turcotte <turcotte.bernard@gmail.com> Cc: Sidley ICANN CCWG <sidleyicannccwg@sidley.com>, ICANN-Adler < ICANN@adlercolvin.com>, "Greeley, Amy E." <AGreeley@sidley.com> Dear Bernie, Attached please find minor proofing/conforming changes on Annexes 1, 2 and 11. Most of the edits to Annex 1 were provided on January 31 but had not been incorporated. If possible, it would be great if these could be reflected in the final version to be distributed for review. We also noticed that Annex 3 did not incorporate our edits sent on January 31, 2016; these are pasted again below for your convenience. If you would prefer that we prepare a markup of Annex 3, please send us a Word version. Many thanks. *Annex 3*: · *Global*: o “c*C*ommunity p*P*ower” or “c*C*ommunity p*P*owers” · *Summary (p. 1)*: o “(ICANN) have a single…” o “Any changes to Fundamental Bylaws require approval from both the ICANN Board and *the Empowered Community*community as outlined in…” · *Paragraph 1 (p. 2), Paragraph 18 (p. 5)*: o “The *Empowered Community for enforcing Community Powers,*Community Mechanism as the Sole Designator Model including the *role of sole designator of ICANN’s Directors,*the right of inspection granted to Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community as described in Recommendation 1.” o “The process for amending Fundamental Bylaws and/or Articles of Incorporation*, and for approving ICANN’s sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN’s assets,* as described in Recommendation 3.” o “The PTI Governance and Customer Standing Committee (CSC) structures, also required by the CWG-Stewardship’s Proposal.” o “The right*s* of investigation *and inspection* (as described in Section 3 of Annex 01 - Recommendation #1: Establishing an Empowered Community for Enforcing Community Power)*.*” · *Paragraph 4 (p. 2)*: “Today, ICANN Bylaws can be changed by a resolution of the Board upon a 2/3 majority vote* of all of the Directors*. The CCWG-Accountability believes that the set of key Bylaws fundamental to ICANN’s stability and operational continuity and essential for the community’s decisions-rights should be given additional protection from changes by requiring *Empowered Community *community approval of any amendments.” · *Paragraph 5 (p. 3)*: “By sharing the authority to authorize changes between the ICANN Board and the *Empowered Community *ICANN community (organized through its *participating* Supporting Organizations (SOs) and Advisory Committees (ACs)*,* *the “Decisional Participants” *in the Empowered Community*, as* outlined in Recommendation #1…).” · *Paragraph 11 (p. 4, graphic)*: Remove the “Sidley/Adler Note,” but we note that our comments on the graphic have not been incorporated into the latest draft. o In the graphic, for the box on the lower right, we recommend adding “(3/4 MAJORITY)” after “REQUIRES ICANN BOARD.” We also recommend addressing the Articles of Incorporation in a separate graphic under the section titled “Articles of Incorporation.” · *Paragraph 12 (p. 4)*: “The *Empowered Community *community approves the addition, amendment, or removal of the Fundamental Bylaw by using its power as an Empowered Community to approve the change…” · *Paragraph 13 (p. 4)*: “If the addition, amendment, or removal of the Fundamental Bylaw is agreed upon by both the ICANN Board and the *Empowered Community *community:” · *Paragraph 16 (p. 5)*: “The CCWG-Accountability *recommends* suggests that only critical aspects of the ICANN Bylaws be classified as Fundamental Bylaws to avoid introducing unnecessary rigidity into ICANN’s structures. The CCWG-Accountability concluded that *recommending*suggesting that all changes…” · *Paragraph 26 (p. 6)*: “…a provision will need to be added to the Articles *of Incorporation* requiring Empowered Community approval…” · *Paragraph 30 (p. 7)*: “Through the *The* Empowered Community, SOs and ACs would have to *affirmatively consent* give positive assent to any change proposed and adopted by the ICANN Board before the amendment could become legally effective, as part of a joint decision process between the ICANN Board and the *Empowered Community *community.” · *Paragraph 32 (p. 7)*: “Such changes require a high degree of *support from the Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community*community assent, as the purpose of this power is to make changing Fundamental Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation possible only with very wide support from the community.” · *Paragraph 34 (p. 7)*: “Clarified *the *process for change*s* of Articles of Incorporation to be similar to process for changes to Fundamental Bylaws*, as well as the process for approving ICANN’s sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN’s assets*.” · *Paragraph 36 (p. 8)*: “ICANN Board: Community rights regarding the ability to appoint/remove Directors of the ICANN Board, and