[CCWG-Accountability] Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
+1 Steve. This would be the best approach to address and forestall all future obstacles that may stand in the way of the New ICANN and opportunity or stakeholder advantage to address issues that may occur should we have a loophole or suspect one in the nearest future. However, i wish to raise the question on defining corporation and community. Its been observed that working definitions within ICANN can be contradictory. The need to point at Bylaws and Clause that clarify responsibility and response is key to the future of ICANN. -Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone. On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 6:12 PM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying,
"I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.”
In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress.
So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process.
Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7).
What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.
This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.
— Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng | akinbo@nira.org.ng <akinbo@yips.org.ng> *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* DNS Africa Magazine, @dnsafrica akinbo@dnsafrica.org www.dnsafrica.org *National Convener,* Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> *President,* Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) wwwyips.org.ng | akinbo@yips.org.ng *The RedHub.* 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com www.iaids.org About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
Hi everyone, and Happy 2015! Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms. My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable. Thanks, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition." In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community's last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN's board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan's group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN's board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN's board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board's duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation - not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN's board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. - Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I strongly agree with both James and Steve. The IANA transition represents an opportunity - probably the last good opportunity - to reflect on the past 15 years of ICANN as the IANA operator (among other things) and make changes that balance bad organizational habits and biases with what we would (and should) expect from the manager of the DNS. The work has already been done multiple times. The problems are well known. The proposed solutions are well known. Now is the time to make it stick rather than lose this one good opening because of semantic concerns. Kieren - [sent through phone] On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 7:59 PM, James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
Hi everyone, and Happy 2015! Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms. My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable. Thanks, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition." In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community's last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN's board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan's group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN's board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN's board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board's duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation - not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN's board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. - Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
+1 From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kieren McCarthy Sent: Saturday, January 3, 2015 12:59 AM To: James M. Bladel Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage I strongly agree with both James and Steve. The IANA transition represents an opportunity - probably the last good opportunity - to reflect on the past 15 years of ICANN as the IANA operator (among other things) and make changes that balance bad organizational habits and biases with what we would (and should) expect from the manager of the DNS. The work has already been done multiple times. The problems are well known. The proposed solutions are well known. Now is the time to make it stick rather than lose this one good opening because of semantic concerns. Kieren - [sent through phone] On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 7:59 PM, James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com<mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>> wrote: Hi everyone, and Happy 2015! Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms. My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable. Thanks, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
+1 McCarthy. McCarty, Steve paints the loophole; its crystal clear. However, while we foresee Membership, how do we curb overzealous membership expectation? With a clear process for equal representation, i believe that we can address it without excess. Its our only opportunity to address transparency for the future ICANN. -Akinbo. On Sat, Jan 3, 2015 at 9:27 PM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
+1
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Kieren McCarthy *Sent:* Saturday, January 3, 2015 12:59 AM *To:* James M. Bladel *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage
I strongly agree with both James and Steve.
The IANA transition represents an opportunity - probably the last good opportunity - to reflect on the past 15 years of ICANN as the IANA operator (among other things) and make changes that balance bad organizational habits and biases with what we would (and should) expect from the manager of the DNS.
The work has already been done multiple times. The problems are well known. The proposed solutions are well known.
Now is the time to make it stick rather than lose this one good opening because of semantic concerns.
Kieren
- [sent through phone]
On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 7:59 PM, James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
Hi everyone, and Happy 2015!
Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms.
My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable.
Thanks,
J.
____________
James Bladel
GoDaddy
On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying,
"I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.”
In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress.
So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process.
Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI>Article 6, Section 7).
What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.
This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.
—
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. www.akinbo.ng *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng | akinbo@nira.org.ng <akinbo@yips.org.ng> @niraworks *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* DNS Africa Magazine www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo@dnsafrica.org @dnsafrica *National Convener,* Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> *President,* Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo@yips.org.ng *The RedHub.* 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. http://www.theredhub.org/ *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com www.iaids.org About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
One more +1 to Steve and Kieren, Having been too close to the ALAC example Steve described, I fully support the analysis on offer. - Evan On 3 January 2015 at 15:52, Adebunmi AKINBO <akinbo.adebunmi@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 McCarthy.
McCarty, Steve paints the loophole; its crystal clear.
However, while we foresee Membership, how do we curb overzealous membership expectation?
With a clear process for equal representation, i believe that we can address it without excess. Its our only opportunity to address transparency for the future ICANN. -Akinbo.
On Sat, Jan 3, 2015 at 9:27 PM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> wrote:
+1
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Kieren McCarthy *Sent:* Saturday, January 3, 2015 12:59 AM *To:* James M. Bladel *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage
I strongly agree with both James and Steve.
The IANA transition represents an opportunity - probably the last good opportunity - to reflect on the past 15 years of ICANN as the IANA operator (among other things) and make changes that balance bad organizational habits and biases with what we would (and should) expect from the manager of the DNS.
The work has already been done multiple times. The problems are well known. The proposed solutions are well known.
Now is the time to make it stick rather than lose this one good opening because of semantic concerns.
Kieren
- [sent through phone]
On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 7:59 PM, James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
Hi everyone, and Happy 2015!
Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms.
My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable.
Thanks,
J.
____________
James Bladel
GoDaddy
On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying,
"I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.”
In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress.
So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process.
Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI>Article 6, Section 7).
What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.
This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.
