recap and next steps?
Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
Dear colleagues, On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 04:25:15PM +1300, Jordan Carter wrote:
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
+1 I agree, but worry that if too many of us say we will live with whatever consensus is reached, we leave it up to the ditch diggers. avri On 21-Feb-16 05:54, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Dear colleagues,
On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 04:25:15PM +1300, Jordan Carter wrote:
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
Best regards,
A
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Indeed. Alan At 20/02/2016 11:50 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
+1
I agree, but worry that if too many of us say we will live with whatever consensus is reached, we leave it up to the ditch diggers.
avri
On 21-Feb-16 05:54, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Dear colleagues,
On Sun, Feb 21, 2016 at 04:25:15PM +1300, Jordan Carter wrote:
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
Best regards,
A
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I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
FWIW, I share Andrew’s thoughts. Jari
Dear All, It is not up to us to evaluate the argument of Board as being weak or strong,We may agree or disagree to those statement but not judge them Regards Kavouss 2016-02-23 18:42 GMT+01:00 Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>:
I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
FWIW, I share Andrew’s thoughts.
Jari
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I disagree completely, Kavouss, but the issue here is that the difficulty stems largely from the silence of the board (not to be mistaken with the silence of the lambs). It is respectful to people and process that, when you have a contrary view or perhaps an alternative suggestion, you elaborate on your position so that others may have the benefit and opportunity to assess said argument/alternative and thereby afforded the opportunity to make one’s own judgement. In this case, the concern being expressed is that we have been deprived of such an opportunity because of the view that the board has not been forthcoming regarding its objections. Even so, the community has been required to process and respond. It is certainly the right and, indeed, responsibility of members and participants to evaluate ALL arguments being proffered. To do otherwise may well be deemed a dereliction of duty. Cheers, Ken From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:56 PM To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear All, It is not up to us to evaluate the argument of Board as being weak or strong,We may agree or disagree to those statement but not judge them Regards Kavouss 2016-02-23 18:42 GMT+01:00 Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net<mailto:jari.arkko@piuha.net>>:
I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
FWIW, I share Andrew’s thoughts. Jari _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Well said. ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Salaets, Ken Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 4:11 PM To: Kavouss Arasteh; Jari Arkko Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? I disagree completely, Kavouss, but the issue here is that the difficulty stems largely from the silence of the board (not to be mistaken with the silence of the lambs). It is respectful to people and process that, when you have a contrary view or perhaps an alternative suggestion, you elaborate on your position so that others may have the benefit and opportunity to assess said argument/alternative and thereby afforded the opportunity to make one’s own judgement. In this case, the concern being expressed is that we have been deprived of such an opportunity because of the view that the board has not been forthcoming regarding its objections. Even so, the community has been required to process and respond. It is certainly the right and, indeed, responsibility of members and participants to evaluate ALL arguments being proffered. To do otherwise may well be deemed a dereliction of duty. Cheers, Ken From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:56 PM To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net<mailto:jari.arkko@piuha.net>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear All, It is not up to us to evaluate the argument of Board as being weak or strong,We may agree or disagree to those statement but not judge them Regards Kavouss 2016-02-23 18:42 GMT+01:00 Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net<mailto:jari.arkko@piuha.net>>:
I've been pretty cranky on list about the Board proposal, mostly because I think the arguments so far advanced for it are really weak. But I'm completely in agreement Jordan's note: it is most important to pick an answer and ship the report. In my personal capacity, I'll get behind the decision, whatever it is. Let's choose something and ship.
FWIW, I share Andrew’s thoughts. Jari _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
Jordan, All: May I make a few key points in this connection: 1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option. 2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated. Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are. 3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question. Regards to you all Christopher Wilkinson (CW) On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
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Chris You werent' on call # 83 - where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637 If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=em ail&utm_campaign=speakers-us2016> From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High Jordan, All: May I make a few key points in this connection: 1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option. 2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated. Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are. 3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question. Regards to you all Christopher Wilkinson (CW) On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Chris
You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637
If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High
Jordan, All:
May I make a few key points in this connection:
1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option.
2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated.
Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are.
3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question.
