Statement of accountability scope and limitations; fact based evidence
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw. In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one? In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing? I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed. George
Hi, While I agree that the ''do no harm" adage is applicable, we have to be careful to not fall into the "íf it ain't broke"mentality. For better or worse, many people believe that NTIA has provided a backstop on the Board. And whether this is true and to what degree it is true in various situations, it is a belief that many hold. If we are looking for a fact, that may be one. There is also nervousness about what the Board might be like in the future if there were no longer a backstop. Beyond that, I do not think that this is the time to get into examples of what has gone wrong in the past. We all have our favorite Reconsideration, DIDP, CEP and IRP failure instances. Suffice it to say there was general agreement that the degree to which the Board rules near absolutely at the moment, with no real way to appeal its decsions, does not sit well with the community. And that the situation just will not do, if we are to lose the NTIA backstop. There are many who think that it is better to have NTIA keep the stewardship if we don't improve accountability. We can't suppose that everyone will great a change in stewardship with same enthusiasm. Many of us are uncomfortable with un-appealable authority, no matter how benevolent it may appear today. The multistakeholder model is one of participatory democracy In the analysis done in the early parts of the process, we came up with a set of powers the community felt were necessary going forward and at this point we are trying to meet those requirements while meeting the issues brought by those who submitted comments. For a while we have focused on the Board's accountability , but Jan and others point out, we have avoided looking at ourselves and our own accountability. This is especially important if we loosen the degree to which the Board can provide oversight over the ACSO structure in our various membership models. Also, discussions of staff accountability to the community and especially to the multistakeholder modalities has long been an issue and this is a good time to initiate that conversation. The focus on our own accountability is important as it leads us to focus more on the balance between the volunteer community and Board we selected from within our community including the new blood we bring in . It forces us to look at the degree to which one segment of the community rules over the other and the mechanisms for assuring that the right things occur. It forces us to ask questions about the balance of accountability and the mechanisms of mutual accountability. Incidentally, I appreciate the effort you and other Board members are making to take off your miter's of authority and participate in these discussions as members of the community. As you know that is something I would like to see much more of. avri On 09-Jul-15 14:16, George Sadowsky wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Avri, Thanks for your contribution, cogent as always. My comments in line mostly supportive but differing at some key points. Steve On Jul 10, 2015, at 12:15 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
While I agree that the ''do no harm" adage is applicable, we have to be careful to not fall into the "íf it ain't broke"mentality.
I’m not sure why “If ain’t broke, don’t fix it” isn’t a perfectly fine mentality. There are plenty of ways to fix things in the future, even under today’s formulation of ICANN, should the need arise.
For better or worse, many people believe that NTIA has provided a backstop on the Board. And whether this is true and to what degree it is true in various situations, it is a belief that many hold. If we are looking for a fact, that may be one.
You have spoken accurately. The *fact* is that many *believe* NTIA has provided a backstop. I assert this effect has been negligible at best. Moreover, NTIA’s administration of the IANA contract has created more problems of trust than it has solved. Apparently not many in the community realize how NTIA’s approach toward administering the IANA contract has been inimical to transparency and accountability of the IANA function. I fully expect that the expiration of the contract will result in improvements transparency and accountability simply because NTIA will no longer be in the loop./
There is also nervousness about what the Board might be like in the future if there were no longer a backstop.
You say below it’s not time to get into examples of what has gone wrong in the past. That’s fine in terms of taking the high road, but I think there are many people who are indeed carrying around angst from what they view as prior bad experience. That’s ok with me. I would also recommend we try to document any instances of NTIA’s oversight that actually prevented or corrected anything. My memory may not be perfect, but I dont know of any. I’m open to hearing from anyone who can describe how NTIA acted as a backstop in any meaningful way.
Beyond that, I do not think that this is the time to get into examples of what has gone wrong in the past. We all have our favorite Reconsideration, DIDP, CEP and IRP failure instances. Suffice it to say there was general agreement that the degree to which the Board rules near absolutely at the moment, with no real way to appeal its decsions, does not sit well with the community.
I think there is very broad agreement that having the board handle reconsideration feels wrong, and, more generally, there should be some sort of independent appeals process. Exactly what this should be is a harder question. An Independent Review Panel (IRP) looks attractive, but closer examination of the little bit of experience we have with that process raises some difficult questions. We have seen panels reach arguably poor decisions and have zero accountability.
