Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Session #14 24 February
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!). But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would. If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here. Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem. Alan At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Dear All, Both Bruce and Alan have some commonality in their views. However, there are points raised by Alan which needs careful attention. Perhaps they could reconcile their views for further process. Regards Kavouss 2015-03-01 3:06 GMT+01:00 Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/ resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Bruce and Alan: There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary. Example: In Iowa, judges are appointed, but periodically must pass a public referendum ("Do you believe (justice X) should be retained on the court?"). In most elections, this is just a formality, but a few years ago our State Supreme Court unanimously overturned a ban on same-sex marriage. The court did so stating that, politics aside, the prohibition was clearly unconstitutional. But later these judges were subject to an active campaign to use the referendum mechanism to remove them from office, and several were. Were they serving the public interest? And in doing so did they lose their jobs? It is admirable to want to insulate Board members from the shifting political climate at ICANN, but I think that ship has already sailed. Whether we like it or not, Board members (and their votes) will always be lightning rods for controversy. Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community. First, the large number of NomCom appointees probably protects the Board/organization from significant disruption (who recalls them, btw?) Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes. And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise. Thank you, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy
On Feb 28, 2015, at 20:08, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Thanks James, I think that the largest problem we now have is Board members sent by AC/SOs who tend to lose touch with their sending organization and the members therein. The potential for recall, I think, would be a good remedy and for that reason alone I would support it. I repeat the question I asked earlier. Do we really believe that any of our AC/SOs that select Board members are likely to "punish" their Board member over a particular vote or small set of vote? If they are displeased with the members overall performance, why should they not be able to rethink their choice? Alan At 01/03/2015 11:24 AM, James M. Bladel wrote:
Bruce and Alan:
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Example: In Iowa, judges are appointed, but periodically must pass a public referendum ("Do you believe (justice X) should be retained on the court?"). In most elections, this is just a formality, but a few years ago our State Supreme Court unanimously overturned a ban on same-sex marriage. The court did so stating that, politics aside, the prohibition was clearly unconstitutional. But later these judges were subject to an active campaign to use the referendum mechanism to remove them from office, and several were. Were they serving the public interest? And in doing so did they lose their jobs?
It is admirable to want to insulate Board members from the shifting political climate at ICANN, but I think that ship has already sailed. Whether we like it or not, Board members (and their votes) will always be lightning rods for controversy. Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community. First, the large number of NomCom appointees probably protects the Board/organization from significant disruption (who recalls them, btw?) Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes. And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Thank you,
J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy
On Feb 28, 2015, at 20:08, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hello James,
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Well Board members currently have 3 year terms. Do you have examples in judicial or political systems in the USA where the electorate can recall their person at will at any time? I think in Australia if an elected official is found guilty of a criminal offence they need to stand down - but I am not aware of mechanisms for the electorate to recall their politicians otherwise. I assume )that there are probably ways for the parliament to at least suspend a member based on their conduct. There have been cases over the past few years when a few elected officials have held the balance of power between two major parties. In some instances these members have not voted in a way that their electorate liked, and then did not get returned in the next election.
Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community.
Yes- I agree that is important and could be part of a code of conduct. It is important for Board members to continue to actively engage with the segment of the community that appointed them. We do encourage Board members to attend functions outside of ICANN Board meetings to get to know the community issues.
Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes.
Agreed - also something that is probably worth including in a code of conduct.
And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Yes - I wasn't envisaging that a Board member would be recalled just because their vote would have changed the result on a particular matter. I was more concerned when the community chooses to send a "message" that they are uncomfortable with a Board position by recalling their member. A little like the way some countries recall their ambassadors to another country to protest an action of that country. I know in the past that some Board members felt they had to vote in a particular way because of perceived pressure from their electorate (mainly related to fear of not being re-elected), and that they felt that this was not in the public interest. This has sometimes led to abstentions. It didn't affect the majority position. I can personally say that I have never experienced pressure from the GNSO community, but I do try to keep in regular contact with all of the stakeholder groups and constituencies. Steve Crocker as chair certainly tries to get matters to as close to unanimous as possible before putting the matter to a vote - so some matters get carried across for more than one meeting until that situation happens. So yes - it is a rare case where any matter is decided by a simple majority. Unfortunately this often appears to the public that all matters are "rubber-stamped" as the workshop discussions are not particularly visible. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Bruce, Recall elections do occur in the US, albeit relatively infrequently, and the right to have a recall election is generally a state law issue. The Governor of Wisconsin survived a recall election in 2012: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_gubernatorial_recall_election, There are a fair number of lower-profile, more local recall elections each year in the US, and some do succeed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election>. Greg On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello James,
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Well Board members currently have 3 year terms.
