Fwd: Re: [Area 4] Business Constituency Stress Test #1
The second part of the message below, which was part of a discussion in Area 4, uncovered what is suggested may be a flaw in our criteria for distributing items between WS1 and WS2. I therefore draw it to the attention of this subgroup. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: [Area 4] Business Constituency Stress Test #1 Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 12:47:37 +0000 From: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> To: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org>, Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>, mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>, rickert@anwaelte.de <rickert@anwaelte.de>, leonfelipe@sanchez.mx >> León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> CC: ccwg-accountability4@icann.org <ccwg-accountability4@icann.org> Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Would you be so kind as to convey the Business Constituency's assigned probability for:
1. termination of the AoC between the USG and the incumbent contractor, by the USG, while leaving the IANA Functions contract otherwise unchanged?
2. termination of the AoC between the USG and the Corporation, by the Corporation, while retaining the IANA Functions contract otherwise unchanged?
On 12/01/2015 01:59, Steve DelBianco wrote:
Eric — there is no need to assign probabilities for contingencies or for consequences. I refer you to the charter for our CCWG <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Charter>, regarding scenarios:
That's fair enough, but in this case I think Eric's question prompts a useful thought. The explicitly announced intention of the NTIA is to transition the USG's historic role in stewardship of the DNS to the community. At the same time, the clear expectation of many governments and others is that transition should bring about a situation where the US no longer has a privileged relationship with ICANN, and especially no special ability to set requirements and enforce them. The AoC is part of the NTIA's historic stewardship role. I am sure that many people will also regard it as an example of the privileged relationship USG has that they wish to see ended. Not necessarily because they disagree with its content, but because they object to its form. So I would regard it as entirely plausible and, sooner or later, quite likely that either ICANN or the USG might terminate the AoC. More likely, both together will do so by agreement. The reason for terminating would be that it is a mechanism that belonged to the era of USG stewardship. Accordingly, insofar as the AoC contains items relevant to accountability, it is the responsibility of this CCWG to identify them and propose how they may be continued or replaced in a post-NTIA world. Listing this as a "contingency" is, to my mind, just a convenient way of ensuring it is on our agenda. The thought that Eric's question prompts is that maybe this discloses a flaw in our criteria for the WS1/WS2 distinction. WS1 is for items that must be dealt with (implemented, or firmly committed) prior to or as part of transition. We have been assuming that this just means those things which are necessarily to give assurance that the rest of the improvements can be implemented later. When we consider the AoC requirements relevant to accountability (and also requirements of the IANA functions contract that are relevant to ICANN accountability beyond IANA) it is immediately apparent that it is an error to assume we need only consider improvements. There are existing mechanisms for accountability as well. Surely, it should be a precondition for transition to ensure that existing accountability functions are continued without interruption? Surely, it is not sufficient that we merely have in place a mechanism to re-institute them later? If this is so, then the criteria for WS1 ought to accomodate that. I shall therefore also forward this message to Area 2. Kind Regards, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Ccwg-accountability4 mailing list Ccwg-accountability4@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability4
Thanks Malcolm. It is indeed, from my point of view, something we might have been missing in our criteria. The AoC is actually in place between the USG and ICANN. When the transition comes, by default, this document would become void. We therefore need to include some kind of measure or mechanism to replace the AoC considering two aspects as far as I can see: a) A new AoC, or some other kind of document, between ICANN and the community. b) A new AoC or some other kind of document between the IANA functions manager and the community. This would be very useful for our call so I encourage all to begin brainstorming on this idea. Best regards, León
El 12/01/2015, a las 4:50, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> escribió:
The second part of the message below, which was part of a discussion in Area 4, uncovered what is suggested may be a flaw in our criteria for distributing items between WS1 and WS2.
I therefore draw it to the attention of this subgroup.
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: [Area 4] Business Constituency Stress Test #1 Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 12:47:37 +0000 From: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> To: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org>, Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>, mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>, rickert@anwaelte.de <rickert@anwaelte.de>, leonfelipe@sanchez.mx >> León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> CC: ccwg-accountability4@icann.org <ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>
Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Would you be so kind as to convey the Business Constituency's assigned probability for:
1. termination of the AoC between the USG and the incumbent contractor, by the USG, while leaving the IANA Functions contract otherwise unchanged?
2. termination of the AoC between the USG and the Corporation, by the Corporation, while retaining the IANA Functions contract otherwise unchanged?
On 12/01/2015 01:59, Steve DelBianco wrote:
Eric — there is no need to assign probabilities for contingencies or for consequences. I refer you to the charter for our CCWG <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Charter>, regarding scenarios:
That's fair enough, but in this case I think Eric's question prompts a useful thought.
The explicitly announced intention of the NTIA is to transition the USG's historic role in stewardship of the DNS to the community. At the same time, the clear expectation of many governments and others is that transition should bring about a situation where the US no longer has a privileged relationship with ICANN, and especially no special ability to set requirements and enforce them.
The AoC is part of the NTIA's historic stewardship role. I am sure that many people will also regard it as an example of the privileged relationship USG has that they wish to see ended. Not necessarily because they disagree with its content, but because they object to its form.
So I would regard it as entirely plausible and, sooner or later, quite likely that either ICANN or the USG might terminate the AoC. More likely, both together will do so by agreement. The reason for terminating would be that it is a mechanism that belonged to the era of USG stewardship.
Accordingly, insofar as the AoC contains items relevant to accountability, it is the responsibility of this CCWG to identify them and propose how they may be continued or replaced in a post-NTIA world. Listing this as a "contingency" is, to my mind, just a convenient way of ensuring it is on our agenda.
The thought that Eric's question prompts is that maybe this discloses a flaw in our criteria for the WS1/WS2 distinction.
WS1 is for items that must be dealt with (implemented, or firmly committed) prior to or as part of transition. We have been assuming that this just means those things which are necessarily to give assurance that the rest of the improvements can be implemented later.
When we consider the AoC requirements relevant to accountability (and also requirements of the IANA functions contract that are relevant to ICANN accountability beyond IANA) it is immediately apparent that it is an error to assume we need only consider improvements. There are existing mechanisms for accountability as well.
Surely, it should be a precondition for transition to ensure that existing accountability functions are continued without interruption? Surely, it is not sufficient that we merely have in place a mechanism to re-institute them later?
If this is so, then the criteria for WS1 ought to accomodate that. I shall therefore also forward this message to Area 2.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Ccwg-accountability4 mailing list Ccwg-accountability4@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability4
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participants (2)
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León Felipe Sánchez Ambía -
Malcolm Hutty