FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration
Right on cue -- Thanks- J. From: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx<mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx>> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 17:20 To: James Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com<mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, Thomas Schneider <Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch>>, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>>, Tripti Sinha <tsinha@umd.edu<mailto:tsinha@umd.edu>>, Brad Verd <bverd@verisign.com<mailto:bverd@verisign.com>>, Byron Holland <byron.holland@cira.ca<mailto:byron.holland@cira.ca>>, Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se<mailto:paf@frobbit.se>>, Lise Fuhr <fuhr@etno.eu<mailto:fuhr@etno.eu>>, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson@afilias.info<mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info>> Cc: <gnso.secretariat@gnso.icann.org<mailto:gnso.secretariat@gnso.icann.org>>, Olof Nordling <olof.nordling@icann.org<mailto:olof.nordling@icann.org>>, Julia Charvolen <julia.charvolen@icann.org<mailto:julia.charvolen@icann.org>>, Tom Dale <tom@acig.com.au<mailto:tom@acig.com.au>>, Staff <staff@atlarge.icann.org<mailto:staff@atlarge.icann.org>>, Carlos Reyes <carlos.reyes@icann.org<mailto:carlos.reyes@icann.org>>, "Kimberly Carlson (kimberly.carlson@icann.org<mailto:kimberly.carlson@icann.org>)" <kimberly.carlson@icann.org<mailto:kimberly.carlson@icann.org>>, Bart Boswinkel <bart.boswinkel@icann.org<mailto:bart.boswinkel@icann.org>>, Julie Hedlund <julie.hedlund@icann.org<mailto:julie.hedlund@icann.org>>, Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad@icann.org<mailto:grace.abuhamad@icann.org>>, David Olive <david.olive@icann.org<mailto:david.olive@icann.org>>, Theresa Swinehart <theresa.swinehart@icann.org<mailto:theresa.swinehart@icann.org>>, ACCT-Staff <acct-staff@icann.org<mailto:acct-staff@icann.org>>, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>, Fadi Chehadé <fadi.chehade@icann.org<mailto:fadi.chehade@icann.org>> Subject: CCWG Final report for your consideration Dear Chartering Organizations, The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) is pleased to provide its Chartering Organizations with its report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. You can download the full report here: https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw. As per the CCWG-Accountability's Charter, we now seek your approval to submit this final report to the ICANN Board and ask you to consider this approval in accordance with your respective SO or AC rules and procedures by 9 March 2016 to meet the overall timing requirements, which would allow the IANA Stewardship Transition (as a whole) to proceed. The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountability's 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the Public Comment proceedings. The final proposal has received the consensus support of the CCWG-Accountability with five minority statements from members recorded for Chartering Organization consideration (see Appendix A). Please note that we are publishing our report today with the minority statements delivered by the original 19 February deadline, but we have given our members a final opportunity to revise, retract or add minority statements based on our compromise reached this morning. We will send you a revised Appendix A on 25 February. As noted in the CCWG-Accountability report, the group worked to meet both NTIA requirements for the overall IANA Stewardship Transition (Annex 14), and the CWG-Stewardship dependencies for the naming community on ICANN accountability enhancements (Annex 13). The co-chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability have coordinated their efforts. The CWG-Stewardship will deliver a letter to you confirming that its dependencies have been met, thus allowing the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal to move forward. We will make ourselves together with or other key contributors available to you before and during the ICANN 55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions you may have and explain any details of the report. For your information, further background documents as well as the slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars explain the details of the final proposal are available here: https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg. Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you very much for your continued support. Thomas Rickert, Mathieu Weill and Leon Sanchez CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs
Thanks James, I ‘d like at first congratulate the CCWG that it came to a conclusion which is now in front of us – whatever painfull the process was they had to go through. I’ll immediately initiate the final discussion within my constituency to get prepared for the council discussion on 29 Feb. The ISPCP call shall be a few hours before the council call. I’m sure my fellow councillors doing their best as well to filter out the very last issues that may exist so that the council at its call could achieve either - a final conclusion (best dream...) or - a condensed list of the issues barring SGs/Cs from approval Best regards Wolf-Ulrich From: James M. Bladel Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2016 12:41 AM To: GNSO Council List Subject: [council] FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration Right on cue -- Thanks- J. From: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 17:20 To: James Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com>, Thomas Schneider <Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch>, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>, Tripti Sinha <tsinha@umd.edu>, Brad Verd <bverd@verisign.com>, Byron Holland <byron.holland@cira.ca>, Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se>, Lise Fuhr <fuhr@etno.eu>, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson@afilias.info> Cc: <gnso.secretariat@gnso.icann.org>, Olof Nordling <olof.nordling@icann.org>, Julia Charvolen <julia.charvolen@icann.org>, Tom Dale <tom@acig.com.au>, Staff <staff@atlarge.icann.org>, Carlos Reyes <carlos.reyes@icann.org>, "Kimberly Carlson (kimberly.carlson@icann.org)" <kimberly.carlson@icann.org>, Bart Boswinkel <bart.boswinkel@icann.org>, Julie Hedlund <julie.hedlund@icann.org>, Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad@icann.org>, David Olive <david.olive@icann.org>, Theresa Swinehart <theresa.swinehart@icann.org>, ACCT-Staff <acct-staff@icann.org>, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org>, Fadi Chehadé <fadi.chehade@icann.org> Subject: CCWG Final report for your consideration Dear Chartering Organizations, The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) is pleased to provide its Chartering Organizations with its report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. You can download the full report here: https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw. As per the CCWG-Accountability’s Charter, we now seek your approval to submit this final report to the ICANN Board and ask you to consider this approval in accordance with your respective SO or AC rules and procedures by 9 March 2016 to meet the overall timing requirements, which would allow the IANA Stewardship Transition (as a whole) to proceed. The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountability’s 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the Public Comment proceedings. The final proposal has received the consensus support of the CCWG-Accountability with five minority statements from members recorded for Chartering Organization consideration (see Appendix A). Please note that we are publishing our report today with the minority statements delivered by the original 19 February deadline, but we have given our members a final opportunity to revise, retract or add minority statements based on our compromise reached this morning. We will send you a revised Appendix A on 25 February. As noted in the CCWG-Accountability report, the group worked to meet both NTIA requirements for the overall IANA Stewardship Transition (Annex 14), and the CWG-Stewardship dependencies for the naming community on ICANN accountability enhancements (Annex 13). The co-chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability have coordinated their efforts. The CWG-Stewardship will deliver a letter to you confirming that its dependencies have been met, thus allowing the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal to move forward. We will make ourselves together with or other key contributors available to you before and during the ICANN 55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions you may have and explain any details of the report. For your information, further background documents as well as the slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars explain the details of the final proposal are available here: https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg. Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you very much for your continued support. Thomas Rickert, Mathieu Weill and Leon Sanchez CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs
Thanks James. It seems to me that what this last minute change boils down to is that the Community will never be able to spill the Board for acting on unpopular GAC advice (since the GAC will never agree to spill the Board for acting on its advice). Any attempt to spill the Board based on faulty GAC advice will have to be blessed by an IRP Panelist and found to violate the bylaws. Is this your understanding too? Best, Paul Paul D. McGrady, Jr. policy@paulmcgrady.com +1-312-558-5963 From: owner-council@gnso.icann.org [mailto:owner-council@gnso.icann.org] On Behalf Of James M. Bladel Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 05:42 PM To: GNSO Council List Subject: [council] FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration Right on cue -- Thanks- J. From: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 17:20 To: James Bladel <jbladel@godaddy.com>, Thomas Schneider <Thomas.Schneider@bakom.admin.ch>, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>, Tripti Sinha <tsinha@umd.edu>, Brad Verd <bverd@verisign.com>, Byron Holland <byron.holland@cira.ca>, Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se>, Lise Fuhr <fuhr@etno.eu>, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson@afilias.info> Cc: <gnso.secretariat@gnso.icann.org>, Olof Nordling <olof.nordling@icann.org>, Julia Charvolen <julia.charvolen@icann.org>, Tom Dale <tom@acig.com.au>, Staff <staff@atlarge.icann.org>, Carlos Reyes <carlos.reyes@icann.org>, "Kimberly Carlson (kimberly.carlson@icann.org)" <kimberly.carlson@icann.org>, Bart Boswinkel <bart.boswinkel@icann.org>, Julie Hedlund <julie.hedlund@icann.org>, Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad@icann.org>, David Olive <david.olive@icann.org>, Theresa Swinehart <theresa.swinehart@icann.org>, ACCT-Staff <acct-staff@icann.org>, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker@icann.org>, Fadi Chehadé <fadi.chehade@icann.org> Subject: CCWG Final report for your consideration Dear Chartering Organizations, The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) is pleased to provide its Chartering Organizations with its report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. You can download the full report here: <https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw> https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw. As per the CCWG-Accountabilitys Charter, we now seek your approval to submit this final report to the ICANN Board and ask you to consider this approval in