recall the entire Board.” *REBECCA* *GRAPSAS* Counsel Sidley Austin 787 Seventh Avenue New York, NY 10019 +1-212-839-8541 Level 10 7 Macquarie Place Sydney NSW 2000 Australia +61-2-8214-2235 rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com www.sidley.com ------------------------------ *From:* Bernard Turcotte *Sent:* Tuesday, February 09, 2016 06:27:31 PM *To:* Gregory, Holly; Rosemary E. Fei; ACCT-Staff (acct-staff@icann.org); Burr, Becky; Cheryl Langdon-Orr; Jordan Carter; León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Mathieu Weill; Steve DelBianco; Thomas Rickert (thomas@rickert.net) *Subject:* CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 Holly, Rosemary, had to modify these per the results today for rec 11. In order to give you a leg up I thought I would forward these before the final report as they should be 99%+ stable. I have attached TC from a clean of your accepted comments. Hope that is ok. Cheers. B. **************************************************************************************************** This e-mail is sent by a law firm and may contain information that is privileged or confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and any attachments and notify us immediately. ****************************************************************************************************
Chairs, Thank you. It seems to me that these statements at the conclusion of Rec 1 and 2 don’t accurately reflect the substance of the proposal: Rec 1: 31 NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution. • Retaining decision-making based on consensus rather than voting. • Maintaining the advisory role of governments in the SO and AC structure. Rec 2: 61 NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution. • Retaining decision-making based on consensus rather than voting. • Maintaining the advisory role of governments in the SO and AC structure, including the GAC. • Enabling all interested stakeholders to join consultations through SOs and ACs or through the Community Forum. In fact, the decisional model does expressly contemplate voting, i.e. tallying support or opposition among the decisional participants with specified thresholds, to climb the escalation ladder and exercise community powers. Moreover, the GAC is now a participant in the Empowered Community (albeit with the carve out) and the advisory role has been altered, not maintained, by defining GAC consensus and elevating the Board threshold to reject GAC consensus advice to 60 percent. These are significant changes. Best, Brett From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Bernard Turcotte Sent: Friday, February 12, 2016 7:21 AM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Grapsas, Rebecca <rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com<mailto:rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com>> Date: Thu, Feb 11, 2016 at 7:28 PM Subject: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 To: Bernard Turcotte <turcotte.bernard@gmail.com<mailto:turcotte.bernard@gmail.com>> Cc: Sidley ICANN CCWG <sidleyicannccwg@sidley.com<mailto:sidleyicannccwg@sidley.com>>, ICANN-Adler <ICANN@adlercolvin.com<mailto:ICANN@adlercolvin.com>>, "Greeley, Amy E." <AGreeley@sidley.com<mailto:AGreeley@sidley.com>> Dear Bernie, Attached please find minor proofing/conforming changes on Annexes 1, 2 and 11. Most of the edits to Annex 1 were provided on January 31 but had not been incorporated. If possible, it would be great if these could be reflected in the final version to be distributed for review. We also noticed that Annex 3 did not incorporate our edits sent on January 31, 2016; these are pasted again below for your convenience. If you would prefer that we prepare a markup of Annex 3, please send us a Word version. Many thanks. Annex 3: • Global: o “cCommunity pPower” or “cCommunity pPowers” • Summary (p. 1): o “(ICANN) have a single…” o “Any changes to Fundamental Bylaws require approval from both the ICANN Board and the Empowered Communitycommunity as outlined in…” • Paragraph 1 (p. 2), Paragraph 18 (p. 5): o “The Empowered Community for enforcing Community Powers,Community Mechanism as the Sole Designator Model including the role of sole designator of ICANN’s Directors,the right of inspection granted to Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community as described in Recommendation 1.” o “The process for amending Fundamental Bylaws and/or Articles of Incorporation, and for approving ICANN’s sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN’s assets, as described in Recommendation 3.” o “The PTI Governance and Customer Standing Committee (CSC) structures, also required by the CWG-Stewardship’s Proposal.” o “The rights of investigation and inspection (as described in Section 3 of Annex 01 - Recommendation #1: Establishing an Empowered Community for Enforcing Community