Questions regarding access to IRP when harm is prospective
Earlier today Rafael Perez Galindo wrote: we deem it essential that the standing scope encompasses not only materially affected persons or entities, but also potentially affected ones. The rationale behind this proposal is that there are instances in which the harm is only done AFTER a decision that violates the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation is made. A typical example would be the decision to delegate a new gTLD that has a high likelihood of harming determined interests or rights or users. In this case, the potentially harmed communities should be in a position to file an IRP BEFORE the harm is done, thus avoiding the commission of the violation. Hence, sometimes it makes no sense to wait till irreversible damage is caused, and a provision envisaging this situation should be put in place, expanding the scope of legitimacy to file an IRP to situations in which it is demonstrated that a severe harm can potentially be done. I responded as follows: As to “potentially affected” parties, I think we are really talking about “prospectively affected” parties. In other words, if the Board takes an action, the party in question will be materially or significantly and adversely affected. In that case, a prospectively affected party would have standing to seek relief prior to an action or decision to the extent the prospective harm is ‘material’ or ‘significant’ and the normal standard for pre-emptive or injunctive relief is met. This would require a showing on the part of the prospectively affected party that they are likely to win an IRP on the merits and that there is no adequate remedy once an action or decision has been taken. Putting aside the merits of any particular case, I believe that this approach has been adopted in at least one ongoing IRP. The chart below reflects my quick research regarding how this issue is handled in different (English speaking) jurisdictions, and how it has been applied in the international arbitration context in an ICANN IRP. (It would be great if Thomas and Leon could provide information on how this applies in civil law jurisdictions.) Our task is to decide (a) whether we agree that this kind of prospective harm should be covered, and if so, what standard should be applied. Please let me know your thoughts. Ontario, CA Three-part test for granting an injunction in R.J.R Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. (1) Is there a serious issue to be tried? Some cases apply a low standard (case is neither vexatious or frivolous) and others apply a high standard (moving party to demonstrate that it has a strong prima facie case). (2) Will the applicant suffer irreparable harm – i.e., harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or that cannot be cured - if the injunction is not granted? (3) Which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the remedy pending a decision on the merits (“balance of convenience”)? Are there other factors to be considered, e.g., “clean hands”? Australia Under Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, an interlocutory injunction will be granted where it is shown that: (1) There is a serious question to be tried in that there is a sufficient likelihood of success so as to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial; (2) The balance of convenience favours granting the injunction (that is, the inconvenience or injury the IPR holder would likely suffer if the injunction were refused outweighs the injury the alleged infringer would suffer if the injunction were granted); and (3) The plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. United States Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as explained in Johnson v. Burge, 506 Fed. Appx. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2012), a party seeking injunctive relief must show: (1) Irreparable harm; (2) Either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits; and (3) A balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party seeking the injunctive relief. International Commercial Arbitration (ICDR) Article 21 of the ICDR Rules grants broad powers to the Panel and the Emergency Arbitrator to “take whatever interim measures it deems necessary.” In order to demonstrate entitlement to interim relief on an emergency basis, a party must indicate the relief requested, explain why it is entitled to the requested interim relief, and demonstrate why the relief is required on an emergency basis. As applied in DCA Trust v. ICANN, interim relief may be granted if the claimants demonstrates (1) There is an urgent need for relief to protect an existing right (2) The relief requested is proportionate to the harm that would occur in the absence of interim relief; and (3) The claimant has a reasonable possibility of succeeding on the merits. (from another source "… most of the Rules do not provide any guidance other than that the decision maker “may” grant interim relief where the decision maker deems it “necessary” or “appropriate.” Some commentators have criticized this lack of specificity, arguing that defined standards will help overcome arbitrators’ traditional reluctance to grant requests for interim relief. Consequently, one commentator has argued that an applicant should be required to demonstrate that it is “possible” (not “probable”) that it will prevail on the merits and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. This is the approach that UNCITRAL has adopted. Others have argued that these standards, although vague, necessarily incorporate other requirements, such as irreparable harm, urgency, and some consideration of the strength of the parties’ claims and defenses.”) J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
