Keith, I wasn't trying to compare the two processes at any level. I was simply pointing out that the concept of board "approval" at a lower threshold than 50% is not a new concept. Whether it is appropriate in the case of GAC advice and whether it should depend on how that advice was determined, was not the focus of my comment. The ALAC has carefully avoided comment on that issue and I am honouring that. Alan At 18/12/2015 01:46 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote:

Alan, if we’re comparing results of GNSO PDP recommendations with GAC consensus advice, it’s important to note that a key element of the GNSO’s threshold is the Board only has to show deference to the GNSO when that advice is the result of a formal PDP. This means not all GNSO resolutions receive the Board deference, even if the vote of the GNSO Council is unanimous. The GNSO may only initiate a formal PDP under certain restrictions in both scope and jurisdiction and not every topic can be properly considered in scope for a GNSO PDP. In fact, as part of every issue report in the GNSO PDP process, the ICANN General Counsel is asked to opine as to whether the proposed issue is properly within the jurisdiction of the GNSO. If it is not, that does not prevent the PDP from continuing, but the higher Board threshold would not be required in such a case. Will the GAC be similarly and appropriately restricted in the scope of its advice, for example, to only issues of public policy or international law and treaties? This issue is under active discussion in the RySG and will be reflected in its public comments. Regards, Keith

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 1:28 PM To: Robin Gross; Greg Shatan Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Does the proposed change to the GAC Bylaw create a new "mandatory voting requirement" for the ICANN Board?

We have th3e exact same situation with the Board accepting GNSO PDP recommendations. It takes supermajority to reject. But we still say that the GNSO "recommends" policy and it is adopted - or not - by the Board. Saying that it takes a supermajority to reject is identical to saying that acceptance only requires 1/3. There is no presumption. It is simply a different threshold.

Alan

At 18/12/2015 01:11 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

Greg raises an interesting point about the status of GAC advice in the absence of a 2/3 vote to reject it below. I recall our lawyers telling us early on (and often) that board members are not allowed to ‬œoff-load" key decisions of the organization ¬™s management to others as it would be a breach of theiir fiduciary duty. But it seems like that is what we may have done (intentionally or not) by presumptively accepting GAC advice and putting the burden on the board to reject and undo the effect of that decision. This may be an issue we need to further explore with our lawyers.

Robin

On Dec 17, 2015, at 9:51 PM, Greg Shatan <<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>gregshatanipc@gmail.com > wrote:

[…] There is another issue raised by this new language. With this revision, it is far from clear what the status of GAC Advice that not been rejected by a 2/3 vote? If the Board takes a vote, but the rejection fails to pass, is the GAC Advice now "accepted" (possibly by a vote of 1/3+1) and binding on ICANN? What about GAC Advice on which no vote has been taken -- is that Advice "accepted" and binding on ICANN and, if so, when? [Compare this to the Community's right to reject a standard bylaws change -- if the community does not elect to do so, or attempts to do so and fails, that bylaw clearly become binding upon ICANN.]

The combination of a 2/3 threshold and a mandatory vote to reject GAC Advice creates a presumption that GAC advice will be accepted. This presumption is novel and clearly elevates GAC Advice to a new level of deference within the ICANN process.

Although none of this is explicitly stated in the detailed explanation in Annex 11, the more I consider this and the more people I talk to, the more convinced I am that what I've laid out above is exactly what was intended by some of those involved in the drafting process for the Bylaw revision, and the rest of us just didn't see it at the time. Since it's not brought out in the CCWG's explanation, this fundamental change can "fly under the radar" until the Proposal is approved.

I don't believe that this was the intention of the CCWG. If it's not the intention of the CCWG, then my alternative wording would remove this concern. If this is in fact the intention of the CCWG then I think it needs to be part of the explanation set forth in the proposal, so that the intent and effect are clear, and any reader can clearly understand what we have wrought.

Finally, I have to say that this is not an "implementation level" concern. This is, if you will, a "policy level" concern. If this gets baked into the accepted proposal, then the implementers will essentially be bound to carry this out in the implementation (i.e., the drafting of the "real" Bylaw language). Any later attempt to change a concept stated in the accepted and transmitted final proposal will face a very high set of hurdles, at best. Now is the time to deal with this.

Greg

On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 3:22 PM, Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > wrote: Greg, you say that the current Bylaws do not reference voting. The current wording ( <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#XI-2.1j>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#XI-2.1j) is "In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice..." How else is the Board able to formally decide on anything other than by voting? Alan At 16/12/2015 03:09 AM, Greg Shatan wrote:

All, In reviewing the Third Draft Proposal, concerns have been raised within my constituency that the proposed Bylaw does more than replace an existing "majority" threshold with a new "2/3" threshold. The concern is that the proposed Bylaw introduces a "mandatory vote" by the Board in order to reject GAC Advice where the Bylaws do not currently require a Board vote. Further, there appears to be a concern that, if the Board does not take a vote and affirmatively reject a piece of GAC advice, then that GAC advice becomes binding on ICANN. These concerns stem from a reading of the draft Bylaw (new language in red): The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. Any Governmental Advisory Committee advice approved by a full Governmental Advisory Committee consensus, understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection, may only be rejected by a vote of two-thirds of the Board, and tThe Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

â€Ã¢€Â¹The ccurrent langanguage of the Bylaw makes no reference to voting, only to the far more ambiguous "determines to take an action." As such, adding a reference to a vote can be seen to add a new element (aside from the introduction of a 2/3 threshold): the element of a bylaws-mandated vote. Similarly, the statement that GAC Advice can only be rejected by a vote of the Board can be read to state that if no such vote is taken (or if such vote is taken and fails) that the GAC Advice is then something ICANN is bound to follow. I don't think either of these things were intended by the CCWG. Whether they are misreadings of our draft language or unintended consequences of the drafting, this concern is troubling. If it is the intent of some of those drafting this language to force a vote where none is currently required, then that is even more troubling. I would appreciate some clarification on these matters that I can bring back to my group. I would also appreciate the CCWG considering a change in language to remove this ambiguity which is currently causing great consternation in my group. I suggest the language below. This m ore closely track â€Ã¢€Â¹sÃsâ€Ã¢€Â¹