Accountability - the "Future Governance Review"
After last night’s call, there appears to be a push toward committing this Group’s resources to evaluation of the “Future Governance Review” approach as a possible “way forward” in the face of the Board’s apparent veto of the CCWG proposal. The Board has expressed concern that the SOs and ACs are “not sufficiently representative” of stakeholders and therefore not sufficiently accountable to assume Sole Member or Designator powers. The irony in this situation is that to my knowledge, this “Future Governance Review” notion has not been reviewed with the CSG or any other SOs and ACs. I confess I do not understand the underlying assumption of the “Future Governance Review” proposal – which is that the Bylaws powers listed (and assumed by the CWG Stewardship Final Report to be guaranteed) will be enforceable outside the Sole Member context. I believe we have already been advised by counsel that enforceability is in question outside that context. We have received this advice in many forms and on many occasions and it has been consistent. It does not seem to me that the proposal re Future Governance Review changes the advice already received regarding enforceability. Moving beyond that VERY FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION underlying the “Future Governance Review” approach. if this hybrid approach has been reviewed with our constituencies and stakeholders, I am personally not aware of that. As a matter of procedure and in the name of Accountability and being truly representative of the groups we allegedly represent, the CCWG should not proceed in this direction and commit resources, legal and otherwise, to the study of this approach, without at least running this approach by their respective SOs and ACs. Given the current rejection by the Board toward the Sole Member model, I am not at all optimistic that “Future Governance Review” would have any different result than the current stalemate. The issue of lack of SO/AC accountability is in my view a “red herring” . I agree with those who have recounted the fact that in all prior communications regarding the transition (including in the CWG Stewardship deliberations), the Board and its members have taken the position that the Multistakeholder model is a wonderful thing that is working well and that the Board would send the CCWG proposal directly to NTIA as finalized after it had provided its input as one stakeholder.) Now, all of a sudden when concrete Community Powers are proposed via the Sole Member structure, the Board is very concerned about SO and AC Accountability. If “Future Governance Review” is seen by “thought leaders” in the CCWG and by the Board and our Co-Chairs as a “way forward”, wouldn’t it be a good idea for members of the CCWG to check with their SOs and ACs on this? In the name of Accountability and being Representative of our constituencies and stakeholders, Anne [cid:image001.gif@01D10010.B3966630] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
On 06/10/2015 16:54, Aikman-Scalese, Anne wrote:
After last night’s call, there appears to be a push toward committing this Group’s resources to evaluation of the “Future Governance Review” approach as a possible “way forward” in the face of the Board’s apparent veto of the CCWG proposal. The Board has expressed concern that the SOs and ACs are “not sufficiently representative” of stakeholders and therefore not sufficiently accountable to assume Sole Member or Designator powers. The irony in this situation is that to my knowledge, this “Future Governance Review” notion has not been reviewed with the CSG or any other SOs and ACs.
Thanks to Steve Del Bianco and others for showing me where his proposal is found. Kicking the can down the road can be helpful if you think that later on it may be easier to resolve a difficult point, once some current obstacle to agreement has been removed. If we kick this particular can down the road, past transition, what reason is there to think that it will be easier resolve in the future? I can think of some reasons why it might actually be harder. Without transition, the community will have even less leverage over the Board than it does now. Why would we expect the Board to be any more tractable in the future? The Board has very helpfully given us advance notice of the next argument it will use against membership: membership cannot be countenanced because SOs and ACs until the SOs and ACs “not sufficiently representative” of stakeholders, and so cannot be trusted. This seems like an evergreen argument: no matter what, they can always claim that SOs and ACs have not reached that perfect, magical state where they would be prepared to yield up some portion of their authority to them. This, ironically, is coming from a Board that derives its own legitimacy from appointment by those very same SOACs. Finally, absent the imperative to reach agreement in time to achieve transition we might find it harder to build a consensus even among ourselves. So with such problems, it doesn't immediately strike me as likely to lead to success. What are the arguments in favour of this approach, other than the allure of procrastination? Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Sensible questions, Malcolm. kjs -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:03 PM To: Aikman-Scalese, Anne; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Accountability - the "Future Governance Review" On 06/10/2015 16:54, Aikman-Scalese, Anne wrote:
After last night's call, there appears to be a push toward committing this Group's resources to evaluation of the "Future Governance Review" approach as a possible "way forward" in the face of the Board's apparent veto of the CCWG proposal. The Board has expressed concern that the SOs and ACs are "not sufficiently representative" of stakeholders and therefore not sufficiently accountable to assume Sole Member or Designator powers. The irony in this situation is that to my knowledge, this "Future Governance Review" notion has not been reviewed with the CSG or any other SOs and ACs.
Thanks to Steve Del Bianco and others for showing me where his proposal is found. Kicking the can down the road can be helpful if you think that later on it may be easier to resolve a difficult point, once some current obstacle to agreement has been removed. If we kick this particular can down the road, past transition, what reason is there to think that it will be easier resolve in the future? I can think of some reasons why it might actually be harder. Without transition, the community will have even less leverage over the Board than it does now. Why would we expect the Board to be any more tractable in the future? The Board has very helpfully given us advance notice of the next argument it will use against membership: membership cannot be countenanced because SOs and ACs until the SOs and ACs "not sufficiently representative" of stakeholders, and so cannot be trusted. This seems like an evergreen argument: no matter what, they can always claim that SOs and ACs have not reached that perfect, magical state where they would be prepared to yield up some portion of their authority to them. This, ironically, is coming from a Board that derives its own legitimacy from appointment by those very same SOACs. Finally, absent the imperative to reach agreement in time to achieve transition we might find it harder to build a consensus even among ourselves. So with such problems, it doesn't immediately strike me as likely to lead to success. What are the arguments in favour of this approach, other than the allure of procrastination? Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (3)
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Aikman-Scalese, Anne -
Malcolm Hutty -
Salaets, Ken