Thank you very much Becky. As I wrote in my answer to you on the WP2 list, I think your explanation is excellent and truly grasps the gist of what I was trying to convey (it is sometimes difficult with legal terms in foreign languages). I am glad that you found in your research some instances that apply this principle of preemptively protecting a prospectively significantly harmed party that has shown the likelihood of succeeding in an IRP on the merits or the irreparable harm that it could suffer. Therefore, once again I kindly request that this kind of prospective harm be covered in the enhanced IRP we are designing, where a prospectively affected party would have standing to seek relief prior to an action or decision by the Board. Best regards Rafael GAC_SPAIN De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Burr, Becky Enviado el: miércoles, 08 de abril de 2015 1:01 Para: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Asunto: [CCWG-ACCT] Questions regarding access to IRP when harm isprospective Earlier today Rafael Perez Galindo wrote: we deem it essential that the standing scope encompasses not only materially affected persons or entities, but also potentially affected ones. The rationale behind this proposal is that there are instances in which the harm is only done AFTER a decision that violates the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation is made. A typical example would be the decision to delegate a new gTLD that has a high likelihood of harming determined interests or rights or users. In this case, the potentially harmed communities should be in a position to file an IRP BEFORE the harm is done, thus avoiding the commission of the violation. Hence, sometimes it makes no sense to wait till irreversible damage is caused, and a provision envisaging this situation should be put in place, expanding the scope of legitimacy to file an IRP to situations in which it is demonstrated that a severe harm can potentially be done. I responded as follows: As to "potentially affected" parties, I think we are really talking about "prospectively affected" parties. In other words, if the Board takes an action, the party in question will be materially or significantly and adversely affected. In that case, a prospectively affected party would have standing to seek relief prior to an action or decision to the extent the prospective harm is 'material' or 'significant' and the normal standard for pre-emptive or injunctive relief is met. This would require a showing on the part of the prospectively affected party that they are likely to win an IRP on the merits and that there is no adequate remedy once an action or decision has been taken. Putting aside the merits of any particular case, I believe that this approach has been adopted in at least one ongoing IRP. The chart below reflects my quick research regarding how this issue is handled in different (English speaking) jurisdictions, and how it has been applied in the international arbitration context in an ICANN IRP. (It would be great if Thomas and Leon could provide information on how this applies in civil law jurisdictions.) Our task is to decide (a) whether we agree that this kind of prospective harm should be covered, and if so, what standard should be applied. Please let me know your thoughts. Ontario, CA Three-part test for granting an injunction in R.J.R Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. ? Is there a serious issue to be tried? Some cases apply a low standard (case is neither vexatious or frivolous) and others apply a high standard (moving party to demonstrate that it has a strong prima facie case). ? Will the applicant suffer irreparable harm - i.e., harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or that cannot be cured - if the injunction is not granted? ? Which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the remedy pending a decision on the merits ("balance of convenience")? Are there other factors to be considered, e.g., "clean hands"? Australia Under Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, an interlocutory injunction will be granted where it is shown that: 1. There is a serious question to be tried in that there is a sufficient likelihood of success so as to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial; 2. The balance of convenience favours granting the injunction (that is, the inconvenience or injury the IPR holder would likely suffer if the injunction were refused outweighs the injury the alleged infringer would suffer if the injunction were granted); and 3. The plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. United States Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as explained in Johnson v. Burge, 506 Fed. Appx. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2012), a party seeking injunctive relief must show: ? Irreparable harm; ? Either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits; and ? A balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party seeking the injunctive relief. International Commercial Arbitration (ICDR) Article 21 of the ICDR Rules grants broad powers to the Panel and the Emergency Arbitrator to "take whatever interim measures it deems necessary." In order to demonstrate entitlement to interim relief on an emergency basis, a party must indicate the relief requested, explain why it is entitled to the requested interim relief, and demonstrate why the relief is required on an emergency basis. As applied in DCA Trust v. ICANN, interim relief may be granted if the claimants demonstrates 1. There is an urgent need for relief to protect an existing right 2. The relief requested is proportionate to the harm that would occur in the absence of interim relief; and 3. The claimant has a reasonable possibility of succeeding on the merits. 4. 5. (from another source "... most of the Rules do not provide any guidance other than that the decision maker "may" grant interim relief where the decision maker deems it "necessary" or "appropriate." Some commentators have criticized this lack of specificity, arguing that defined standards will help overcome arbitrators' traditional reluctance to grant requests for interim relief. Consequently, one commentator has argued that an applicant should be required to demonstrate that it is "possible" (not "probable") that it will prevail on the merits and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. This is the approach that UNCITRAL has adopted. Others have argued that these standards, although vague, necessarily incorporate other requirements, such as irreparable harm, urgency, and some consideration of the strength of the parties' claims and defenses.") J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
