Questions on Accountability Proposals
The ALAC and IANA-Issues meetings last week brought a lot of clarity to the position of At-Large with respect the CCWG-Accountability Proposals. One area where participants seemed to hold varying opinions was to what extent the new accountability measures need to be "enforceable". For a power given to the community to be enforceable, the community or its representatives ultimately need to be able to go to court if ICANN (ie the ICANN Board) does not honor the communities directives. That doesn't mean that anyone WILL sue, but the right and therefore the possibility is there. Currently, we have no such right. Although there have been numerous times where parts of the community (at times large parts) have been dissatisfied with Board action, it is not clear that IF we had the planned powers at that time, would we have used them. In a typical case, although some parts of the community may be dissatisfied, others were delighted with the decision. In a case such as the creation of "digital archery" to address the order in which new gTLD applications would be processed, pretty much everyone was dissatisfied, but it is far from clear it was an issue that warranted extreme action. If there is no formal enforceability, then we would rely on good faith and trust to address points of contention. In the case of failure, most parties seem to agree that removal of the Board (or selected parts of it) must be fully enforceable. The current CCWG proposal calls for COMPLETE enforceability. This implies certain structural changes. Here are several questions. This message is also being sent to the IANA Issues list. Only one reply is needed. Please reply by Monday if at all possible. 1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board? 2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that). 3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it? Alan
On 31/05/2015 04:04, Alan Greenberg wrote:
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
Yes - this is something which has been discussed since the beginning of the discussions on Stewardship Transition & ICANN Accountability. I think this is really important.
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
Good faith. Legal Enforceability is a Red Herring that will not serve any of the SOs and ACs - because when you threaten to sue an organisation, you better have the adequate funding to sue that organisation. Hence where would the money from come for the ALAC to sue?
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
No. I see no particular harm in a call for something that will, in practice, likely neither work, nor ever be used. If we reach the need for legal enforceability, it means ICANN really is in trouble. If we ever crossed that bridge, I'd recommend that ALAC and its RALOs walk away & find another home. Kindest regards, Olivier
Hello Alan, 1) Removing Board member(s): this is an area (the only one?) where a change in Bylaws might empower ACs such as ALAC to exercise a form of control. So I would say "yes", but this depends on the legal answer to the following question. 2) Legal enforceability: under California law, Board members are held personally liable for decisions made, and by the way that's why they are covered by an insurance taken by the Corporation on their behalf. Would legal enforceability imply extending personal liability to those (say in ALAC) taking part in a decision, which could then be challenged in a court? In the case of the ALAC, this would/might imply the personal liability not only of ALAC members taking part in a vote, but all its members (this needs to be checked). 3) ALAC position: to my mind, this depends on the answers the ALAC can or is willing to give to the above questions 1 and 2. Jean-Jacques. ----- Mail original ----- De: "Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond" <ocl@gih.com> À: alac@atlarge-lists.icann.org Envoyé: Dimanche 31 Mai 2015 11:05:57 Objet: Re: [ALAC] Questions on Accountability Proposals On 31/05/2015 04:04, Alan Greenberg wrote:
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
Yes - this is something which has been discussed since the beginning of the discussions on Stewardship Transition & ICANN Accountability. I think this is really important.
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
Good faith. Legal Enforceability is a Red Herring that will not serve any of the SOs and ACs - because when you threaten to sue an organisation, you better have the adequate funding to sue that organisation. Hence where would the money from come for the ALAC to sue?
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
No. I see no particular harm in a call for something that will, in practice, likely neither work, nor ever be used. If we reach the need for legal enforceability, it means ICANN really is in trouble. If we ever crossed that bridge, I'd recommend that ALAC and its RALOs walk away & find another home. Kindest regards, Olivier _______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
My 2c 1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board? YES - If there was unanimous agreement among the ALAC that something was desperately wrong then we should have the ability to demand removal of individuals or all of the Board. 2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability or can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal (if you supported that). NO - legal enforceability changes the role of SOs and ACs so that good faith and trust in the system becomes lost. Would volunteers be as effective if they knew that their decisions could imply personal liability? 3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it? YES - I can't see the point if it is going to in any way impact on the way that At-Large currently operates: volunteerism - consultation - consensus - trust Maureen On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
On 31/05/2015 04:04, Alan Greenberg wrote:
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
Yes - this is something which has been discussed since the beginning of the discussions on Stewardship Transition & ICANN Accountability. I think this is really important.
