The implication of this declaration is that the public display of WHOIS records must be different in the following way:
Legal person Full display of all WHOIS records
Natural person Limited display of WHOIS records
Therefore, we are differentiating privacy based on legal entity types. This is a noted issue on other nations with privacy rights.
2)
This type of access would be limited to the record of a Registrant at a specific time, wherein a specific request is made to the Registrar for each incident.
§ This access would take place when there is "reasonable evidence of actionable harm" such as suspected fraudulent activity, suspected intellectual property infringement, suspected false declaration as to being a natural person, or where other criminal, civil or administrative laws may be infringed.
§ Such access would need to be timely to be effective. (Timeliness would be defined as proportionate to the suspected harm and related to the means of access).
Any time I see this stuff, I'm reminded of the Third Reich. There was a day when privacy was paramount. Today there is the mindset that privacy is of no concern, because - well, one day you may be a criminal. Sure, this argument exists but its precept is largely based on falsehood. It is very easy to accomplish the goal of law enforcement and anti-fraud matters without this argument. However, to keep people running scared we have to put this argument into all current Nazi materials. I disagree with this entire section just based on it's intent. Secondarily, there is no way to implement controls on this.The group identified two broad categories of Accessors who might have a need for such access as described above.
§ Public law enforcement agencies (LEAs): governmental agencies legally mandated to investigate and/or prosecute illegal activity.
§ Private actors: organisations or individuals that are not part of an LEA.
Did anyone catch that?
AGREED
§ There were circumstances where LEAs must have access described above (one or more of 6.2, 6.3, 6.4) and that private actors must have access described above (one or more of 6.2 and 6.3). These circumstances broadly include suspected terrorist, fraudulent or other illegal activity, suspected consumer harm and suspected intellectual property infringement.
And, therefore we group a 'suspected terrorist' with a 'suspected IP infringer'. Comes straight from the playbook.AGREED:
§ In the absence of a known method of authentication today the group recommends access be granted to LEAs and private agencies based on self-declaration by the Accessor.
§ A system of safeguards to prevent abuse of this Access is needed such as a challenge mechanism by Registrars.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS:
Certain user members believed self-declaration was insufficient and that authentication was essential: thus OPOC implementation should wait until authentication systems existed.
One registrar member disagreed with the recommendation.
One registry member disagreed with the recommendationPlease share your comments on version 1.6 of the WHOIS WG report. I've
already shared my (personal) disagreement with most of the statements of
claimed "agreement," and with the way disagreement has been
characterized. Others who'd like to agree or disagree should please do so.
I have not said the OPOC should have no responsibilities,
rather that those responsibilities should be determined between the
registrant and its OPOC, not imposed by ICANN, since the registrant
remains responsible for registration and use of the domain name.
Thanks,
--Wendy
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [gnso-whois-wg] Draft outcomes report v 1.6
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2007 14:41:31 +0200
From: Philip Sheppard <philip.sheppard@aim.be>
To: <gnso-whois-wg@icann.org >
References: <p06230911c2d6a8cae753@[MailScanner warning: numerical links are often malicious: 10.0.1.2]>
Please find attached the outcomes report version 1.6.
This I hope captures the last two weeks of discussion on list and on our
two calls.
Changes compared to v1.5 are:
- new and clarified text;
- revised levels of support;
- revised section 7 (with text transferred from section 2);
- new section 8 (further studies).
(I considered issuing a red-line tracked version but there have been too
many changes to
make this a useful tool.)
I would like to call a halt to changes of substance on the issues: these
we have well
covered.
I would like to invite any comments where you feel any opinion on the
substance is NOT yet
recorded.
Please do NOT repeat earlier opinion: that will just make life more
challenging to weed out
duplication.
Please do WITHDRAW earlier statements of disagreement if you now believe
the revised text is
something that you can support.
Comments are open for one week until mid-day Thursday 9 August.
After that we will issue version 1.7 which will factor in any changes
(as above) along with
factual and contextual additions from ICANN staff.
I will advise later how long version 1.7 will be up for comment before
completion of the
group's work.
Many thanks.
Philip Sheppard
Chairman
--
Wendy Seltzer -- wendy@seltzer.org
phone: +1.914.374.0613
Visiting Professor, Northeastern University School of Law
Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seltzer.html
http://www.chillingeffects.org/
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