On 21-Feb-15 01:08, Seun Ojedeji wrote:

Hi,

How does this proposal address the few points below:

- ICANN is running IANA properly and should continue to be the operator


This proposal rest upon the same team being able to continue handling the operator functions.  The 12 person IANA team is what is doing the job properly and what needs protecting in a stewardship transition.

In the fully owned subsidiary configuration, ICANN remains the operator, or rather the owner or the operator.
In the Shared Service Arrangement ICANN remains one of the owners.  In this operational control is shared with the other operational communities while ICANN remains a co-owner, has SLA/MOUs and a board seats.

It is only in the Free Standing configuration that ICANN would cease being an owner of a subsidiary though would probably remain owners, perhaps even members, of the Free Standing company.   And would retain Community Board seats.

- ICANN is purpose built with it's main purpose of centrally operating IANA for the 3 communities


While this may have been the intention at day 0, the evolution of ICANN over the years has been anything but purpose built.  ICANN has evolved into a much needed policy group that deals with the political, financial and other issues that grow out of its narrow technical mandate.   The remaining issue that has not been solved in the Internal models is the one where the policy organization for gTLDS, the bulk of ICANN's 100+ MUSD operations is not separated from IANA.

- The task at hand is to transition IANA stewardship, is the proposal not doing more than that?


Not really.  Especially the model is very much about stewardship and finding ways to distribute that stewardship in the light of losing NTIA.  In one configuration, ICANN retains complete control, just of a structurally separated internal component that provides greater transparency.  In the Shared Service Arrangement, IANA shares this ownership with the other 2 communities, if they are interested in sharing.  If they aren't, I figure they will be fine with leaving it as a full Owned subsidiary of ICANN.

- Based on the response given by Milton, the practical implication of this proposal seem to imply absolute separation between IANA functions so names operation is no longer under ICANN oversight. If that is correct are we still within scope of our task by proposing that?


I do not speak for Milton, that is beyond my pay grade.

While there is structural separation it is not absolute - currently some try to argue that there is functional separation at ICANN as required by NTIA in the RFP, though some of us have our doubts on this actually being the case, especially since IANA isn't even as separated as is GDD.  Not all separation is the same or absolute.

In two of the configurations, that structural separation is contained within the existing organizations and remains under ICANN protection. Even in the Free Standing configuration, ICANN remains on of the controling voices on the Community Board.  ICANN retains its share of the stewardship role in all of the configurations in the model.  In no part of the model, and in none of it configurations is the separation complete or absolute.  And remember we allegedly have functional separation today.  This model is just an evolution of current realities with as little disruption as possible.

In fact for absolute or complete separation in this model, ICANN would have to utilize the same so-called nuclear option the other two operational communities are posting, the ability to take their business elsewhere.  None of the configurations offered provides absolute separation.

I see nothing that excludes this from our scope to find the best stewardship solution we can given the constraint of multistakeholder general agreement.  We face an impasse with strong smart people insisting they are correct on two very opposed sides of the discussion.  We can continue the tug of war about who is right; constantly worrying over who has the better argument of the day or the best allies.  Perhaps we can even engage in some brinkmanship - just like US political leaders.  We decided to try to find a solution that satisfies many of the concerns of both camps without scaring those who are watching.

- What does the proposal intend to address; separability OR separation?


It is attempting to balance the most critical requirements for a multistakeholder solution, an Internal solution and also for an External solution, and one that is solid, stable and safe from International capture enough to satisfy Republicans in Congress as well.  It is meant to be a reasonable and based on a relatively standard business relationship that provides the multistakeholder control through ownership, sla/mous, and membership in the Post Transition Board.  Separability is a principle that all solutions must satisfy, but it is not a goal.  The goal is stewardship for a multistakeholder, stable, secure and resilient IANA. The secondary goal was making the solution as simple as possible with as little reliance on CCWG-Accountabilty fundamental change as possible.

thanks

avri


Thanks

Regards
sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.

On 21 Feb 2015 00:19, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:

On 20-Feb-15 16:50, Milton L Mueller wrote:

My question:

 

Does this model provide for separability?

 


First it provides structural separation in all configurations.  That is a first level of severability and hopefully as much as really is ever needed.  Additionally, in this model, ICANN would have the same ability to pick another provider, or perhaps a redundant provider, just as the names or protocols can now.  This is made possible by virtue of structural  separation and the defintion of SLA/MOUs across a corporate boundary.

Further levels of separability can, however, be obtained in the Shared Service Arrangement configuration or the finally in the Free Standing configuration.

Finally



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