Power).” • Paragraph 4 (p. 2): “Today, ICANN Bylaws can be changed by a resolution of the Board upon a 2/3 majority vote of all of the Directors. The CCWG-Accountability believes that the set of key Bylaws fundamental to ICANN’s stability and operational continuity and essential for the community’s decisions-rights should be given additional protection from changes by requiring Empowered Community community approval of any amendments.” • Paragraph 5 (p. 3): “By sharing the authority to authorize changes between the ICANN Board and the Empowered Community ICANN community (organized through its participating Supporting Organizations (SOs) and Advisory Committees (ACs), the “Decisional Participants” in the Empowered Community, as outlined in Recommendation #1…).” • Paragraph 11 (p. 4, graphic): Remove the “Sidley/Adler Note,” but we note that our comments on the graphic have not been incorporated into the latest draft. o In the graphic, for the box on the lower right, we recommend adding “(3/4 MAJORITY)” after “REQUIRES ICANN BOARD.” We also recommend addressing the Articles of Incorporation in a separate graphic under the section titled “Articles of Incorporation.” • Paragraph 12 (p. 4): “The Empowered Community community approves the addition, amendment, or removal of the Fundamental Bylaw by using its power as an Empowered Community to approve the change…” • Paragraph 13 (p. 4): “If the addition, amendment, or removal of the Fundamental Bylaw is agreed upon by both the ICANN Board and the Empowered Community community:” • Paragraph 16 (p. 5): “The CCWG-Accountability recommendssuggests that only critical aspects of the ICANN Bylaws be classified as Fundamental Bylaws to avoid introducing unnecessary rigidity into ICANN’s structures. The CCWG-Accountability concluded that recommendingsuggesting that all changes…” • Paragraph 26 (p. 6): “…a provision will need to be added to the Articles of Incorporation requiring Empowered Community approval…” • Paragraph 30 (p. 7): “Through the The Empowered Community, SOs and ACs would have to affirmatively consent give positive assent to any change proposed and adopted by the ICANN Board before the amendment could become legally effective, as part of a joint decision process between the ICANN Board and the Empowered Community community.” • Paragraph 32 (p. 7): “Such changes require a high degree of support from the Decisional Participants in the Empowered Communitycommunity assent, as the purpose of this power is to make changing Fundamental Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation possible only with very wide support from the community.” • Paragraph 34 (p. 7): “Clarified the process for changes of Articles of Incorporation to be similar to process for changes to Fundamental Bylaws, as well as the process for approving ICANN’s sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN’s assets.” • Paragraph 36 (p. 8): “ICANN Board: Community rights regarding the ability to appoint/remove Directors of the ICANN Board, and recall the entire Board.” REBECCA GRAPSAS Counsel Sidley Austin 787 Seventh Avenue New York, NY 10019 +1-212-839-8541<tel:%2B1-212-839-8541> Level 10 7 Macquarie Place Sydney NSW 2000 Australia +61-2-8214-2235<tel:%2B61-2-8214-2235> rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com<mailto:rebecca.grapsas@sidley.com> www.sidley.com<http://www.sidley.com/> ________________________________ From: Bernard Turcotte Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 06:27:31 PM To: Gregory, Holly; Rosemary E. Fei; ACCT-Staff (acct-staff@icann.org<mailto:acct-staff@icann.org>); Burr, Becky; Cheryl Langdon-Orr; Jordan Carter; León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Mathieu Weill; Steve DelBianco; Thomas Rickert (thomas@rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>) Subject: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 Holly, Rosemary, had to modify these per the results today for rec 11. In order to give you a leg up I thought I would forward these before the final report as they should be 99%+ stable. I have attached TC from a clean of your accepted comments. Hope that is ok. Cheers. B. **************************************************************************************************** This e-mail is sent by a law firm and may contain information that is privileged or confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and any attachments and notify us immediately. ****************************************************************************************************
Hi, On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 01:18:11PM +0000, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
In fact, the decisional model does expressly contemplate voting, i.e. tallying support or opposition among the decisional participants with specified thresholds, to climb the escalation ladder and exercise community powers.
