- Ccwg-accountability2 - lists.icann.org

Comments on accountabilty
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Mathieu Dear All Please find attached my comments on the document provided by mathieu on accountabilty Regards Kavouss

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Malcolm, Dear Keith Dear All Thank you very much for your contributions. First I will comment on Malcolm,s position He indicated Quote *"I would say that it is the responsibility of the Board to find ways to reconcile the community consensus with their legal obligations. Normally this is done through a combination of engagement with the community (so as to relieve unrealistic or unachievable expectations) and creative approaches to implementation (so that the objectives of the community are met in a manner compatible other obligations, which may not be the implementation originally envisaged)."* Unquote Kavouss Comment 1.Since currently ICANN functions , amongs others, Under the Incorporation Articles and Californian Laws and Rules ,it is incumbent to it to respect those Laws and Rules, thus the pressure or the burden would be shifted to the community. Consequently ,the argument is not a balanced approach. This inconsistency between the communit6y consensus outcome and those Laws and Rules was raised before and is not yet resolved 2. Malcolm also said Quote *"These twin duties are, in my view, *both* fundamental. The latter should not be allowed to become an excuse for the Board to go its own way, in defiance of the community"* Unqupote Comment from Kavouss I fully agree with your analysis 3. Malcolm also POINTED OUT Quote "Ultimately, if a Board member believes they are incapable of satisfying all their duties, then their responsibility is to resign their office" Unquote Comment from Kavouss Here also I fully agree with the analysis . 4. The last part of Malcolms opinion is Quote *"The radical idea would be to propose that directors are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences in defiance of the community they are appointed to serve"* Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here I disagree with the analysis* Now on the Keith's position Quote "The radical idea would be to propose that directors > are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences, OR THE PREFERENCES OF ICANN'S LEGAL COUNSEL, in" Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here also I disagree with the amendment made by Keith* Now on the Alan's position Quote *"But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole".* Unquote Comment from Kavouss It is not clear whether Alan in favour of Malcolm's views or against it The argument he made is a double face argument.,on the one hand he expressed worries about being sued and ,on the other hand, he refers to *A**rticles of *incorporation which includes the phrase "the corporation shall operate for the benefit of the internet community as a whole" There seems to be a need to clarify his position i.e in favour or anaist Malcolm’s views Tks Kavouss 2015-01-12 9:24 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > I would like to strongly support Keith's proposal that we 1) request the > ability to consult legal expert in California corporate law (as opposed to > strictly nonprofit corporate law, as the new Benefits Corporation is a > vehicle we may want to consider) and 2) we ensure the expert is not > affiliated in any way with ICANN legal or any legal contractor, such as > Jones Day, which has a a historical relationship with ICANN. To the extent > any participant can or would be allowed to be involved in the process by > which such an expert is selected, I certainly would like to be part of any > such effort. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> > To: Adebunmi AKINBO <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > Cc: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 04:57:27 +0000 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors > > In response to Akinbo's question below, I would like to ask the Co-Chairs > to add a discussion of expert legal advice to Tuesday's agenda. > > I believe the CCWG will likely need our own subject matter expert in > California not-for-profit corporate law. > > It's probably time we discuss how best to secure these services and to > ensure that individual is in the service of the CCWG and the community, so > we are not relying only on ICANN's interpretations. > > Thanks, > Keith > > On Jan 11, 2015, at 3:32 AM, "Adebunmi AKINBO" <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > +1 DelBianco = So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus > to take an action that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how > do you believe a board member is obliged to react? > > On the above, can we seek a legal opinion? > Its important to address this scenario. > > This can happen at anytime in the lifetime of ICANN. > -Akinbo. > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> > wrote: >> >> I am not an ICANN Board Member. I am not a lawyer. I am not a California >> law expert. >> >> But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that >> the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of >> losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its >> Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall >> operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole". >> >> Alan >> >> At 10/01/2015 08:40 PM, Steve DelBianco wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for the larger context around that bylaws provision, Bruce. But >> if we are considering whether the bylaws refer to â€˜ICANNâ€™ as the >> corporation or the *community*, see ICANNâ€™s own Management Operating >> Principles (2008 link >> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-trans-frameworks-principle…>, >> p. 5): >> "The third and perhaps most critical point of tension is between the >> accountability to the participating community to perform functions in >> keeping with the expectations of the community and the corporate and legal >> responsibilities of the Board to meet its fiduciary obligations. The >> ultimate legal accountability of the organization lies with the Board, not >> with the individuals and entities that make up the ICANN community.â€ >> >> So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus to take an action >> that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how do you bellieve a >> board member is obliged to react? >> >> >> From: Robin Gross < robin(a)ipjustice.org> >> Date: Saturday, January 10, 2015 at 8:10 PM >> To: Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> >> Cc: " accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors >> >> Thanks for the info, Bruce. It is worth pointing out that regardless of >> how those bylaws are interpreted, under California law, nonprofit board >> members owe a legal duty of loyalty to the corporation and there isn't >> anything that this working group can do change California corporations law >> and the legal duty of loyalty each board member owes to the corporation (as >> a corporation, yes, not staff). This is where a tension comes in for >> trying to do public governance via a private corporation - the two concepts >> weren't "built" for the other, so there are gaps and some issues as a >> result. I think this is an issue our group should explore. >> >> Best, >> Robin >> >> >> On Jan 10, 2015, at 4:43 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote: >> Hello Steve, ICANN Bylaws Article 6 Section 7 defines the duty of >> directors to ICANN the Corporation: >> Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what >> they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as >> representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any >> other organizations or constituencies. >> I have often heard you refer to that specific clause in the bylaws >> over the past year. I think it is worth understanding it a little >> more. I personally believe that the intent of putting this clause in the >> bylaws is that several Board members are appointed to the Board from a >> specific stakeholder group, and this makes it clear that Board members need >> to act on behalf of all stakeholders not just the stakeholder group that >> appointed them. So from my perspective it is a higher level of >> accountability than simply being accountable to the group that appointed >> them. We certainly make that clear as new directors join the Board. The >> clause does not mean that somehow a Board director is now accountable to >> the staff in the organization rather than the "ICANN community". For >> those appointed to the Board by the nominating committee - I think it is >> already clear to them that they represent stakeholders as a whole, as they >> go through a rigorous interview process in front of the whole nominating >> committee. In my experience as Board director, Boards in general operate >> on behalf of their stakeholders - these stakeholders could be the general >> public, shareholders, or members. Under its articles of incorporation, >> ICANN is structured to act on behalf of the global public interest - i.e. >> the general public. In addition to acting on behalf of stakeholders, a >> board is also accountable to govern an organization in accordance with the >> law. This to me is the "corporate" obligation that you often refer. >> This includes ensuring that the organization can meet its financial >> commitments, ensure the staff have a safe workplace, ensure there are >> financial controls to stop fraud, ensure the organization complies with any >> contracts it has entered into etc. Directors of ICANN can be held >> personally liable under law if they are negligent. After the ATRT1 >> review, a set of governance guidelines were established to make this >> clearer: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/guidelines-2012-05-15-en From >> the section on the role of directors: "The fundamental responsibility of >> Directors (as defined below) is to exercise their business judgment to act >> in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of ICANN and in >> the global public interest, taking account of the interests of the Internet >> community as a whole rather than any individual group or interest" "It >> is the duty of the Board to oversee management's performance to ensure that >> ICANN operates in an effective, efficient and ethical manner. The Board >> will also be responsible for overseeing the development of ICANN's short, >> medium and long-term strategic plans, ensuring that they will result in >> sustainable outcomes, and taking account of the critical interdependencies >> of financial, human, natural, manufactured, social and intellectual >> capitals." "Some of the Board's key responsibilities are to ensure that >> ICANN's ethics are managed effectively, that ICANN as a whole (as well as >> individual Board and staff members) operates pursuant to the highest >> ethical standards, that ICANN complies with applicable laws, and that ICANN >> considers adherence to best practices in all areas of operation." The >> bylaws could certainly be enhanced to incorporate the notion in the >> Governance Guidelines that Board directors are accountable to the Internet >> community as a whole. Regards, Bruce Tonkin >> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community >> mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* > +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. > www.akinbo.ng > > *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, > Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) > www.nira.org.ng | akinbo(a)nira.org.ng <akinbo(a)yips.org.ng> > @niraworks > > *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* > DNS Africa Magazine > www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo(a)dnsafrica.org > @dnsafrica > > *National Convener,* > Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) > www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> > > *President,* > Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) > www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo(a)yips.org.ng > > *The RedHub.* > 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. > http://www.theredhub.org/ > > *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* > Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) > www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com > www.iaids.org > About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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CCWG Work Area 2 (inventory of accountability suggestions
by Steve DelBianco Jan. 11, 2015

