Re: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations. But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board". Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to. Alan At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
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We won't know about the bylaws vote until we are well into implementation. Which requires the Chartering Organizations to have approved the Report some months earlier. On Sunday, October 18, 2015, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations.
But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
Alan
At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
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Agreed. Moreover even the Board consideration step comes AFTER submission to the SO/AC, so the Board would consider the view of the community, not visa versa. On Oct 18, 2015, at 3:50 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote: We won't know about the bylaws vote until we are well into implementation. Which requires the Chartering Organizations to have approved the Report some months earlier. On Sunday, October 18, 2015, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote: Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations. But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board". Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to. Alan At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote: The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board. -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs. In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model. I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model. Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
From the above statement, it is apparent that Alan has made this statement under the fear that the transition will fail if the board does not accept the CCWG proposal citing fiduciary responsibility. Please let me assure you this kind of fear mongering is a tactical technique used by Alan that has demonstrated much success earlier as well. In the CWG-Stewardship, he similarly fear mongered that the transition will fail because NTIA would reject the Contract Co model. That time too everybody else blinked.
I really hope the community doesn't blink this time. On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations.
But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
Alan
At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
In the CWG-Stewardship, he similarly fear mongered that the transition will fail because NTIA would reject the Contract Co model. That time too everybody else blinked.
Interesting you think the proposal that came out of CWG-Stewardship was as a result of formal intervention from Alan (ALAC), well if thats is at all valid, I guess maybe ALAC deserves accolades then. ;-). We may want to face reality or just continue in fantasy as we all got to that stage within the CWG where it was realistically agreed upon that Contract-Co was at best close to fantasy and then we worked to develop a compromise solution which by the way was not entirely the preferred solution of ALAC.
I really hope the community doesn't blink this time.
Hopefully we will learn from CWG and maximize the CCWG time as much as possible going forward. Regards
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations.
But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
Alan
At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
On Sunday 18 October 2015 09:23 PM, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> wrote:
In the CWG-Stewardship, he similarly fear mongered that the transition will fail because NTIA would reject the Contract Co model. That time too everybody else blinked.
Interesting you think the proposal that came out of CWG-Stewardship was as a result of formal intervention from Alan (ALAC), well if thats is at all valid, I guess maybe ALAC deserves accolades then. ;-). We may want to face reality or just continue in fantasy
Yes, efforts at disruption of power concentrations are best derided as 'fantasies' by those who want to hold on to power. But then people have a nasty democratic way of getting what is legitimately theirs (democracy was long just a popular fantasy for autocrats)... The problem here is that the group within the ICANN system that is supposed to represent the 'peripheries' seem even more eager than many other groups to reinforce the status quo. That alone is the irony, although only a minor one give the well-known manner in which the 'fantasy' of representation of ICANN outsiders is structured within the ICANN system. My problem at this stage is no longer much about the substance of the matter, we know that the status quo of power in the system will be preserved at any cost, and any democratisation would have to be got by other means. My problem is entirely about the process: the torturous manner in which decisions made dictatorially, to cater to narrow interests, are being sought to be retrofitted with a 'bottom up participatory process' that then is also sold as the model for all kinds of governance. ALAC as the supposed rep of the 'peripheries' has a key role in this tragi-comedy, which is being played out right now... This joke and bluff should be called, if anyone can. I hope there is someone in Dublin who will do it - bell the cat, I mean, getting past the enormous gates that ICANN carefully erects against such intrusions (and still gets away calling it an open process). parminder
as we all got to that stage within the CWG where it was realistically agreed upon that Contract-Co was at best close to fantasy and then we worked to develop a compromise solution which by the way was not entirely the preferred solution of ALAC.
I really hope the community doesn't blink this time.
Hopefully we will learn from CWG and maximize the CCWG time as much as possible going forward.
Regards
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote:
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations.
But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
Alan
At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
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/Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 //alt email:<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>/
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
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Seun, What you call the "reality" of the transition is actually the chilling effect that forces the community to err on the side of caution. You may feel ALAC deserves accolades for projecting the wishes of the Board and NTIA in the form of guesses about what they may accept or reject. On the other hand, for me, this reality demonstrates a significant failure of the multistakeholder process. It undermines the integrity of the entire process if our ultimate objective is to merely project the desires of the Board and NTIA. Guru On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 9:23 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
In the CWG-Stewardship, he similarly fear mongered that the transition will fail because NTIA would reject the Contract Co model. That time too everybody else blinked.
Interesting you think the proposal that came out of CWG-Stewardship was as a result of formal intervention from Alan (ALAC), well if thats is at all valid, I guess maybe ALAC deserves accolades then. ;-). We may want to face reality or just continue in fantasy as we all got to that stage within the CWG where it was realistically agreed upon that Contract-Co was at best close to fantasy and then we worked to develop a compromise solution which by the way was not entirely the preferred solution of ALAC.
I really hope the community doesn't blink this time.
Hopefully we will learn from CWG and maximize the CCWG time as much as possible going forward.
Regards
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca
wrote:
Correct, the CCWG proposal is not dependant on a supermajorty of the Board supporting it, or in fact any Board support, since it is not one of the CCWG's chartering organizations.
But that is not what I said. At the point when our recommended changes are to be implemented, the current Bylaws must be amended. Under the current Bylaws, the "Bylaws of ICANN may be altered, amended, or repealed and new Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws adopted only upon action by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the Board".
Under their fiduciary duty, each Board member may only vote to adopt new Bylaws if he/she believes it is in the interest of ICANN and its mission and core values to do so. It was THAT action that I was referring to.
Alan
At 18/10/2015 09:53 AM, Chartier, Mike S wrote:
The CCWG proposal is not dependent on support "by a supermajority of Board directors". The requirement is that there is not a determination that it is not in the global public interest by a 2/3 majority of the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2015 9:42 AM To: CCWG Accountability Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ALAC Statement on proposed accountability models
In its formal response to the CCWG-Accountability proposal issued in August 2015, the ALAC said that it could support the model being proposed, but preferred something far less complex and lighter-weight, and that we saw no need for the level of enforceability that the proposal provided. Moreover, the ALAC had specific concerns with the budget veto and the apparent lack of participation of perhaps a majority of AC/SOs.
In light of the reconsideration of a designator model by the CCWG, along with the recommendations of the Saturday morning break-out sessions, the ALAC felt that a revised statement was in order. Accordingly we decided, by a unanimous vote of the 14 ALAC members present (with 1 not present), to withdraw support for the Membership model.
I want to make it clear that this is not a "red line" decision. Should a Membership model become one that is generally advocated by the CCWG, and supported by a supermajority of Board directors (who ultimately MUST support any changes that they will be called upon to approve, else they would be in violation of their fiduciary duty), then the ALAC reserves its right to support such a model.
Alan Greenberg Chair, At-Large Advisory Committee
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
participants (6)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Chartier, Mike S -
Greg Shatan -
Guru Acharya -
parminder -
Seun Ojedeji