CCWG on ICANN Accountability: Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage
First, Happy New Year! And second, here’s an update from the Accountability CCWG<https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability>. We had our 4th call on Tuesday (call notes<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414982>). The work team I am leading has documented<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%205.1%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1419814534000&api=v2> many accountability mechanisms, placing them into one of 2 ‘work streams’ according to this rationale: Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.  At this point the CCWG is debating that rationale, with some members fearing that ICANN's board might reject significant new accountability measures. Below is the response I gave to Alan Greenberg when he expressed that concern: On 1/2/15, 5:12 PM, "Steve DelBianco" <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16oct14-en.pdf>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Steve, thanks for this update. I share the concerns about accountability mechanisms being essential and the linkage to the IANA Transition - while enhancing the present mechanisms can be an improvement it is simply not enough. I am troubled to hear that the Board is viewed as possibly rejecting effective accountability mechanisms that the broad community recommends -- that speaks to the critical importance of the BC engaging more directly with the CSG constituencies, and with the Contracted Party SGs and CCNSO to discuss shared views about accountability. Steve, this also should rise to the top of the priority list for the Intercessional discussions. We will have Crocker and Kummer joining the Intercessional, along with Fadi, as noted in the agenda. I will look for the transcript. It didn't seem to be available as of yet. Thanks so much for the ongoing feedback. It is very helpful to the BC! Marilyn From: sdelbianco@netchoice.org To: bc-gnso@icann.org Subject: [bc-gnso] CCWG on ICANN Accountability: Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 23:05:18 +0000 First, Happy New Year! And second, here’s an update from the Accountability CCWG. We had our 4th call on Tuesday (call notes). The work team I am leading has documented many accountability mechanisms, placing them into one of 2 ‘work streams’ according to this rationale: Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.  At this point the CCWG is debating that rationale, with some members fearing that ICANN's board might reject significant new accountability measures. Below is the response I gave to Alan Greenberg when he expressed that concern: On 1/2/15, 5:12 PM, "Steve DelBianco" <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org and http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
Thanks, Steve. It may also be helpful to highlight that we debated this issue within the CCWG drafting group and basically agreed that the CCWG should be empowered to address accountability across the whole of ICANN – this should be reflected in the transcripts. From: owner-bc-gnso@icann.org [mailto:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org] On Behalf Of Steve DelBianco Sent: 02 January 2015 23:05 To: BC List Subject: [bc-gnso] CCWG on ICANN Accountability: Work Stream 1 and the concept of Leverage First, Happy New Year! And second, here’s an update from the Accountability CCWG<https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability>. We had our 4th call on Tuesday (call notes<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414982>). The work team I am leading has documented<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%205.1%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1419814534000&api=v2> many accountability mechanisms, placing them into one of 2 ‘work streams’ according to this rationale: Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board.  At this point the CCWG is debating that rationale, with some members fearing that ICANN's board might reject significant new accountability measures. Below is the response I gave to Alan Greenberg when he expressed that concern: On 1/2/15, 5:12 PM, "Steve DelBianco" <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> wrote: Alan Greenberg has questioned the accountability measures we were placing into Work Stream 1, saying, "I am somewhat troubled by all of the items in WS1 where I do not see the direct link to the IANA transition. Note I am not saying that they might not be perfectly valid and desirable accountability mechanism, just that I do not see the direct link, and thus perhaps greatly increasing our work to be done to allow transition.” In responding to Alan, several of us said that a direct link to IANA transition is neither required nor desirable. Instead, the IANA transition is the community’s last bit of leverage to force accountability measures on ICANN’s board. The leverage is directly held by NTIA, who has said they would not transition IANA unless there was consensus about holding ICANN accountable to the community once the IANA contract is gone. And the internet community has indirect leverage, though pressure being brought on the US Administration and on Congress. So I would hope that Alan and others can gain confidence and comfort with the leverage our CCWG holds in this process. With that leverage comes the responsibility to create accountability mechanisms that will guide DNS policy making for decades to come. And we must also get our work done without causing undue delay to the IANA transition process. Alan’s group is the ALAC, which has often felt the lack of leverage over ICANN’s board and and management. As a recent example, ALAC called on ICANN to stop delegating new gTLDs serving highly regulated sectors but lacking enforceable public interest commitments (link<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/alac-to-icann-board-16oct14-en.pdf>). ICANN’s board and management might continue signing contracts despite concerns of the ALAC and others, perhaps fearing lawsuits by gTLD applicants. The fear of lawsuits may also have led the board to ignore community concerns over delegating both singular and plural forms of the same gTLDs. After all, the ICANN board’s duty is to the interests of the ICANN corporation — not to the community. (see Bylaws <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#VI> Article 6, Section 7). What would be the source of leverage to hold the board accountable to the community for this decision? We have seen the futility of Reconsideration requests and Independent Reviews that lack leverage to reverse a board decision. This IANA transition is our last chance to create mechanisms that could hold ICANN’s board accountable to the community it was designed to serve. Let's embrace that challenge and use all the leverage we have. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 This message and its attachments may contain legally privileged or confidential information. It is intended solely for the named addressee. If you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for delivery of the message to the addressee), you may not copy or deliver this message or its attachments to anyone. Rather, you should permanently delete this message and its attachments and kindly notify the sender by reply e-mail. 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participants (3)
-
Fares, David -
Marilyn Cade -
Steve DelBianco