Jan. 11, 2015

Chairs: Just want to follow-up on action items for WA2 arising from our 6-Jan call (link<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414985>). First, I updated the inventory page<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51416471> to reflect the chairs’ proposed definition for Work Stream 1 (WS1). I realize this is still open to comment and discussion by the CCWG. I did not see other action items or email traffic that would otherwise affect our draft inventory<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51416471> at this time. Do you? Second, I realize the chairs are eager to see this list prioritized (WS1) and otherwise reduced to become more manageable. But as rapporteur for WA2, I am reluctant to unilaterally change WS1/2 preferences that were designated by CCWG participants. Nor am I assuming the rapporteur has any right to discard suggestions by others. Instead, I assume my rapporteur role as that of consolidating and organizing suggestions gathered from public comment and in CCWG discussions. Please provide guidance (via email or on our next call) as the appropriate role of work area rapporteurs in editing or discarding suggestions of CCWG participants. Regards, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482

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CCWG-Accountability work team 2: draft 5.1
by Steve DelBianco Jan. 4, 2015

Jan. 4, 2015

Hope all of you are enjoying the holidays. Work Team 2 has added several ideas and requests that arrived after 21-Dec. Draft v5.1 is attached, reflecting these changes: CWG requests: IANA Stewardship CWG co-chairs Jonathan Robinson and Lise Fuhr requested 3 new accountability items in Category 1, Work Stream 1. These 3 items are flagged as CWG (in red and bold) David Johnson: For Category 1, Work Stream 1, proposed a contract between ICANN and Registries & Registrars, with Registrants as 3rd party beneficiaries. Contract lets ICANN impose rules on others only when supported by consensus of affected parties. Disputes go to independent arbitration panel that could issue binding decisions. In a discussion with David, we thought the contract could work alongside the Member structure, not instead of it. Izumi Okutani and Athina Fragkouli noted support for four accountability items, but would place them in Work Stream 2 and suggested some wording changes. Malcolm Hutty requested an item be moved to Work Stream 1: "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its Bylaws, with effective remedy if breach found by independent adjudicator.” Seun Ojedeji requested an alternative: “found by the community" Daniel Castro of ITIF and Wisdom Donkor requested Open Data transparency rules, in Category 3, Work Stream 2. Guru Achayra: For Category 1, Work Stream 1, proposed an Accountability Contract between ICANN and ‘Contract Co.’ to replace the Affirmation of Commitments Carlos Gutiérrez: requested 4 new prescribed actions in Category 3, Work Stream 2 Apologies if I have missed other suggestions. Look forward to discussing on our next call. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 4, 2015