I am really leery of having a discussion in which we parse the meanings of "consensus" and "voting", but I think there is at least an open argument that the escalation ladder and so on amounts to a way to determine community consensus. Moreover, the specification of thesholds are, after all, of the constituent SOs and ACs rather than of individual voters. Having already long ago decided that decision making in ICANN would be along constituency-defined lines (rather than the unitary "community" that we see in, say, the IETF), it seems self-evident that one needs a way to ensure that one interest group can't block everyone else. So regardless of whether one thinks that this is some form of voting, it's still a mechanism to find consensus.
Moreover, the GAC is now a participant in the Empowered Community (albeit with the carve out) and the advisory role has been altered, not maintained, by defining GAC consensus and elevating the Board threshold to reject GAC consensus advice to 60 percent. These are significant changes.
But there is a difference between "letting governments participate" and "letting governments decide". The proposal does the former -- I think correctly, because they too are part of the global community. It does not do the latter -- again, correctly, and in line with the NTIA criteria. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Andrew, On your first point, that is a rather circuitous justification that, in my opinion, reads as an attempt to disguise what is actually happening. The bottom line is that, while the EC would strive for consensus, if it is not possible, the EC will make decisions based on the “votes” of individual decisional participants. On your second point, the statements say that the we are “Maintaining the advisory role of governments in the SO and AC structure” and “Maintaining the advisory role of governments in the SO and AC structure, including the GAC.” Those statements are not accurate. We are changing the role of governments in the SO AC structure by allowing them to participate in the EC. We are also changing the way the Board treats GAC consensus advice. I would not think that anyone would disagree with either of those two conclusions. Whether we are expanding the influence of governments is open to debate. I firmly believe that this proposal as the best compromise that the community could support. But I think we should be forthright in what we are proposing. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Friday, February 12, 2016 9:36 AM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 Hi, On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 01:18:11PM +0000, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
In fact, the decisional model does expressly contemplate voting, i.e. tallying support or opposition among the decisional participants with specified thresholds, to climb the escalation ladder and exercise community powers.
I am really leery of having a discussion in which we parse the meanings of "consensus" and "voting", but I think there is at least an open argument that the escalation ladder and so on amounts to a way to determine community consensus. Moreover, the specification of thesholds are, after all, of the constituent SOs and ACs rather than of individual voters. Having already long ago decided that decision making in ICANN would be along constituency-defined lines (rather than the unitary "community" that we see in, say, the IETF), it seems self-evident that one needs a way to ensure that one interest group can't block everyone else. So regardless of whether one thinks that this is some form of voting, it's still a mechanism to find consensus.
Moreover, the GAC is now a participant in the Empowered Community (albeit with the carve out) and the advisory role has been altered, not maintained, by defining GAC consensus and elevating the Board threshold to reject GAC consensus advice to 60 percent. These are significant changes.
