Re: [CPWG] [registration-issues-wg] [GTLD-WG] Towards a comment on evolving the multistakeholder model at ICANN
Evan, as much as some people (and I count myself among them) feel that the overall ICANN model needs to be changed to address the types of issues you list in your bullet points below, that is not what this exercise is about. As the name implies, this is evolution to increase the effectiveness of the current model and not a complete reorg. That may make it less than useful in the minds of some, but that is what it is. It is not the only such exercise going on. There is one purely within the GNSO which addresses some of these same problems but has the potential for worsening some things (including participation of non-GNSO groups/entities which some view as impeding the PDP process). Is this current process sufficient to address the larger problems? No (in my mind). But can it provide useful change without increasing the overall structural problems? I hope so. Alan At 18/05/2019 01:58 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote: Hi Marita, I apologize for not making the call. I am very interested in this topic, but even more interested in not having my time wasted. As has been expressed before, I am extremely skeptical that the status quo can be disrupted purely from the inside. There have been quite a few exercises of this kind before, even high profile moves such as the ATRT and independence from the US government have been tortuous but led to little real change in the way decisions are made. I could even make the case that the IANA transition has worsened the status of stakeholders outside the compact of domain buyers and domain sellers. What is the assurance (or even broad confidence) that the results of any new work would be heeded? What are the consequences to ICANN of yet again ignoring the calls to distribute power more broadly or address its many fundamental breeches of public trust? There are a few key components of ICANN governance that, so long as they exist, render all talk of real change aspirational at best. * So long as GNSO consensus policy binds the ICANN Board, the rest of us are essentially powerless. * So long as ICANN's revenue comes solely from domain acquisition, it is by definition in a conflict of interest in setting domain policy. * So long as domain sellers sit on both sides of the negotiating table in development of the RAA and other instruments of domain regulation, ICANN cannot be trusted to act impartially. * So long ICANN is accountable to nobody but its core conflicted community, it will successfully resist change. "Empowered" my eye. ALAC has diligently participated in multiple previous "fix the MSM" efforts which have yielded no significant result. Two white papers produced by ALAC members were ignored without so much as acknowledgement of their existence. In this context, exactly how serious is this latest iteration? A new turnover of ALAC members provides fresh hope and maybe even new insights, but lack of institutional memory simply indicates new iterations of old efforts that have proven to fail. We hit the most solid of walls whenever intention tries to turn to execution. This just feels so much like ICANN is Lucy and ALAC is Charlie Brown. Maybe if we try kicking the football again, this time it will work..... What's different this time? - Evan _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ registration-issues-wg mailing list registration-issues-wg@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/registration-issues-wg
If anyone would point me to the two white papers that Evan mentions in his message below, it would be a useful addition to our submission to be able to reference these. Marita On 5/18/2019 4:37 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Evan, as much as some people (and I count myself among them) feel that the overall ICANN model needs to be changed to address the types of issues you list in your bullet points below, that is not what this exercise is about.
As the name implies, this is _evolution_ to increase the effectiveness of the current model and not a complete reorg. That may make it less than useful in the minds of some, but that is what it is.
It is not the only such exercise going on. There is one purely within the GNSO which addresses some of these same problems but has the potential for worsening some things (including participation of non-GNSO groups/entities which some view as impeding the PDP process).
Is this current process sufficient to address the larger problems? No (in my mind). But can it provide useful change without increasing the overall structural problems? I hope so.
Alan
At 18/05/2019 01:58 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:
Hi Marita,
I apologize for not making the call. I am very interested in this topic, but even more interested in not having my time wasted.
As has been expressed before, I am extremely skeptical that the status quo can be disrupted purely from the inside. There have been quite a few exercises of this kind before, even high profile moves such as the ATRT and independence from the US government have been tortuous but led to little real change in the way decisions are made. I could even make the case that the IANA transition has worsened the status of stakeholders outside the compact of domain buyers and domain sellers. What is the assurance (or even broad confidence) that the results of any new work would be heeded? What are the consequences to ICANN of yet again ignoring the calls to distribute power more broadly or address its many fundamental breeches of public trust?
There are a few key components of ICANN governance that, so long as they exist, render all talk of real change aspirational at best.
* So long as GNSO consensus policy binds the ICANN Board, the rest of us are essentially powerless. * So long as ICANN's revenue comes solely from domain acquisition, it is by definition in a conflict of interest in setting domain policy. * So long as domain sellers sit on both sides of the negotiating table in development of the RAA and other instruments of domain regulation, ICANN cannot be trusted to act impartially. * So long ICANN is accountable to nobody but its core conflicted community, it will successfully resist change. "Empowered" my eye.