Do you have examples in judicial or political systems in the USA where the electorate can recall their person at will at any time?
I think in Australia if an elected official is found guilty of a criminal offence they need to stand down - but I am not aware of mechanisms for the electorate to recall their politicians otherwise. I assume )that there are probably ways for the parliament to at least suspend a member based on their conduct. There have been cases over the past few years when a few elected officials have held the balance of power between two major parties. In some instances these members have not voted in a way that their electorate liked, and then did not get returned in the next election.
Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community.
Yes- I agree that is important and could be part of a code of conduct. It is important for Board members to continue to actively engage with the segment of the community that appointed them. We do encourage Board members to attend functions outside of ICANN Board meetings to get to know the community issues.
Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes.
Agreed - also something that is probably worth including in a code of conduct.
And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Yes - I wasn't envisaging that a Board member would be recalled just because their vote would have changed the result on a particular matter. I was more concerned when the community chooses to send a "message" that they are uncomfortable with a Board position by recalling their member. A little like the way some countries recall their ambassadors to another country to protest an action of that country. I know in the past that some Board members felt they had to vote in a particular way because of perceived pressure from their electorate (mainly related to fear of not being re-elected), and that they felt that this was not in the public interest. This has sometimes led to abstentions. It didn't affect the majority position. I can personally say that I have never experienced pressure from the GNSO community, but I do try to keep in regular contact with all of the stakeholder groups and constituencies.
Steve Crocker as chair certainly tries to get matters to as close to unanimous as possible before putting the matter to a vote - so some matters get carried across for more than one meeting until that situation happens. So yes - it is a rare case where any matter is decided by a simple majority. Unfortunately this often appears to the public that all matters are "rubber-stamped" as the workshop discussions are not particularly visible.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Hello Greg,
Recall elections do occur in the US, albeit relatively infrequently, and the right to have a recall election is generally a state law issue. The Governor of Wisconsin survived a recall election in 2012: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_gubernatorial_recall_election,
Thanks for the references. I see that the threshold for a recall in the Wisconsin case was a petition that needed 540,000 signatures: “In less than half of the allotted time (60 days) to collect signatures, recall organizers report collecting more than 500,000 signatures, leaving roughly one month left to collect the remaining 40,000 signatures needed to force a recall vote. On January 17, 2012, United Wisconsin, the coalition that spearheaded the recall effort, along with the Democratic Party, said that one million signatures were collected, which far exceeded the 540,208 needed, and amounted to 23 percent of the state's eligible voters, 46 percent of the total votes cast in the 2010 gubernatorial election and just shy of the 1.1 million votes earned by Walker”
There are a fair number of lower-profile, more local recall elections each year in the US, and some do succeed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election.
Interesting to see that most of these are based on some form of petition: “Recalls, which are initiated when sufficient voters sign a petition, have a history dating back to the ancient Athenian democracy and are a feature of several contemporary constitutions.” Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Just to put some perspective into this, John Oliver had some very pertinent stuff to say on judicial election in the US last week (we only get it one week later, here). Very worth watching, not only for the amusement value... el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
On Mar 2, 2015, at 01:26, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Bruce,
Recall elections do occur in the US, albeit relatively infrequently, and the right to have a recall election is generally a state law issue. The Governor of Wisconsin survived a recall election in 2012: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_gubernatorial_recall_election, There are a fair number of lower-profile, more local recall elections each year in the US, and some do succeed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election.
Greg
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote: Hello James,
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Well Board members currently have 3 year terms.
Do you have examples in judicial or political systems in the USA where the electorate can recall their person at will at any time?