And that the situation just will not do, if we are to lose the NTIA backstop. There are many who think that it is better to have NTIA keep the stewardship if we don't improve accountability. We can't suppose that everyone will great a change in stewardship with same enthusiasm. Many of us are uncomfortable with un-appealable authority, no matter how benevolent it may appear today. The multistakeholder model is one of participatory democracy
While I agree we need something akin to a judicial function, you have repeated two assertions that aren’t true, at least not as you’ve formulated them in absolute terms. First, as noted above, NTIA has not functioned as a backstop. And the board does not have absolute authority. Board members have limited terms, strong opposition from the community does have an effect, and, in the event the board goes beyond its statutory authority, it can be sued in court. I think a somewhat clearer presentation of the matter is that many in the community are not satisfied with these avenues of recourse and want stronger, more immediate, and finer-grained forms of recourse. All of that is understandable, but I think we should recognize that these are improvements in degree, not kind.
In the analysis done in the early parts of the process, we came up with a set of powers the community felt were necessary going forward and at this point we are trying to meet those requirements while meeting the issues brought by those who submitted comments.
For a while we have focused on the Board's accountability , but Jan and others point out, we have avoided looking at ourselves and our own accountability. This is especially important if we loosen the degree to which the Board can provide oversight over the ACSO structure in our various membership models. Also, discussions of staff accountability to the community and especially to the multistakeholder modalities has long been an issue and this is a good time to initiate that conversation.
The focus on our own accountability is important as it leads us to focus more on the balance between the volunteer community and Board we selected from within our community including the new blood we bring in . It forces us to look at the degree to which one segment of the community rules over the other and the mechanisms for assuring that the right things occur. It forces us to ask questions about the balance of accountability and the mechanisms of mutual accountability.
Yes. Thanks.
Incidentally, I appreciate the effort you and other Board members are making to take off your miter's of authority and participate in these discussions as members of the community. As you know that is something I would like to see much more of.
Hmm… my wardrobe has never included a miter. Unless is comes with magical powers of infallibility, I’d shy away from wearing one. Humor aside, I think you will see greater participation as we move through this critical period. Steve
avri
On 09-Jul-15 14:16, George Sadowsky wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, thanks for the reply, I only want to address one paragrapgh. On 10-Jul-15 12:51, Steve Crocker wrote:
While I agree we need something akin to a judicial function, you have repeated two assertions that aren’t true, at least not as you’ve formulated them in absolute terms. First, as noted above, NTIA has not functioned as a backstop. And the board does not have absolute authority. Board members have limited terms, strong opposition from the community does have an effect, and, in the event the board goes beyond its statutory authority, it can be sued in court. I think a somewhat clearer presentation of the matter is that many in the community are not satisfied with these avenues of recourse and want stronger, more immediate, and finer-grained forms of recourse. All of that is understandable, but I think we should recognize that these are improvements in degree, not kind.
I think there is a difference of opinion on the degree of backstop. Just the fact that a contract has to be renewed every few years, with an RFP ever 7 years year (how biblical) means that to some degree they are a backstop. If nothing else, if the Board really messes up, the contract might end up elsewhere. As to whether they ever also served as an informal moderating influence by having strong conversations that helped Board members arrive at a better clue, we could argue until the end of time without reaching a final conclusion as to degree to which these served as a backstop. As for absolute authority, of course I mean within the limits of the bylaws, I do not mean to speak of absolute authority in the sense of the Dear Leader of North Korea. Currently the bylaws offer no repsonse for the community to a Board consensus other than a (s)election that could be up to 3 years away. If the Board decides to unilaterally change reference contracts of new gTLD applicants, no one can challenge that. It the Board decides to add TMCH+50 we have no real recourse. Given that the Board can overrule any recommendation made by any SO or advice of an AC, without any possible recourse (except of course for the GAC with its special powers) is as close as we can come to absolute authority, at least within the confines of ICANN's mission. And, as some argue, even outside the confines of a narrowly understood mission the Board can decide to things that no ACSO can affect, e.g. deciding which multistakeholder efforts beyond ICANN we give money to, and how much we give. So we may need to agree to disagree on whether the Board has absolute authority and whether the NTIA is a backstop. avri As for miters, we speak of a removing ones hat to speak in ones own right as opposed to speaking ex cathedra with the authority of the Board. The only hats of authority I can think of, other than crowns, are miters. --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Please find inline el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPhone 6
On Jul 10, 2015, at 17:51, Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> wrote:
[....]
The *fact* is that many *believe* NTIA has provided a backstop. I assert this effect has been negligible at best.
I have always believed the above to be true. However this statement by the Chairman of the ICANN Board is contradictory to ICANN's position in at least one recent court case. In my country misleading the court is frowned upon. Very seriously.
Moreover, NTIA’s administration of the IANA contract has created more problems of trust than it has solved. Apparently not many in the community realize how NTIA’s approach toward administering the IANA contract has been inimical to transparency and accountability of the IANA function. I fully expect that the expiration of the contract will result in improvements transparency and accountability simply because NTIA will no longer be in the loop. [...]
