CONSENSUS CALL: My comments on Draft Bylaws
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US. I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC. Alan PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP. ============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately. Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions. Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time. It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review. But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.] The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well. I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible". ============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC. Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration. Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board." Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilitiesâ (Article VII, Section 4.4)."] I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection. I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons. 1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director. 2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered"). 3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously" 4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group. 5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable).
Hi Alan, On the second point, if I understand it correctly, you are proposing that the following text be removed from the current bylaw draft: "...be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor..." So it then reads: "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board" I support it, however I will suggest that you explicitly indicate that as an action required as what you have stated in your current text seem to all be rationales. Regards Sent from my LG G4 Kindly excuse brevity and typos On 19 May 2016 14:58, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= *Background:* The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
*Section 4.6(e)(v) *During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
*Section 7.4(d) *"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities†(Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable).
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At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Thanks Seun. Noted. Alan On May 19, 2016 10:30:30 AM EDT, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Alan,
On the second point, if I understand it correctly, you are proposing that the following text be removed from the current bylaw draft:
"...be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor..."
So it then reads:
"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board"
I support it, however I will suggest that you explicitly indicate that as an action required as what you have stated in your current text seem to all be rationales.
Regards Sent from my LG G4 Kindly excuse brevity and typos On 19 May 2016 14:58, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= *Background:* The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
*Section 4.6(e)(v) *During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
*Section 7.4(d) *"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities†(Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable).
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki:
https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
-- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
FWIW, I support the first. FWIW, I support the second and with Seun's observations. -Carlton ============================== Carlton A Samuels Mobile: 876-818-1799 *Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround* ============================= On Thu, May 19, 2016 at 9:30 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Alan,
On the second point, if I understand it correctly, you are proposing that the following text be removed from the current bylaw draft:
"...be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor..."
So it then reads:
"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board"
I support it, however I will suggest that you explicitly indicate that as an action required as what you have stated in your current text seem to all be rationales.
Regards Sent from my LG G4 Kindly excuse brevity and typos On 19 May 2016 14:58, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= *Background:* The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
*Section 4.6(e)(v) *During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
*Section 7.4(d) *"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities†(Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable).
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I have already provided my full support for the first I did support the second, but find Seun’s comments persuasive - so like Carlton, continue with my support for the second, but keeping in mind Seun’s comments Holly On 20 May 2016, at 6:17 am, Carlton Samuels <carlton.samuels@gmail.com> wrote:
FWIW, I support the first.
FWIW, I support the second and with Seun's observations.
-Carlton
============================== Carlton A Samuels Mobile: 876-818-1799 Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround =============================
On Thu, May 19, 2016 at 9:30 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: Hi Alan,
On the second point, if I understand it correctly, you are proposing that the following text be removed from the current bylaw draft:
"...be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor..."
So it then reads:
"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board"
I support it, however I will suggest that you explicitly indicate that as an action required as what you have stated in your current text seem to all be rationales.
Regards Sent from my LG G4 Kindly excuse brevity and typos
On 19 May 2016 14:58, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities†(Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable).
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Alan, I support your comment on Section 4.6(e)(v) but not 7.4(d) because I don’t find it a problem to restrict to someone who is serving on the EC administration to be simultaneously on the board or to be candidate to such position. I even find it a kind of avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a single person. So please record my full support to your comments on section 4.6(e)(v) and my opposition to those about section 7.4(d). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 14:56, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> a écrit :
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilitiesâ (Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable). _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Hello Tijani/Alan, Unless I am misunderstood Alan, as he seem to indicate that the ALT already supported the write-up so I am surprised to read Tijani's comment. Irrespective maybe there is something that Tijani is seeing that I am probably missing so perhaps I could improve my understanding of things by knowing why Tijani is of this view (ofcourse while respecting his personal opinion as we must not always agree). As proposed in the CCWG proposal, the Chair's of SO/AC would represent the EC. In the case of AtLarge that will be the ALAC Chair. At the moment noting prevents an ALAC Chair from being nominated as a board member just that he/she will need to resign his/her Chair position if he happens to make it to the board. In that case, there will be no room for concurrent occupant of the EC and of the board(either liaison or voting). My question then would be to know if we currently identified conflict of interest(and such disallow) in our current board member selection/nomination process where a sitting Chair cannot be nominated? If that exist then I will have to differ on my previous stand and agree with Tijani. Otherwise I think the fix should be at our board selection process instead; by requiring that sitting Chair cannot be nominated for board talkless of being elected. Regards Sent from my LG G4 Kindly excuse brevity and typos On 19 May 2016 16:56, "Tijani BEN JEMAA" <tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn> wrote:
Alan,
I support your comment on *Section **4.6(e)(v)* but not *7.4(d)* because I don’t find it a problem to restrict to someone who is serving on the EC administration to be simultaneously on the board or to be candidate to such position. I even find it a kind of avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a single person.
