FW: Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy - PDP Part B
The GNSO Council is considering whether to initiate a Policy Development Process to examine several more questions that have arisen under the existing IRTP. This would be the second of five PDP's recommended by an earlier GNSO team. The general issues are: a) Whether a process for urgent return/resolution of a domain name should be developed b) Whether additional provisions for undoing inappropriate transfers are needed, especially with regard to disputes between a Registrant and Admin Contact c) Whether special provisions are needed for a change of registrant when it occurs near to the time of a change of registrar d) Whether standards or best practices should be implemented regarding use of Registrar Lock status e) Whether, and if so, how best to clarify denial reason #7: A domain name was already in 'lock' status provided that the Registrar provides a readily accessible and reasonable means for the Registered Name Holder to remove the lock status More detail in Issues Report: http://gnso.icann.org/issues/transfers/irtp-report-b-15may09.pdf And in a nice Powerpoint presentation by Marika Koenings of ICANN Staff: http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/irtp-part-b-issues-report-28may09.pdf A few BC members have been involved in the previous PDP and I believe we all support this next PDP as well. The BC Councilors expect to vote in favor of this PDP when the Council votes in Sydney on June 24. Please reply with any questions, concerns, or comments. Thanks, Mike Mike Rodenbaugh Rodenbaugh Law 548 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94104 +1.415.738.8087 www.rodenbaugh.com
Hello, On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 1:36 PM, Mike Rodenbaugh wrote:
c) Whether special provisions are needed for a change of registrant when it occurs near to the time of a change of registrar
We'd support the PDP, if it will raise the general level of security for all registrants. For many years we've been fighting to reverse domain name thefts and the industry needs to be proactive regarding security, instead of "reactive" using an exception mechanism. Some of our past comments within ICANN can be seen at: http://forum.icann.org/lists/transfer-comments-g/msg00003.html and some registrars have followed our advice. However, this issue is also closely tied in to WHOIS accuracy and registrant verification. Domains are valuable and if the thieves are able to operate in relative anonymity, they'll continue to operate. Address verification and other systems (2-factor security, out-of-band verification, etc.) can be used to raise the level of security for every registrant and their clients/users. One should be cautious about the "special provisions" noted above, as most domain name purchases/sales will involve a change of registrar at the same time as a registrant change (e.g. Sally Jones purchases Example.com from John Smith, registered at NSI, and immediately transfers the name to her favourite registrar Tucows). But, I assume we'll have lots of time to comment on anything produced by members of the PDP, so nothing too kooky should come out of the process once everyone has had an opportunity to review it. Making ALL domain registrant changes highly secure (with an audit trail, with verified registrants) reduces the need for exception mechanisms. Rogue registrars are also part of the problem (e.g. RegisterFly, EstDomains) and so the bar needs to be raised in terms of due diligence in the registrar accreditation and ongoing compliance process. Sincerely, George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/
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George Kirikos -
Mike Rodenbaugh