—
Steve DelBianco
Executive Director
NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. www.akinbo.ng
*Member, Executive Board of Directors*, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng | akinbo@nira.org.ng <akinbo@yips.org.ng> @niraworks
*Acting Chief Operating Officer,* DNS Africa Magazine www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo@dnsafrica.org @dnsafrica
*National Convener,* Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/>
*President,* Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo@yips.org.ng
*The RedHub.* 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. http://www.theredhub.org/
*National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com www.iaids.org About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Evan Leibovitch Toronto Canada Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56
James, I suggest that you suggest with links and a reference. This can be summarised and posited for others to see the key and the relevance. It is correct that we ensure continuity and reduce the work with existing layouts yet to be seen as strong for the future of the internet. -Akiinbo On Sat, Jan 3, 2015 at 4:59 AM, James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
Hi everyone, and Happy 2015!
Just wanted to lend my support to Steve's post, below. The IANA transition is the context, but not necessarily the yardstick, for the work on new accountability mechanisms.
My only concern is that two separate review teams (ATRT1 and ATRT2) also went down this path, and with arguably more time & resources to complete their work. For this CWG to be successful, I strongly believe we need to stand on their shoulders and reference prior work wherever possible and applicable.
Thanks,
J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy
On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote:
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying,
"I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.”
In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress.
So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process.
Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7).
What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.
This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.
— Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
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-- *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. www.akinbo.ng *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng | akinbo@nira.org.ng <akinbo@yips.org.ng> @niraworks *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* DNS Africa Magazine www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo@dnsafrica.org @dnsafrica *National Convener,* Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> *President,* Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo@yips.org.ng *The RedHub.* 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. http://www.theredhub.org/ *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com www.iaids.org About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
Akinbo asked for specific references, so here you are: ICANN Bylaws Article 6 Section 7 defines the duty of directors to ICANN the Corporation: Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies. Should there be any confusion about whether the bylaws refer to ‘ICANN’ as the corporation or the community, see ICANN’s own Management Operating Principles (2008 link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-trans-frameworks-principles...>, p. 5): "The third and perhaps most critical point of tension is between the accountability to the participating community to perform functions in keeping with the expectations of the community and the corporate and legal responsibilities of the Board to meet its fiduciary obligations. The ultimate legal accountability of the organization lies with the Board, not with the individuals and entities that make up the ICANN community.” ICANN doesn’t have shareholders in the traditional sense, so we are seeking to give voice and voting power to the community ICANN was designed to serve. California Nonprofit Corporation Law expressly authorizes non-profit organizations to have Members with ultimate authority to control the organization. Under Cal. Corp. Code § 5310 “A corporation may admit persons to Membership, as provided in its Articles or Bylaws”. California law recognizes that Members may reserve the right to approve nonprofit actions and oversee the Board of Directors. (§ 5210) A Board of Directors’ authority to conduct the affairs of a nonprofit may be limited by the rights of the Members specified in the law or in the nonprofit corporation’s Articles or Bylaws. Although ICANN does not currently have Members under Article XVII of its Bylaws, ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation expressly anticipate that ICANN may have Members: “These Articles may be amended by the affirmative of at least two-thirds of the directors of the Corporation. When the Corporation has Members, amendments must be ratified by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the Members voting on any proposed amendment.” (Section 9) On Jan 2, 2015, at 11:13, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16o...>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria. +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. www.akinbo.ng<http://www.akinbo.ng> Member, Executive Board of Directors, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng<http://www.nira.org.ng/> | akinbo@nira.org.ng<mailto:akinbo@yips.org.ng> @niraworks Acting Chief Operating Officer, DNS Africa Magazine www.dnsafrica.org<http://www.dnsafrica.org/> | akinbo@dnsafrica.org<mailto:akinbo@dnsafrica.org> @dnsafrica National Convener, Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng<http://www.nira.org.ng/> President, Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) www.yips.gnbo.com.ng<http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo@yips.org.ng<mailto:akinbo@yips.org.ng> The RedHub. 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. http://www.theredhub.org/ National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011. Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org<http://www.youthaidscoalition.org> www.takingitglobal.com<http://www.takingitglobal.com> www.iaids.org<http://www.iaids.org> About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
Steve, family matters have kept me from replying to this earlier. Several points. - I completely understand the issue of the leverage given to us by the IANA stewardship transition. I have talked about this a number of times in CWG-Stewardship prior to the start of the CWG-Accountability (and have been chastised for daring to mention it). You may recall that I have championed one of the "internal to ICANN" transition proposals which presumes (or rather demands) that the CCWG-Accountability put in place real and effective accountability and the existance of this leverage is why I believed that it was indeed possible. - As I said (or perhaps wrote in the chat) later in the meeting, I support using this leverage to get overall Board accountability and I have explicitly documented some of the methods that your inventory itemizes. - I still feel that some of the items flagged as WS1 are not in this category (examples of those are ones that reference details on registrar or registry contracts, but there are others) that I feel are not at all connected to either IANA or general Board accountability. Others are specific instances of accountability that may not be needed if we succeed in the more generalized methods. Regarding this being the "last kick at the can", that will depend on whether the Affirmation of Commitments is replaced in this pass or not. My hope is that even if this is not the last kick, we will not need another one if we do our job properly. Alan At 02/01/2015 12:12 PM, Steve DelBianco wrote:
Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.â
In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the communityâs last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANNâs board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress.
So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process.
Alanâs group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANNâs board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16oct14-en.pdf>link). ICANNâs board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN boardâs duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation not to the community. (see <https:///www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI>Bylaws Article 6, Section 7).
What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision.
This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANNâs board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice <http://www.netchoice.org/>http://www.NetChoice.org and <http://blog.netchoice.org/>http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
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participants (7)
-
Adebunmi AKINBO -
Alan Greenberg -
Evan Leibovitch -
James M. Bladel -
Jonathan Zuck -
Kieren McCarthy -
Steve DelBianco