Personal thoughts on membership
Hello All, I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months. As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members. Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members). ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole. For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community". The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community. Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure: - gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc. Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model. So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Dear Bruce Thank you again for this one as well Do you have another one to compete with these two? Regards Kavouss 2015-10-03 9:09 GMT+02:00 Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>:
Hello All,
I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months.
As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members.
Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members).
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community".
The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community.
Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure: - gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc.
Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model.
So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I'm not sure I agree with this exactly as phrased by Bruce. ICANN's Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. This is undeniable. ICANN (the corporation) is established to lessen the burden of government and promote the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet (Art 3). ICANN operates for the benefit of the Internet Community as a whole (Art 4). Whilst ICANN certainly owes a duty or obligation of some form "to the Internet community as a whole" (as per Art 4, above), I am not convinced that it is that of a fiduciary, or even the lesser standard of the tort duty of care: see as a starting point:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary Please convince me.
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
Bruce, I agree with your presentation. However, you have exposed the flaw in ICANN Structure, rather than addressing it. Membership would address the flaw. Thus, would it not be better to create the new ICANN addressing flaws? Regards. On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 11:17 AM, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
I'm not sure I agree with this exactly as phrased by Bruce.
ICANN's Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. This is undeniable.
ICANN (the corporation) is established to lessen the burden of government and promote the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet (Art 3).
ICANN operates for the benefit of the Internet Community as a whole (Art 4).
Whilst ICANN certainly owes a duty or obligation of some form "to the Internet community as a whole" (as per Art 4, above), I am not convinced that it is that of a fiduciary, or even the lesser standard of the tort duty of care: see as a starting point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary
Please convince me.
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. www.akinbo.ng *Co-Founder,* My Nigeria Online (MyNOL) www.mynol.org.ng <http://www.mynol.org/> | @mynol1 *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) www.nira.org.ng | akinbo@nira.org.ng <akinbo@yips.org.ng> @niraworks *National Convener,* Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> *President,* Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo@yips.org.ng *The RedHub.* 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. http://www.theredhub.org/ *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com www.iaids.org About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone
Nigel, Please see my email today in response to you on another thread regarding the three duties that make up the fiduciary duties of a non-profit Board member. The "Duty of Obedience" does obligate the Board to "obey" the mission, purpose and values of ICANN as set forth in the Articles and Bylaws (including those cited above), and to its status as a public benefit corporation. This is a fiduciary duty, and while it must be balanced by the Board members against the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, it cannot be denigrated to the point where it is breached. Greg On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
I'm not sure I agree with this exactly as phrased by Bruce.
ICANN's Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. This is undeniable.
ICANN (the corporation) is established to lessen the burden of government and promote the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet (Art 3).
ICANN operates for the benefit of the Internet Community as a whole (Art 4).
Whilst ICANN certainly owes a duty or obligation of some form "to the Internet community as a whole" (as per Art 4, above), I am not convinced that it is that of a fiduciary, or even the lesser standard of the tort duty of care: see as a starting point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary
Please convince me.
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Let's recall what the NTIA said in its press release: *To support and enhance the multistakeholder model of Internet policymaking
and governance*, the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) today announces its intent to *transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community*. As the first step, NTIA is asking the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene global stakeholders to *develop a proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system* (DNS).