accordance with your respective SO or AC rules and procedures by 9 March 2016 to meet the overall timing requirements, which would allow the IANA Stewardship Transition (as a whole) to proceed. The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountabilitys 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the Public Comment proceedings. The final proposal has received the consensus support of the CCWG-Accountability with five minority statements from members recorded for Chartering Organization consideration (see Appendix A). Please note that we are publishing our report today with the minority statements delivered by the original 19 February deadline, but we have given our members a final opportunity to revise, retract or add minority statements based on our compromise reached this morning. We will send you a revised Appendix A on 25 February. As noted in the CCWG-Accountability report, the group worked to meet both NTIA requirements for the overall IANA Stewardship Transition (Annex 14), and the CWG-Stewardship dependencies for the naming community on ICANN accountability enhancements (Annex 13). The co-chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability have coordinated their efforts. The CWG-Stewardship will deliver a letter to you confirming that its dependencies have been met, thus allowing the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal to move forward. We will make ourselves together with or other key contributors available to you before and during the ICANN 55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions you may have and explain any details of the report. For your information, further background documents as well as the slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars explain the details of the final proposal are available here: <https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg> https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg. Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you very much for your continued support. Thomas Rickert, Mathieu Weill and Leon Sanchez CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs
What would be very useful for me would be to hear someone more closely involved in the process explain what has changed since the compromise proposal that was discussed at the intercessional in Los Angeles three weeks ago, and why the changes happened. Julf On 24-02-16 19:52, Paul McGrady (Policy) wrote:
Thanks James. It seems to me that what this last minute change boils down to is that the Community will never be able to spill the Board for acting on unpopular GAC advice (since the GAC will never agree to spill the Board for acting on its advice). Any attempt to spill the Board based on faulty GAC advice will have to be blessed by an IRP Panelist and found to violate the bylaws. Is this your understanding too?
Hello Paul,
Thanks James. It seems to me that what this last minute change boils down to is that the Community will never be able to spill the Board for acting on unpopular GAC advice (since the GAC will never agree to spill the Board for acting on its advice). Any attempt to spill the Board based on faulty GAC advice will have to be blessed by an IRP Panelist and found to violate the bylaws. Is this your understanding too?
Basically if the ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC simply don't like the GAC advice they can spill the Board. If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board if the Board does not follow the binding direction of the IRP panel. So far most major debates about the Board following GAC advice are usually about whether the Board is acting outside of its narrow mission. Note though the process of reaching a decision involves a community forum in either situation - and the Board would be actively listening and participating. I would think that the Board in general would change its view if even one SO or AC could provide a strong argument. Let alone two or more. There would also likely be strong coverage in the industry press etc of any such forum. So just escalating to the point of having a community forum - would be a powerful incentive for the Board to reflect on its decision, and look for ways to find a compromise to maximise support across the multi-stakeholder community. Regards Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board member
Hi, Bruce,
If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board
I think Paul had the concern that removing the board requires both a violation of bylaws and a supportive IRP panel ruling. I agree that the situation is mostly academic, and we are spending a lot of time thinking up worst case scenarios while the reason the net still works as well as it does is the mutual trust of the community, but I think many of us do realize that the transition, once entered into, can't be undone, and we are also aware of ICANN's less than brilliant historical track record in terms of transparency and accountability. Julf
Sorry to come in on this thread so late, but I think Bruce and Julf have hit the main points. The most recent change does make it more difficult (effectively impossible?) to spill the board in response to their implementation of GAC advice. But I agree with those who believe that this is an edge-case, and other mechanisms (IRP) would be invoked first. Also (and looking for Bruce, Keith, Phil or others to confirm this), I believe this change only applies to community effort to spill the entire board, and would not apply to the mechanisms for recall of a single board member. Thanks‹ J. On 2/25/16, 9:10 , "owner-council@gnso.icann.org on behalf of Johan Helsingius" <owner-council@gnso.icann.org on behalf of julf@julf.com> wrote:
Hi, Bruce,
If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board
I think Paul had the concern that removing the board requires both a violation of bylaws and a supportive IRP panel ruling.