I think in Australia if an elected official is found guilty of a criminal offence they need to stand down - but I am not aware of mechanisms for the electorate to recall their politicians otherwise. I assume )that there are probably ways for the parliament to at least suspend a member based on their conduct. There have been cases over the past few years when a few elected officials have held the balance of power between two major parties. In some instances these members have not voted in a way that their electorate liked, and then did not get returned in the next election.
Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community.
Yes- I agree that is important and could be part of a code of conduct. It is important for Board members to continue to actively engage with the segment of the community that appointed them. We do encourage Board members to attend functions outside of ICANN Board meetings to get to know the community issues.
Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes.
Agreed - also something that is probably worth including in a code of conduct.
And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Yes - I wasn't envisaging that a Board member would be recalled just because their vote would have changed the result on a particular matter. I was more concerned when the community chooses to send a "message" that they are uncomfortable with a Board position by recalling their member. A little like the way some countries recall their ambassadors to another country to protest an action of that country. I know in the past that some Board members felt they had to vote in a particular way because of perceived pressure from their electorate (mainly related to fear of not being re-elected), and that they felt that this was not in the public interest. This has sometimes led to abstentions. It didn't affect the majority position. I can personally say that I have never experienced pressure from the GNSO community, but I do try to keep in regular contact with all of the stakeholder groups and constituencies.
Steve Crocker as chair certainly tries to get matters to as close to unanimous as possible before putting the matter to a vote - so some matters get carried across for more than one meeting until that situation happens. So yes - it is a rare case where any matter is decided by a simple majority. Unfortunately this often appears to the public that all matters are "rubber-stamped" as the workshop discussions are not particularly visible.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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-- Gregory S. Shatan ï Abelman Frayne & Schwab Partner | IP | Technology | Media | Internet 666 Third Avenue | New York, NY 10017-5621 Direct 212-885-9253 | Main 212-949-9022 Fax 212-949-9190 | Cell 917-816-6428 gsshatan@lawabel.com ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com www.lawabel.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
And perhaps the most famous example of a successful recall effort would be the election that removed California governor Gray Davis, and replaced him with Arnold Schwarzenegger. http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_California_recall Thanks-- J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Mar 1, 2015, at 18:27, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote: Bruce, Recall elections do occur in the US, albeit relatively infrequently, and the right to have a recall election is generally a state law issue. The Governor of Wisconsin survived a recall election in 2012: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_gubernatorial_recall_election, There are a fair number of lower-profile, more local recall elections each year in the US, and some do succeed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election>. Greg On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello James,
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Well Board members currently have 3 year terms. Do you have examples in judicial or political systems in the USA where the electorate can recall their person at will at any time? I think in Australia if an elected official is found guilty of a criminal offence they need to stand down - but I am not aware of mechanisms for the electorate to recall their politicians otherwise. I assume )that there are probably ways for the parliament to at least suspend a member based on their conduct. There have been cases over the past few years when a few elected officials have held the balance of power between two major parties. In some instances these members have not voted in a way that their electorate liked, and then did not get returned in the next election.
Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community.
Yes- I agree that is important and could be part of a code of conduct. It is important for Board members to continue to actively engage with the segment of the community that appointed them. We do encourage Board members to attend functions outside of ICANN Board meetings to get to know the community issues.
Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes.
Agreed - also something that is probably worth including in a code of conduct.
And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Yes - I wasn't envisaging that a Board member would be recalled just because their vote would have changed the result on a particular matter. I was more concerned when the community chooses to send a "message" that they are uncomfortable with a Board position by recalling their member. A little like the way some countries recall their ambassadors to another country to protest an action of that country. I know in the past that some Board members felt they had to vote in a particular way because of perceived pressure from their electorate (mainly related to fear of not being re-elected), and that they felt that this was not in the public interest. This has sometimes led to abstentions. It didn't affect the majority position. I can personally say that I have never experienced pressure from the GNSO community, but I do try to keep in regular contact with all of the stakeholder groups and constituencies. Steve Crocker as chair certainly tries to get matters to as close to unanimous as possible before putting the matter to a vote - so some matters get carried across for more than one meeting until that situation happens. So yes - it is a rare case where any matter is decided by a simple majority. Unfortunately this often appears to the public that all matters are "rubber-stamped" as the workshop discussions are not particularly visible. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Gregory S. Shatan * Abelman Frayne & Schwab Partner | IP | Technology | Media | Internet 666 Third Avenue | New York, NY 10017-5621 Direct 212-885-9253 | Main 212-949-9022 Fax 212-949-9190 | Cell 917-816-6428 gsshatan@lawabel.com<mailto:gsshatan@lawabel.com> ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> www.lawabel.com<http://www.lawabel.com/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Well now, there’s an example we should all aspire to :-) Cheers, Chris On 2 Mar 2015, at 20:03 , James M. Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:
And perhaps the most famous example of a successful recall effort would be the election that removed California governor Gray Davis, and replaced him with Arnold Schwarzenegger.
