• How will non-performance related questions be escalated from the CSC?  At the moment their mandate is performance issues and the proposed CSC composition lends itself more to performance than policy escalation. 
  
• No matter the liaison role of the SO ACs, I would suggest that policy issues can/should also be raised directly with the PRT.
  
• How will the PRT be composed, how often will it meet, etc.?
• Representation on the PRT should reflect but also be broader than ICANN (additional independent experts) otherwise I believe we will not have satisfied the key criteria of "support(ing) and enhanc(ing) the multistakeholder model".   The PRT should meet annually to review overall IANA operator performance and any policy or other concerns.  It should also be convened on an ad hoc basis to address policy or performance issues as they arise or are escalated.
  
• Should the CSC assume the responsibilities of the current NTIA Contracting Officer?  I would have through that this should reside with the PRT.  (we may need further elaboration on this particular role at NTIA, etc., and where it would best sit.)
  
• The draft has some contract duties assumed by both the PRT and CSC - is this deliberate?  C.5.1., C.5.2 and C.5.3. for example. 
  
• Do we believe that the role described in the current contract (sections C.3. and C.5.3.) related to the audit of security provisions can be undertaken by CSC or the PRT? 
  
• It still remains unclear how the Contract Co could "take action" per the request of the PRT if the contracting Co. is not staffed, etc.   And, does it need to be a corporation?  We advice on this asap. otherwise we will have to consider another model.
  
• Is the IANA function to have independent legal counsel (per the proposal)?  And will that legal counsel role need to have a more expanded role than delegation and re-delegation issues?
• Annex 3 already points to a model for contract options including up to two options to extend.  I do not recall there being any consensus or agreement on the structuring of the contract or extension options and this section should be reworded accordingly - for example to state that all contract details such as length, options to extend, etc., are TBD.  (I do recall that there was some sense of the room that the amended contract should remain with the current operator after the transition for a limited period of time again TDB.)
  
• In Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread - see below for examples:
  
• It reads "ICANN to Provide Qualified Program Manager" and should read "Contractor....."
• Why does the CSC approve contractor personnel changes?  Surely it should the PRT as responsible for contracting issues?
• Shouldn't the Final Report and Acceptance and Inspection be for the PRT?  There seems to be some lack of clarity in the Annex as to what roles/functions are CSC or PRT? 
  
• Again C.6 and C.7 should be PRT, not CSC, issues and are identified as such in the section 3 text.  Same issue with C.8 and E.
  

Finally, I share a number of the concerns voiced on the list over the past couple of days.  In particular there are many critical details yet unresolved.  We may rue not addressing these now. 

On the issue of accountability, I am pleased to see that the Co-chairs of the two WGs are meeting and believe that we need to quickly align as best possible these two work streams.  If, as is likely, the amended contract remains with ICANN for some period of time after the transition the recommendations from work stream 1 (and 2) of the Accountability WG are and remain critically important no matter what happens after the initial contract period.

Matthew

-- 
Matthew Shears
Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
mshears@cdt.org
+ 44 771 247 2987