Jan. 4, 2015

Dear Avri, Dear All. Thank you very much for your comments I have one question which continued to bother me as everyone refers to «community" What is that magic term "community» covers? Does it includes or embrace the entire multistakeholders? As it was discussed at several occasion, there is a defacto agreement that ,generally speaking multistakeholder composed of Civil Society Private Sector, Technical Community including academics Governments In your views and the views other those who repeatedly refer to "Community" do they mean; Global Multistakeholer" as described above. If that is the case how the " community" fits in that overall description. When there are comments received from «community" have we checked whether all four categories of multistakeholder have commented? Do we treat the comments with equal footing. I know that your are defending the equal rights of the constituency In CSTD you defended that equality of rights for more than 2 hours and finally succeeded to win How we decide whether comments from a limited number of people ( mostly those who comments on everything are representing which of those four categories of community How we have taken into account whether the number of comments is representative of the entire multistakeholder . I give you an example, for the issue of ICANN accountability at one point of time ICANN mentioned based on 17 comments it modified the approach previously submitted. Did we checked whether all four categories of Multistakeholder commented ? Have we checked whether any Government commented or as they are frustrated they did not? What footing criteria were used to conclude on the representativeness of the comments? Did we consider comment made on behalf on a big community with equal footing with comments received from an individual who spoke on behalf of herself or himself? We need to be careful when we refer to the term “ community” Until the time that the constituents of Global Multistakeholder Community is not clearly specified and their footing are not agreed ,it is difficult to associate any serious value to the comment received from a limited number of permanent commenting people which may not representing the community as such. Best Regards Your friend Kavouss 2015-01-02 16:42 GMT+01:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>: > Dear Kavouss > > > > I reply to you privately simply because I think we have pretty much > exhausted our friends on the listserve. I found your answer fascinating. > And I think, in the end, the difference lies in the perspectives of our > different worlds. Where I work (here in Washington DC) if I am going to > have a fight with someone, it is often beneficial to create a public > perception that I am being reasonable and the other fellow is the one who > is being unreasonable – and having the Board say “no” to my question would > help me in that regard. > > > > Best wishes > > Paul > > > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Friday, January 2, 2015 9:10 AM > > *To:* Paul Rosenzweig > *Cc:* Seun Ojedeji; <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear Paul, > > Dear All > > I am coming back to reply to your kind responses on which we have major > agreement on the substance but different views on the approaches. > > Let me just clarify my points that I raised many times and no answer was > give. > > Currently, there is constitutional and legal mechanism for ICANN > accountability > > On the other hand, there are some sort of optional accountability ( in > form of ATRT Recommendations and comments received from a limited number of > people ( Public Comments ) > > However, there is no mechanism at all to verify whether the > responsibilities entrusted to the Board have been properly held or > implemented. > > Moreover, there are not any constitutional (legally adopted) by > stakeholder accountability terms and conditions. > > We have bylaws crafted by board and under the Board authority to modify > and or update > > In my view having more than 40 years of constitutional experience the > Board is no more than an executive entity > > What they execute is AoC and Bylaws .The first one is designed to meet the > NTIA requirement .The second one is a quasi-unilateral provisions crafted > by Board and commented by a limited number of people ( public ) without > knowing that whether or not that limited number of people commented > represents the entire multistakeholders ( Civil Society, Private Sector, > Technical Community including Academics and last but not leased Governments > ) > > There is no separation of authority between those who establish policy/ > Multistakeholders or their legally designated or elected representatives > with appropriate footing and those who implement policies ( ICANN) and in > particular the policy itself ( modified version of AoC plus modified Bylaws > ) Every thing is mixed. > > Currently ICANN is at least is responsible to NTIA for certain actions and > responsible to UNKNOWN Public for certain other actions .Once the > transition is done the entire responsibilities goes to that UNKNOWN Public > without having any authority to scrutinize actions implemented and no > authority to sanction those who did not implement the established policy > > Now CCWG is making every effort to clarify the situation .We are at the > beginning of the process. In my view, that takes many months if not many > years to do so . > > Now you and those supporting your approach consider that we need to ask > the Board in an upfront approach what they believe implementable and what > believe Un/ Non implementable > > Allow me dear Paul to describe the scenarios. > > We would wish to ask an entity whether or not that entity agrees that we > a) limit its authority) designating or establishing a mechanism for > overnighting their action and c) implement sanctions if they have not or > will not perform their duties as prescribed by the Policy Terms and > condition > > Now I am asking this simple question > > Do you know any one or any entity wants that a) ,b) and C) individually > and or/ collectively be implemented in her or his regard? > > In this world that we are living no one wants to be limited in authority > nor being held more responsible than she or he is currently responsible > and more importantly no one which is not under any sanctioning rules to be > under that rules > > If the answer is yes, then we should not raise any question to them at all. > > Moreover, does the legislating authority ask the executing authority which > kind of authority sphere or responsibility domain it wishes to perform its > function? > > The answer is no > > The legislator establishes the laws and rules and the executing entity > MUST implement that Law or Rule. > > However, in devising those laws and Rules there is continuing dialogues > between the two CCWG and ICANN Board. > > In summary, in view of the above, we should not raise any such questions > to the Board but continue to exchange views