Here's the key recital with my emphases: "Whereas, the GNSO Council desires to develop a GNSO agreed perspective with regard to the role, function and method of conducting joint activities for future projects that respects and preserves the recognized roles and responsibilities assigned to each SO/AC under the ICANN Bylaws; Read my comments. Then read yours. You will quickly see we say the exact same thing, including covering all your 'it does not says'! I just got to the weeds by a different path. So here's it plain. I confess ignorance of the extant GNSO 'house rules'. But from casual observation of what goes on and from second hand information, it suggests that a vocal minority from certain 'houses' could derail even the publication of a majority view. I'm against that. I take the classic definition of 'principles'. But I know from experience that sometimes principles actually subscribe to processes that enable their expression. And the processes themselves could be troublesome. This is where my caution comes in: we can agree on a principle but how it plays out is another matter. In this case, I am for unfettered communications and our ability to act, in our judgment, unilaterally to preserve the at-large's interest. - Carlton ============================== Carlton A Samuels Mobile: 876-818-1799 *Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround* ============================= On Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 9:59 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>wrote:

I am a bit confused by this statement and by similar ones made by others. I completely agree with the sentiment, but am unsure how it applies here.

The issue being discussed is what principles should govern (if indeed there should be any) how "Cross Constituency Working Groups" will be formed, run and report. In the worst case, if these rules are repugnant to At-Large, or will not satisfy our needs, then we will not likely enter into such groups (at least in the cases where there is this discontinuity). It does not say anything about any other working constructs that we may enter into, nor what we do with the results of a CCWG (or any other WG), nor what we do in other venues (including some future multi-party WGs that are not deemed to be "CCWG"s).

So how is it construed that these rules (if indeed they end up being used) can alter our Bylaw mandated role?

Bottom line is that just as we cannot force the GNSO to enter into a relationship that they find inappropriate, they similarly have no ability to force us into a role that we do not want.

Alan

At 19/01/2012 10:40 AM, Carlton Samuels wrote:

...

Third, on principle, the ALAC must reject any framework espoused by this proposal that undermines our by-law mandated role. In this context any notion of agreeing to rules that a) limit our ability to communicate up, down, sideways or backwards b) constrain or hobble our ability to explore, act or otherwise engage any party or constituency in furtherance of the public interest must be summarily rejected.

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