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
Good faith. Legal Enforceability is a Red Herring that will not serve any of the SOs and ACs - because when you threaten to sue an organisation, you better have the adequate funding to sue that organisation. Hence where would the money from come for the ALAC to sue?
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
No. I see no particular harm in a call for something that will, in practice, likely neither work, nor ever be used. If we reach the need for legal enforceability, it means ICANN really is in trouble. If we ever crossed that bridge, I'd recommend that ALAC and its RALOs walk away & find another home.
Kindest regards,
Olivier
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At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
ALAN , sorry to use other colleagues response to respond to you, but as I have said some times before, I do not receive you message when it is coming from ICANN lists; Not new problem, I know, but never really solved. But let¹s go to my feedback: Q1 - Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board? A - I believe yes. Even we expect not use it, the possibility to have higher court to appeal is relevant. Q2 - With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that). A - I believe on good faith or if we need enforcement, it will never really work. Q3 - If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it? A - no, as I respond on question 2 above, if we need enforcement nothing will be working and whatever is written will never work either, hence I see no reason to create a difficulty due to this issue. Vanda Scartezini Polo Consultores Associados Av. Paulista 1159, cj 1004 01311-200- Sao Paulo, SP, Brazil Land Line: +55 11 3266.6253 Mobile: + 55 11 98181.1464 Sorry for any typos. On 5/31/15, 6:05, "Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond" <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
On 31/05/2015 04:04, Alan Greenberg wrote:
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
Yes - this is something which has been discussed since the beginning of the discussions on Stewardship Transition & ICANN Accountability. I think this is really important.
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
Good faith. Legal Enforceability is a Red Herring that will not serve any of the SOs and ACs - because when you threaten to sue an organisation, you better have the adequate funding to sue that organisation. Hence where would the money from come for the ALAC to sue?
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
No. I see no particular harm in a call for something that will, in practice, likely neither work, nor ever be used. If we reach the need for legal enforceability, it means ICANN really is in trouble. If we ever crossed that bridge, I'd recommend that ALAC and its RALOs walk away & find another home.
Kindest regards,
Olivier
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At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(A LAC)
Hello all, My answers: 1- Yes 2- Yes 3- No Best regards, León
El 30/05/2015, a las 21:04, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> escribió:
The ALAC and IANA-Issues meetings last week brought a lot of clarity to the position of At-Large with respect the CCWG-Accountability Proposals.
One area where participants seemed to hold varying opinions was to what extent the new accountability measures need to be "enforceable".
For a power given to the community to be enforceable, the community or its representatives ultimately need to be able to go to court if ICANN (ie the ICANN Board) does not honor the communities directives. That doesn't mean that anyone WILL sue, but the right and therefore the possibility is there.
Currently, we have no such right. Although there have been numerous times where parts of the community (at times large parts) have been dissatisfied with Board action, it is not clear that IF we had the planned powers at that time, would we have used them.
In a typical case, although some parts of the community may be dissatisfied, others were delighted with the decision. In a case such as the creation of "digital archery" to address the order in which new gTLD applications would be processed, pretty much everyone was dissatisfied, but it is far from clear it was an issue that warranted extreme action.
If there is no formal enforceability, then we would rely on good faith and trust to address points of contention. In the case of failure, most parties seem to agree that removal of the Board (or selected parts of it) must be fully enforceable.
The current CCWG proposal calls for COMPLETE enforceability. This implies certain structural changes.
Here are several questions. This message is also being sent to the IANA Issues list. Only one reply is needed. Please reply by Monday if at all possible.
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
Alan
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
Dear Alan, All, My answers: 1.Yes 2. No 3. Yes +1 Maureen coments. Best Regards, Fatima 2015-05-31 20:04 GMT-05:00 León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> :
Hello all,
My answers:
1- Yes 2- Yes 3- No
Best regards,
León
El 30/05/2015, a las 21:04, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> escribió:
The ALAC and IANA-Issues meetings last week brought a lot of clarity to the position of At-Large with respect the CCWG-Accountability Proposals.
One area where participants seemed to hold varying opinions was to what extent the new accountability measures need to be "enforceable".
For a power given to the community to be enforceable, the community or its representatives ultimately need to be able to go to court if ICANN (ie the ICANN Board) does not honor the communities directives. That doesn't mean that anyone WILL sue, but the right and therefore the possibility is there.
Currently, we have no such right. Although there have been numerous times where parts of the community (at times large parts) have been dissatisfied with Board action, it is not clear that IF we had the planned powers at that time, would we have used them.