Dear Becky and all, To further illustrate the need for this enhancement and to explain my request more clearly, I draw your attention to the current Bylaws, which state for IRP (and equally for RR): "...In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation," Therefore, the current situation entails that it is a mandated criteria stemming from the Bylaws that the damage or harm is already done at the very moment of issuing the IRP, and ICANN actually demands that the requester demonstrate that it has been adversely affected as a matter of fact. If the harm is not a reality, but only a very likely presumption, ICANN rejects the case without further looking into the details, stating only that the requester does not meet the burden of demonstrating the adverse effects caused (as the Bylaws mandate) and closes the case. This loophole is what we intend to fill. Hence, the proposal is to expand the scope of legitimacy to file an IRP to a "prospectively affected" party which demonstrates that a severe harm can potentially be done to its interests, although this damage is not done or suffered yet, as the current Bylaws demand. And this way an IRP (or RR) could not be turned down just on the ground that the damage is not still a reality. Some language to amend the Bylaws as regards the IRP could be (should also apply to the RR section): "...In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer, or demonstrate that it is highly likely that it will suffer, injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation," Best regards Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Perez Galindo, Rafael Enviado el: miércoles, 08 de abril de 2015 11:11 Para: Burr, Becky; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Questions regarding access to IRP when harm isprospective Thank you very much Becky. As I wrote in my answer to you on the WP2 list, I think your explanation is excellent and truly grasps the gist of what I was trying to convey (it is sometimes difficult with legal terms in foreign languages). I am glad that you found in your research some instances that apply this principle of preemptively protecting a prospectively significantly harmed party that has shown the likelihood of succeeding in an IRP on the merits or the irreparable harm that it could suffer. Therefore, once again I kindly request that this kind of prospective harm be covered in the enhanced IRP we are designing, where a prospectively affected party would have standing to seek relief prior to an action or decision by the Board. Best regards Rafael GAC_SPAIN De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Burr, Becky Enviado el: miércoles, 08 de abril de 2015 1:01 Para: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Asunto: [CCWG-ACCT] Questions regarding access to IRP when harm isprospective Earlier today Rafael Perez Galindo wrote: we deem it essential that the standing scope encompasses not only materially affected persons or entities, but also potentially affected ones. The rationale behind this proposal is that there are instances in which the harm is only done AFTER a decision that violates the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation is made. A typical example would be the decision to delegate a new gTLD that has a high likelihood of harming determined interests or rights or users. In this case, the potentially harmed communities should be in a position to file an IRP BEFORE the harm is done, thus avoiding the commission of the violation. Hence, sometimes it makes no sense to wait till irreversible damage is caused, and a provision envisaging this situation should be put in place, expanding the scope of legitimacy to file an IRP to situations in which it is demonstrated that a severe harm can potentially be done. I responded as follows: As to "potentially affected" parties, I think we are really talking about "prospectively affected" parties. In other words, if the Board takes an action, the party in question will be materially or significantly and adversely affected. In that case, a prospectively affected party would have standing to seek relief prior to an action or decision to the extent the prospective harm is 'material' or 'significant' and the normal standard for pre-emptive or injunctive relief is met. This would require a showing on the part of the prospectively affected party that they are likely to win an IRP on the merits and that there is no adequate remedy once an action or decision has been taken. Putting aside the merits of any particular case, I believe that this approach has been adopted in at least one ongoing IRP. The chart below reflects my quick research regarding how this issue is handled in different (English speaking) jurisdictions, and how it has been applied in the international arbitration context in an ICANN IRP. (It would be great if Thomas and Leon could provide information on how this applies in civil law jurisdictions.) Our task is to decide (a) whether we agree that this kind of prospective harm should be covered, and if so, what standard should be applied. Please let me know your thoughts. Ontario, CA Three-part test for granting an injunction in R.J.R Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. ? Is there a serious issue to be tried? Some cases apply a low standard (case is neither vexatious or frivolous) and others apply a high standard (moving party to demonstrate that it has a strong prima facie case). ? Will the applicant suffer irreparable harm - i.e., harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or that cannot be cured - if the injunction is not granted? ? Which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the remedy pending a decision on the merits ("balance of convenience")? Are there other factors to be considered, e.g., "clean hands"? Australia Under Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, an interlocutory injunction will be granted where it is shown that: 1. There is a serious question to be tried in that there is a sufficient likelihood of success so as to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial; 2. The balance of convenience favours granting the injunction (that is, the inconvenience or injury the IPR holder would likely suffer if the injunction were refused outweighs the injury the alleged infringer would suffer if the injunction were granted); and 3. The plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. United States Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as explained in Johnson v. Burge, 506 Fed. Appx. 