This is hardly readable due to the formatting. el On 2015-03-17 11:23, Mathieu Weill wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

Please find below a response to our request by Thomas Schneider, Chair of the GAC, relating to our stress test #14 (amendment of GAC's operating procedures). Please note that this response is based on his own experience as well as exchanges with some GAC members.

I suggest we discuss this in our call later today when we come to the WP-ST update.

Best, Mathieu

-------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : AW: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Date : Tue, 17 Mar 2015 02:56:55 +0000 De : Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch Pour : Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr, rickert@anwaelte.de, leonfelipe@sanchez.mx Copie à : adam.peake@icann.org, gac@icann.org

Dear Co-Chairs of the CCWG Accountability, dear Thomas, Leon and Mathieu

Thank you for your request for input from the GAC on the prospect of a contingency induced by a potential change in the GAC's decision making procedures. And thank you all for the good exchange we had on the phone last week.

Given the short time available, it has not been possible to undertake broad consultations with the whole GAC about this issue. In this situation, I can only give you some feedback based on my own experience as well as exchanges I had with some GAC members in the past days. I hope you will get more feedback from GAC members and observers before, during and after the f2f meeting of the CCWG in Istanbul next week.

First of all, I - like many of my colleagues - do not really see a contingency related to the GAC as a body with regard to the CCWG's Work Stream 1 (accountability related to the IANA functions). As we do not recall the GAC having had an role in the IANA stewardship function so far and as one of the conditions put forward by the NTIA is that no other single country or intergovernmental body should take over the IANA stewardship role, it is difficult to see why the GAC's operating principles should have an effect on the IANA stewardship function at all.

With regard to the overall accountability of ICANN (WS2), the GAC may indeed have a role in contributing to enhancing ICANN's accountability and to the organisations' checks and balances in the future.

However, it should be noted that - unlike the GNSO or the ccNSO - the GAC does not develop or decide about policies, but is - in its role as advisory body of the ICANN board - giving advice to the board on public policy matters. The board can either ask the GAC for advice on an issue or the GAC can advise the board on its own initiative. In both cases, according to the current bylaws, the board is only asked to take GAC advice "duly into account", but is not obliged to follow GAC advice. In case the board decides not to follow GAC advice, the board shall inform the GAC about its reasons for not doing so and will try to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no such solution is found, the board is still free to take its decision without the GAC as a committee having any means to force the board to follow its advice. It is then up to individual GAC members to act according to their "rights and obligations ... with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsib il ities".

According to its operating principles, the GAC works on "the basis of seeking consensus among its membership". Where consensus is not possible, the chair shall "convey the full range of views expressed by members" to the ICANN board. So, under the current operating principles, the GAC may address advice to the board which is either informing the board about a GAC consensus or about the existence of diverse views among its membership on an issue. Again, the board should then take this advice "duly into account". In the past, there have been several examples where there has been a diversity of views among GAC members on an issue which have been communicated to the board.

In the current operating principles, it is not specified how - in the case of diverse views in the GAC on an issue - this diversity should be communicated to the board. In the attempt to enhance accountability of ICANN's processes as well as the accountability of governments to their citizens and the global community, but also to improve ICANN's checks and balances and to avoid any risk of capture by an individual or a small group of governments, it may be useful to enhance transparency about the range and spread of diversity of views among GAC members, so that - before taking a decision - the board is best informed about this diversity and also the whole community is able to see on what basis GAC advice is formulated and that it is able to assess to what extent such advice has been "duly taken into account".

I am happy to discuss with you how the GAC can help to contribute to enhancing ICANN's accountability and I am sure that other GAC members (and observers) will contribute to this deliberations as well.

I am looking forward to a fruitful and constructive discussion in Istanbul

Best regards

Thomas

Thomas Schneider chair of the GAC

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 5. März 2015 17:43 An: Olga Cavalli; Suzanne Radell; Julia Katja Wolman; brumark@telia.com; alice@apc.org; Schneider Thomas BAKOM Cc: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Thomas Rickert; Adam Peake Betreff: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making

Dear GAC members of the CCWG Accountability, Dear Thomas,

[Cc: CCWG Co-chairs]

As you are aware, the CCWG Accountability has identified a number of contingencies and is applying stress tests to its proposals to check how they would mitigate them.

Consistent with the principle set out by the NTIA that the transition proposals should not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution, one of the identified contingency is currently defined as such :

Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board.

Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. [...]

While investigating whether the measures currently proposed by the CCWG would provide adequate mitigation, concerns were raised that, despite the ability for the community to veto a Board decision, changes in the GAC decision making rules might infringe on the principle set out by the NTIA.