This is an important admission which confirms what I have been saying all along and what the SLE Design Team of the CWG has encountered. It obviously needs to be addressed in WS1 as we don't need expectations of accountability but mechanisms in place before the transition can go ahead. greetings, el
Dear George, All, Thank you for providing me an opportunity to remind everyone of one of our first work product, which was focused on definition and scoping, and addressed the questions raised by Jan (and others) about what accountability means, its purpose, etc. The document is an appendix of our initial report but can also be found at : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/50823981/20150313%20CCWG%20... Always good to keep this foundation in mind. Best Mathieu Le 09/07/2015 20:16, George Sadowsky a écrit :
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************
Dear Mathieu, Thanks again for the reference below. I'm pleased by the comprehensiveness of this work, and I was pleased to see that section 6.d covers much of the subject of my recent post. I think that I've injected enough thoughts into this conversation for the moment, an I hope that we can achieve a constructive result in Paris. Thanks for the guidance. Georg George On Jul 11, 2015, at 2:26 AM, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
Dear George, All,
Thank you for providing me an opportunity to remind everyone of one of our first work product, which was focused on definition and scoping, and addressed the questions raised by Jan (and others) about what accountability means, its purpose, etc.
The document is an appendix of our initial report but can also be found at : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/50823981/20150313%20CCWG%20...
Always good to keep this foundation in mind.
Best Mathieu
George, as being familiar with the Hippocratic Oath from a professional perspective, I need to point out that the "First, do no harm" maxim does not appear there. A popular misconception, as seven Wikipedia will tell you. However, I do not agree that we should put in only minimum fixes, because we can only fix what comes to our attention as being broken, after the fact. Now the old software maxim "Don't fix what ain't broken" has its place in avoiding introducing new bugs, but it does nothing to improve the user experience or function. Since you brought it up, in (Curative) Medicine and especially Surgery, we of course only do what the patients gives informed consent to, but only doing the minimum to fix a problem is considered unprofessional and would attract serious liability. Never mind that Preventative Medicine including Screening have shown to be of immense value. ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy, and I am sure in many other ways that will come to light eventually. It is in need of comprehensive, structural reform, if not a complete redesign. Not just our tinkering around the edges. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 9, 2015, at 19:16, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Eberhard, I took a tour of the history of the Hippocratic Oath, via Google, and you are of course correct. Actually, it is a very, very long oath in any of its forms. Avri believes that there is no point in going over the past, but I really would like to understand what past events are most prominent in driving the accountability discussion. There are, to be sure, normative considerations regarding governance models and structures, but there also seem to be a lot of specific evens that would yield fact based evidence for change. Are there that many? Hw about starting a list, with a short description of how each affects the accountability process underway? As for reforming ICANN, I have a number of ideas on how ICANN could be improved, some affecting the Board. For example, I feel strongly that Board meetings should generally be public, and that the serious issues for debate should be scheduled for public sessions. That is not the case now, and I continue to push the idea. Now, when you say, "ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy," say more, give concrete examples of brokenness and the directions the fix could take. It's impossible to deal only with the general statement. I'm not aversee to changes in ICAN, but I want them to be based on observable defects and improvement strategies that are likely to be effective in fulfilling our mandate. That's all. George
What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from?
On Jul 11, 2015, at 1:09 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
George,
as being familiar with the Hippocratic Oath from a professional perspective, I need to point out that the "First, do no harm" maxim does not appear there. A popular misconception, as seven Wikipedia will tell you.
However, I do not agree that we should put in only minimum fixes, because we can only fix what comes to our attention as being broken, after the fact.
Now the old software maxim "Don't fix what ain't broken" has its place in avoiding introducing new bugs, but it does nothing to improve the user experience or function.
Since you brought it up, in (Curative) Medicine and especially Surgery, we of course only do what the patients gives informed consent to, but only doing the minimum to fix a problem is considered unprofessional and would attract serious liability. Never mind that Preventative Medicine including Screening have shown to be of immense value.
ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy, and I am sure in many other ways that will come to light eventually.
It is in need of comprehensive, structural reform, if not a complete redesign. Not just our tinkering around the edges.
