Dear ALAC and RALO Chairs,

I had shared the attached presentation slides outlining Board Comments on CCWG 3rd Draft Proposal during the At-Large IANA Issues Working Group Call on Tue UTC2030. Please review the full Board comments as there is more information and detail there (also attached together with cover letter from Steve Crocker on behalf of the Board).  The concerns, rationale and suggestions in the full Board Comments document are important to understand.  Please note that the Board is open to alternative solutions on how to address the concerns.

Some points that I highlighted during the call:

 

The Board comments dated 14 Dec 2015 are directed at the SOs/ACs for consideration in their capacity as chartering organizations of the accountability initiative as well as at the CCWG on Accountability.

 

The comments represent the_full_consensus view of the Board.   

 

The Board expresses support and agreement for nearly all the recommendations.


However, there are remaining concerns and these concerns are consistent with concerns that the Board had raised in the past.


For concerns that are considered as “serious” for the Board, if they are not sufficiently addressed in the CCWG’s Final Report, the Board would follow the principles and procedure laid out in its Resolution of 16 October 2014 (I pasted the text of that resolution below so that you are aware of what the process entails).

 

In my view, if we end up with a situation where there is no Board and CCWG agreement, there is the possibility that we may miss the political window for the transition.  We need to work to bridge the gap constructively and in a timely manner.

 

My understanding is that the Board wants to have a Transition, but it has duties and responsibilities that require it to consider carefully the impact of CCWG recommendations on ICANN before agreeing to them.  In principle, the Board is not able to agree to recommendations that in its opinion and judgment would endanger, weaken or destabilize ICANN.  Within the 3rd Draft Proposal, some recommendations are too broad and/or too vague.  This opens the door for unintended consequences or exploitation, which may unbalance or interrupt the operation of ICANN.  In principle, anything that creates open-ended obligations would destabilize ICANN and would undermine ICANN’s ability to do its job.  A stable and functioning ICANN is a prerequisite for ICANN to carry out its mission and this is the yardstick for what is considered to be in the global public interest.

 

 

Board Resolution 2014.10.16.17 (emphasis in red and underlined text is mine)

 

 

Resolved (2014.10.16.17), the Board commits to following the following principles when considering the Cross Community Working Group Recommendations on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance:

  1. These principles apply to consensus-based recommendations from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance.
  2. If the Board believes it is not in the global public interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
  3. The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
  4. The CCWG will have an opportunity to address the Board's concerns and report back to the Board on further deliberations regarding the Board's concerns. The CCWG shall discuss the Board's concerns within 30 days of the Board's initiation of the dialogue.
  5. If a recommendation is modified through the CCWG, it is returned back to the Board for further consideration. The CCWG is to provide detailed rationale on how the modification addresses the concerns raised by the Board.
  6. If, after modification, the Board still believes the CCWG Recommendation is not in the global public interest to implement the CCWG Recommendation, the Board may send the item back to the CCWG for further consideration, again requiring a 2/3 vote of the Board for that action. Detailed rationale for the Board's action is again required. In the event the Board determines not to accept a modification, then the Board shall not be entitled to set a solution on the issue addressed by the recommendation until such time as CCWG and the Board reach agreement.


Best regards,


Rinalia