Hi, Alan,
Thank you very much for your prompt
reply.
I completely agree with your analysis, especially
regarding the side-effects that my suggestion may create. Thus,
although its intention was to make an improvement in extreme cases which
may rarely happen, but now I would like to withdraw this suggestion, and
agree that your position as the one of ALAC on this
issue.
Also, thank you very much for answering my question on
the calculation of votes.
Best regards,
Kaili
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 10:42
PM
Subject: Re: [ALAC] Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress
Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion
Thanks Kaili,
I would suggest that details at that level
do not belong in the Bylaws. If the ALAC chooses to follow this path, it is
part of our own processes. However, I would caution that this is a decision
that should be made on a case by case basis. The ALAC gives formal advice to
the Board relatively infrequesntly. In most cases, such decisions are
unanimous. If it was not, it would likely be a very small minority that would
oppose (again, using past history). The ALAC would need to carefully decide if
it wanted to offset its "advice" with an opposing view. I'm not saying it is
not appropriate, just that if we do it, it should be a conscious
decision.
On 2/3, in most cases, a vote requiring 2/3 (referred to as a
supermajority) is 2/3 of those directors present at the time (and subject to a
quorum being there). In some cases, such as approval of Bylaw changes, what is
required is the affirmative 2/3 vote of all
directors.
Alan
At 10/11/2015 03:22 AM, Kan Kaili wrote:
Hi,
Alan,
Thank you for collecting comments
from our ALAC members.
Regarding the
statement "The need that each and every Advisory Committee should
preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus" and
"each Advisory Committee has the
right to determine its particular definition of
consensus", considering:
-- the final decision's responsibility and power rests at the
Board;
-- ACs are to provide "advices"
instead of instructions nor guidance to the Board;
-- under
various definitions of "consensus", the ACs's advices may not be unanimous,
implying there may be opinions against such advices which may provide value
and may represent opionions of substantial stakeholders, as well as
may provide insight to the Board in the future;
-- in order to provide richer advices to the Board for consideration
and decision making,
I suggest to make the
follwing modification:
"... each Advisory
Committee has the right to determine its particular definition of
consensus. In the case an advice is not made unanimously by the
Advisory Committee, opinions against the advice have the right to state such
opinions attached to the advice."
Another comment is more of a question and more technical, which maybe
because I am new:
The Board has 16 voting
members, which means "a vote of
more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board" is
normally 11 votes or more. However, after reading thru the Bylaws, I
did not find how this 2/3 is calculated. That is, the counting of
votes are those physically present at a meeting at the time of voting, or
can be casted remotely or by proxy? Also, in case one or more Board
members casted an "absentee" vote, the 2/3 majority is calculated according
to the total members who casted their votes, or is according to only those
who casted a for/against vote, thus discounting absentee votes? (There
are more cases which may further complicate the outcome of
calculation.)
Such technical details may
well have been addressed somewhere already. In such a likely case,
please kindly discard my above question/comment. However, my thoughts
are, at such a critical time of ICANN's future, we cannot afford to overlook
these details.
Thank
you.
Best
regards,
Kaili
- ----- Original Message -----
- From: Alan Greenberg
- To: alac
- Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 2:07 AM
- Subject: [ALAC] Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment
suggestion
- This is a new proposal by Brazil to replace the current Bylaw change
to address Stress Test 18. It re-instates the requirement that the Board
reject GAC advice by a supermajority, one of the ATRT outcomes that was
proposed several months ago. At that time, there was significant push back
that increasing the rejection threshhold increased the power of the
Board. Although possible technically correct, in my mind, it would
not make a difference, because rejection of GAC advice, in the relatively
rare times it has happened, has been nearly or completely
unanimous.
- This is now accompanied by a much stronger requirement to consider the
advice of all ACs including the ALAC.
- This may well be a way to bypass the GAC's rejection of the ST18
outcomes and at first glance, I would support it.
- Comments?
- Alan
- To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org"
-
<accountability-cross-community@icann.org>
- Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2015 14:28:46 +0000
- Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment
suggestion
- Dear CCWG colleagues,
- As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has
provided a consensus input with regards to the bylaw amendments derived
from ST18. The GAC input was the following:
- "The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to have a
better understanding of the different views on the issue. In assessing
the different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the
GAC considered:
- The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that the
advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the
Committee;
- The need that each and every Advisory Committee should preserve its
own autonomy in its definition of consensus;
- The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice;
- The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to
set the threshold for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3
majority voting, consistent with the threshold established for rejection
of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations.
- In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by
various parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress
Test 18, and to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account
the timelines of the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the
CCWG to finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability."
- With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN
54 communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18
proponents, I present for your consideration the following alternative
amendments (underlined) in ICANN bylaws.
-
- ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
- Section 1. GENERAL
- “The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to
those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may
consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors
only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory
Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall
report their findings and recommendations to the Board.
- Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from
Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires
finding mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the
Advisory Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice
provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In
this context, each Advisory Committee has the right to determine its
particular definition of consensus.”
- ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
- Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
- Item 1.j
- “The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy
matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and
adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to
take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory
Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons
why it decided not to follow that advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a
GAC consensus may only be rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds
(2/3) of the Board. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the
ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient
manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.”
- Kind regards,
- Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
- Divisão da Sociedade da Informação
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores
- T: +55 61 2030-6609
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