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_California_recall
Thanks--
J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy
On Mar 1, 2015, at 18:27, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Bruce,
Recall elections do occur in the US, albeit relatively infrequently, and the right to have a recall election is generally a state law issue. The Governor of Wisconsin survived a recall election in 2012: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin_gubernatorial_recall_election, There are a fair number of lower-profile, more local recall elections each year in the US, and some do succeed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recall_election.
Greg
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote: Hello James,
There are parallels / analogs to both of your positions in the US, where some states provide judges a lifetime appointment, and others require them to stand for election. Life (or exceptionally long) terms of office do not ensure that the official is responsive to the wishes of the public/Community, while subjecting judges to election raises criticisms of "politicizing" the judiciary.
Well Board members currently have 3 year terms.
Do you have examples in judicial or political systems in the USA where the electorate can recall their person at will at any time?
I think in Australia if an elected official is found guilty of a criminal offence they need to stand down - but I am not aware of mechanisms for the electorate to recall their politicians otherwise. I assume )that there are probably ways for the parliament to at least suspend a member based on their conduct. There have been cases over the past few years when a few elected officials have held the balance of power between two major parties. In some instances these members have not voted in a way that their electorate liked, and then did not get returned in the next election.
Recognizing this, we should probably err on the side of ensuring individual members to be responsive to their segment of the community.
Yes- I agree that is important and could be part of a code of conduct. It is important for Board members to continue to actively engage with the segment of the community that appointed them. We do encourage Board members to attend functions outside of ICANN Board meetings to get to know the community issues.
Second, Board members should be in regular communication with their community to explain/defend their votes.
Agreed - also something that is probably worth including in a code of conduct.
And finally, as Alan noted, very few issues would ever be decided by such a slim margin. If any vote is cutting it that close, that should be an indication to the Board to keep working towards furthering a compromise.
Yes - I wasn't envisaging that a Board member would be recalled just because their vote would have changed the result on a particular matter. I was more concerned when the community chooses to send a "message" that they are uncomfortable with a Board position by recalling their member. A little like the way some countries recall their ambassadors to another country to protest an action of that country. I know in the past that some Board members felt they had to vote in a particular way because of perceived pressure from their electorate (mainly related to fear of not being re-elected), and that they felt that this was not in the public interest. This has sometimes led to abstentions. It didn't affect the majority position. I can personally say that I have never experienced pressure from the GNSO community, but I do try to keep in regular contact with all of the stakeholder groups and constituencies.
Steve Crocker as chair certainly tries to get matters to as close to unanimous as possible before putting the matter to a vote - so some matters get carried across for more than one meeting until that situation happens. So yes - it is a rare case where any matter is decided by a simple majority. Unfortunately this often appears to the public that all matters are "rubber-stamped" as the workshop discussions are not particularly visible.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Gregory S. Shatan ï Abelman Frayne & Schwab Partner | IP | Technology | Media | Internet 666 Third Avenue | New York, NY 10017-5621 Direct 212-885-9253 | Main 212-949-9022 Fax 212-949-9190 | Cell 917-816-6428 gsshatan@lawabel.com ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com www.lawabel.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hi, I support your position Alan. But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off. It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c. My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do. avri * for an example please see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/ IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Thanks Avri, Certainly for an AC/SO, there is an obligation to document how the selection is made (or who it is made by) and if there were a recall allowed, then that procedure must be documented as well. I don't know to what extent we should or could prescribe those rules for them, but I don't think it would be unreasonable to say that the decision to recall should be made by the same group (current incumbents) that do the selection, and that it should require a supermajority instead of just a majority. I am less sure I agree on the NomCom recall. I would prefer a mechanism that required the overall community to act instead of the NomCom. The NomCom is a surrogate for the community at least partly because of the desire for confidentiality in its candidate list, confidential references and deliberations. When you are only taking about a binary decision to recall or not recall a particular person, I see no reason why the secrecy of the NomCom is needed, and indeed, I think that it would be a negative with regard to transparency of how/why the decision is taken. Alan At 01/03/2015 11:42 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I support your position Alan.
