Question about the role of AOC Review Teams within ICANN
Hi, I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding. When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential. While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations. As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong? Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable. I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way. What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee? avri
Dear Avri, I share your worries and doubts. I strongly recommend reading the following article on exactly those questions. Enjoy Carlos Raúl Gutierrez -- crg@isoc-cr.org Skype carlos.raulg +506 7070 7176 El 24/04/2013, a las 08:32, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> escribió:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
Avri, On Apr 24, 2013, at 7:32 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
I hope this is on topic,
I think it is. I believe it is important to get clarity on this issue.
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization.
I think so.
Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented.
I think "must be respected and implemented" is too strong. Not entirely sure what you mean by "respected", but I see the recommendations as what the review team(s) believed at the time would improve ICANN's accountability and transparency. However, I do not believe the review team(s) are omniscient and as such I believe implementation of recommendations must be informed by experience, practicality, cost effectiveness, timeliness, etc.
Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I guess my view, not being fully versant in ATRT history/lore, is that the recommendations provided by the ATRT are advisory. However, perhaps more so than with other advise staff/board receive, if the ATRT recommendations are ignored, there would be negative implications. Perhaps as an aside, right now in SSAC, we're dealing with this issue in the sense that the SSAC has provided a number of recommendations to the ICANN board on the new gTLD program and there are questions as to the implementation status of some of those recommendations. I personally believe that if an advisory committee recommendation is not followed, an explanation as to the rationale/justification for not following the recommendation should be published, allowing for public comment and perhaps something like a reconsideration process. Regards, -drc
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision. You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached. Alan At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
Hi, Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function? For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly. avri On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
As you will see from the note I just sent, I guess I line up with David and Alan. But I think attempting to draw a bright line between "review" and "oversight" creates additional problems. The system won't work if we spend all of our time adjudicating roles and authority. Steve On Apr 25, 2013, at 6:58 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly.
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
Hi, Thanks Steve for your clarifications. I think however, that delineating such a line between advice and oversight is an essential ingredient in our evaluation of the ICANN Staff and Board responses to the work done by previous AOC Review Teams. I acknowledge that it may be a difficult delineation, but it should be possible to understand the essential difference between advice and oversight. And it should be possible to understand whether the role of the AOC Review Teams is oversight or advice and whether it has been accepted as oversight or advice. I personally beleive that relegating it as advice that can be rejected, albeit only after due consideration, may damage the essential compact of the AOC. I think understanding this is essential in our efforts here and in our representation before the CSTD Enhanced Cooperation WG starting at the end of May. It makes a difference whether those who have ICANN connection in that body's consultations, myself among them, can state that there is a revolutionary bottom-up multistakeholder oversight mechanism working within ICANN or whether we must acknowledge that the AOC is yet another ICANN advice mechanism. I tend to beleive the AOC presents a radically new mechanism, and that it is not the definition of yet another advice mechanism. I think understanding this is a critical component to this 2nd ATRT. The cycle has run once. I see our job as more involved than evaluating specific nuances of particular remedial actions. I see it as a responsibility for an evaluation of the AOC mechanisms asking the question of whether the implementation of the AOC as evidenced in the first round of the AOC review Teams meets the criteria agreed to in the AOC? Thanks avri On 24 Apr 2013, at 22:08, Steve Crocker wrote:
As you will see from the note I just sent, I guess I line up with David and Alan. But I think attempting to draw a bright line between "review" and "oversight" creates additional problems. The system won't work if we spend all of our time adjudicating roles and authority.
Steve
On Apr 25, 2013, at 6:58 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly.
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
Avri, Where's the governance, i.e. the checks and balances, on the ATRT if it's an oversight body? What happens if the ATRT gets into a mode of group think and runs off an inappropriate direction? Steve On Apr 25, 2013, at 7:43 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Thanks Steve for your clarifications.
I think however, that delineating such a line between advice and oversight is an essential ingredient in our evaluation of the ICANN Staff and Board responses to the work done by previous AOC Review Teams. I acknowledge that it may be a difficult delineation, but it should be possible to understand the essential difference between advice and oversight. And it should be possible to understand whether the role of the AOC Review Teams is oversight or advice and whether it has been accepted as oversight or advice.
I personally beleive that relegating it as advice that can be rejected, albeit only after due consideration, may damage the essential compact of the AOC. I think understanding this is essential in our efforts here and in our representation before the CSTD Enhanced Cooperation WG starting at the end of May. It makes a difference whether those who have ICANN connection in that body's consultations, myself among them, can state that there is a revolutionary bottom-up multistakeholder oversight mechanism working within ICANN or whether we must acknowledge that the AOC is yet another ICANN advice mechanism. I tend to beleive the AOC presents a radically new mechanism, and that it is not the definition of yet another advice mechanism.