I agree that the situation is mostly academic, and we are spending a lot of time thinking up worst case scenarios while the reason the net still works as well as it does is the mutual trust of the community, but I think many of us do realize that the transition, once entered into, can't be undone, and we are also aware of ICANN's less than brilliant historical track record in terms of transparency and accountability.
Julf
James,
Also (and looking for Bruce, Keith, Phil or others to confirm this), I believe this change only applies to community effort to spill the entire board, and would not apply to the mechanisms for recall of a single board member.
Could it be used repeatedly to spill the entire board, one member at a time? (only half-joking) Julf
"Could it be used repeatedly to spill the entire board, one member at a time? (only half-joking)" Yes (not joking) Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: owner-council@gnso.icann.org [mailto:owner-council@gnso.icann.org] On Behalf Of Johan Helsingius Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2016 10:31 AM To: James M. Bladel; council@gnso.icann.org Subject: Re: [council] FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration James,
Also (and looking for Bruce, Keith, Phil or others to confirm this), I believe this change only applies to community effort to spill the entire board, and would not apply to the mechanisms for recall of a single board member.
Could it be used repeatedly to spill the entire board, one member at a time? (only half-joking) Julf ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4537/11690 - Release Date: 02/24/16
Hi Julf,
Also (and looking for Bruce, Keith, Phil or others to confirm this), I believe this change only applies to community effort to spill the entire board, and would not apply to the mechanisms for recall of a single board member.
Could it be used repeatedly to spill the entire board, one member at a time? - I'm not Bruce, Keith or Phil, but I can confirm that this does not apply to removal of individual Board members. My principle problem with what happened was not with the specific substantive issue but rather with the way it was raised. Seven and one half hours before a review period on the day before we were to release the Final Report Steve Crocker dropped the post on us that prompted the crisis. That the community did not tell the Board to reserve their comment for the appropriate time (most of which was in the past, some of which was in the future) or manner as envisioned in the Charter was and is a problem for me. Accountability rules are nice but if the Board is allowed by the community to ignore the timelines, rules and procedures of the group in charge of developing future Accountability procedures, why should anyone think the community will not allow the Board to do the same in the future with those procedures? The actual "battle" was over the text in red, below, which was deleted: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board's implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects, with the following exception: Where the power to be exercised is recalling the entire Board for implementing GAC advice, the reduced threshold would apply only either after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws, or (1) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question. If the Empowered Community has brought such an IRP and does not prevail, the Empowered Community may not exercise its power to recall the entire the Board solely on the basis of the matter decided by the IRP. It may, however, exercise that power based on other grounds. Best, Ed
Hi, Ed,
- I'm not Bruce, Keith or Phil, but I can confirm that this does not apply to removal of individual Board members.
Indeed. The question is how feasible it would be to go through the whole process separately for each board member. OK, now the engineer in me says "but I guess you would only need to do it twice - once for all board members except one, and once for the remaining one".
My principle problem with what happened was not with the specific substantive issue but rather with the way it was raised.
I agree. It really doesn't give a nice, warm feeling of trust. But in the end I guess it is the result that counts. Julf
Since trust is one of the key goals in this whole exercise of defending the multi-stakeholder model, I think you have hit the nail on the head Julf. Stephanie Perrin
My principle problem with what happened was not with the specific substantive issue but rather with the way it was raised. I agree. It really doesn't give a nice, warm feeling of trust. But in the end I guess it is the result that counts.