But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off.
It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c.
My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do.
avri
* for an example please see <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/
IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees
On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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I agree that it would be best for the entire community to have the recall power with respect to the NomComm appointees. They are supposed to be representative of the larger community and so that is the appropriate place for that recall to happen. It would also create an incentive for NomComm to appoint people who might be more responsive to the community than otherwise. I also support the proposal that an AC/SO should be able to set their own threshold and other terms for recall. Thanks, Robin On Mar 1, 2015, at 9:28 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Thanks Avri,
Certainly for an AC/SO, there is an obligation to document how the selection is made (or who it is made by) and if there were a recall allowed, then that procedure must be documented as well. I don't know to what extent we should or could prescribe those rules for them, but I don't think it would be unreasonable to say that the decision to recall should be made by the same group (current incumbents) that do the selection, and that it should require a supermajority instead of just a majority.
I am less sure I agree on the NomCom recall. I would prefer a mechanism that required the overall community to act instead of the NomCom. The NomCom is a surrogate for the community at least partly because of the desire for confidentiality in its candidate list, confidential references and deliberations. When you are only taking about a binary decision to recall or not recall a particular person, I see no reason why the secrecy of the NomCom is needed, and indeed, I think that it would be a negative with regard to transparency of how/why the decision is taken.
Alan
At 01/03/2015 11:42 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I support your position Alan.
But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off.
It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c.
My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do.
avri
* for an example please see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/
IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees
On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Agree, Robin. I don't believe it is realistic to think that the NomCom would ever recall a member that it appointed itself. We would need agreement from the entire community or establish some sort of "un-NomCom." Thank you, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Mar 1, 2015, at 13:50, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> wrote: I agree that it would be best for the entire community to have the recall power with respect to the NomComm appointees. They are supposed to be representative of the larger community and so that is the appropriate place for that recall to happen. It would also create an incentive for NomComm to appoint people who might be more responsive to the community than otherwise. I also support the proposal that an AC/SO should be able to set their own threshold and other terms for recall. Thanks, Robin On Mar 1, 2015, at 9:28 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote: Thanks Avri, Certainly for an AC/SO, there is an obligation to document how the selection is made (or who it is made by) and if there were a recall allowed, then that procedure must be documented as well. I don't know to what extent we should or could prescribe those rules for them, but I don't think it would be unreasonable to say that the decision to recall should be made by the same group (current incumbents) that do the selection, and that it should require a supermajority instead of just a majority. I am less sure I agree on the NomCom recall. I would prefer a mechanism that required the overall community to act instead of the NomCom. The NomCom is a surrogate for the community at least partly because of the desire for confidentiality in its candidate list, confidential references and deliberations. When you are only taking about a binary decision to recall or not recall a particular person, I see no reason why the secrecy of the NomCom is needed, and indeed, I think that it would be a negative with regard to transparency of how/why the decision is taken. Alan At 01/03/2015 11:42 AM, Avri Doria wrote: Hi, I support your position Alan. But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off. It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c. My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do. avri * for an example please see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/ IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote: Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!). But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would. If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here. Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem. Alan At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote: Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making. I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s. The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole." Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law." I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws. I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. www.avast.com<http://www.avast.com/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, While I understand and agree with the intent of keeping a board member accountable through recall threat, I think it would be neater and less subject to abuse/uncertainties if a board member knows he/she will be removed if not acting in the interest of the community. I am of the opinion that board should always act in the interest of the entire community(the organisation); especially as the composition of board is not balanced per SO/AC in representation, its members then should not act representatively. The referenced recall process could be very much applied for the noncom selected board members, I can't say the same for SO/AC selected members. However if such kill switch needs to be handed to various SO/AC then I think the recall process needs to be uniform across the communities as much as possible; factors that remove a board member needs to be clearly defined and should not be bent on the member solely representing his/her SO/AC. Overall there is need to strike a balance so we don't have a board that becomes representative in it's action but a board that is representative of the entire community. That way it will be easier to notice if any SO/AC board member is acting contrary and then the kill switch can be initiated by respective SO/AC Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 1 Mar 2015 17:43, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I support your position Alan.