In a typical case, although some parts of the community may be dissatisfied, others were delighted with the decision. In a case such as the creation of "digital archery" to address the order in which new gTLD applications would be processed, pretty much everyone was dissatisfied, but it is far from clear it was an issue that warranted extreme action.
If there is no formal enforceability, then we would rely on good faith and trust to address points of contention. In the case of failure, most parties seem to agree that removal of the Board (or selected parts of it) must be fully enforceable.
The current CCWG proposal calls for COMPLETE enforceability. This implies certain structural changes.
Here are several questions. This message is also being sent to the IANA Issues list. Only one reply is needed. Please reply by Monday if at all possible.
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
Alan
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
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My answers to Alan's questions: 1- Yes 2- Yes 3- No Raf
El 30/05/2015, a las 21:04, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> escribió:
The ALAC and IANA-Issues meetings last week brought a lot of clarity to the position of At-Large with respect the CCWG-Accountability Proposals.
One area where participants seemed to hold varying opinions was to what extent the new accountability measures need to be "enforceable".
For a power given to the community to be enforceable, the community or its representatives ultimately need to be able to go to court if ICANN (ie the ICANN Board) does not honor the communities directives. That doesn't mean that anyone WILL sue, but the right and therefore the possibility is there.
Currently, we have no such right. Although there have been numerous times where parts of the community (at times large parts) have been dissatisfied with Board action, it is not clear that IF we had the planned powers at that time, would we have used them.
In a typical case, although some parts of the community may be dissatisfied, others were delighted with the decision. In a case such as the creation of "digital archery" to address the order in which new gTLD applications would be processed, pretty much everyone was dissatisfied, but it is far from clear it was an issue that warranted extreme action.
If there is no formal enforceability, then we would rely on good faith and trust to address points of contention. In the case of failure, most parties seem to agree that removal of the Board (or selected parts of it) must be fully enforceable.
The current CCWG proposal calls for COMPLETE enforceability. This implies certain structural changes.
Here are several questions. This message is also being sent to the IANA Issues list. Only one reply is needed. Please reply by Monday if at all possible.
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
Alan
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac
At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committe e+(ALAC)
_______________________________________________ ALAC mailing list ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/alac At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...) ______________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service. For more information please visit http://www.symanteccloud.com ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service. For more information please visit http://www.symanteccloud.com ______________________________________________________________________
1. Yes 2. Yes 3. No -ed On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 10:04 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
The ALAC and IANA-Issues meetings last week brought a lot of clarity to the position of At-Large with respect the CCWG-Accountability Proposals.
One area where participants seemed to hold varying opinions was to what extent the new accountability measures need to be "enforceable".
For a power given to the community to be enforceable, the community or its representatives ultimately need to be able to go to court if ICANN (ie the ICANN Board) does not honor the communities directives. That doesn't mean that anyone WILL sue, but the right and therefore the possibility is there.
Currently, we have no such right. Although there have been numerous times where parts of the community (at times large parts) have been dissatisfied with Board action, it is not clear that IF we had the planned powers at that time, would we have used them.
In a typical case, although some parts of the community may be dissatisfied, others were delighted with the decision. In a case such as the creation of "digital archery" to address the order in which new gTLD applications would be processed, pretty much everyone was dissatisfied, but it is far from clear it was an issue that warranted extreme action.
If there is no formal enforceability, then we would rely on good faith and trust to address points of contention. In the case of failure, most parties seem to agree that removal of the Board (or selected parts of it) must be fully enforceable.
The current CCWG proposal calls for COMPLETE enforceability. This implies certain structural changes.
Here are several questions. This message is also being sent to the IANA Issues list. Only one reply is needed. Please reply by Monday if at all possible.
1. Do you believe that failing anything else, we must have the ability to remove parts of or all of the Board?
2. With the exception of Board member removal, do we need legal enforceability of can we rely on good faith (and Board member removal if you supported that).
3. If the final CCWG proposal calls for full legal enforceability, is that sufficient reason for the ALAC to not ratify it?
Alan
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At-Large Online: http://www.atlarge.icann.org ALAC Working Wiki: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/At-Large+Advisory+Committee+(ALA...)
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participants (9)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Eduardo Diaz -
Fatima Cambronero -
León Felipe Sánchez Ambía -
Maureen Hilyard -
Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond -
Rafid Fatani -
Subrenat, Jean-Jacques -
Vanda Scartezini