It was proposed within the CCWG that a mitigating measure might be to amend Icann Bylaws so that the provision of article XI 2.1.j of the Bylaws (duly taking into account GAC Advice) would only apply to consensus advice (see current proposal here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/Accountability%20M...).

Some similarity could be drawn out from the gNSO policy recommendations Bylaw provisions (Annex A, 9.a) where supermajority votes from the gNSO can only be vetoed by the Board if there is a 2/3 majority to do so.

We are aware of the high sensitivity of this question within the GAC as well as with the community. The GAC is also one of the chartering organizations of the CCWG Accountability. Therefore our group wishes to engage with the GAC to identify how we can meet both the NTIA requirements and a solution that is consistent with the GAC expectations.

Ideally, we would welcome inputs via GAC appointed members to the CCWG and/or specific discussions between ourselves.

Best regards, Thomas Rickert, Leon Felipe Sanchez, Mathieu Weill Co-chairs, CCWG Accountability

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/

Dear all It seems that there has been some confusion in the CCWG-Accountabilty about the status of my response of 17 March 2015 to the request of the Co-chairs of the CCWG accountability – in their email of 5 march – to get some feedback from the GAC about stress test 18 (amendment of GAC’s operating principles). For the sake of transparency and in the hope to contribute to a clarification and to avoiding misunderstandings, I would like to share with you the following: After I had received the request of 5 march from the CCWG Co-Chairs, I sent an email message to the CCWG co-chairs with copy to the GAC the same day, notifying that I did not fully understand what exactly was expected of the GAC and/or myself and I asked, in order to better understand – a number of questions regarding the relevance of this issue with regard to IANA transition and the assumptions that were at the basis of this particular stress test. The CCWG Co-chairs then proposed to have a phone conversation with me about this. This call was held on Wednesday 11 March. During that call, I explained the Co-Chairs that – in the short time available before the Istanbul meeting of 23-24 March, it was not possible to coordinate a formal GAC response on this issue. I also informed them about a decision of the GAC taken at the ICANN 52 meeting in Singapore that the GAC will undertake a holistic review on its operating principles and that this work will take some time and that there may be no outcome of this process in the coming months. During that call, the CCWG Co-chairs explained to me that it was important for them to get at least some feedback from the GAC on this issue before the Istanbul meeting. I then told them that the only thing that I could do at this stage was to share my own experience and deliberations on this issue and to convey these to them – while at the same time inviting the other GAC members to join the discussion and share their views and experience before and during the Istanbul meeting. The Co-chairs welcomed this and asked me to do this in the coming days. Later that Wednesday 11 March, this was discussed by the GAC Leadership team at our biweekly Chair-Vice-Chair call and it was agreed by the GAC leadership team that I should send such a message based on the questions that I had raised in my first reply to the CCWG Co-Chairs of 5 March. The message that I then sent to the CCWG Co-chairs with copy to the GAC on 17 March clearly indicated that it was not possible to communicate a formal response from the GAC but that I could only give some feedback on my own experience and with some GAC members. (This was emphasized by the CCWG Co-chairs when they forwarded the message to the CCWG – see below.) And I invited other GAC members to join this discussion and give their views as well – an invitation which I would like to repeat here again. Finally, I would like to clarify that my response to the CCWG Co-chairs of 17 March was not a formal “letter” as it is called on the CCWG-Website, but a simple email message. Thank you for taking note of this message and for putting it on the CCWG website in addition to the message of 17 March. Best regards Thomas Von: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Gesendet: Dienstag, 17. März 2015 10:23 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Cc: Schneider Thomas BAKOM Betreff: Fwd: AW: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Dear Colleagues, Please find below a response to our request by Thomas Schneider, Chair of the GAC, relating to our stress test #14 (amendment of GAC's operating procedures). Please note that this response is based on his own experience as well as exchanges with some GAC members. I suggest we discuss this in our call later today when we come to the WP-ST update. Best, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : AW: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Date : Tue, 17 Mar 2015 02:56:55 +0000 De : Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch> Pour : Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr<mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>, rickert@anwaelte.de<mailto:rickert@anwaelte.de>, leonfelipe@sanchez.mx<mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> Copie à : adam.peake@icann.org<mailto:adam.peake@icann.org>, gac@icann.org<mailto:gac@icann.org> Dear Co-Chairs of the CCWG Accountability, dear Thomas, Leon and Mathieu Thank you for your request for input from the GAC on the prospect of a contingency induced by a potential change in the GAC's decision making procedures. And thank you all for the good exchange we had on the phone last week. Given the short time available, it has not been possible to undertake broad consultations with the whole GAC about this issue. In this situation, I can only give you some feedback based on my own experience as well as exchanges I had with some