el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 9, 2015, at 19:16, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear all, dear George, I did see a specific example in the recent note by Kieran in response to Bruce's point about financial transparency. I can note from a ccTLD perspective the ICP1 'original sin' if you like, from years ago. I can note more recently and more generally the NetMundial experiment. I can also point you to a post that Jonathan Zuck made during the Buenos Aires meeting on the mail list, which I take the liberty of posting below. His post was in response to Chris Disspain saying "It is one thing to assert this and another to document it.", which in turn was Chris responding to Jonathan saying, among other things: "...ICANN as an institution has systematically resisted real accountability for years". I also note the strange case that many accountability improvements agreed for implementation in various ATRTs seem not to have been implemented? best, Jordan *---------- Forwarded message ----------From: Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org <JZuck@actonline.org>>Date: 20 June 2015 at 06:48Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary ModelTo: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <ceo@auda.org.au>>Cc: Accountability CCWG <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>Sigh. Okay.Failed thus far to develop binding accountability mechanisms.Failed to adhere to policies around publication of documents prior to meetings.Failed to prevent decision making prior to termination of comment periods.Developed no standard for review during the previous attempt at accountability reform (2006?)Failed to develop public metrics to hold ICANN institutions to account (such as contract compliance)Failed to listen to community consensus on singular/plural and controlled the outcome of the redress mechanisms through overly narrow mandate.Pushed ahead with new gTLD program despite a lack of operational readiness, again without consequences.Launched a staff lead review of the new gTLD program prior to any input from the community.Scheduled new round of applications (at least initially) prior to scheduled reviews.Failed to reign in the Net Mundial initiative despite community objection or specify any consequences for secret board resolutions, etc.Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest. Weakened rather than strengthened the IRP. Allowed staff to unilaterally change community agreement on registry agreements and imposed the unilateral right to amend registry agreements. Failed to implement half of the ATRT1 recommendations, again without consequences.Supported the practice of passing off all responsibility to third parties so ICANN has no risk. (.SUCKS is the latest example)First attempted to prevent an accountability component to the IANA transition and then tried to control it, insert experts, etc. rather than trusting the community to organize itself.Just a few thoughts off the top of my head. Your turn.Jonathan ZuckPresidentACT: The App AssociationWww.ACTonline.org <http://Www.ACTonline.org>* On 12 July 2015 at 06:52, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
Eberhard,
I took a tour of the history of the Hippocratic Oath, via Google, and you are of course correct. Actually, it is a very, very long oath in any of its forms.
Avri believes that there is no point in going over the past, but I really would like to understand what past events are most prominent in driving the accountability discussion. There are, to be sure, normative considerations regarding governance models and structures, but there also seem to be a lot of specific evens that would yield fact based evidence for change. Are there that many? Hw about starting a list, with a short description of how each affects the accountability process underway?
As for reforming ICANN, I have a number of ideas on how ICANN could be improved, some affecting the Board. For example, I feel strongly that Board meetings should generally be public, and that the serious issues for debate should be scheduled for public sessions. That is not the case now, and I continue to push the idea. Now, when you say, "ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy," say more, give concrete examples of brokenness and the directions the fix could take. It's impossible to deal only with the general statement.
I'm not aversee to changes in ICAN, but I want them to be based on observable defects and improvement strategies that are likely to be effective in fulfilling our mandate. That's all.
George
What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from?
On Jul 11, 2015, at 1:09 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
George,
as being familiar with the Hippocratic Oath from a professional perspective, I need to point out that the "First, do no harm" maxim does not appear there. A popular misconception, as seven Wikipedia will tell you.
However, I do not agree that we should put in only minimum fixes, because we can only fix what comes to our attention as being broken, after the fact.
Now the old software maxim "Don't fix what ain't broken" has its place in avoiding introducing new bugs, but it does nothing to improve the user experience or function.
Since you brought it up, in (Curative) Medicine and especially Surgery, we of course only do what the patients gives informed consent to, but only doing the minimum to fix a problem is considered unprofessional and would attract serious liability. Never mind that Preventative Medicine including Screening have shown to be of immense value.
ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy, and I am sure in many other ways that will come to light eventually.
It is in need of comprehensive, structural reform, if not a complete redesign. Not just our tinkering around the edges.
el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 9, 2015, at 19:16, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *
Hi Jordan, On ATRT, please see https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/atrt2-recommendation-implementat... <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/atrt2-recommendation-implementat...> and let me know the 'strange cases' to which you refer. On Jonathan’s list, the challenge is to demonstrate a) they are true and b) they are widely held community concerns rather than concerns of some in the community. Take:
Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest.
Really? What does that mean? And when we‘re clear what it means could we then demonstrate community consensus that whatever it means is a problem? There may well be examples of ‘Board’ action that would have had community consensus to overturn. But a cavalier approach to claiming such really is detrimental to the process we are trying to bring to a consensus based closure. Cheers, Chris
On 12 Jul 2015, at 13:22 , Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Dear all, dear George,
I did see a specific example in the recent note by Kieran in response to Bruce's point about financial transparency.
I can note from a ccTLD perspective the ICP1 'original sin' if you like, from years ago.
I can note more recently and more generally the NetMundial experiment.
I can also point you to a post that Jonathan Zuck made during the Buenos Aires meeting on the mail list, which I take the liberty of posting below. His post was in response to Chris Disspain saying "It is one thing to assert this and another to document it.", which in turn was Chris responding to Jonathan saying, among other things: "...ICANN as an institution has systematically resisted real accountability for years".
I also note the strange case that many accountability improvements agreed for implementation in various ATRTs seem not to have been implemented?
best, Jordan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org <mailto:JZuck@actonline.org>> Date: 20 June 2015 at 06:48 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary Model To: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Cc: Accountability CCWG <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>
Sigh. Okay.