between the Board and CCWG ,as > appropriate > > Kavouss > > > > > > 2015-01-02 9:52 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > > Dear Paul, > > Thank you very much in deed to kindly answering my question. > > Yes it helps ( your clarification) . > > I will revert to you in few hours > > Thanks again for your kind answer and analysis > > Kavouss > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 2 Jan 2015, at 00:08, Paul Rosenzweig < > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> wrote: > > Dear Kavouss > > > > Thank you for this question which is a very sensible one. Let me try to > clarify what I am trying to accomplish by my proposal. > > > > I am a complete and firm support of Board accountability to the > Community. That is 100% clear and I think you and I are in firm agreement > on that. > > > > I may, however, not be clear about my method and process. From my > perspective the strongest accountability would be with a clear Bylaw > limitation on ICANN functionality and a provision for an outside arbiter. > Both of those changes would require Board approval. I am not trying to > subordinate the CCWG to the Board. Far from it – what I am trying to do > is find out as early in the process whether the Board is going to be > willing to agree to subordinate itself to the Community through those > mechanisms. > > > > So, I think the place where you may misunderstand me is at the very end of > your note – where you say “why you want to limit CCWG to just follow those > areas of accountability that Board wishes?” I think you are assuming that > if the Board said “no” to the questions I was asking that my reaction would > be to say “oh … oh well. That is OK. If the Board won’t agree, we can’t > do it.” > > > > My real reaction, in practice, would be exactly the opposite – I would > urge the Community to dig in for an extended discussion with the Board and > use my limited powers of persuasion to rally the community to demand that > the Board changed its mind. J And I would probably urge CCWG to > recommend those same things anyway – but at least we would do that knowing > what was going to happen. > > > > Does that help? > > Regards > > Paul > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com > <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 1, 2015 4:39 PM > *To:* Paul Rosenzweig > *Cc:* Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear Paul, > > The way you commenting on the matter could have two different > interprétations or leave two different impressions: > > A) You are a firm supporter of accountabilty process when we note your > comments about Mathieu > > B) You wish to raise the question Under discussion to the Board asking > what they wish to see from CCWG and what they do not see from CCWG .The > latter interpretation ,in my view, seems to be subordinating CCWG to the > Board in the sense that we just study, elaborate and recoomend those area > of accountability that Board is comfortable with but not CCWG address the > full picture, objectives, requiremnets of accountability. > > Pls find a coherence between interpretation A) and interpretation B) .In > order words if you are really in favour of addressing the accountability in > a fullflege scope why you want to limit CCWG to just follow those areas of > accountability that Board wishes? > Thank you very much to clarify your position. > > Best Regards > > Kavouss > > > > 2015-01-01 21:35 GMT+01:00 Paul Rosenzweig < > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>: > > Bruce is a wonderful man. But we don’t need his opinion, we need a formal > commitment from the Board. That’s why we need to ask the question in an > official manner. > > > > Indeed, I would posit that if the accountability working group tasked with > ensuring accountability by ICANN is reluctant to even ask the Board a > question then the communities capacity to actually reign in Board excess > when/if it perceives such would be very limited. If we are so unwilling to > even ask a question, will we be willing to tell the Board “no.” > > > > In any event, if we choose not to ask this question, then the scope of WS1 > has just expanded to essentially include almost all oversight mechanisms we > might conceivably want – which would, I think, be the wrong result. > > > > Warm regards > > Paul > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 1, 2015 10:09 AM > *To:* Seun Ojedeji > *Cc:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear All > > I agree to the term that no one should dictate the CCWG. > > Still why there is a need that we raise any such question to the Board, > > Bruce is quite active and requested to continue the Liaison > > Kavouss > > > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 1 Jan 2015, at 15:28, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Bruce, > > Thanks for this information, I will then suggest that this WG determine if > those steps will indeed be appropriate for us especially since WS1 is more > of a perquisite to transition. One would expect some adjustments on timing > and wording rights to be made in the process, also board voting rights in > this particular process may need to be agreed upon. It will not be > encouraging to have implementation stopped on the basis of no 2/3 board > majority....time utilization is an important factor in all these. So the > earlier we involve board (without having them dictate for us) the better. > > Regards > sent from Google nexus 4 > kindly excuse brevity and typos. > > On 1 Jan 2015 04:55, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: > > Hello Seun, > > >> I think writing to board to know how it will treat the WG outcome > especially when some of it's implementations will require by-law > modifications that further involve the ICANN community in decision making > process may be useful. > > In terms of the process for making bylaws changes, changes have previously > been made to accommodate recommendations from the review teams associated > with the work of the Accountability and Transparency Review Teams (ATRT) > https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/atrt-2012-02-25-en . > > Any archive of all previous versions of the bylaws is available here: > https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/archive-bc-2012-02-25-en > > Based on our current practice I would expect the process to be as follows: > > - Board accepts recommendations from the CCWG > > - General Counsel's office prepares specific text to change in the bylaws > > - proposed bylaws changes are put out for public comment (45 days) > > - Board then votes on the bylaws amendments - a 2/3 majority of the Board > is required to make a bylaw change > > If there is significant community comments against the proposed bylaws > language - then a new draft of the bylaws would be put out for public > comment that is consistent with the recommendations from the CCWG. > > Regards, > Bruce Tonkin > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > >

