Agree, Keith. Let’s please copy this note to the ST18 email list as well. As an example that supports your point, the Commercial Stakeholders Group (CSG) that I represent has long wanted to gain voice and representation of its components — BC, IPC, and ISPs. That’s why we supported “split” voting for the GNSO — allowing the CSG to have a partial decisional role. But we realize that the community moved towards binary (SUPPORT/OPPOSE) decisions by AC/SOs, in Dublin. And we have not insisted on fixing our long-suffering situation as part of this transition. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Keith Drazek <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> Date: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 at 2:41 PM To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ST-18 and 2/3 Threshold Proposal All, Here are my current thoughts on our ongoing discussions around ST-18, the 2/3 threshold issue, and the GAC’s participation in the community mechanism: The CCWG’s mandate is to empower the community as a whole to better hold ICANN and its Board accountable. Our mission is not to modify the influence of one SO or AC relative to the Board, or to one another, nor to enable or encourage such change in the future. This process should not be used by individual groups to seek increased influence relative to others. That’s why we are proposing a unified community as the sole Designator, and set thresholds for decisions supported by multiple ACs and SOs. Under the current discussions, it appears that a subset of GAC members want three new “powers” that do not exist today: (1) the right to hold a decisional role in the community mechanism, (2) a 2/3 threshold for Board rejection of consensus advice, and (3) the ability to adjust the definition of consensus that would trigger the Board’s special obligations. Why is the CCWG now focusing on the 11th-hour introduction of the 2/3 board threshold along with flexibility to change current practice on the definition of consensus? Both of those stand to increase the influence of the GAC alone over the Board and other community groups. No one is trying to tell the GAC how to define consensus for its internal deliberations or advice. Rather, ST-18 simply reinforces the current practice that the Board’s obligations kick in only when the GAC’s consensus is consistent with current practice – reflecting the UN definition/absence of formal objection. Any change to this practice must be viewed as empowering the GAC alone over the Board and potentially in a disproportionate way relative to others. By participating in the community mechanism as a co-equal, the GAC will be able to contribute to this joint community empowerment in a decisional way, if it chooses to do so. This is already a big change (that some are uncomfortable with) but it shows that the rest of the community respects the important role of governments and the GAC in our community processes. In my view, the CCWG should resist pressure to intentionally or inadvertently increase the relative influence of any one group, and stay focused on the joint community empowerment envisioned in our charter. This should not be an opportunity for any group to secure individual benefits they have previously been denied. Thanks and regards, Keith