Failed thus far to develop binding accountability mechanisms. Failed to adhere to policies around publication of documents prior to meetings. Failed to prevent decision making prior to termination of comment periods. Developed no standard for review during the previous attempt at accountability reform (2006?) Failed to develop public metrics to hold ICANN institutions to account (such as contract compliance) Failed to listen to community consensus on singular/plural and controlled the outcome of the redress mechanisms through overly narrow mandate. Pushed ahead with new gTLD program despite a lack of operational readiness, again without consequences. Launched a staff lead review of the new gTLD program prior to any input from the community. Scheduled new round of applications (at least initially) prior to scheduled reviews. Failed to reign in the Net Mundial initiative despite community objection or specify any consequences for secret board resolutions, etc. Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest. Weakened rather than strengthened the IRP. Allowed staff to unilaterally change community agreement on registry agreements and imposed the unilateral right to amend registry agreements. Failed to implement half of the ATRT1 recommendations, again without consequences. Supported the practice of passing off all responsibility to third parties so ICANN has no risk. (.SUCKS is the latest example) First attempted to prevent an accountability component to the IANA transition and then tried to control it, insert experts, etc. rather than trusting the community to organize itself.
Just a few thoughts off the top of my head. Your turn.
Jonathan Zuck President ACT: The App Association Www.ACTonline.org <http://www.actonline.org/>
On 12 July 2015 at 06:52, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com <mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com>> wrote: Eberhard,
I took a tour of the history of the Hippocratic Oath, via Google, and you are of course correct. Actually, it is a very, very long oath in any of its forms.
Avri believes that there is no point in going over the past, but I really would like to understand what past events are most prominent in driving the accountability discussion. There are, to be sure, normative considerations regarding governance models and structures, but there also seem to be a lot of specific evens that would yield fact based evidence for change. Are there that many? Hw about starting a list, with a short description of how each affects the accountability process underway?
As for reforming ICANN, I have a number of ideas on how ICANN could be improved, some affecting the Board. For example, I feel strongly that Board meetings should generally be public, and that the serious issues for debate should be scheduled for public sessions. That is not the case now, and I continue to push the idea. Now, when you say, "ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy," say more, give concrete examples of brokenness and the directions the fix could take. It's impossible to deal only with the general statement.
I'm not aversee to changes in ICAN, but I want them to be based on observable defects and improvement strategies that are likely to be effective in fulfilling our mandate. That's all.
George
What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from?
On Jul 11, 2015, at 1:09 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na <mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote:
George,
as being familiar with the Hippocratic Oath from a professional perspective, I need to point out that the "First, do no harm" maxim does not appear there. A popular misconception, as seven Wikipedia will tell you.
However, I do not agree that we should put in only minimum fixes, because we can only fix what comes to our attention as being broken, after the fact.
Now the old software maxim "Don't fix what ain't broken" has its place in avoiding introducing new bugs, but it does nothing to improve the user experience or function.
Since you brought it up, in (Curative) Medicine and especially Surgery, we of course only do what the patients gives informed consent to, but only doing the minimum to fix a problem is considered unprofessional and would attract serious liability. Never mind that Preventative Medicine including Screening have shown to be of immense value.
ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy, and I am sure in many other ways that will come to light eventually.
It is in need of comprehensive, structural reform, if not a complete redesign. Not just our tinkering around the edges.
el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 9, 2015, at 19:16, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com <mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com>> wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi all, hi Chris: On 12 July 2015 at 15:54, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
Hi Jordan,
On ATRT, please see https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/atrt2-recommendation-implementat... and let me know the 'strange cases' to which you refer.
Probably the implementation timetable. The report was submitted in December 2013. It is July 2015. There seem to be ticks in the boxes marking complete for roughly half the components in that (sixty-six) page PDF. Other elements continued (tho this update is April, and it's now July), and some aren't due for well over another year. Is that the kind of pace that we should expect? Also: sixty-six pages is not the kind of summary that is a useful dashboard look at what is happening. Is part of the new dashboard approach going to summarise this information more briefly, more meaningfully? Another question if you know - is there a similar from ATRT1? Avri sometimes mentions things not implemented from ATRT reviews, maybe she can add.
On Jonathan’s list, the challenge is to demonstrate a) they are true and b) they are widely held community concerns rather than concerns of some in the community.
Take:
*Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest. *
Really? What does that mean? And when we‘re clear what it means could we then demonstrate community consensus that whatever it means is a problem?
There may well be examples of ‘Board’ action that would have had community consensus to overturn. But a cavalier approach to claiming such really is detrimental to the process we are trying to bring to a consensus based closure.