So please record my full support to your comments on *section 4.6(e)(v)* and my opposition to those about *section 7.4(d)*.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- *Tijani BEN JEMAA* Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 14:56, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> a écrit :
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= *Background:* The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
*Section 4.6(e)(v) *During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
*Section 7.4(d) *"No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilities†(Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable). _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Tijani, if I mis-stated your position, my apologies. I do not recall any opposition when this was discussed on the ALT call. On the subject, I too do not support the simultaneous holding of the two positions. Can you explain what conflict you see in a Chair applying for a Board position, with the clear understanding that he/she would have to resign the EC Admin position if selected? Alan At 19/05/2016 11:54 AM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
Alan,
I support your comment on Section 4.6(e)(v) but not 7.4(d) because I donât find it a problem to restrict to someone who is serving on the EC administration to be simultaneously on the board or to be candidate to such position. I even find it a kind of avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a single person.
So please record my full support to your comments on section 4.6(e)(v) and my opposition to those about section 7.4(d).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 14:56, Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> a écrit :
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilitiesâ (Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable). _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list <mailto:ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org>ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Alan, I do apologize if the issue was discussed in the ALT and I didn’t react. It was probably because I wasn’t following the last part of the call because people came and were sitting in the same room. I tried to follow, but I was almost absent at the end of the call. I apologize once more. Nevertheless I didn’t say I support your comment during the ALT call. As for my position on this comment, I don’t see why ALAC should oppose to the restriction made by the bylaw proposal for the person who is serving on the EC administration to be nominated for a board position. Is this of vital interest for the end users community? Are we convinced that we have only one person who is eligible for the board position? For me, it is not an issue that merit the opposition of the At-Large community. it may give a bad image. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 18:02, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> a écrit :
Tijani, if I mis-stated your position, my apologies. I do not recall any opposition when this was discussed on the ALT call.
On the subject, I too do not support the simultaneous holding of the two positions. Can you explain what conflict you see in a Chair applying for a Board position, with the clear understanding that he/she would have to resign the EC Admin position if selected?
Alan
At 19/05/2016 11:54 AM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
Alan,
I support your comment on Section 4.6(e)(v) but not 7.4(d) because I donât find it a problem to restrict to someone who is serving on the EC administration to be simultaneously on the board or to be candidate to such position. I even find it a kind of avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a single person.
So please record my full support to your comments on section 4.6(e)(v) and my opposition to those about section 7.4(d).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 14:56, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > a écrit :
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilitiesâ (Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable). _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac <https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac>
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org <http://www.atlarge.icann.org/> ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA... <https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...> )
ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Hi Tijani, See below.. At 19/05/2016 03:18 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
Alan,
I do apologize if the issue was discussed in the ALT and I didnât react. It was probably because I wasnât following the last part of the call because people came and were sitting in the same room. I tried to follow, but I was almost absent at the end of the call. I apologize once more. Nevertheless I didnât say I support your comment during the ALT call.
As for my position on this comment, I donât see why ALAC should oppose to the restriction made by the bylaw proposal for the person who is serving on the EC administration to be nominated for a board position. Is this of vital interest for the end users community? Are we convinced that we have only one person who is eligible for the board position?