But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off.
It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c.
My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do.
avri
* for an example please see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/
IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees
On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!).
But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here.
Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
Alan
At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making.
I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s.
The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law."
I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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"possible but very difficult to do." +1 Thank you, J. ____________ James Bladel GoDaddy On Mar 1, 2015, at 11:43, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi, I support your position Alan. But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off. It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO, but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board members, we should consider a system for removal. &c. My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should be hard to do. avri * for an example please see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/ IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process: Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote: Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First, decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our requests would be looked at more kindly!). But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would. If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate, they certainly would not have selected them if they could have foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly elected appointees, so why not here. Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem. Alan At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote: Hello Roelof,
- Recall Board members if not acting in global public interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on the global public interest in their decision making. I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary) duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization was established to act in the global public interest. When new Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the community that appointed the director/s. The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of conduct: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en . Also Board members must annually certify that they have read this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole." Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws and applicable law." I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN community that appoints a director having the ability to recall that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard -ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws. I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their case for a particular decision. Generally Board members appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members from a particular par t of the community do however help explain to other Board members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the community where that is not clear. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ________________________________ [http://static.avast.com/emails/avast-mail-stamp.png] <http://www.avast.com/> This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. www.avast.com<http://www.avast.com/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello All,
"possible but very difficult to do."
Agreed. I think the main difference between my view and Alan's view is that I think there should be some objective standards - one of which is that the Board member is not acting in the global public interest. It is still up to the segment of the appointing community that appoints the director to make that call and justify their decision to the wider community. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
This discussion is very helpful for the design work in wp1 on this precise power, so thank you for all the contributions. Bruce: who defines the global public interest? And who judges it in the context of removing one, more or all Icann directors from their roles? Interested in your view on this point. Best Jordan On Monday, 2 March 2015, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello All,
"possible but very difficult to do."
Agreed. I think the main difference between my view and Alan's view is that I think there should be some objective standards - one of which is that the Board member is not acting in the global public interest. It is still up to the segment of the appointing community that appoints the director to make that call and justify their decision to the wider community.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:;> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
Hello Jordan,
Bruce: who defines the global public interest?
The community. This is basically a core value of ICANN. As within any "values" - it is important to have a shared understanding of what it means across the community. That is why it is the 5th strategic objective for ICANN: "Develop and implement a global public interest framework bounded by ICANN's mission. The Internet is a shared global resource, the greatest platform for knowledge in the history of the world. It drives continuous change in everything it touches: business, education, government, technology, and society. As the Internet grows worldwide and society increases its dependency on it for all manner of activity, the Internet's systems of unique identifiers become more important and of global public interest. ICANN seeks to develop a public responsibility framework for promoting the global public interest in the coordination of the Internet's unique identifier systems and in furtherance of ICANN's mission. The framework will clarify ICANN's roles, objectives and milestones in promoting the public interest through capacity building, and increasing the base of internationally diverse, knowledgeable, and engaged ICANN stakeholders." I think it is best defined through discussion about what it means and doesn't mean. And to create some examples to illustrate what is in the global public interest. For example having an interoperable Internet - is an example of something that is the in global public interest.
And who judges it in the context of removing one, more or all ICANN directors from their roles?
The segment of the community that has appointed the particular Board director, or the community-as-a-whole with respect to removing the whole Board. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
participants (11)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Avri Doria -
Bruce Tonkin -
Chris Disspain -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Greg Shatan -
James M. Bladel -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Robin Gross -
Seun Ojedeji