·
The
ICANN core value cited as the reason the Report provides for
more
constituencies is about broad participation in policy making. The formation of more
constituencies is not
the only way to expand participation, and it ignores the
existence and role of
the ALAC. ALAC, with its
representatives
from five regions, from a wide range of language groups and
myriad internet
user groups is far better placed to provide that broad
participation. A better
and more achievable way to achieve the broad participation
sought is to support
and encourage ALAC members to engage in policy processes.
Whilst the
ALAC support almost all of the recommendations made in the
Westlake Report, the
ALAC is concerned that the vast majority of the recommendations
focus on GNSO
Working Groups and suggest making small adjustments rather than
taking a
serious look at the GNSO Council's bicameral structure.
Examples of
areas for review are numerous and not limited to:
·
The
current structure of the GNSO Council provides the ability for a
more united
vote in the Contracted Party House whilst fragmenting the
Non-Contracted Party
house to the point of imbalance. The unprecedented growth of
Contracted Parties
caused by the new gTLD Program has not been addressed. What
might have been a
homogeneous Constituency might now be more heterogeneous and the
potential consequences
of this change have not been studied. For example, City TLDs are
an entirely
new breed of Registry; so are Brand TLDs. How does this affect
the current
status quo? How would the people using City TLDs have their
voice heard
·
Other
commenters in the At-Large Community have noted that the
proposals for more
geographically balanced representation appeared to be focused on
finding new
participants from outside the GNSO’s usual territory. A question
to ask is how
many gTLD registries and gTLDs are domiciled both legally and
operationally in
each of the ICANN regions both before and after the recent
expansion of gTLD
space under the GNSO's auspices. The Westlake Review misses on
the opportunity
to potentially reveal a hidden pattern that the ICANN GNSO is
self-reinforcing
the domain name business geopolitically and whether that is
underpinning the
Westlake observation of the concentration of the GNSO’s
constituencies as North
American and European.
·
GNSO
Working Groups are open for all participants including non-GNSO
Constituency members
– but the GNSO Council, thanks to its very structure, has the
ability to affect
a working group’s results. Voting is one of the ways to support
or halt
recommendations from a bottom-up PDP.
The ALAC
believes that the complex issues of GNSO structure and processes
need to be
studied now. The ALAC reminds the Reviewers of the At-Large
Future Challenges
Working Group R3 White Paper (http://www.atlarge.icann.org/correspondence/correspondence-01oct12-en.htm
) drafted in 2012 and containing proposals that should be
explored.
Reinforcing
ALAC’s view is its recollection of several of its members that
during the first
GNSO Review, it was understood that Constituencies and the
creation of “Stakeholder
Groups” were going to be reviewed at the next iteration.
Tragically, this is
missing from the current report.