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CCWG-Accountability work team 2: draft 5
by Steve DelBianco Dec. 27, 2014

Dec. 27, 2014

Hope all of you are enjoying the holidays. I just added several requests that arrived after 21-Dec. Draft v5 is attached, reflecting these changes: David Johnson: For Category 1, Work Stream 1, proposed a contract between ICANN and Registries & Registrars, with Registrants as 3rd party beneficiaries. Contract lets ICANN impose rules on others only when supported by consensus of affected parties. Disputes go to independent arbitration panel that could issue binding decisions. CWG requests: IANA Stewardship CWG co-chairs Jonathan Robinson and Lise Fuhr requested 3 new accountability items in Category 1, Work Stream 1. These items are flagged with CWG (in bold) Izumi Okutani and Athina Fragkouli noted support for four accountability items, but would place them in Work Stream 2 and suggested some wording changes. Malcolm Hutty requested an item be moved to Work Stream 1: "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its Bylaws, with effective remedy if breach found by independent adjudicator.” Seun Ojedeji requested an alternative: “found by the community" Daniel Castro of ITIF and Wisdom Donkor requested Open Data transparency rules, in Category 3, Work Stream 2. Guru Achayra: For Category 1, Work Stream 1, proposed an Accountability Contract between ICANN and ‘Contract Co.’ for naming-related IANA functions. Carlos Gutiérrez: requested 4 new prescribed actions in Category 3, Work Stream 2 Apologies if I have missed other suggestions. Please email me with further changes by Sunday evening so we can circulate before our next CCWG call. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4
by Paul Rosenzweig Dec. 23, 2014