But there is a difference between "letting governments participate" and "letting governments decide". The proposal does the former -- I think correctly, because they too are part of the global community. It does not do the latter -- again, correctly, and in line with the NTIA criteria. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
When I look up the definition of “voting” in order to understand if SO-ACs are doing it through exercise of community power, it seems pretty clear we will be “voting”. SO-ACs will be expressing formal opinions in response to a proposed decision. Putting the word “consensus” in there just doesn’t negate the core meaning of the words we are using. And we aren't going to trick the NTIA and Congress into believing the ordinary dictionary definition of words should not apply to their requirements. The sooner we put together a proposal that *will* be accepted by the powers-that-be, the sooner we can get this process over with. Robin Merriam Webster <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vote> defines the term “voting” to mean “: 1 a : a usually formal expression of opinion or will in response to a proposed decision; especially : one given as an indication of approval or disapproval of a proposal, motion, or candidate for office b : the total number of such expressions of opinion made known at a single time (as at an election) c : an expression of opinion or preference that resembles a vote d : ballot <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ballot> 1 2 : the collective opinion or verdict of a body of persons expressed by voting 3 : the right to cast a vote; specifically : the right of suffrage : franchise <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/franchise> 4 a : the act or process of voting <brought the question to a vote> b : a method of voting 5 : a formal expression of a wish, will, or choice voted <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voted> by a meeting Oxford defines “voting” as: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/vote> 1.0 A formal indication <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/indication#...> of a choice <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> between two or more candidates or courses of action, expressed typically through a ballot <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/ballot#ball...> or a show of hands <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/show#show__...> or by voice. <>1.1An act of expressing a formal indication <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/indication#...> of choice <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...>: they are ready to put it to a vote <> <>1.2(the vote) The choice <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> expressed collectively by a body of electors <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/elector#ele...> or by a specified group: the Republican vote in Florida <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Florida#Flo...> <>1.3(the vote) The right to indicate a choice <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> in an election.
On Feb 12, 2016, at 6:35 AM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
Hi,
On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 01:18:11PM +0000, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
In fact, the decisional model does expressly contemplate voting, i.e. tallying support or opposition among the decisional participants with specified thresholds, to climb the escalation ladder and exercise community powers.
I am really leery of having a discussion in which we parse the meanings of "consensus" and "voting", but I think there is at least an open argument that the escalation ladder and so on amounts to a way to determine community consensus. Moreover, the specification of thesholds are, after all, of the constituent SOs and ACs rather than of individual voters. Having already long ago decided that decision making in ICANN would be along constituency-defined lines (rather than the unitary "community" that we see in, say, the IETF), it seems self-evident that one needs a way to ensure that one interest group can't block everyone else. So regardless of whether one thinks that this is some form of voting, it's still a mechanism to find consensus.
Moreover, the GAC is now a participant in the Empowered Community (albeit with the carve out) and the advisory role has been altered, not maintained, by defining GAC consensus and elevating the Board threshold to reject GAC consensus advice to 60 percent. These are significant changes.