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2012), a party seeking injunctive relief must show: ? Irreparable harm; ? Either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits; and ? A balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party seeking the injunctive relief. International Commercial Arbitration (ICDR) Article 21 of the ICDR Rules grants broad powers to the Panel and the Emergency Arbitrator to "take whatever interim measures it deems necessary." In order to demonstrate entitlement to interim relief on an emergency basis, a party must indicate the relief requested, explain why it is entitled to the requested interim relief, and demonstrate why the relief is required on an emergency basis. As applied in DCA Trust v. ICANN, interim relief may be granted if the claimants demonstrates 1. There is an urgent need for relief to protect an existing right 2. The relief requested is proportionate to the harm that would occur in the absence of interim relief; and 3. The claimant has a reasonable possibility of succeeding on the merits. 4. 5. (from another source "... most of the Rules do not provide any guidance other than that the decision maker "may" grant interim relief where the decision maker deems it "necessary" or "appropriate." Some commentators have criticized this lack of specificity, arguing that defined standards will help overcome arbitrators' traditional reluctance to grant requests for interim relief. Consequently, one commentator has argued that an applicant should be required to demonstrate that it is "possible" (not "probable") that it will prevail on the merits and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. This is the approach that UNCITRAL has adopted. Others have argued that these standards, although vague, necessarily incorporate other requirements, such as irreparable harm, urgency, and some consideration of the strength of the parties' claims and defenses.") J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
On 08/04/2015 00:00, Burr, Becky wrote:
The chart below reflects my quick research regarding how this issue is handled in different (English speaking) jurisdictions,
Our task is to decide (a) whether we agree that this kind of prospective harm should be covered, and if so, what standard should be applied. Please let me know your thoughts.
As to prospective harm, I agree that it should be covered. As to the standard, I have a comment on the chart: it reflects that some jurisdictions regard injunctive relief as particularly intrusive, and so only available where the harm could not be compensated adequately with monetary damages. In the case of the IRP, as far as I know nobody is proposing that it be empowered to award monetary damages against ICANN, so the "irreparable harm" standard wouldn't be appropriate as a threshold. In ICANN's case, I'm not sure we need be so fixated on 'harm' at all: we should be keen to ensure ICANN can be restrained from activity in breach of its bylaws or outside its mission. I would favour a liberal approach to standing and that instead we ensure that the IRP can swiftly and efficiently dispose of frivolous complaints or those with no reasponable prospect of success, without causing disruption to ordinary affairs. So as to standing, let me suggest "any party who has been materially affected by a decision or action by ICANN, or who will be materially affected if an imminent decision or action is made". However some of the tests in the chart you copy speak to that "swift and efficient disposal" I mentioned: things like, is there a serious issue, is there a reasonable prospect of success on the merits? To my mind that's not so much "who" should have the right to complain, but whether a complaint should be struck out early. It's important to provide for this too, rather than relying on standing alone. Here I would suggest providing for early strike out if i) the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success on the merits; ii) the correction of a failure to follow process would not materially affect the outcome; iii) intervention by the IRP would be premature The last would cover, for example a complaint that a step in a process wasn't followed (e.g. failure to consider a material fact) but that the process could correct itself later (e.g. by considering that fact at a later stage). Any other suggestions? Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Malcolm, I don¹t completely agree that the ³inadequate remedy² prong of this analysis is irrelevant. It is true in the ordinary setting we are talking about an inadequate remedy ³at law² - and (in the US at least) that usually means money damages won¹t resolve. But putting money damages aside, I don¹t know why an individual/entity seeking prospective injunctive relief should not be called upon to demonstrate that an action of the board/staff cannot be rolled back effectively, and any harm ³undone.² I agree that the test formulated is not simply a ³standing² test - the test for standing is ³materially affected.² The test in the chart relates to when a court will entertain a request for prospective relief from someone with standing (that is to say has been or will be materially affected, et.c) J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz On 4/8/15, 7:31 AM, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 08/04/2015 00:00, Burr, Becky wrote:
The chart below reflects my quick research regarding how this issue is handled in different (English speaking) jurisdictions,
Our task is to decide (a) whether we agree that this kind of prospective harm should be covered, and if so, what standard should be applied. Please let me know your thoughts.