It is not about "us" and not about one person. The examples I gave are from the GNSO, ccNSO and SSAC. We (the CCWG) have been very careful to make sure that the Bylaws accurately reflect what the CCWG proposed. The only places where we have diverged are where there were legal or other compelling reasons to do so. In fact the other part of my comment is about just such a case, where I *DO* believe there is a compelling case. If the case I make is insufficient, we will follow the exact proposal. In this present case, I see no reason to add rules that the CCWG did not create, and without a compelling argument. So we should follow the CCWG proposal.
For me, it is not an issue that merit the opposition of the At-Large community. it may give a bad image.
I will take that into account if I make any claim that my submission has other support. Alan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 18:02, Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> a écrit :
Tijani, if I mis-stated your position, my apologies. I do not recall any opposition when this was discussed on the ALT call.
On the subject, I too do not support the simultaneous holding of the two positions. Can you explain what conflict you see in a Chair applying for a Board position, with the clear understanding that he/she would have to resign the EC Admin position if selected?
Alan
At 19/05/2016 11:54 AM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
Alan,
I support your comment on Section 4.6(e)(v) but not 7.4(d) because I donât find it a problem to restrict to someone who is serving on the EC administration to be simultaneously on the board or to be candidate to such position. I even find it a kind of avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a single person.
So please record my full support to your comments on section 4.6(e)(v) and my opposition to those about section 7.4(d).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Le 19 mai 2016 à 14:56, Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > a écrit :
Most of the comments I made (sent to the CCWG list and IANA-Issues lists) have either been completely integrated into the CCWG comments or are not particularly important. There are two that I feel still have merit. I have reviewed them with the ALT, and I have their full support (including Cheryl and Leon who have been very involved in the current draft Bylaws as well as the more recent comments of the CCWG itself on the draft Bylaws. I am not making these comments without considerable thought. IN BOTH CASES, IF THE CURRENT DRAFT BYLAWS ARE IMPLEMENTED, I BELIEVE THAT ICANN WILL BE FOLLOWING A PATH THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT ALL OF US.
I will be submitting these comments to the Public Comment on my own behalf, but I would like to be able to say that they are supported by the ALAC prior to the close of the comment oat 23:59 on Saturday. I would appreciate explicit statements of support, but in the absence of significant opposition, I will say that the comments are those of the ALAC.
Alan
PS I will not be submitting the comment until later today. If you notice any typos, please let me know ASAP.
============================= Background: The Affirmation of Commitment (AoC) Reviews are now being integrated into the Bylaws. The AoC called for the reviews to be held every three years, but was unclear as to when the three years was measured from. The three years has been interpreted flexibly to allow more time between some reviews and the Board has deferred some reviews due to community overload (with the agreement of the NTIA, the AoC co-signer). The CCWG required the new reviews to be carried out no less frequently than every five years, measured from the start of one review until the start of the next one. It was recently realized that the last WHOIS review started in October 2010, so when the new Bylaws are adopted, we will already be several months past the October 2015 date for the next one to start and will need to initiate the next one immediately.
Since the required review is an Registration Directory Services Review, renamed from WHOIS Review, we would technically NOT be in default, since there never has been an "RDS Review". But it is assumed that this distinction will not affect ICANN's actions.
Section 4.6(e)(v) During the CCWG discussions on the interval between the reviews, the issue of ICANN immediately being in default on the WHOIS/RDS review was never raised. Moreover, since those discussions were held, the GNSO new RDS PDPWG has been convened and is well underway. It is reasonably clear that the people in the volunteer community who would likely participate in an RDS review significantly overlap with those who are heavily involved in the RDS PDP. To schedule an RDS Review soon after the Bylaws are enacted would be serious error and will only serve to slow the work of the PDP - a PDP that even now may go on for quite some time.
It is clear that there is work that needs to be done that would fall under the auspices of a full blown PDP. We need a good picture of how the various current WHOIS/RDS efforts mesh together. We need to assess how the recommendations of the first WHOIS review are being implemented and their impact, as well as other WHOIS/RDS related activities unrelated to that last AoC review.