(emphasis added) As I read this, the role of the NTIA, which expressly includes its role as the "steward of the DNS," is being transitioned to the "global multistakeholder community." (Some may think that means ICANN, Inc.; I disagree and I think most of us do.) As I read Bruce, he seems to have significant concerns about whether the ICANN community is sufficiently representative of the "global multistakeholder community" to take on that job. If we're not, then that would seem to be reason to delay the transition until we are. However, I tend to disagree with Bruce's view of the ICANN community. While there is always room for improvement, I tend to share Phil's view and Jordan's view in this regard, both with regard to our readiness and Bruce's view of the yardstick for readiness. I'm not sure what statistical significance is proposed, but if it is based on direct representation and participation seems like an unreachably high bar, and something that has never been a focus of ICANN. I also don't think it takes into account how stakeholder organizations work. For instance, I don't foresee the IPC having 10,000 members in the foreseeable future. However, I would note that the IPC is in significant part an organization of organizations,, and through organizational members, we represent over 50,000 intellectual property owners around the world. Our direct membership is about half North America-based (though that includes global organizations headquartered in the US), but that ratio is improving, and the majority of our new members are coming from outside the North American/Western European area. So I would say that the characterization of "predominately US based intellectual property interests" is at best outmoded. I expect that other commercial and noncommercial community groups can demonstrate similarly how their reach exceeds the number of noses counted at an ICANN meeting, both in terms of indirect participation and in terms of mission. The NTIA did not just decide that ICANN was ready. It decided that the global multistakeholder community -- the target of their transition -- was ready. We should honor that decision. Greg On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Nigel,
Please see my email today in response to you on another thread regarding the three duties that make up the fiduciary duties of a non-profit Board member. The "Duty of Obedience" does obligate the Board to "obey" the mission, purpose and values of ICANN as set forth in the Articles and Bylaws (including those cited above), and to its status as a public benefit corporation. This is a fiduciary duty, and while it must be balanced by the Board members against the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, it cannot be denigrated to the point where it is breached.
Greg
On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
I'm not sure I agree with this exactly as phrased by Bruce.
ICANN's Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. This is undeniable.
ICANN (the corporation) is established to lessen the burden of government and promote the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet (Art 3).
ICANN operates for the benefit of the Internet Community as a whole (Art 4).
Whilst ICANN certainly owes a duty or obligation of some form "to the Internet community as a whole" (as per Art 4, above), I am not convinced that it is that of a fiduciary, or even the lesser standard of the tort duty of care: see as a starting point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary
Please convince me.
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Bruce, You below statement casts the Board's resistance to the CCWG in a completely new light and which, at least for the present discussion, I will judge as being a rather more favourable light. What I understand you to be basically saying - and please correct me if I am wrong - is that you can agree that the Board should be under the oversight of the global public, or the global Internet community, and that, if the right structure can be provided for it, it is obviously the global Internet community which should hold the final and unassailable legitimacy and power, and not the Board. Whereby a membership organisation is fine with you. However, the real problem here is that the so called group(s) or the community which are/is represented in the current CCWG's oversight or accountability model are simply not representative enough of the global Internet community. You are so very right. But the problem I see here is that this is just not the right moment to raise this most important of issues in the oversight transition process. This should have been more or less the first issue that should have been dealt with by this process. Seethe contribution of the Just Net Coalition <https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission19.pdf> where our primary contention is that the process is flawed precisely because it seems to lunge towards sorting out the details to the most meticulous levels before addressing the issues that are rather higher in logical and political hierarchy, as the issue of representativity of the Internet community, or as the NTIA announcement called it, the global multistakeholder community, obviously is. Even now, instead of employing this rather well-founded argument, that the current community structure is simply not representative enough, to propose that therefore we should keep the Board un- supervised or inadequately supervised, which almost everyone has recognised as 'the' central problem in the transition, we should be looking in full earnest into the issue of/*what kind of membership structure will be representative enough to have a legitimate claim to the kind of oversight over the Board that the CCWG proposal presents. */ Should we not first be addressing this key question, rather than any other? This indeed was among the two key questions that were the ones that should have been sorted out at the very start (other being jurisdiction), before getting quickly into details of specific models. Even at this stage, the current exercise of arriving at the best model for public ('internet community' if you like) oversight over one of the most important global technical infrastructures being of such outstanding and sustained global importance, we still must do what we must do... Rather than submit to the circular logic of since we do not have a community structure that is representative enough, we cannot have any effective oversight over the Board, which now becomes