Mwendwa,
Regarding your first question, let me first say that I don’t see ‘bottom-up’ as a cliché. Secondly, it is a fundamental principle of policy development.
I think it is important to note that the principle is not saying that IANA functions are operated in a bottom-up way but rather that the IANA functions operator’s role is to implement changes according to such policies. As I see it, the essence of this principle
is not that policy development must be bottom-up but rather that “the IANA functions operator should be independent of the policy processes”.
That said, is the term ‘bottom-up’ essential to the principle? No. And I think that is probably your point. I personally don’t have any problem leaving ‘bottom-up’ in the statement but I don’t think removing it if the group wants to do that would detract
from the principle.
If we want to keep the principle short and to the point, we could delete the second sentence.
Chuck
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]
On Behalf Of Mwendwa Kivuva
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 5:59 AM
To: Milton L Mueller
Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
Independence of policy from IANA: the IANA funtions operator should be independent of the policy processes. Its role is to implement changes in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy process [Note: this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the policy and IANA roles. The current contract already requires such separation];
Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles?
Diversity of IANA’s Customers:
For ccTLDs, the IANA should provide a service without requiring a contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in place for ccTLDs. In particular, the national policy authority or legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
"unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS"
Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level that can threaten the DNS?
______________________
Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya
L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh
B: http://lord.me.ke/
T: twitter.com/lordmwesh
"There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson
On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability
test.
From:
cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]
On Behalf Of Avri Doria
Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM
To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
Hi,
While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there
to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN.
This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
avri
On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don'tthink it can be made a principle.There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believethat self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need forseparability does not exist.Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than aprinciple for all solutions.Regards,GuruOn 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:Hi,Comments:a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the serviceshould be accountable and transparent.I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversightshould be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure theaccountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholdercommunity;I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution tothe accountability issue.b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand howit is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, sothe notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANNcorporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders asis ICANN.I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardshipfunction should be to the Internet stakeholder community.I also think we need to add a principle called separabilitySeparability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of itssubsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transitionof stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review andcontracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANAservice provider(s). The power of removing the function to a differentoperator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANAfunction(s)Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levelsbe subject to independent audit, with results published for review by theInternet community on an annual basis.thanksavri_______________________________________________CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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