I think understanding this is a critical component to this 2nd ATRT. The cycle has run once. I see our job as more involved than evaluating specific nuances of particular remedial actions. I see it as a responsibility for an evaluation of the AOC mechanisms asking the question of whether the implementation of the AOC as evidenced in the first round of the AOC review Teams meets the criteria agreed to in the AOC?
Thanks
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 22:08, Steve Crocker wrote:
As you will see from the note I just sent, I guess I line up with David and Alan. But I think attempting to draw a bright line between "review" and "oversight" creates additional problems. The system won't work if we spend all of our time adjudicating roles and authority.
Steve
On Apr 25, 2013, at 6:58 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly.
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
_______________________________________________ atrt2 mailing list atrt2@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/atrt2
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And also more, what would happen if two advices, coming from relevant bodies, are mutually not congruent or even exclusive? demi On 04/25/2013 12:47 AM, Steve Crocker wrote:
Avri,
Where's the governance, i.e. the checks and balances, on the ATRT if it's an oversight body? What happens if the ATRT gets into a mode of group think and runs off an inappropriate direction?
Steve
On Apr 25, 2013, at 7:43 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Thanks Steve for your clarifications.
I think however, that delineating such a line between advice and oversight is an essential ingredient in our evaluation of the ICANN Staff and Board responses to the work done by previous AOC Review Teams. I acknowledge that it may be a difficult delineation, but it should be possible to understand the essential difference between advice and oversight. And it should be possible to understand whether the role of the AOC Review Teams is oversight or advice and whether it has been accepted as oversight or advice.
I personally beleive that relegating it as advice that can be rejected, albeit only after due consideration, may damage the essential compact of the AOC. I think understanding this is essential in our efforts here and in our representation before the CSTD Enhanced Cooperation WG starting at the end of May. It makes a difference whether those who have ICANN connection in that body's consultations, myself among them, can state that there is a revolutionary bottom-up multistakeholder oversight mechanism working within ICANN or whether we must acknowledge that the AOC is yet another ICANN advice mechanism. I tend to beleive the AOC presents a radically new mechanism, and that it is not the definition of yet another advice mechanism.
I think understanding this is a critical component to this 2nd ATRT. The cycle has run once. I see our job as more involved than evaluating specific nuances of particular remedial actions. I see it as a responsibility for an evaluation of the AOC mechanisms asking the question of whether the implementation of the AOC as evidenced in the first round of the AOC review Teams meets the criteria agreed to in the AOC?
Thanks
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 22:08, Steve Crocker wrote:
As you will see from the note I just sent, I guess I line up with David and Alan. But I think attempting to draw a bright line between "review" and "oversight" creates additional problems. The system won't work if we spend all of our time adjudicating roles and authority.
Steve
On Apr 25, 2013, at 6:58 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly.
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
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I don't think I actually said that. Perhaps "modified oversight" since overseeing has a connotation of authority which I don't think that a RT can have, given the requirement for the Board to exercise judgement. I think that it is important for us to have a unified view of the impact of what we recommend. I am far less sure that finding the correct word to describe it is that important, nor am I sure there is a word that would fully capture it. Alan At 24/04/2013 10:58 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
For my part, I beleive that is consistent with the reaction of ICANN Staff and the Board, but that it is not consistent with the mandate. I have only just started reading the Froomkin chapter, but I am sure it will educate me as his work always does. So I will get back to this conversation once I finished reading. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding you correctly.
avri
On 24 Apr 2013, at 20:56, Alan Greenberg wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
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Avri, On Apr 24, 2013, at 7:58 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
In my view, AOC teams provide an (or perhaps more accurately 'the primary') advisory function within ICANN's oversight mechanism. Beyond the issue that Steve raises about oversight of AOC review teams and the issue Demi raises about conflicting recommendations from the different teams (and ignoring the legal question of fiduciary responsibility you raised), I believe the bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance model would suggest AOC review teams are a component of a broader oversight mechanism, one that incorporates oversight input from other stakeholders. However, as mentioned in another note, I'm not well versed in the history/lore of AOC review teams so my views may well be mistaken. Regards, -drc
Hi, If we are an advisory within the oversight, then who is it within the oversight mechanism that we advise. Certainly the Board cannot be its own oversight, and I did not think that the NTIA was in that oversight role anymore - though of course both NTIA and the Board participate in this oversight mechanism, in this case as equals according to our collective decision. Also you mention "component of a broader oversight mechanism, one that incorporates oversight input from other stakeholders." Who or what does this refer to? I apologize for the philosophical angst that is confusing me and perhaps causing confusion for others of you, but if we, the ongoing process of AOC review teams, are not the normative oversight mechanism for ICANN and its Board etc, then who is? Recognizing that the CA States Attorney, of course, remains the corporate oversight. I think understanding the vantage point from which we make our judgements is critical to the making of those judgements. I also think that recording this in our product will be an important part of our effort. avri On 25 Apr 2013, at 13:26, David Conrad wrote:
Avri,
On Apr 24, 2013, at 7:58 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
In my view, AOC teams provide an (or perhaps more accurately 'the primary') advisory function within ICANN's oversight mechanism. Beyond the issue that Steve raises about oversight of AOC review teams and the issue Demi raises about conflicting recommendations from the different teams (and ignoring the legal question of fiduciary responsibility you raised), I believe the bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance model would suggest AOC review teams are a component of a broader oversight mechanism, one that incorporates oversight input from other stakeholders.