As to prospective harm, I agree that it should be covered.
As to the standard, I have a comment on the chart: it reflects that some jurisdictions regard injunctive relief as particularly intrusive, and so only available where the harm could not be compensated adequately with monetary damages.
In the case of the IRP, as far as I know nobody is proposing that it be empowered to award monetary damages against ICANN, so the "irreparable harm" standard wouldn't be appropriate as a threshold.
In ICANN's case, I'm not sure we need be so fixated on 'harm' at all: we should be keen to ensure ICANN can be restrained from activity in breach of its bylaws or outside its mission. I would favour a liberal approach to standing and that instead we ensure that the IRP can swiftly and efficiently dispose of frivolous complaints or those with no reasponable prospect of success, without causing disruption to ordinary affairs.
So as to standing, let me suggest
"any party who has been materially affected by a decision or action by ICANN, or who will be materially affected if an imminent decision or action is made".
However some of the tests in the chart you copy speak to that "swift and efficient disposal" I mentioned: things like, is there a serious issue, is there a reasonable prospect of success on the merits? To my mind that's not so much "who" should have the right to complain, but whether a complaint should be struck out early. It's important to provide for this too, rather than relying on standing alone.
Here I would suggest providing for early strike out if
i) the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success on the merits; ii) the correction of a failure to follow process would not materially affect the outcome; iii) intervention by the IRP would be premature
The last would cover, for example a complaint that a step in a process wasn't followed (e.g. failure to consider a material fact) but that the process could correct itself later (e.g. by considering that fact at a later stage).
Any other suggestions?
Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__publicaffairs.linx.net _&d=AwIF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=7kpzgEwwMUjQEQqR9dBDJ6XrHeVTxs9huxbxBZEOa1M&s=44oF3OvkQ2jIv__V6n Wk-G3qD2KBpjmnJ9V8-O62yUQ&e=
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
On 08/04/2015 15:50, Burr, Becky wrote:
Malcolm, I don¹t completely agree that the ³inadequate remedy² prong of this analysis is irrelevant. It is true in the ordinary setting we are talking about an inadequate remedy ³at law² - and (in the US at least) that usually means money damages won¹t resolve. But putting money damages aside, I don¹t know why an individual/entity seeking prospective injunctive relief should not be called upon to demonstrate that an action of the board/staff cannot be rolled back effectively, and any harm ³undone.²
Ah, sorry, we're talking at cross purposes, and it's my fault. The question I now see that you actually asked was about the standard for prospective relief; I thought you were suggesting that chart as a basis for deciding the standard for injunctive relief generally, and I started on that subject. Which was quite silly of me; on looking again it is obvious that you weren't and couldn't have been. It's my fault for replying when distracted by other things. Sorry for this misunderstanding.
I agree that the test formulated is not simply a ³standing² test - the test for standing is ³materially affected.² The test in the chart relates to when a court will entertain a request for prospective relief from someone with standing (that is to say has been or will be materially affected, et.c)
OK, we're on the same page then. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
participants (3)
-
Burr, Becky -
Malcolm Hutty -
Perez Galindo, Rafael