Julf
I think "effectively impossible" goes too far. But it would impinge on the timeliness, depending on how long the required predecsssor IRP took (and my impression is that some wind on for a very long time). But yes, as I observed in my long analytical post the other day, if a significant part of the community was aggrieved by a Board decision to implement GAC advice it still has the 4a and 4b avenues to removing individual Board members, and there is no restriction on doing so in a collective fashion within a short and contemporaneous timespan. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: owner-council@gnso.icann.org [mailto:owner-council@gnso.icann.org] On Behalf Of James M. Bladel Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2016 10:28 AM To: Johan Helsingius; Bruce Tonkin; council@gnso.icann.org Subject: Re: [council] FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration Sorry to come in on this thread so late, but I think Bruce and Julf have hit the main points. The most recent change does make it more difficult (effectively impossible?) to spill the board in response to their implementation of GAC advice. But I agree with those who believe that this is an edge-case, and other mechanisms (IRP) would be invoked first. Also (and looking for Bruce, Keith, Phil or others to confirm this), I believe this change only applies to community effort to spill the entire board, and would not apply to the mechanisms for recall of a single board member. Thanks< J. On 2/25/16, 9:10 , "owner-council@gnso.icann.org on behalf of Johan Helsingius" <owner-council@gnso.icann.org on behalf of julf@julf.com> wrote:
Hi, Bruce,
If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board
I think Paul had the concern that removing the board requires both a violation of bylaws and a supportive IRP panel ruling.
I agree that the situation is mostly academic, and we are spending a lot of time thinking up worst case scenarios while the reason the net still works as well as it does is the mutual trust of the community, but I think many of us do realize that the transition, once entered into, can't be undone, and we are also aware of ICANN's less than brilliant historical track record in terms of transparency and accountability.
Julf
----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4537/11690 - Release Date: 02/24/16
Hello Johan,
If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board
I think Paul had the concern that removing the board requires both a violation of bylaws and a supportive IRP panel ruling.
The power to spill the Board with 4 SOs and ACs still remains. The requirement for an IRP panel finding that the board had violated its bylaws in the case of GAC advice, was only in the case where only 3 SOs and ACs decides to spill the Board. As others have pointed out the power to remove individual directors is also unchanged. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Thanks Bruce. This is very helpful. Best, Paul -----Original Message----- From: owner-council@gnso.icann.org [mailto:owner-council@gnso.icann.org] On Behalf Of Bruce Tonkin Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2016 05:09 AM To: council@gnso.icann.org Subject: RE: [council] FW: CCWG Final report for your consideration Hello Paul,
Thanks James. It seems to me that what this last minute change boils down to is that the Community will never be able to spill the Board for acting on unpopular GAC advice (since the GAC will never agree to spill the Board for acting on its advice). Any attempt to spill the Board based on faulty GAC advice will have to be blessed by an IRP Panelist and found to violate the bylaws. Is this your understanding too?
Basically if the ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC simply don't like the GAC advice they can spill the Board. If the Board is accused of mission creep or violating its bylaws by following GAC advice, and an IRP panel rules in favour of the complainant, then any three of ccnSO, GNSO, ASO, and ALAC can remove the Board if the Board does not follow the binding direction of the IRP panel. So far most major debates about the Board following GAC advice are usually about whether the Board is acting outside of its narrow mission. Note though the process of reaching a decision involves a community forum in either situation - and the Board would be actively listening and participating. I would think that the Board in general would change its view if even one SO or AC could provide a strong argument. Let alone two or more. There would also likely be strong coverage in the industry press etc of any such forum. So just escalating to the point of having a community forum - would be a powerful incentive for the Board to reflect on its decision, and look for ways to find a compromise to maximise support across the multi-stakeholder community. Regards Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board member
participants (8)
-
Bruce Tonkin -
Edward Morris -
James M. Bladel -
Johan Helsingius -
Paul McGrady (Policy) -
Phil Corwin -
Stephanie Perrin -
WUKnoben