Regards to you all
Christopher Wilkinson (CW)
On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
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No, Kavouss, they are not. If process means anything it means that when we close an issue we close it. If we are reopening one issue; we will reopen others. In particular the GAC carveout under Rec 1 was directly linked in the call below to the GAC threshold in Rec 11. If you reopen Rec 2, then Rec 11 must also reopen. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:06 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu>; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: Chris You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637 If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> <image001.png> From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High Jordan, All: May I make a few key points in this connection: 1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option. 2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated. Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are. 3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question. Regards to you all Christopher Wilkinson (CW) On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Paul. It also has implications on the willingness of some of us to accept recommendation 10. They are all linked and to open up one for change means we need to reconsider the rest as well. Sad. Ed Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 16:14, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
No, Kavouss, they are not. If process means anything it means that when we close an issue we close it. If we are reopening one issue; we will reopen others. In particular the GAC carveout under Rec 1 was directly linked in the call below to the GAC threshold in Rec 11. If you reopen Rec 2, then Rec 11 must also reopen.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:06 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu>; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps?
Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Chris
You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637
If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High
Jordan, All:
May I make a few key points in this connection:
1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option.
2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated.
Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are.
3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question.
Regards to you all
Christopher Wilkinson (CW)
On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
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Yes, .. Rec 10 will also be reopened and maybe even parts of Rec 2 … Thanks for reminding me P Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> From: Edward Morris [mailto:egmorris1@toast.net] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:17 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Paul. It also has implications on the willingness of some of us to accept recommendation 10. They are all linked and to open up one for change means we need to reconsider the rest as well. Sad. Ed Sent from my iPhone On 21 Feb 2016, at 16:14, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: No, Kavouss, they are not. If process means anything it means that when we close an issue we close it. If we are reopening one issue; we will reopen others. In particular the GAC carveout under Rec 1 was directly linked in the call below to the GAC threshold in Rec 11. If you reopen Rec 2, then Rec 11 must also reopen. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> <image001.png> From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:06 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> >; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: Chris You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637 If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> <image001.png> From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High Jordan, All: May I make a few key points in this connection: 1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option. 2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated. Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are. 3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question. Regards to you all Christopher Wilkinson (CW) On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Paul Let wait how the carve-out would be settled. Why not reopen Rec 11. If it is necessary. Pls be prepared to satisfy threshold non IRP related then we will see Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:12, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
No, Kavouss, they are not. If process means anything it means that when we close an issue we close it. If we are reopening one issue; we will reopen others. In particular the GAC carveout under Rec 1 was directly linked in the call below to the GAC threshold in Rec 11. If you reopen Rec 2, then Rec 11 must also reopen.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:06 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu>; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps?
Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Chris
You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637
If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High
Jordan, All:
May I make a few key points in this connection:
1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option.
2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated.
Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are.
3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question.
Regards to you all
Christopher Wilkinson (CW)
On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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If the carve out goes away Recc 11 MUST be reopened. I count at least a dozen statemetns in the call that accepting Rec 11 and the 60% requires the carevout. I personally will NOT support any Rec 11 increase if the carevout changes … P Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:29 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu>; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear Paul Let wait how the carve-out would be settled. Why not reopen Rec 11. If it is necessary. Pls be prepared to satisfy threshold non IRP related then we will see Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:12, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: No, Kavouss, they are not. If process means anything it means that when we close an issue we close it. If we are reopening one issue; we will reopen others. In particular the GAC carveout under Rec 1 was directly linked in the call below to the GAC threshold in Rec 11. If you reopen Rec 2, then Rec 11 must also reopen. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> <image001.png> From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 11:06 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > Cc: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> >; Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Dear Paul Dear others All options are on the table Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone On 21 Feb 2016, at 17:02, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: Chris You werent’ on call # 83 – where the decision to accept a compromise package was made. The consensus was to accept two points: a 60% threshold for GAC advice to be rejected by the Board and a carveout that prevented the GAC from voting on EC actions regarding its own advice: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58001637 If we are going to revisit the carve out, we will revisit the 60%. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> <image001.png> From: Christopher Wilkinson [mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:39 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Importance: High Jordan, All: May I make a few key points in this connection: 1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option. 2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated. Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are. 3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question. Regards to you all Christopher Wilkinson (CW) On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All Christopher raised an important issue deserved to be taken into account Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 21 Feb 2016, at 12:39, Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:
Jordan, All:
May I make a few key points in this connection:
1. I have no record or recollection of any *decision* having been taken by CCWG. At the last conference call in which I was able to participate, the 'carve-out' was still being discussed as an open option.