Dec. 23, 2014

I would be completely comfortable with an “exhaustion” requirement that invokes outside adjudication only after efforts at internal mediation have been unsuccessful. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> Link to my PGP Key From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 12:42 PM To: Paul Rosenzweig Cc: Malcolm Hutty; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4 On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: Mr. Ojedeji Respectful disagreement (and agreement with Mr. Hutty) on two counts: First, the principle as stated is at too high a level of generality. We need to be specific and if you are going to call for community oversight you need propose a mechanism. I am seeing it as the mechanism is what we are to determined in this process. Second, in disputes between the community and the Board, the community will often be an interested party. If you refer to dispute that that remained unresolved among both parties then i agree. My main point is that the existing community processes needs to be exhausted before seeking any external options. As you know, I favor the community generally over the Board, but it is reasonable for the Board to insist on an independent adjudicator. Saying that some issues may be “too complex to understand” is not persuasive. The Bylaws are “law” and interpreting law is a very common practice. I agree but again based on the understanding i have mentioned above. Thanks Warm regards Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> Link to my PGP Key From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> ] Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 11:48 AM To: Malcolm Hutty Cc: ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org <mailto:ccwg-accountability2@icann.org> ; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4 Hi Malcolm, While I agree that it may be moved to WS1, I will like to suggest a rewording as below: "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its own Bylaws, and effective remedy granted if breach found by it's community." I don't think an independent external entity will understand the bylaw than the community because they are the ones directly affected. They may engage the external entity if required but the trigger should happen from the community and the decision made by them. However as you have observed, the WS1 item seem to be the start-up and what is in WS2 is the continuation. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Dec 2014 17:17, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm(a)linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net> > wrote: On 21/12/2014 21:10, Steve DelBianco wrote: > To: members of CCWG and Work Area 2, > > After our last call on 16-Dec, the chairs tasked the entire CCWG with > this action: > > 3. ACTION review the inventory list compiled by WA2 and suggest > either additions to or deletions from the list. > > With regard to work area 2, everyone is encouraged to review the > latest version of the inventory that was developed by the WA 2 > sub-group. Steve, 1. I would like to propose that the item "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its own Bylaws, and effective remedy granted if breach found by independent adjudicator." be reclassified to WS1. I have three reasons for this. Firstly, I would suggest that this is a fundamental element of accountability. Although the is not limited to such extreme scenarios, it includes the case where the Board willfully defies the bylaws. If you cannot ensure that the Board honours the bylaws, any accountability mechanisms that that depend upon the bylaws are critically weakened. This makes this foundational, and I think that reason alone is sufficient to justify placing it in WS1. In short, the statement "these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above)" does not apply unless this is WS1. Secondly, my own view is that the only way this accountability objective can be achieved robustly is to create an independent/external body that is able to review the Board's actions for compliance with the bylaws (presumably on an appellate basis) and, if it finds a breach, to vacate the Board action. To be effective, in my view, in the face of a theoretically defiant Board, this entity could not be answerable to the Board. While it is possible that others may not support such a mechanism, this type of approach clearly ought to be considered. Any such a mechanism would have to be created by NTIA, not ICANN; the ICANN Board is self-evidently incapable of setting up something in authority over itself and its own bylaws. For that reason I believe that this also qualifies this scenario for WS1 according to your own criterion of "things that cannot be done if left until after transition has occurred" Thirdly, this overlaps with another proposal you have classifed as WS1 "Establish a permanent cross-community working group with power to refer any board decision to an independent review panel." If the only grounds for making such a referral is an alleged breach of the bylaws then the one is a perfect superset of this other proposal: referral from a cross-community one of a range of possible means of having such an allegation considered by an independent review panel, but not the only one. If it was intended that the cross-community group be able to refer decisions on other grounds too, then there is overlap but not duplication. 2. I would like to propose that the items "Ensure ICANN Board does not act "ultra vires", and stays within assigned mission and scope. e.g., prevent scope creep in policies imposed via RAA." and "Prevent ICANN Board redefining mission/scope in Bylaws without community consensus" be reclassified to WS1. My reasons are similar to the previous item. A Board that is capable ignoring its mission or of redefining its mission at will cannot be accountable to anyone: if anyone says it has done wrong it can simply redefine the goals so as to justify its preferred actions. This item is therefore foundational for any other mechanisms, which is in my view sufficient to justify WS1 classification. Moreover, the ability to set the goals and thereby determine the criteria according to which any accountability mechanisms will operate is so fundamental that it largely defines "who is in charge". It is almost inconceivable that any Board would yield up ultimate decision-making authority on this issue to anyone else, unless faced with extraordinary leverage. NTIA transition is therefore the only opportunity for the community to seize this authority directly, and so it also qualifies for WS1 according your "now or never" criterion. Finally this overlaps with another proposal you have assigned to WS1: "Establish a permanent cross-community working group with power to approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 majority". A permanent cross-community working group is one means by which community consensus might be established, but not the only possible means (for example, changes to the bylaws and articles could be ratified directly by ACs and components of SOs directly). 3. Lastly, I am a little concerned that the proposals relating to Affirmation Review Teams might be a bit too narrow and 'solution-oriented' for WS1 track. There is an underlying idea, I think, that continuing community oversight is required and that the community needs a permanent ability to initiate major perform, but I suspect the details of this may need to be left to WS2; the minimum requirement in these proposals it to be confident such reforms could be initiated later. However I've just tried three times to come up with an alternative way of framing this that would allow these proposals to be reclassified as WS2 and found myself unsatisfied with my own idea each time. I will therefore await the discussion -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: <http://goog_1872880453> seun.ojedeji(a)fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view !

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4
by Paul Rosenzweig Dec. 23, 2014

