I think most of Alan's concerns about integratability with other proposals, acceptability by USG, nature of PRT etc have been addressed by multiple people.

What remains un-answered are Alan's concerns about (i) Contract Co becoming a target for litigation; (ii) source of funding of Contract Co; (iii) jurisdiction of Contract Co; and (iv) accountability of Contract Co.

I agree that these are substantial concerns.

The Contract Co can be the subject of litigation for multiple reasons including wrongful termination of a IANA contract; or any cause of action related to a failed bid for a IANA contract. It can also be reasonable to assume that Contract Co will be made a party to all cases that are against ICANN in the future. For example, a case similar to the recent 'Iran/Iraq ccTLD as attachable property' will definitely make Contract Co a respondent along with ICANN.

Therefore, Contract Co will need a substantial litigation war chest. There will also be substantial costs involved in contract drafting; negotiation; preparation of RFPs etc. This needs to be addressed. Greg suggested the possibility of a litigation indemnification mechanism. A mechanism to deal with unforeseen non-litigation expenses should also be explored.

@Allan & Olivier: What accountability mechanisms do you suggest should be built into the Contract Co by-laws?


On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:46 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

On 01-Dec-14 17:02, Alan Greenberg wrote:

But my main reason for opposition is that I am far from convinced that all of the questions I and others have can be viably answered.

As far as I can tell they have been answered.  You just have not accepted the answers you have been given.

which is of course your right.  But from my reading they have been answered multiple times in different ways.

 

My answer invovled the parallel with the  BCP 101 from the IETF. where the administrator of contracting Co is just that an administrator, acting like the lawyer who only does what she has been instructed to do by the PRT.  With the PRT being the multistakeholders of ICANN and perhaps beyond that we are used to , but unfettered by the ability of the Board to overrule their decisions. And the PRT being awoken periodically and whenever the CSC felt there was a crisis for them to handle.

You seem to have an issue with them not being a standing committee.  The reason for that is to avoid them becoming ICANN like and acquiring new functions because they were bored when they had nothing else to do. Standing committees with nothing to do, find new stuff to do.  Hence the CSC as an alarm to bring them into existence whenever necessary out of period.

I think that using the transition to force accountability with respect to policy IS out of scope. But I also think that SOME transition models will have the incidental benefit of better policy-making accountability.

It is not out of scope with forcing accountability for IANA.  A periodic RFP is repsnsible for forcing IANA accountability whether it is at ICANN or elsewhere.  And IANA accountability is in our charter.

avri

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