Alan,

First, I agree that the PTI board has responsibility for PTI, as described in the excerpt I pasted in earlier.  Generically, "insider" boards are also answerable to the parent company (sole shareholder) and to their board.  It is typically a more constrained set of responsibilities, and much less independent than the board of an independent company.  Even within those parameters, there are more or less active boards.  I doubt that I would describe any as a complete "puppet" -- was that someone else's positive description or just your somewhat negative one?

Greg 

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 3:54 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
I agree that some clarity here would be useful.

The Board *IS* responsible for the PTI. Perhaps some envision it as a puppet to some other entity (including budget decisions as well as overseeing senior IANA staff). If that is the case, please specify who.

Alan


At 20/04/2015 12:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,

In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about
the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to
undertake and or decisions it needs to make.

It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that
function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred
to as an internal or insider board.

Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that
the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed
elsewhere?

Thanks,

Jonathan

-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com]
Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36
To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character
> in the PTI.

It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder.  There are stakes
-- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.

> IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of
> participation?
>                       We should be cautious assigning roles &
> responsibilities to them

I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it.  One thing that's
attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a
responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more
volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things
the liaison would have to do).  It certainly needs to be confirmed.

> a GAC rep  (government particpation)
> an ALAC  (user particpatiion)

Why?  IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose.  What ought the GAC or
the ALAC have to say about it?  By constraining the board to this narrow
scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining
PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has
been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting
used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).

> an ICANN Board rep

Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an
additional one needed?

> If all accepted, that would bring it to 9.
> Still a small number.

In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9
cannot.

Best regards,

A


--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
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