The legacy domain names, including .info and .org, were handed over to ICANN as trustee to manage for the public benefit. ICANN has betrayed that trust by turning .info over to a private company to exploit for its own benefit.
Of the various rationale given in support of this policy, that ICANN does not want to "become a price regulator" is the most disingenuous and pernicious. ICANN as a trustee of the public interest for the legacy domains is, and always has been, and unless it abdicates its responsibility, will continue to be a setter of prices within the legacy extensions. Has ICANN throughout its history been overstepping its authority when it entered into agreements that included terms governing pricing?
The US Department of Justice viewed ICANN's role as creating competitive mechanisms, such as putting registry agreements out for rebid, to keep prices low for registrants, and failing that, the DOJ clearly stated it was ICANN's role to manage the TLDs in a manner that "safeguards the interests of registrants in obtaining high quality domains at the lowest possible prices." (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/baker-to-dengate-thrush-18dec08-en.pdf)
The DOJ expressly stated that ICANN should set price caps in the absence of putting out registries for competitive bid:
"Because ICANN's proposed registry agreement lacks any [pricing] safeguards,... ICANN should consider revising the proposed registry agreement, at least for instances where there is not competitive bidding to operate a new gTLD, to include provisions designed to limit the ability of the registry operator to exercise market power, i.e., price caps..."
The DOJ called for agreements that included a maximum price and limitations on price increases:
"ICANN's requests for bids [to operate a new gTLD] should expressly call for bids to specify an initial maximum price that would be charged by the operator for domain registrations, as well as limitations on price increases over time.."
The DOJ knew that relying on market forces and competition were not adequate where registries had market power. The DOJ found that .com and other gTLD registry operators had market power:
"our investigation of the .com agreement found evidence that other gTLD registry operators may possess a degree of market power. The market power inherent in other gTLDs is less than the market power in .com, but is still material..."
and
"Further, the introduction of new gTLDs is not likely to constrain the market power by existing gTLDs..."
On the one hand we have a registry talking point that ICANN should not "become a price regulator". On the other hand, the US Department of Justice is castigating ICANN for not doing enough to protect registrants since "ICANN has not come close to fulfilling its obligations to employ competitive principles in its management of TLD registry operations." As a consequence, since ICANN has created an environment where registries have market power "ICANN should take steps to protect consumers from the exercise of market power by gTLD operators".
The nature of developed domains as online brands, means that once established there is no substitute for that domain and the registrant is locked into continued use of that domain as long as it wants to continue using its brand. ICANN is creating a situation akin to the USPTO allowing a private company the right to set whatever price it wanted for trademark owners to continue using their trademarks or else the trademark owner would be forced to abandon the right to its trademark.
I believe this commenter expresses the issue well:
This is basically sanctioning extortion, a domain name is closer to a
trademark, except a company is apparently not allowed to own it... instead
they must keep "leasing" their trademark from a registrar. What do I get
for improving my domain name (making my business known, improving public
trust, running a well known blog/ news site)? Clearly higher rent costs on
that same name.
There is nothing pro-competitive about the proposed agreement. It is a set up for extortion. This approach should be rethought with appropriate price safeguards established.