Given the CCWG has people with a range of different sets of information, experience and length of service in the ICANN community to hand, part of the work in building consensus is getting the information on the table. You challenged Jonathan to pose some examples; he did so; as far as I can find, this is the first time you've responded. I didn't quite know what to make of your silence, but now I do at least in respect of one of his points :-) It leads to a more important question tho: How can we have a sophisticated, evidence based discussion about the specific examples of failures in ICANN's accountability, the breadth of view as to whether they are failures or not, in a way that helps the CCWG do its work? Do you / do participants generally think that would be an appropriate thing to spend some time on in WS2? cheers Jordan
Hello Jordan, See in line below. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator
On 12 Jul 2015, at 14:17, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all, hi Chris:
On 12 July 2015 at 15:54, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote: Hi Jordan,
On ATRT, please see https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/atrt2-recommendation-implementat... and let me know the 'strange cases' to which you refer.
Probably the implementation timetable. The report was submitted in December 2013. It is July 2015. There seem to be ticks in the boxes marking complete for roughly half the components in that (sixty-six) page PDF. Other elements continued (tho this update is April, and it's now July), and some aren't due for well over another year. Is that the kind of pace that we should expect?
George said: "Now, when you say, "ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy," say more, give concrete examples of brokenness and the directions the fix could take." You gave ATRT as an example and referred to the "strange case" of failure to implement. Now apparently the problem is the timetable. You raise a valid question about what pace should be expected. That's a question which can be discussed. However it's not about accountability per se and it is not the same as putting forward ATRT as an example of what George was asking for.
Also: sixty-six pages is not the kind of summary that is a useful dashboard look at what is happening. Is part of the new dashboard approach going to summarise this information more briefly, more meaningfully?
So we're clear are we that this is not an example of obfuscation or secrecy? Rather it seems you are concerned, now, that there is too much detail. Which indicates to me that what we are actually dealing with is an example "damned if we do and damned if we don't".
Another question if you know - is there a similar from ATRT1?
I don't know but will find out. However, I do know that ATRT 2 assessed the implementation of ATRT 1 and made a list of those recommendations it considered to be outstanding. There may still be some awaiting GAC action and I suspect there may be others about which there will be dispute as to whether they are completed or not. As was discussed in the public session on reviews that we held in BA, it can be hard to tell what "completion" is for some types of recommendations.
Avri sometimes mentions things not implemented from ATRT reviews, maybe she can add.
To be clear, you gave this as an example of the brokenness George asked for. I assumed that you had done so from your own knowledge of the situation rather then extrapolating from others comments.
On Jonathan’s list, the challenge is to demonstrate a) they are true and b) they are widely held community concerns rather than concerns of some in the community.
Take:
Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest.
Really? What does that mean? And when we‘re clear what it means could we then demonstrate community consensus that whatever it means is a problem?
There may well be examples of ‘Board’ action that would have had community consensus to overturn. But a cavalier approach to claiming such really is detrimental to the process we are trying to bring to a consensus based closure.
Given the CCWG has people with a range of different sets of information, experience and length of service in the ICANN community to hand, part of the work in building consensus is getting the information on the table.
Could not agree with you more. It's why it is important to challenge assertions stated as fact that are actually an individual's opinion or sometimes the re-statement as fact of an opinion of a third party.
You challenged Jonathan to pose some examples; he did so; as far as I can find, this is the first time you've responded. I didn't quite know what to make of your silence, but now I do at least in respect of one of his points :-)
Jonathan had posted in a subsequent note that he realised he had breached his own suggested protocol by posting the list. I decided on that basis not to respond. Your restatement of the list in the context of answering George's question led to me to chose an example.
It leads to a more important question tho:
How can we have a sophisticated, evidence based discussion about the specific examples of failures in ICANN's accountability, the breadth of view as to whether they are failures or not, in a way that helps the CCWG do its work?
Well, we could do what I suggested. Come up with an example from the past that we all understand and agree is something that there would be community consensus to overturn. And acknowledge that in truth these are few and far between. Or, alternatively, stop justifying our calls for greater accountability by making broad brush, non-evidence based claims that place the staff, the board and often various parts of the community in a bad light and instead acknowledge that greater accountability is a good thing and within reasonable boundaries doesn't actually need to be justified by claims of bad acting in the past.
Do you / do participants generally think that would be an appropriate thing to spend some time on in WS2?
Good question. Don't know.
cheers Jordan
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Sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 12 Jul 2015 8:42 am, "Chris Disspain" <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
.
Or, alternatively, stop justifying our calls for greater accountability by making broad brush, non-evidence based claims that place the staff, the board and often various parts of the community in a bad light and instead acknowledge that greater accountability is a good thing and within reasonable boundaries doesn't actually need to be justified by claims of bad acting in the past.