more or less a sovereign power in this area, ..... Indeed, Just Net Coalition had recommended a membership based model <http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/msg00009.html> which will include all registrants from across the world... If that makes for too unwieldy a number, we can have some means of regional elections, with one person or legal entity given just one vote however many domains it may have registered, to have a viable number of representatives of the Internet community to exercise oversight over the board (although I still find this model defective bec it doesnt include those who use the Internet but havent registered a domain name). But of course this is just one possibility and there could be numerous others that can tend towards better addressing the problem of lack of representativity of the current structures. We also know that whatever we get finally may still not be perfect but the test here would be how well we try, within the limits of practicality. So that it may not be alleged that in taking on from Bruce's emails I have moved to entirely different territories of some kind of personal political priorities, I must repeat that all that I am doing here is to address the issue posited by Bruce as follows, which I really find genuine. "For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community". I just dont see how it can be just left as an excuse, however reasonable, for Board to not to accept community oversight... The problem has to be approached from the opposite direction... By actually coming up with a "membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community". Not to do so would be a complete dereliction of the duty of the CCWG, and is likely to attract the allegation that the group being constituted largely by the 'defectively' representative current community structure, and therefore having a vest interest in it, for this reason chose not to look beyond towards a really representative structure . The CCWG group should remember that it was constituted to represent and serve the interests of the global Internet community and not that of the currently, and defectively, constituted ICANN plus community structure. The real thing to do in devising the right oversight over ICANN always was to find or devise that structure which can be considered sufficiently representative of the Internet community and therefore legitimate, and inter alia therefore avoid responses like this from the Board that sorry you yourself are not legitimate enough to be trusted with the kind of power you seek. This was/ is the time and opportunity to devise some kind of really globally representative structure outside the states based structures, and thus meet the requirements of participatory democracy, and alternative models of global governance that are still democratic, and interact with the current states based ones. Regards, parminder On Saturday 03 October 2015 12:39 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello All,
I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months.
As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members.
Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members).
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community".
The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community.
Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure: - gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc.
Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model.
So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Bruce: With all respect, on one hand your thoughts provide fodder for the argument that the current "representative government" model under which ICANN has allowed a non-representative subset of the global Internet community to capture control of the organization that is both technical administrator of the DNS and creator of related policies. (If the current community is adjudged to be insufficiently representative overall then the Board whose members are selected from it would be the same). On the other hand, you have set the bar so high for moving to the more "direct democracy" membership model -- that it should not be contemplated until " each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN" -- that it may never be reached. I don't concur with either proposition. My perspective is that so long as the barriers to entry for ICANN participation remain low, and are abetted by effective remote participation tools and affirmative outreach to underrepresented sectors, that either of the models is legitimate and that it is up to the community to select the one that affords, in their view, the optimum balance between competing model selection factors, including both accountability and potential capture. Best regards, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Bruce Tonkin Sent: Saturday, October 03, 2015 3:09 AM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Personal thoughts on membership Hello All, I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months. As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members. Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members). ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole. For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community". The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community. Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure: - gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc. Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model. So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2015.0.6140 / Virus Database: 4419/10680 - Release Date: 09/22/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Hello Phil,
(If the current community is adjudged to be insufficiently representative overall then the Board whose members are selected from it would be the same).
Yes that is true. It is mitigated using the nominating committee process that attempts to get fresh perspectives, and ensure cultural and geographic diversity on the Board. While the membership of the nominating committee is drawn from the existing ICANN community - it does need to reach consensus to appoint 8 Board members. There have been some very good board members that have been appointed from that process.
On the other hand, you have set the bar so high for moving to the more "direct democracy" membership model -- that it should not be contemplated until " each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN" -- that it may never be reached.