2. The scenario whereby the GAC is excluded in certain circumstances from exercising accountability powers is not plausible. Absent the GAC, the remaining participants include three SOs, with an in-built majority. The resulting opportunities for collusion are too great to be contemplated.
Indeed, one may regret the abstention of certain ACs, who were essential to maintain the multi-stakeholder balance, but we are where we are.
3. One possible solution would be that in the event that the GAC abstains (e.g. having exercised their advisory role), the other ACs (in practice ALAC, absent the others), would have additional voting participation to restore the multistakeholder balance. Leaving such decisions (however exceptional) to a super-majority of SOs should clearly be out of the question.
Regards to you all
Christopher Wilkinson (CW)
On 21 Feb 2016, at 04:25, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Jordan, This is a good summary. I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda. I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process? Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Jordan, I also think that is a good summary for threshold issue . You have kindly took one of the options that I did suggest this morning to Co-Chairs to explore There are some other issues that may be settled if we settle the threshold Having said that in regard with the two alternatives for selecting one of the two options that you have highlighted in your message the following Quote *"other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice"* Unquote *IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT* This option further marginalized the GAC position and create further objections on the matter.On the contrary the first option Quote "some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws" Unquote The latter option . indicated in Blue colour may clam down the situation to some extent and could , just could avoid further objections from other Governments yet to be decided on the matter . Theser are just foods for thought. I am not addressing any other issues raised in this regards As Jordan This is a thought , you may take it or reject it with kind reply. NO CRITICISM, NO ANGER, NO OFFENSIVE AND NO INSULTATION PLEASE Please let us have a healthy discussion, and maintain a friendly enviroments The discussion of the issue is Evolved .No need to say who did what . That does not help at all Let us discuss where we are now and what is the next step. Thank you again Jordan for your very friendly message and nice tone Regards Kavouss 2016-02-21 12:59 GMT+01:00 Schaefer, Brett <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>:
Jordan,
This is a good summary.
I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda.
I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process?
Best,
Brett
________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>
On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
"... so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process?" The same conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that "we" folded on the Member model in Dublin when the Board protested, rather than insisting that ICANN's single member community have the same statutory powers as any other California non-profit corporation. Don't get me wrong. The accountability powers in the current proposal are far more robust than what we have at present. But getting the level of community cohesion to exercise the more powerful ones will be like herding cats. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Schaefer, Brett Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:59 AM To: Jordan Carter Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? Jordan, This is a good summary. I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda. I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process? Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ----- No virus found in this message. 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Some people keep referring to sole member model as if we will still not require threshold to spill the board or exercise any of the community powers. What we have in front of us is just a minor issue(compared to what had been surmounted in the past) that ought not to require so much unnecessary threats as I don't think they are necessary neither do they draw much water. I encourage everyone to just calm down about all these and then we move into the substance of the issue by looking at the text that was proposed at the last meeting (which by the way only had 1 objection when the co-chairs asked for objection), and figure out whether it's sufficient compromise or not. Regards On 21 Feb 2016 6:24 p.m., "Phil Corwin" <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
"... so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process?"
The same conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that "we" folded on the Member model in Dublin when the Board protested, rather than insisting that ICANN's single member community have the same statutory powers as any other California non-profit corporation.
Don't get me wrong. The accountability powers in the current proposal are far more robust than what we have at present. But getting the level of community cohesion to exercise the more powerful ones will be like herding cats.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell
Twitter: @VlawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Schaefer, Brett Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:59 AM To: Jordan Carter Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps?
Jordan,
This is a good summary.
I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda.
I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process?
Best,
Brett
________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>
On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along.
Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it:
- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both).
- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating.
- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation.
- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply.
- some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws
- other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice
- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it.
- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion.
So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do:
- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified.
- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with.
- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation)
- we have to publish the report
I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible.
I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why
I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being:
- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment
If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions.
I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out.
SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do.
If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-)
best Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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participants (13)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Andrew Sullivan -
Avri Doria -
Christopher Wilkinson -
Edward Morris -
Jari Arkko -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Phil Corwin -
Salaets, Ken -
Schaefer, Brett -
Seun Ojedeji