SO: +1 to above, I think what needs to be improved on is that staff/board action/inaction should become less of a surprise to the community as much as possible. This will happen when: - There is clear evidence that the community (including board/staff) are following their processes. - There is strong evidence of engaging the community in board's decision making process. For instance getting community feedback on budget should be a compulsory item in board's budget approval process. (It's not the same as making it subject to community approval) - There is proof that community's recommendations to board are evident in their actions. However this would only be more helpful if the community itself work together to achieve rough consensus on issues. Overall "improving accountability" is a continuous exercise and if everything was perfect then there may be no further progress to be recorded and perhaps no community. Regards
Do you / do participants generally think that would be an appropriate
thing to spend some time on in WS2?
Good question. Don't know.
cheers Jordan
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Hi, On 12-Jul-15 03:41, Chris Disspain wrote:
I don't know but will find out. However, I do know that ATRT 2 assessed the implementation of ATRT 1 and made a list of those recommendations it considered to be outstanding. There may still be some awaiting GAC action and I suspect there may be others about which there will be dispute as to whether they are completed or not. As was discussed in the public session on reviews that we held in BA, it can be hard to tell what "completion" is for some types of recommendations.
Yes that is one of the critical parts of each ATRT, reviewing the progress since the last one. There were materials we received from the staff durring the process of doing ATRT2. Not sure where all of it is, but some may be found on <https://community.icann.org/display/atrt/The+Accountability+and+Transparency...>. I am sure someone from the ATRT support staff can give us the details come the work week. There are also yearly reports to be found. While there were deficiencies in the completion of ATRT1 (they actually just called themselves ATRT ) that we documented in the ATRT2 report, there had also been significant progress. The evaluations starts on Page 13 of the ATRT2 report <http://www.icann.org/en/about/aoc-review/atrt/final-recommendations-31dec13-...> It was a mixed bag where more had been done than was left undone, though I don't rember us doing percentage completion ratings or anything psuedo-quantitative like that. I do rember anecdottal noticing that much of the work had occurred in the last year of the interval. But it is expected that to some degree subsequant reviews serve as the forcing function for getting the work done. I know that is how deadlines work for me. And it is one of my concerns about having 5 yearrs between ATRT instances. Waiting 2 years for the work to actually get in gear is more productive than waiting 4 years. Incidentally we reviewed not only the implementations, but the degree to which the recommendations and their implementations had been succcessful in responding to the issue. We also tried to take any material changes in the state of the world into account in making evaluations. The point I want to make is that the yearly review of progress in making the Accountability changes and the duty of the ATRTn+1 to check on the implementation of ATRTn are among the most important features of the ATRT as an accountability mechanism. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
where do I start? For starters: CEO Turnover Board Turnover (in particular female) Staff Turnover Staff Appointments (Kieren McCarthy's narrative how he was treated is a very good example , but there are many others where one wonders what their positions were created for) Board governance (Revocations on the Consent Agenda, so in-transparent that new Board members can not figure out what happened, rationales published as boilerplate) IANA department staff leaning on (ccTLD) Managers, incumbent and prospective, in the past (AXFR requirement, Contract demands, being used as leverage in even emergency name server changes) but also currently, Staff insinuating themselves into decision making processes And I do not have to mention what the IRP Panel had to say about the GAC's internal processes and how the Board deals with their advice. But I do want to quote from their Third declaration: 16. Accountability requires an organization to explain or give reasons for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in a transparent manner. With regards to the original sin, ICP1 was even put into the CWG report/proposal. I have a valid excuse for not voting against the acceptance at the ccNSO meeting in BA, because I was presenting at the DNSSSEC workshop at the time the question was asked, but am on record against its inclusion before and afterwards. I will make sure I'll be available when the CCWG and the ICG proposals will be discussed, however. greetings, el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 12, 2015, at 04:22, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Dear all, dear George,
I did see a specific example in the recent note by Kieran in response to Bruce's point about financial transparency.
I can note from a ccTLD perspective the ICP1 'original sin' if you like, from years ago.
I can note more recently and more generally the NetMundial experiment.
I can also point you to a post that Jonathan Zuck made during the Buenos Aires meeting on the mail list, which I take the liberty of posting below. His post was in response to Chris Disspain saying "It is one thing to assert this and another to document it.", which in turn was Chris responding to Jonathan saying, among other things: "...ICANN as an institution has systematically resisted real accountability for years".
I also note the strange case that many accountability improvements agreed for implementation in various ATRTs seem not to have been implemented?
best, Jordan
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@actonline.org> Date: 20 June 2015 at 06:48 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [Acct-Legal] Memo - Revised Powers Chart, Voluntary Model To: Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> Cc: Accountability CCWG <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>
Sigh. Okay.