But there is a difference between "letting governments participate" and "letting governments decide". The proposal does the former -- I think correctly, because they too are part of the global community. It does not do the latter -- again, correctly, and in line with the NTIA criteria.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On voting: Beginning in Dublin, CCWG moved away from making decisions my supermajority voting. Instead, the empowered community will determine consensus by meeting thresholds of support in the absence of multiple objections. This is markedly different than determining outcomes by tallying votes to see who got the most. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> Date: Friday, February 12, 2016 at 1:46 PM To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: FW: CCWG - recs 1,2 and 11 When I look up the definition of “voting” in order to understand if SO-ACs are doing it through exercise of community power, it seems pretty clear we will be “voting”. SO-ACs will be expressing formal opinions in response to a proposed decision. Putting the word “consensus” in there just doesn’t negate the core meaning of the words we are using. And we aren't going to trick the NTIA and Congress into believing the ordinary dictionary definition of words should not apply to their requirements. The sooner we put together a proposal that *will* be accepted by the powers-that-be, the sooner we can get this process over with. Robin Merriam Webster<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vote> defines the term “voting” to mean “: 1. 1a : a usually formal expression of opinion or will in response to a proposed decision; especially : one given as an indication of approval or disapproval of a proposal, motion, or candidate for officeb : the total number of such expressions of opinion made known at a single time (as at an election)c : an expression of opinion or preference that resembles a voted : ballot<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ballot> 1 2. 2: the collective opinion or verdict of a body of persons expressed by voting 3. 3: the right to cast a vote; specifically : the right of suffrage : franchise<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/franchise> 4. 4a : the act or process of voting <brought the question to a vote>b : a method of voting 5. 5: a formal expression of a wish, will, or choice voted<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voted> by a meeting Oxford defines “voting” as:<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/vote> 1.0 A formal indication<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/indication#...> of a choice<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> between two or more candidates or courses of action, expressed typically through a ballot<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/ballot#ball...> or a show of hands<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/show#show__...> or by voice. 1.1An act of expressing a formal indication<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/indication#...> of choice<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choice__18>:they are ready to put it to a vote 1.2(the vote) The choice<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> expressed collectively by a body of electors<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/elector#ele...> or by a specified group:the Republican vote in Florida<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Florida#Flo...> 1.3(the vote) The right to indicate a choice<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/choice#choi...> in an election. On Feb 12, 2016, at 6:35 AM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: Hi, On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 01:18:11PM +0000, Schaefer, Brett wrote: In fact, the decisional model does expressly contemplate voting, i.e. tallying support or opposition among the decisional participants with specified thresholds, to climb the escalation ladder and exercise community powers. I am really leery of having a discussion in which we parse the meanings of "consensus" and "voting", but I think there is at least an open argument that the escalation ladder and so on amounts to a way to determine community consensus. Moreover, the specification of thesholds are, after all, of the constituent SOs and ACs rather than of individual voters. Having already long ago decided that decision making in ICANN would be along constituency-defined lines (rather than the unitary "community" that we see in, say, the IETF), it seems self-evident that one needs a way to ensure that one interest group can't block everyone else. So regardless of whether one thinks that this is some form of voting, it's still a mechanism to find consensus. Moreover, the GAC is now a participant in the Empowered Community (albeit with the carve out) and the advisory role has been altered, not maintained, by defining GAC consensus and elevating the Board threshold to reject GAC consensus advice to 60 percent. These are significant changes. But there is a difference between "letting governments participate" and "letting governments decide". The proposal does the former -- I think correctly, because they too are part of the global community. It does not do the latter -- again, correctly, and in line with the NTIA criteria. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On Fri, Feb 12, 2016 at 10:46:50AM -0800, Robin Gross wrote:
When I look up the definition of “voting” in order to understand if SO-ACs are doing it through exercise of community power, it seems pretty clear we will be “voting”.
As I already suggested, I don't think debating the word's meaning is going to help us, because decision-making mechanisms are complicated and people have different meanings. For instance, as you pointed out, Webster seems to think that "an expression of opinion or preference that resembles a vote" qualifies; since that is going to stand or fall on what you think "resembles" or "vote" (or both) means, it doesn't really help us. The point is rather that the mechanism we have provides a number of escalation procedures along with lots of different mechanisms for discussion and debate, punctuated by decision-making moments that rely on more or less formally-established bodies to express opinion. This is certainly not _individual_ voting, and it's not even representative voting since AFAIK the SOs and ACs aren't themselves constituted by election. Some might call it voting by the SOs and ACs. I say all we know is that there is an escalating majoritarian principle for certain kinds of action, but the majority is of groups the composition of which is at best a little murky; and also that the principle is always accompanied by a lot of discussion. Something like that, even if it contained something that everyone would call a formal vote, can also be correctly described as a way of determining consensus. I don't think there is a good argument for binary opposition here. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
participants (5)
-
Andrew Sullivan -
Bernard Turcotte -
Robin Gross -
Schaefer, Brett -
Steve DelBianco