However, as mentioned in another note, I'm not well versed in the history/lore of AOC review teams so my views may well be mistaken.
Regards, -drc
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I like your questions very much Avri! In traditional terms the Board should oversee, and the Corporation should act. But it is not so clear in this case (policy vs. Implementation). The board may be doing two things at the same time.....and "the staff" eufemism not responding for the whole Corporation as such. But we could push rewind and play it over again, and instead of a hierarchical oversight approach, let's try to play it with a horizontal "check and balances" one between the public interest (users) on the one hand and the "decision makers/operative agents (registries/registrars)" on the other (money making stakeholders in terms of one of our guests this morning call). Maybe we can then avoid this dead end angst of yours and make progress with our work Cheers Carlos Raul Enviado desde un dispositivo Blackberry® de Kolbi -----Original Message----- From: Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> Sender: atrt2-bounces@icann.org Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 14:46:44 To: ATRT2<atrt2@icann.org> Subject: Re: [atrt2] Question about the role of AOC Review Teams within ICANN Hi, If we are an advisory within the oversight, then who is it within the oversight mechanism that we advise. Certainly the Board cannot be its own oversight, and I did not think that the NTIA was in that oversight role anymore - though of course both NTIA and the Board participate in this oversight mechanism, in this case as equals according to our collective decision. Also you mention "component of a broader oversight mechanism, one that incorporates oversight input from other stakeholders." Who or what does this refer to? I apologize for the philosophical angst that is confusing me and perhaps causing confusion for others of you, but if we, the ongoing process of AOC review teams, are not the normative oversight mechanism for ICANN and its Board etc, then who is? Recognizing that the CA States Attorney, of course, remains the corporate oversight. I think understanding the vantage point from which we make our judgements is critical to the making of those judgements. I also think that recording this in our product will be an important part of our effort. avri On 25 Apr 2013, at 13:26, David Conrad wrote:
Avri,
On Apr 24, 2013, at 7:58 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Do I understand correctly that you and David beleive that the AOC review teams collectively are not an oversight mechanism but rather an advisory function?
In my view, AOC teams provide an (or perhaps more accurately 'the primary') advisory function within ICANN's oversight mechanism. Beyond the issue that Steve raises about oversight of AOC review teams and the issue Demi raises about conflicting recommendations from the different teams (and ignoring the legal question of fiduciary responsibility you raised), I believe the bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance model would suggest AOC review teams are a component of a broader oversight mechanism, one that incorporates oversight input from other stakeholders.
However, as mentioned in another note, I'm not well versed in the history/lore of AOC review teams so my views may well be mistaken.
Regards, -drc
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Alan, Avri, et al, At some point I will try to write a longer paper with my view about the role of advice to ICANN covering all of the different sources of advice, i.e. AoC reviews, Advisory Committees, various ad hoc expert committees, etc. In brief, there are two key points. First, we always take advice seriously. We recognize that each group takes its role seriously, brings a lot of expertise to the process, and works very hard. Under no circumstances do we *ignore* advice. Per the next point, however, we do go through a decision process related to *all* advice. Regarding the source of the advice, yes, there is a somewhat stronger onus and considerably more process involved regarding advice from the GAC, and I would say that advice from the AoC review teams is given essentially the same weight. In general, our preference is to accept advice, but the decision whether to accept the advice is necessarily up to the Board. (Another absolutely important source of "advice" are the policies recommended by the SOs.) Second, the Board has to go through a diligence process whenever we receive advice. For me, there are three questions we have to answer. Sometime the process is implicit and immediate; in other cases the process is more explicit. 1. Is the advice clear enough to understand what's being recommended? 2. What resources will be required and who will be responsible for implementation if we accept the advice? 3. Last, and certainly not least, is the advice relevant and appropriate? There is obviously a lot of judgment in each of these questions, and there aren't any hard and fast rules. No advisory body has absolute authority, and, at the same time, the Board has a very strong obligation to document and explain its decisions. In the case of the recommendations from the Whois Review Team, we tried to accept the advice but felt some modifications were required in light of the three questions above. Steve On Apr 25, 2013, at 5:56 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
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Thanks Steve. Perhaps we can agree that your Board does not have quite the same perspective of this as some previous Boards did. Alan At 24/04/2013 10:59 PM, Steve Crocker wrote:
Alan, Avri, et al,
At some point I will try to write a longer paper with my view about the role of advice to ICANN covering all of the different sources of advice, i.e. AoC reviews, Advisory Committees, various ad hoc expert committees, etc.