GAC members in the past days. I hope you will get more feedback from GAC members and observers before, during and after the f2f meeting of the CCWG in Istanbul next week. First of all, I - like many of my colleagues - do not really see a contingency related to the GAC as a body with regard to the CCWG's Work Stream 1 (accountability related to the IANA functions). As we do not recall the GAC having had an role in the IANA stewardship function so far and as one of the conditions put forward by the NTIA is that no other single country or intergovernmental body should take over the IANA stewardship role, it is difficult to see why the GAC's operating principles should have an effect on the IANA stewardship function at all. With regard to the overall accountability of ICANN (WS2), the GAC may indeed have a role in contributing to enhancing ICANN's accountability and to the organisations' checks and balances in the future. However, it should be noted that - unlike the GNSO or the ccNSO - the GAC does not develop or decide about policies, but is - in its role as advisory body of the ICANN board - giving advice to the board on public policy matters. The board can either ask the GAC for advice on an issue or the GAC can advise the board on its own initiative. In both cases, according to the current bylaws, the board is only asked to take GAC advice "duly into account", but is not obliged to follow GAC advice. In case the board decides not to follow GAC advice, the board shall inform the GAC about its reasons for not doing so and will try to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no such solution is found, the board is still free to take its decision without the GAC as a committee having any means to force the board to follow its advice. It is then up to individual GAC members to act according to their "rights and obligations ... with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibil ities". According to its operating principles, the GAC works on "the basis of seeking consensus among its membership". Where consensus is not possible, the chair shall "convey the full range of views expressed by members" to the ICANN board. So, under the current operating principles, the GAC may address advice to the board which is either informing the board about a GAC consensus or about the existence of diverse views among its membership on an issue. Again, the board should then take this advice "duly into account". In the past, there have been several examples where there has been a diversity of views among GAC members on an issue which have been communicated to the board. In the current operating principles, it is not specified how - in the case of diverse views in the GAC on an issue - this diversity should be communicated to the board. In the attempt to enhance accountability of ICANN's processes as well as the accountability of governments to their citizens and the global community, but also to improve ICANN's checks and balances and to avoid any risk of capture by an individual or a small group of governments, it may be useful to enhance transparency about the range and spread of diversity of views among GAC members, so that - before taking a decision - the board is best informed about this diversity and also the whole community is able to see on what basis GAC advice is formulated and that it is able to assess to what extent such advice has been "duly taken into account". I am happy to discuss with you how the GAC can help to contribute to enhancing ICANN's accountability and I am sure that other GAC members (and observers) will contribute to this deliberations as well. I am looking forward to a fruitful and constructive discussion in Istanbul Best regards Thomas Thomas Schneider chair of the GAC -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 5. März 2015 17:43 An: Olga Cavalli; Suzanne Radell; Julia Katja Wolman; brumark@telia.com<mailto:brumark@telia.com>; alice@apc.org<mailto:alice@apc.org>; Schneider Thomas BAKOM Cc: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Thomas Rickert; Adam Peake Betreff: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Dear GAC members of the CCWG Accountability, Dear Thomas, [Cc: CCWG Co-chairs] As you are aware, the CCWG Accountability has identified a number of contingencies and is applying stress tests to its proposals to check how they would mitigate them. Consistent with the principle set out by the NTIA that the transition proposals should not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution, one of the identified contingency is currently defined as such : Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. [...] While investigating whether the measures currently proposed by the CCWG would provide adequate mitigation, concerns were raised that, despite the ability for the community to veto a Board decision, changes in the GAC decision making rules might infringe on the principle set out by the NTIA. It was proposed within the CCWG that a mitigating measure might be to amend Icann Bylaws so that the provision of article XI 2.1.j of the Bylaws (duly taking into account GAC Advice) would only apply to consensus advice (see current proposal here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/Accountability%20M...). Some similarity could be drawn out from the gNSO policy recommendations Bylaw provisions (Annex A, 9.a) where supermajority votes from the gNSO can only be vetoed by the Board if there is a 2/3 majority to do so. We are aware of the high sensitivity of this question within the GAC as well as with the community. The GAC is also one of the chartering organizations of the CCWG Accountability. Therefore our group wishes to engage with the GAC to identify how we can meet both the NTIA requirements and a solution that is consistent with the GAC expectations. Ideally, we would welcome inputs via GAC appointed members to the CCWG and/or specific discussions between ourselves. Best regards, Thomas Rickert, Leon Felipe Sanchez, Mathieu Weill Co-chairs, CCWG Accountability