Failed thus far to develop binding accountability mechanisms. Failed to adhere to policies around publication of documents prior to meetings. Failed to prevent decision making prior to termination of comment periods. Developed no standard for review during the previous attempt at accountability reform (2006?) Failed to develop public metrics to hold ICANN institutions to account (such as contract compliance) Failed to listen to community consensus on singular/plural and controlled the outcome of the redress mechanisms through overly narrow mandate. Pushed ahead with new gTLD program despite a lack of operational readiness, again without consequences. Launched a staff lead review of the new gTLD program prior to any input from the community. Scheduled new round of applications (at least initially) prior to scheduled reviews. Failed to reign in the Net Mundial initiative despite community objection or specify any consequences for secret board resolutions, etc. Accepted the GC advice to protect the corporation instead of the public interest. Weakened rather than strengthened the IRP. Allowed staff to unilaterally change community agreement on registry agreements and imposed the unilateral right to amend registry agreements. Failed to implement half of the ATRT1 recommendations, again without consequences. Supported the practice of passing off all responsibility to third parties so ICANN has no risk. (.SUCKS is the latest example) First attempted to prevent an accountability component to the IANA transition and then tried to control it, insert experts, etc. rather than trusting the community to organize itself.
Just a few thoughts off the top of my head. Your turn.
Jonathan Zuck President ACT: The App Association Www.ACTonline.org
On 12 July 2015 at 06:52, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote: Eberhard,
I took a tour of the history of the Hippocratic Oath, via Google, and you are of course correct. Actually, it is a very, very long oath in any of its forms.
Avri believes that there is no point in going over the past, but I really would like to understand what past events are most prominent in driving the accountability discussion. There are, to be sure, normative considerations regarding governance models and structures, but there also seem to be a lot of specific evens that would yield fact based evidence for change. Are there that many? Hw about starting a list, with a short description of how each affects the accountability process underway?
As for reforming ICANN, I have a number of ideas on how ICANN could be improved, some affecting the Board. For example, I feel strongly that Board meetings should generally be public, and that the serious issues for debate should be scheduled for public sessions. That is not the case now, and I continue to push the idea. Now, when you say, "ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy," say more, give concrete examples of brokenness and the directions the fix could take. It's impossible to deal only with the general statement.
I'm not aversee to changes in ICAN, but I want them to be based on observable defects and improvement strategies that are likely to be effective in fulfilling our mandate. That's all.
George
What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from?
On Jul 11, 2015, at 1:09 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
George,
as being familiar with the Hippocratic Oath from a professional perspective, I need to point out that the "First, do no harm" maxim does not appear there. A popular misconception, as seven Wikipedia will tell you.
However, I do not agree that we should put in only minimum fixes, because we can only fix what comes to our attention as being broken, after the fact.
Now the old software maxim "Don't fix what ain't broken" has its place in avoiding introducing new bugs, but it does nothing to improve the user experience or function.
Since you brought it up, in (Curative) Medicine and especially Surgery, we of course only do what the patients gives informed consent to, but only doing the minimum to fix a problem is considered unprofessional and would attract serious liability. Never mind that Preventative Medicine including Screening have shown to be of immense value.
ICANN is broken in so many ways, some of which we know, some we suspect, some that are hidden by obfuscation and even secrecy, and I am sure in many other ways that will come to light eventually.
It is in need of comprehensive, structural reform, if not a complete redesign. Not just our tinkering around the edges.
el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Jul 9, 2015, at 19:16, George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> wrote:
The Hippocratic oath, "do no harm," is as relevant to communities and organizations as it is to medicine. If something is largely working but has flaws, it's reasonable to ask the question of what is the minimum change necessary to eliminate the flaw.
In the case of accountability, it is clear that accountability is a necessary component of an adequate governance structure. The question in my mind is how much and in what form. I believe that the advisor to the CCWG, Jan Scholte, remarked in an earlier intervention, the issue is accountability for what, to whom, and with what enforcement mechanisms. It's possible that the this easy WG has already provided a concise statement answering these questions. If so, could someone please point me to it; if not wouldn't it be useful to have one?
In that spirit, I'd like to ask members of this group the following question: What specific events and/or activities can you identify In the past on any part of ICANN or its constituent bodies that current accountability mechanisms do not protect from? how do the variety of current proposals address those shortcomings, and how in the past with these mechanisms have been used to address those specific events and/or activities? If there already exists such a list, please point me to it; if there isn't wouldn't it be useful for some reality testing?
I am not suggesting that it would be sufficient to engineer new accountability mechanisms that dealt only with previous behavior that was considered inappropriate. Clearly it's very possible that new behavior by any part of the community considered inappropriate by any other part of the community will fit into new patterns and will not replicate earlier activities. However, there's a lot of merit in fact-based evidence, and I would like very much to have the opinion of people on this list of those instances where new accountability measures would have been useful and effective where existing accountability measures failed.
George _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
A better world through a better Internet
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participants (8)
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Avri Doria -
Chris Disspain -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
George Sadowsky -
Jordan Carter -
Mathieu Weill -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve Crocker