In brief, there are two key points.
First, we always take advice seriously. We recognize that each group takes its role seriously, brings a lot of expertise to the process, and works very hard. Under no circumstances do we *ignore* advice. Per the next point, however, we do go through a decision process related to *all* advice. Regarding the source of the advice, yes, there is a somewhat stronger onus and considerably more process involved regarding advice from the GAC, and I would say that advice from the AoC review teams is given essentially the same weight. In general, our preference is to accept advice, but the decision whether to accept the advice is necessarily up to the Board. (Another absolutely important source of "advice" are the policies recommended by the SOs.)
Second, the Board has to go through a diligence process whenever we receive advice. For me, there are three questions we have to answer. Sometime the process is implicit and immediate; in other cases the process is more explicit.
1. Is the advice clear enough to understand what's being recommended?
2. What resources will be required and who will be responsible for implementation if we accept the advice?
3. Last, and certainly not least, is the advice relevant and appropriate?
There is obviously a lot of judgment in each of these questions, and there aren't any hard and fast rules. No advisory body has absolute authority, and, at the same time, the Board has a very strong obligation to document and explain its decisions.
In the case of the recommendations from the Whois Review Team, we tried to accept the advice but felt some modifications were required in light of the three questions above.
Steve
On Apr 25, 2013, at 5:56 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
My answers are generally in line with David's. RTs issue "recommendations" and the AoC requires the Board to "take action". Within that scope, I believe there is wriggle room for the Board to choose not to implement the intent or the letter of a recommendation, but to do so should, at the very least, require a strong reason for taking that decision.
You make reference to RT recommendations being akin to those of Advisory Committees. As you well know, there are several flavours of ACs and they both currently and historically have been treated VERY differently. I would like to think that the GAC model is closer to what we should expect, than anything else. Our recommendations should be honoured and if that is not to be, there should be both explanation AND good-faith interaction both understand the issue (on both sides) and see if there is any common ground that could be reached.
Alan
At 24/04/2013 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I hope this is on topic, and wanted to bring it up head-on because I am not sure that all have a similar understanding.
When I first read about the AOC I understood it to be a 'soft' oversight mechanism that was replacing, at least in part, the previous oversight mechanisms as had been part of the MOU and more directly of the previous contract with ICANN. Of course direct oversight still exists of the IANA functions and of the Verisign operations on the root. I found this new form of bottom-up multistakeholder oversight quite an exciting possibility and put a lot of faith in its potential.
While I understand that the full nature and practice of the new ICANN oversight mechanism is still unfolding and in some sense experimental as one of the first bottom up multistakeholder oversight mechanisms of its kind, I beleive the review teams are supposed to act as oversight to ICANN: Board, Paid Staff (including CEO and Senior Executives), and Volunteer organizations. Due to reputed California legal constraints regarding corporate fiduciary responsibilities of Board of Directors, it is only soft oversight in that its recommendations, especially with regard to financial fiduciary maters, are not legally binding despite the fact that they are normative recommendations.
As I interact with many in the community, including some senior staff members, I gather that my understanding does not match their understanding. So I am wondering: do I have it wrong?
Do we in ATRT2 have the responsibility to see ourselves as part of an ongoing bottom-up multistakeholder oversight within the organization. Can we look at the recommendations of the previous review teams as oversight mandates that must be respected and implemented. Or does a prevailing impression I get from many on senior staff and some on the Board that these are recommendation that like the recommendations of Advisory Committees: only advisory and ignorable.
I think getting this straight within this group and between ATRT2 and the Governing structure of the organization is critical to the judgements we need to make during the course of our work. I beleive we, the collective members of the various review groups, are responsible for overseeing the organization we care about so much. I do not have the impression that the powers that be in ICANN see it that way.
What do others think? Do I have it completely wrong? Are we just another advisory committee?
avri
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participants (7)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Avri Doria -
Carlos Raúl Gutierrez -
crg＠isoc-cr.org -
David Conrad -
Demi Getschko -
Steve Crocker