Dec. 23, 2014

Mr. Ojedeji Respectful disagreement (and agreement with Mr. Hutty) on two counts: First, the principle as stated is at too high a level of generality. We need to be specific and if you are going to call for community oversight you need propose a mechanism. Second, in disputes between the community and the Board, the community will often be an interested party. As you know, I favor the community generally over the Board, but it is reasonable for the Board to insist on an independent adjudicator. Saying that some issues may be “too complex to understand” is not persuasive. The Bylaws are “law” and interpreting law is a very common practice. Warm regards Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> Link to my PGP Key From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 11:48 AM To: Malcolm Hutty Cc: ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4 Hi Malcolm, While I agree that it may be moved to WS1, I will like to suggest a rewording as below: "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its own Bylaws, and effective remedy granted if breach found by it's community." I don't think an independent external entity will understand the bylaw than the community because they are the ones directly affected. They may engage the external entity if required but the trigger should happen from the community and the decision made by them. However as you have observed, the WS1 item seem to be the start-up and what is in WS2 is the continuation. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Dec 2014 17:17, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm(a)linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net> > wrote: On 21/12/2014 21:10, Steve DelBianco wrote: > To: members of CCWG and Work Area 2, > > After our last call on 16-Dec, the chairs tasked the entire CCWG with > this action: > > 3. ACTION review the inventory list compiled by WA2 and suggest > either additions to or deletions from the list. > > With regard to work area 2, everyone is encouraged to review the > latest version of the inventory that was developed by the WA 2 > sub-group. Steve, 1. I would like to propose that the item "Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its own Bylaws, and effective remedy granted if breach found by independent adjudicator." be reclassified to WS1. I have three reasons for this. Firstly, I would suggest that this is a fundamental element of accountability. Although the is not limited to such extreme scenarios, it includes the case where the Board willfully defies the bylaws. If you cannot ensure that the Board honours the bylaws, any accountability mechanisms that that depend upon the bylaws are critically weakened. This makes this foundational, and I think that reason alone is sufficient to justify placing it in WS1. In short, the statement "these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above)" does not apply unless this is WS1. Secondly, my own view is that the only way this accountability objective can be achieved robustly is to create an independent/external body that is able to review the Board's actions for compliance with the bylaws (presumably on an appellate basis) and, if it finds a breach, to vacate the Board action. To be effective, in my view, in the face of a theoretically defiant Board, this entity could not be answerable to the Board. While it is possible that others may not support such a mechanism, this type of approach clearly ought to be considered. Any such a mechanism would have to be created by NTIA, not ICANN; the ICANN Board is self-evidently incapable of setting up something in authority over itself and its own bylaws. For that reason I believe that this also qualifies this scenario for WS1 according to your own criterion of "things that cannot be done if left until after transition has occurred" Thirdly, this overlaps with another proposal you have classifed as WS1 "Establish a permanent cross-community working group with power to refer any board decision to an independent review panel." If the only grounds for making such a referral is an alleged breach of the bylaws then the one is a perfect superset of this other proposal: referral from a cross-community one of a range of possible means of having such an allegation considered by an independent review panel, but not the only one. If it was intended that the cross-community group be able to refer decisions on other grounds too, then there is overlap but not duplication. 2. I would like to propose that the items "Ensure ICANN Board does not act "ultra vires", and stays within assigned mission and scope. e.g., prevent scope creep in policies imposed via RAA." and "Prevent ICANN Board redefining mission/scope in Bylaws without community consensus" be reclassified to WS1. My reasons are similar to the previous item. A Board that is capable ignoring its mission or of redefining its mission at will cannot be accountable to anyone: if anyone says it has done wrong it can simply redefine the goals so as to justify its preferred actions. This item is therefore foundational for any other mechanisms, which is in my view sufficient to justify WS1 classification. Moreover, the ability to set the goals and thereby determine the criteria according to which any accountability mechanisms will operate is so fundamental that it largely defines "who is in charge". It is almost inconceivable that any Board would yield up ultimate decision-making authority on this issue to anyone else, unless faced with extraordinary leverage. NTIA transition is therefore the only opportunity for the community to seize this authority directly, and so it also qualifies for WS1 according your "now or never" criterion. Finally this overlaps with another proposal you have assigned to WS1: "Establish a permanent cross-community working group with power to approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 majority". A permanent cross-community working group is one means by which community consensus might be established, but not the only possible means (for example, changes to the bylaws and articles could be ratified directly by ACs and components of SOs directly). 3. Lastly, I am a little concerned that the proposals relating to Affirmation Review Teams might be a bit too narrow and 'solution-oriented' for WS1 track. There is an underlying idea, I think, that continuing community oversight is required and that the community needs a permanent ability to initiate major perform, but I suspect the details of this may need to be left to WS2; the minimum requirement in these proposals it to be confident such reforms could be initiated later. However I've just tried three times to come up with an alternative way of framing this that would allow these proposals to be reclassified as WS2 and found myself unsatisfied with my own idea each time. I will therefore await the discussion -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4
by Steve DelBianco Dec. 23, 2014