ALAC has diligently participated in multiple previous "fix the MSM" efforts which have yielded no significant result. Two white papers produced by ALAC members were ignored without so much as acknowledgement of their existence. In this context, exactly how serious is this latest iteration? A new turnover of ALAC members provides fresh hope and maybe even new insights, but lack of institutional memory simply indicates new iterations of old efforts that have proven to fail. We hit the most solid of walls whenever intention tries to turn to execution.
This just feels so much like ICANN is Lucy and ALAC is Charlie Brown. Maybe if we try kicking the football again, this time it will work.....
What's different this time?
- Evan
_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg
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https://atlarge.icann.org/correspondence/future-challenges-white-paper-17sep... https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GIWLITB63MNZcG769aceEpTZc23UASdKA5ZS3MUx... On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 14:06, Marita Moll <mmoll@ca.inter.net> wrote:
If anyone would point me to the two white papers that Evan mentions in his message below, it would be a useful addition to our submission to be able to reference these.
Marita On 5/18/2019 4:37 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Evan, as much as some people (and I count myself among them) feel that the overall ICANN model needs to be changed to address the types of issues you list in your bullet points below, that is not what this exercise is about.
As the name implies, this is *evolution* to increase the effectiveness of the current model and not a complete reorg. That may make it less than useful in the minds of some, but that is what it is.
It is not the only such exercise going on. There is one purely within the GNSO which addresses some of these same problems but has the potential for worsening some things (including participation of non-GNSO groups/entities which some view as impeding the PDP process).
Is this current process sufficient to address the larger problems? No (in my mind). But can it provide useful change without increasing the overall structural problems? I hope so.
Alan
At 18/05/2019 01:58 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:
Hi Marita,
I apologize for not making the call. I am very interested in this topic, but even more interested in not having my time wasted.
As has been expressed before, I am extremely skeptical that the status quo can be disrupted purely from the inside. There have been quite a few exercises of this kind before, even high profile moves such as the ATRT and independence from the US government have been tortuous but led to little real change in the way decisions are made. I could even make the case that the IANA transition has worsened the status of stakeholders outside the compact of domain buyers and domain sellers. What is the assurance (or even broad confidence) that the results of any new work would be heeded? What are the consequences to ICANN of yet again ignoring the calls to distribute power more broadly or address its many fundamental breeches of public trust?
There are a few key components of ICANN governance that, so long as they exist, render all talk of real change aspirational at best.
- So long as GNSO consensus policy binds the ICANN Board, the rest of us are essentially powerless. - So long as ICANN's revenue comes solely from domain acquisition, it is by definition in a conflict of interest in setting domain policy. - So long as domain sellers sit on both sides of the negotiating table in development of the RAA and other instruments of domain regulation, ICANN cannot be trusted to act impartially. - So long ICANN is accountable to nobody but its core conflicted community, it will successfully resist change. "Empowered" my eye.
ALAC has diligently participated in multiple previous "fix the MSM" efforts which have yielded no significant result. Two white papers produced by ALAC members were ignored without so much as acknowledgement of their existence. In this context, exactly how serious is this latest iteration? A new turnover of ALAC members provides fresh hope and maybe even new insights, but lack of institutional memory simply indicates new iterations of old efforts that have proven to fail. We hit the most solid of walls whenever intention tries to turn to execution.
This just feels so much like ICANN is Lucy and ALAC is Charlie Brown. Maybe if we try kicking the football again, this time it will work.....
What's different this time?
- Evan
_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg
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_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg
Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs
-- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch or @el56
Thanks. Excellent material. It goes a long way to addressing the shifting ground that has got ICANN to this point. I think that some of the white paper on future challenges does and should be used in our current discussions re the MS model. Currently, there is a proposal in the intergroup issues that suggests that power imbalances need to be addressed -- but it could be put in a larger frame as something that cuts across structural and process issues as well. Marita On 5/21/2019 3:46 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:
https://atlarge.icann.org/correspondence/future-challenges-white-paper-17sep...
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GIWLITB63MNZcG769aceEpTZc23UASdKA5ZS3MUx...
On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 14:06, Marita Moll <mmoll@ca.inter.net <mailto:mmoll@ca.inter.net>> wrote:
If anyone would point me to the two white papers that Evan mentions in his message below, it would be a useful addition to our submission to be able to reference these.
Marita
On 5/18/2019 4:37 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Evan, as much as some people (and I count myself among them) feel that the overall ICANN model needs to be changed to address the types of issues you list in your bullet points below, that is not what this exercise is about.