I think there is far more that we could do to broaden participation. We have been funding more and more people to attend ICANN face-to-face meetings - which has helped grow the ALAC structure and also helped get more participation at the GAC - but that is not really very scalable. I think we need to engage far more regionally and have some resources available in those regions to help local people articulate their concerns into the ICANN policy processes. We also need to be using online collaboration tools far more. Even the current CCWG process needs people able to devote close to 40 hours a week to fully engage, and the ability to attend face-to-face meetings (whether funded by ICANN or under their own funding) Only a narrow set of even the current ICANN community can devote that amount of time. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Hi Bruce Thank you for sharing your thoughts with us candidly and honestly. I would hope that everyone can follow in that path, and that doing so will help us move into a mode of collaboration or at least compromise that lets us get the work done. I think it's important to recognise that broadly speaking, the CCWG shared the same logic of concerns with you in prepping its second draft proposal, and came to a different conclusion of how to deal with them. The SOs and ACs aren't stakeholders per se - they are channels or routes for a wide range of stakeholders to be involved with ICANN processes, and (at their best) they aggregate and consolidate those stakeholders' views. Making sure they are open routes to aggregate stakeholder preferences is the only thing that grants them -- and by extension ICANN -- any legitimacy at all. To another post you made in the past few days - the reason we went to a single member model was to enhance and consolidate the idea that the community, acting together, should be what holds the Board to account - not the individual stakeholder groups. If ICANN doesn't have suitable involvement of the global stakeholder community today, then what you are essentially suggesting, if I am right, is that the ICANN Board should be seen as the Platonic "Philosopher Kings" of old. I personally am very uncomfortable with such an approach being taken for governance at the core of the Internet's identifiers system. And after the contract goes, in the Board's proposal, that is all we are left with. Jordan On 3 October 2015 at 20:09, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
I have given the topic of membership some thought over the last 6 months.
As has already been noted, the Articles of Incorporation does contemplate that one day ICANN may have members.
Member organisations are quite common structures for ccTLD managers (e.g the manager of .au - auDA has about 150 members) , RIR structures (APNIC has 4,500 members) , and other I* bodies like the Internet Society (65,000 members) and World Wide Web Consortium (404 members).
ICANN owes a fiduciary duty to the Internet community as a whole.
For ICANN to move to a membership model I think it needs a membership structure that more broadly reflects the size and diversity of that "Internet community".
The Structure of the SOs and ACs is an attempt to at least have a structure that "could" involve a large proportion of the Internet community.
Using the GNSO as an example, it has as part of its structure: - gTLD registries, gTLD registrars, business users, intellectual property interests, internet service and connectivity providers, non-commercial users, and not-for-profit operational concerns interests.
From my perspective ICANN would be ready to move to a membership model when each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN. The gTLD registrars stakeholder group for example have 89 members of about 1000 registrars, and those registrars represent a majority of the domain name registrations. I am less clear on whether the representation is appropriately in proportion across the 5 geographic regions. When I look at other areas though - I see limited participation from different parts of the world, and a limited proportion of the business, non-commercial entities and individuals involved in any way.
The current ICANN model was established to reduce capture from any particular segment - e.g. just commercial gTLD registry or registrar interests, or predominately US based intellectual property interests etc.
Each SO appoints two directors, ALAC appoints one director, the technical community has three liaisons (IETF, SSAC, RSSAC) and the public sector has one liaison (GAC). Other than that we formed a nominating committee comprising all of the above to find 8 directors that provide some cultural and geographic diversity to the Board. The nominating committee operates using consensus amongst all the representations from the SOs and ACs. This model attempts to balance people on the Board with specific technical names and numbers expertise, with people that bring a broad range of experience from different cultural and geographic backgrounds. This voting model was established over 16 years with a few changes along the way to substitute for the broader membership based body that many would like to see. I interpreted the NTIA announcement that it was ready to transition its stewardship as support for this governance model.
So I don't think ICANN has sufficient participation to move to a full membership mode such that each of the parts of the Internet community has a statistically relevant participation in ICANN.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
participants (8)
-
Adebunmi AKINBO -
Bruce Tonkin -
Greg Shatan -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Nigel Roberts -
parminder -
Phil Corwin