Dec. 23, 2014

To: members of CCWG and Work Area 2, After our last call on 16-Dec, the chairs tasked the entire CCWG with this action: 3. ACTION review the inventory list compiled by WA2 and suggest either additions to or deletions from the list. With regard to work area 2, everyone is encouraged to review the latest version of the inventory that was developed by the WA 2 sub-group. The inventory is intended to capture all ideas / suggestions made to date through previous public comment periods and/or (new) suggestions from CCWG colleagues. As agreed during the last call we suggest that you now check whether the list is complete, and if not suggest to include other items or delete some on the list. We ask you to share any additions to the inventory prior to our next meeting on Tuesday 23 December. The chairs also recommended next steps for our Work Area 2, after our inventory is complete. (see bottom of this email) As rapporteur for Work Area 2, I reviewed emails since 16-Dec (see email archives<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/ccwg-accountability2/2014-December/date.html> for Work Area 2 and for entire CCWG<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2014-December/…>). Most of the correspondence was about Public Interest and International Law, but I found notes relevant to Work Area 2 from Kavouss Arasteh, Alain Bidron, Google, Paul Rosenzweig, and Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez. For your review, I attach an updated drafted with these changes: - added a footnote to page 1 citing how Member oversight is enabled by California Law and by ICANN Articles of incorporation, and noted that ICANN’s present bylaws would have to be changed to recognize Members. - I did not delete any items at this point, but for items where opposition has been noted, you will see under the Support column, [opposition noted] - Per requests from the chairs and from Alain Bidron, I expanded the rationale for work stream designations. These appear in the headers of the table and are shown below: Proposed rationale for designating Work Streams: Work Stream 1 is designated for accountability enhancement mechanisms that must be in place [or firmly committed] before IANA transition occurs. All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. 1. Mechanisms giving the ICANN community ultimate authority over the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS1, since community Members need the leverage of IANA transition to obtain these Bylaws changes. 2. Mechanisms to restrict actions of the board and management of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). 3. Mechanisms to prescribe actions of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). For example, a bottom-up consensus process to change ICANN bylaws might be rejected by ICANN board, but the Members could then reverse that decision and force the change. [I folded the Transparency items into this category] Look forward to discussion on tomorrow’s call. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482 On 12/18/14, 3:10 PM, "Thomas Rickert" <rickert(a)anwaelte.de<mailto:rickert@anwaelte.de>> wrote: B. WA 2 With regard to work area 2, everyone is encouraged to review the latest version of the inventory that was developed by the WA 2 sub-group. The inventory is intended to capture all ideas / suggestions made to date through previous public comment periods and/or (new) suggestions from CCWG colleagues. As agreed during the last call we suggest that you now check whether the list is complete, and if not suggest to include other items or delete some on the list. We ask you to share any additions to the inventory prior to our next meeting on Tuesday 23 December. It is our intention that after completing this inventory, the CCWG will, as next steps, consider the following: * Assess and determine which items of the inventory belong in stream 1 (mechanisms that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition in light of the changing historical contractual relationship with the US Government) or stream 2 (accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition). Note that the charter of the CCWG includes a definitions and guiding questions questions, which are expected to serve as the basis for this assessment and determination (see below). In order to make this assessment the CCWG should also consider the meaning of ‘must be in place’ and ‘committed to’ as included in the definition of work stream 1. (Note: Steve already included a proposed categorisation in the latest draft version of the inventory). * Provide a rationale for categorising an item as part of work stream 1 or 2, taking into account the definitions and guiding questions in the CCWG charter. Only after agreement has been reached on the categorisation of items and rationale, we can proceed to focus on the items in work stream 1 to a) develop further details for each of the proposed accountability mechanisms and b) review each accountability mechanism proposed in work stream 1 and c) assess whether there is CCWG support for including it as part of the CCWG recommendations. As a reminder, the following list of non-exhaustive questions were included in the CCWG charter to aid the CCWG in its deliberations: Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 include, but are not limited to: * What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what potential accountability concerns could this cause? * What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition? * How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? * What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after. * If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be deferred, how can the community be assured they will be implemented? * How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 2 include, but are not limited to: * What enhancements or reforms can be addressed after the NTIA Stewardship Transition? * If there are enhancements or reforms that can be addressed after NTIA disengages, what new or existing processes ensure they will be addressed and implemented? * How will these enhancement or reforms be stress-tested? Suggested questions to be considered as part of both Work Stream 1 and 2 include, but are not limited to: * What mechanisms are needed to ensure ICANN’s accountability to the multi-stakeholder community once NTIA has disengaged from its stewardship role? * What enhancements or reforms are needed to ICANN’s existing accountability mechanisms? * What new accountability reforms or mechanisms are needed? * If accountability enhancements and reforms are made through changes to ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws, how can the community be assured that those changes will be permanent, or not subject to unilateral amendment by the ICANN Board at a later date? *

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FW: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Area 2: inventory of accountability mechanisms, draft 4
by Grace Abuhamad Dec. 23, 2014

Dec. 23, 2014

Dear all, I'm forwarding Daniel's remarks on the work of WA2 so that his comments may be reflected in the archive for this group. Best, Grace On 12/22/14 9:52 AM, "Castro, Daniel" <dcastro(a)itif.org> wrote: >Steve/All, > >Great work compiling these items. As part of the list of mechanisms, I'd >like to propose for consideration adding "Establish an open data policy >and develop an open data action plan" as part of the efforts to increase >ICANN's transparency and accountability (WS2). > >There has been a growing movement to adopt open data among nations (see >G8 Open Data Charter), non-governmental organizations (World Bank, UN, >etc.), and nonprofits/universities. This takes freedom of information >policies to the next level by establishing an "open by default" rule for >an organization (rather than requiring individuals to request >information). Developing an open data action plan for ICANN, could allow >stakeholders the ability to prioritize high-value data sets for release, >ensure data sets are released in a timely and complete manner, and ensure >machine-readability so that data sets can be analyzed and visualized. All >of these efforts can be used to improve the transparency of ICANN >operations, and bring ICANN's transparency efforts in line with other >leading global organizations. > >Daniel Castro >Director | Center for Data Innovation >202-626-5742 | dcastro(a)datainnovation.org | www.datainnovation.org >Twitter: twitter.com/castrotech | LinkedIn: >www.linkedin.com/in/danieldcastro > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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