But these efforts, as important as they are, do not need to be done by a full-blown AoC-like review. Most of the work can be done by staff. To the extent that "staff cannot be trusted" (something that I question, but will address), I am others in the community will gladly act as a sounding block and review their work. [For the record, I was the person on the ATRT2 who did the full analysis of the WHOIS RT Recommendation implementation, so I have some idea of what I am talking about.]
The current Bylaws for the organizational reviews all have explicit time limits in them, but also have the words "if feasible". That was true even when the organization review interval was (foolishly) three years instead of the five years it was quickly changed to. "If feasible" allowed the Board to save an immense amount of wasted community expense and ICANN dollars. We need some wriggle room in the current case as well.
I strongly suggest that the draft Bylaws be revised to allow additional flexibility to defer the RDS review until there is a real RDS to review, and would even suggest that once implemented, they soon after be amended to add the missing "if feasible".
============================= Background: The CCWG Proposal requires the Empowered Community (EC) to take a variety of actions but was not specific on exactly how this would happen or what people would take responsibility for ensuring that the actions are carried out. As a result this had to be addressed during Bylaw drafting. The concept of the EC Administration was created, embodied by the Chairs (or other delegates) of the AC/SOs participating in the EC.
Along with the creation (or perhaps identification, since there was always a need for such a body/group) of the EC Administration, a section was added to the draft Bylaws placing restrictions on the people involved in the EC Administration.
Section 7.4(d) "No person who serves on the EC Administration while serving in that capacity shall be considered for nomination or designated to the Board, nor serve simultaneously on the EC Administration and as a Director or Liaison to the Board."
Lawyers Comments (in reply to my early raising of this issue): On March 31, 2016, counsel posed the following question to the Bylaws Coordination Group and received confirmation that the disqualification in Section 7.4(d) be included in the Bylaws: "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board. Such a provision would be consistent with other provisions in the current Bylaws, which provide that (a) "no person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board (Article VI, Section 4.2)" and (b) persons serving on the Nominating Committee must be "neutral and objective, without any fixed personal commitments to particular individuals, organizations, or commercial objectives in carrying out their Nominating Committee responsibilitiesâ (Article VII, Section 4.4)."]
I note that the term "nominated" as used in the new Bylaws is used in the sense of the current Nominating Committee. Once a person is "nominated" by the NomCom or an AC/SO, they will become a Director once the EC takes the appropriate action (and the EC has no option to NOT take such action). However, this is confusing terminology, because an AC/SO may well have a nomination process used to select candidates who will then vie for the actual AC/SO selection.
I believe that the Bylaws Coordination Group may have erred in its reply and moreover, the Bylaw drafters went farther than was required in implementing that response. There are several reasons.
1. I cannot understand what the relation ship is to the EC Administration and the rules that apply to the NomCom. The NomCom makes decisions. The AC/SO Chairs or other delegates who participate in the EC Administration have no discretion whatsoever. They MUST follow the directions of the entity nominating/removing a director.
2. Given that lack of ability to influence outcomes, I find it unreasonable to restrict such a person from submitting an SoI to the NomCom or to their own AC/SO as a potential director (ie to be "considered").
3. I would find it quite reasonable that they would have to surrender (or be deemed to have surrendered) their EC Administration seat if they are actually nominated (nominated in the sense of the Bylaws - will actually serve on the Board once the EC Designates them). This is in line with the reference to serving "simultaneously"
4. I note that the wording in the proposed Bylaws is different that what was asked. The March 31st question was "Confirm that chairs of the Decisional Participants and persons designated by the Decisional Participants to serve on the EC Chairs Council cannot be nominated or serve on the ICANN Board.". The draft Bylaws extend that to "considered for nomination" which is a much wider group.
5. The path of AC/SO Chair to Director is not unreasonable - both require high degree of confidence in the person expressed by the AC/SO. And to be blunt, arguably two of our best currently seated AC/SO Directors have followed exactly that path, as did the current Board Chair (although in that case, since the SSAC has chosen not to be part of the EC, the rule would not be applicable). _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list <mailto:ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org>ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
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participants (5)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Carlton Samuels -
Holly Raiche -
Seun Ojedeji -
Tijani BEN JEMAA