As the name implies, this is _evolution_ to increase the effectiveness of the current model and not a complete reorg. That may make it less than useful in the minds of some, but that is what it is.
It is not the only such exercise going on. There is one purely within the GNSO which addresses some of these same problems but has the potential for worsening some things (including participation of non-GNSO groups/entities which some view as impeding the PDP process).
Is this current process sufficient to address the larger problems? No (in my mind). But can it provide useful change without increasing the overall structural problems? I hope so.
Alan
At 18/05/2019 01:58 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:
Hi Marita,
I apologize for not making the call. I am very interested in this topic, but even more interested in not having my time wasted.
As has been expressed before, I am extremely skeptical that the status quo can be disrupted purely from the inside. There have been quite a few exercises of this kind before, even high profile moves such as the ATRT and independence from the US government have been tortuous but led to little real change in the way decisions are made. I could even make the case that the IANA transition has worsened the status of stakeholders outside the compact of domain buyers and domain sellers. What is the assurance (or even broad confidence) that the results of any new work would be heeded? What are the consequences to ICANN of yet again ignoring the calls to distribute power more broadly or address its many fundamental breeches of public trust?
There are a few key components of ICANN governance that, so long as they exist, render all talk of real change aspirational at best.
* So long as GNSO consensus policy binds the ICANN Board, the rest of us are essentially powerless. * So long as ICANN's revenue comes solely from domain acquisition, it is by definition in a conflict of interest in setting domain policy. * So long as domain sellers sit on both sides of the negotiating table in development of the RAA and other instruments of domain regulation, ICANN cannot be trusted to act impartially. * So long ICANN is accountable to nobody but its core conflicted community, it will successfully resist change. "Empowered" my eye.
ALAC has diligently participated in multiple previous "fix the MSM" efforts which have yielded no significant result. Two white papers produced by ALAC members were ignored without so much as acknowledgement of their existence. In this context, exactly how serious is this latest iteration? A new turnover of ALAC members provides fresh hope and maybe even new insights, but lack of institutional memory simply indicates new iterations of old efforts that have proven to fail. We hit the most solid of walls whenever intention tries to turn to execution.
This just feels so much like ICANN is Lucy and ALAC is Charlie Brown. Maybe if we try kicking the football again, this time it will work.....
What's different this time?
- Evan
_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org <mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg
_______________________________________________ registration-issues-wg mailing list registration-issues-wg@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:registration-issues-wg@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/registration-issues-wg
_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org <mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg
Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs
-- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch or @el56
Hi Alan, Marita, and the WG. Evan, as much as some people (and I count myself among them) feel that the
overall ICANN model needs to be changed to address the types of issues you list in your bullet points below, that is not what this exercise is about.
This sentiment infuriates me. "We all know that we really need A but they're telling us they want B so we must comply". *WHY?* What prevents ALAC from actually expressing your accurate instinct, that *all this tweaking and searching for inefficiencies is a diversion* from what really matters? If you and others agree that the ICANN model needs to be changed, who has stolen your voice to say that? Exactly what objectives of our mandate do we serve through such self-censorship? Playing the game of the status quo maintainers simply validates their power and confirms they can screw over the public interest with impunity, not even a quiet reprimand. Heaven knows accountability elsewhere is in short supply. I remind, once again, that ALAC is empowered by the ICANN bylaws to advise the board about *any issue at any time* intended to benefit end-users. We are indeed less constrained than the GNSO in scope. There is *nothing ever* binding us to react to the initiatives of the those working against the public interest, except our own timidity. Perhaps one day it will occur to ALAC that we are not, and never were, obligated to follow an agenda that repeatedly and consistently harms our cause. We've tried so far and have regressed as a result. Even the little victories such as domain tasting are a distant memory. *WHAT ARE WE SCARED OF*? Why not at least try -- even as an experiment -- to establish the priorities of end user interests and assert them? *That's why ALAC exists*. ICANN staff and the domain compact can't possibly ignore us more than they do now (beyond diplomatic patronizing), and we might just gain some respect for having discovered a backbone and the voice we were elected and funded to provide. *Everyone reading this email involved in At-Large, please ask yourself: Is this what ALAC exists to do -- identify inefficiencies and tweak ICANN around the edges, because that's what staff and the domain compact want us to do? Is this what the massive cost to ICANN, the substantial infrastructure, and most importantly the cost of your own time and money to participate, is for?* We're better than this, and we need to show it. Maybe, just maybe, the next time ICANN's bell rings instead of salivating we should consider growling. If we can't speak truth to power, who within ICANN will? - Evan
participants (3)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Evan Leibovitch -
Marita Moll