Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT F2F Day 1 Session 3 | 23 March
Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Face to Face DAY 1 Session 3 on 23 March will be available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Session+3 These high-level notes were prepared to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. Action Items ACTION ITEM - Comparison table for the power ACTION ITEM - Read CWG letter to set the scene. Notes WP1.A Block Changes to ICANN Bylaws Jordan Carter - WP 1 rapporteur walked the CCWG through 1.A Block changes to ICANN's Bylaws. feedback included: - Suggestion to separate Bylaws changes -------> suggested by Board or Bylaws changes that went through bottom-up process. - Circumstances for community veto should be described. - Suggestion to use "considerations for community voting: language - Ultimate resort of blocking would be a positive way to strengthen - For budget, we have a public comment process but it is not in bylaws. - We had experience with Bylaws changes - change of standard of work independent review. This is a valid remedy. How would initiate idea of Bylaws change would need to be defined. - Supermajority vs. majority - need to define this. - Need to be very clear on percentages (e.g. GAC MO) - No feedback received from members on feasibility - What happens if a group sits out voting? Endangers supermajority. - GAC is undergoing revision of operating principles - that may include right to vote - vote should be involved in these decisions whatever way is felt appropriate - Consensus call on power - Voting threshold, quota should be clarified - Should mission creep contingency be factored into this conversation? - Questions of how independent panel would this. - Do we want to prohibit changing mission? For each Bylaw lay out what requirements are needed for change ACTION ITEM - Comparison table for the power WP1-7A Removing the ICANN Board of Directors Jordan Carter - WP 1 rapporteur walked the CCWG through 7A Removing the ICANN Board of Directors. Feedback includes: - Did you consider rather than having committee using SO/ACs - having bylaws mandate each SO/AC needs to go through process. There would be a cross community discussion but that vote would occur in each SO or AC. - Who makes the Committee? - What is the minimum Board size and composition required under California law. - Should Board who served on spilled Board be ineligible? - Variations for how this power might work: 1) last resort mechanism, stability is of high priority, broad community support (# of So/Acs) needed and last resort potentially a document such as AoC; 2) high threshold but by setting lower threshold for starting conversation but discussion would happen within community council rather than before you get there. A substantial element of community would have venue to go to to place grievance (forum.) 3) based on idea of Board serves several communities and must command confidence of each community it serves (-vote of no-confidence). What kind of power do we want and when would we want to use it (under realistic circumstances. - Objective decisions - Back-up solution needed - interim Board - Theses decisions must engage SO/ACs directly - Supervisory Board is in place which would fill management function - not in our case - liability risks are involved. - Issue of whether SO/ACs have to vote: no difference if conveyed through member. Moral authority of community needs to be acting - Caretaker board to step in - you cannot have objective reasons - Strawman 2 requires a lot of work - 2 constituencies in GNSO - 3 regions in ccNSO does not mean anything - Strawman 3 is unacceptable - Community council needs to vote on it in the end. Supermajority vote needed in the end - Forget about petition - Remove 2 and 3 - Decisions be made in SO/ACs is a sensible suggestion - Both sides of SO/ACs should have voice in it --> 2 and 1 combo - Objective criteria can be defined. - Two elements of Sidley letter to CWG meeting: 1) powers commonly given to members are removing directors without cause --> no need to delineate standards of removal; 2) removing IANA functions from ICANN - nuclear option - is one way of discipline but ultimate nuclear action is for stakeholders to select other Directors ACTION ITEM - Read CWG letter to set the scene. - Who can trigger process, what is the threshold? - Level of petition matters. motion of no-confidence is very disruptive. Not indifferent to have a high or low level of threshold. Need to take into account extreme perception it gives. High level of threshold is needed to avoid giving impression ICANN is in crisis mode Conclusion - No objection to dropping # 3 - Merge dropping # 1 and # 2 - High threshold for no confidence - More support for subjective criteria (incl. objective criterai Community Veto - Wish to keep veto process - Call for flexibility - Multitude of mechanisms created - concerns - Community empowerment of Frankfurt meeting was that this apply to limited set of issues - not a provision for WP1 to work on generic mechanism - Did we want to limit community veto mechanism? - Multitude of mechanisms would be merged - Budget/strat plan should be WS1 because allocation of resources is a way for ICANN to go outside its mission. Community should be empowered to check if that happened. Out of touch with community expectation - Put process to place that is community consultation mechanism that would become part of mandate process to be use including a process for community veto. That would give option to work within timeline. It has to be realistic for it to work. - Get a timeline and determine what needs to be slot it - Blco mechanism has a designed characteristic that it does not delay process. - Concept of budget expenses - formulating directions - WS2 aspirational moves to improve processes - delineate WS1 and WS2 Community Empowerment Recap Override decisions All of them need to take into account continuity impact Voting is involved and needs to be transparent Need work on supermajority, how manage abstentions etc Votes would not directed by SO/ACs Reducing to to 1 mechanism Thresholds will need to be simplified/harmonized - Different rules for voting of different processes - SO/ACs vote Community Council Community Council - which groups do we think should be represented and how are the powers balanced? CCWG Threshold - Discussions needed on who we think should be on it or not - needs to be based on facts rather than thoughts. - Dangerous to differentiate between SO/ACs suggestion of a opt-out - observers/liaisons. SO/ACs should be represented - Opt out for ACs - Any member of community needs to be represented - everyone is represented - Inclusiveness is important - We need to make sure we are enabling outsiders - external stakeholders need to be given opportunity to appeal
participants (1)
-
Brenda Brewer